2e2bc42c83
There's a new conflict with Linus's upstream tree, because in the following merge conflict resolution in <asm/coco.h>:38b334fc76
Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.9_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Linus has resolved the conflicting placement of 'cc_mask' better than the original commit:1c811d403a
x86/sev: Fix position dependent variable references in startup code ... which was also done by an internal merge resolution:2e5fc4786b
Merge branch 'x86/sev' into x86/boot, to resolve conflicts and to pick up dependent tree But Linus is right in38b334fc76
, the 'cc_mask' declaration is sufficient within the #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM block. So instead of forcing Linus to do the same resolution again, merge in Linus's tree and follow his conflict resolution. Conflicts: arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
731 lines
19 KiB
ArmAsm
731 lines
19 KiB
ArmAsm
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
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/*
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* linux/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S -- start in 32bit and switch to 64bit
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2000 Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@suse.de> SuSE
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* Copyright (C) 2000 Pavel Machek <pavel@suse.cz>
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* Copyright (C) 2000 Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de>
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* Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
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* Copyright (C) 2005 Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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*/
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/linkage.h>
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#include <linux/threads.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/pgtable.h>
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#include <asm/segment.h>
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#include <asm/page.h>
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#include <asm/msr.h>
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#include <asm/cache.h>
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#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
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#include <asm/percpu.h>
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#include <asm/nops.h>
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#include "../entry/calling.h"
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#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
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#include <asm/apicdef.h>
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#include <asm/fixmap.h>
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#include <asm/smp.h>
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#include <asm/thread_info.h>
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/*
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* We are not able to switch in one step to the final KERNEL ADDRESS SPACE
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* because we need identity-mapped pages.
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*/
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#define l4_index(x) (((x) >> 39) & 511)
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#define pud_index(x) (((x) >> PUD_SHIFT) & (PTRS_PER_PUD-1))
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L4_PAGE_OFFSET = l4_index(__PAGE_OFFSET_BASE_L4)
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L4_START_KERNEL = l4_index(__START_KERNEL_map)
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L3_START_KERNEL = pud_index(__START_KERNEL_map)
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__HEAD
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.code64
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SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
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UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK
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/*
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* At this point the CPU runs in 64bit mode CS.L = 1 CS.D = 0,
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* and someone has loaded an identity mapped page table
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* for us. These identity mapped page tables map all of the
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* kernel pages and possibly all of memory.
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*
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* %RSI holds the physical address of the boot_params structure
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* provided by the bootloader. Preserve it in %R15 so C function calls
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* will not clobber it.
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*
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* We come here either directly from a 64bit bootloader, or from
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* arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S.
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*
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* We only come here initially at boot nothing else comes here.
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*
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* Since we may be loaded at an address different from what we were
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* compiled to run at we first fixup the physical addresses in our page
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* tables and then reload them.
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*/
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mov %rsi, %r15
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/* Set up the stack for verify_cpu() */
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leaq (__end_init_task - TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING - PTREGS_SIZE)(%rip), %rsp
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/* Setup GSBASE to allow stack canary access for C code */
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movl $MSR_GS_BASE, %ecx
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leaq INIT_PER_CPU_VAR(fixed_percpu_data)(%rip), %rdx
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movl %edx, %eax
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shrq $32, %rdx
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wrmsr
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call startup_64_setup_gdt_idt
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/* Now switch to __KERNEL_CS so IRET works reliably */
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pushq $__KERNEL_CS
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leaq .Lon_kernel_cs(%rip), %rax
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pushq %rax
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lretq
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.Lon_kernel_cs:
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UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK
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#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
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/*
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* Activate SEV/SME memory encryption if supported/enabled. This needs to
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* be done now, since this also includes setup of the SEV-SNP CPUID table,
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* which needs to be done before any CPUID instructions are executed in
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* subsequent code. Pass the boot_params pointer as the first argument.
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*/
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movq %r15, %rdi
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call sme_enable
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#endif
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/* Sanitize CPU configuration */
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call verify_cpu
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/*
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* Perform pagetable fixups. Additionally, if SME is active, encrypt
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* the kernel and retrieve the modifier (SME encryption mask if SME
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* is active) to be added to the initial pgdir entry that will be
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* programmed into CR3.
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*/
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leaq _text(%rip), %rdi
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movq %r15, %rsi
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call __startup_64
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/* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */
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leaq early_top_pgt(%rip), %rcx
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addq %rcx, %rax
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#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
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mov %rax, %rdi
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/*
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* For SEV guests: Verify that the C-bit is correct. A malicious
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* hypervisor could lie about the C-bit position to perform a ROP
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* attack on the guest by writing to the unencrypted stack and wait for
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* the next RET instruction.
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*/
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call sev_verify_cbit
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#endif
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/*
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* Switch to early_top_pgt which still has the identity mappings
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* present.
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*/
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movq %rax, %cr3
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/* Branch to the common startup code at its kernel virtual address */
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ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
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jmp *0f(%rip)
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SYM_CODE_END(startup_64)
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__INITRODATA
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0: .quad common_startup_64
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.text
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SYM_CODE_START(secondary_startup_64)
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UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK
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ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
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/*
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* At this point the CPU runs in 64bit mode CS.L = 1 CS.D = 0,
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* and someone has loaded a mapped page table.
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*
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* We come here either from startup_64 (using physical addresses)
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* or from trampoline.S (using virtual addresses).
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*
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* Using virtual addresses from trampoline.S removes the need
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* to have any identity mapped pages in the kernel page table
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* after the boot processor executes this code.
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*/
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/* Sanitize CPU configuration */
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call verify_cpu
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/*
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* The secondary_startup_64_no_verify entry point is only used by
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* SEV-ES guests. In those guests the call to verify_cpu() would cause
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* #VC exceptions which can not be handled at this stage of secondary
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* CPU bringup.
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*
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* All non SEV-ES systems, especially Intel systems, need to execute
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* verify_cpu() above to make sure NX is enabled.
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*/
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SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
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UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK
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ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
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/* Clear %R15 which holds the boot_params pointer on the boot CPU */
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xorl %r15d, %r15d
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/* Derive the runtime physical address of init_top_pgt[] */
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movq phys_base(%rip), %rax
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addq $(init_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax
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/*
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* Retrieve the modifier (SME encryption mask if SME is active) to be
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* added to the initial pgdir entry that will be programmed into CR3.
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*/
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#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
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addq sme_me_mask(%rip), %rax
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#endif
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/*
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* Switch to the init_top_pgt here, away from the trampoline_pgd and
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* unmap the identity mapped ranges.
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*/
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movq %rax, %cr3
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SYM_INNER_LABEL(common_startup_64, SYM_L_LOCAL)
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UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK
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ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
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/*
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* Create a mask of CR4 bits to preserve. Omit PGE in order to flush
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* global 1:1 translations from the TLBs.
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*
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* From the SDM:
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* "If CR4.PGE is changing from 0 to 1, there were no global TLB
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* entries before the execution; if CR4.PGE is changing from 1 to 0,
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* there will be no global TLB entries after the execution."
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*/
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movl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57), %edx
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
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/*
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* Preserve CR4.MCE if the kernel will enable #MC support.
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* Clearing MCE may fault in some environments (that also force #MC
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* support). Any machine check that occurs before #MC support is fully
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* configured will crash the system regardless of the CR4.MCE value set
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* here.
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*/
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orl $X86_CR4_MCE, %edx
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#endif
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movq %cr4, %rcx
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andl %edx, %ecx
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/* Even if ignored in long mode, set PSE uniformly on all logical CPUs. */
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btsl $X86_CR4_PSE_BIT, %ecx
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movq %rcx, %cr4
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/*
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* Set CR4.PGE to re-enable global translations.
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*/
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btsl $X86_CR4_PGE_BIT, %ecx
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movq %rcx, %cr4
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#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
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/*
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* For parallel boot, the APIC ID is read from the APIC, and then
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* used to look up the CPU number. For booting a single CPU, the
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* CPU number is encoded in smpboot_control.
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*
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* Bit 31 STARTUP_READ_APICID (Read APICID from APIC)
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* Bit 0-23 CPU# if STARTUP_xx flags are not set
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*/
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movl smpboot_control(%rip), %ecx
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testl $STARTUP_READ_APICID, %ecx
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jnz .Lread_apicid
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/*
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* No control bit set, single CPU bringup. CPU number is provided
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* in bit 0-23. This is also the boot CPU case (CPU number 0).
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*/
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andl $(~STARTUP_PARALLEL_MASK), %ecx
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jmp .Lsetup_cpu
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.Lread_apicid:
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/* Check whether X2APIC mode is already enabled */
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mov $MSR_IA32_APICBASE, %ecx
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rdmsr
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testl $X2APIC_ENABLE, %eax
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jnz .Lread_apicid_msr
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_X2APIC
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/*
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* If system is in X2APIC mode then MMIO base might not be
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* mapped causing the MMIO read below to fault. Faults can't
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* be handled at that point.
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*/
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cmpl $0, x2apic_mode(%rip)
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jz .Lread_apicid_mmio
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/* Force the AP into X2APIC mode. */
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orl $X2APIC_ENABLE, %eax
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wrmsr
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jmp .Lread_apicid_msr
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#endif
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.Lread_apicid_mmio:
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/* Read the APIC ID from the fix-mapped MMIO space. */
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movq apic_mmio_base(%rip), %rcx
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addq $APIC_ID, %rcx
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movl (%rcx), %eax
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shr $24, %eax
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jmp .Llookup_AP
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.Lread_apicid_msr:
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mov $APIC_X2APIC_ID_MSR, %ecx
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rdmsr
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.Llookup_AP:
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/* EAX contains the APIC ID of the current CPU */
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xorl %ecx, %ecx
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leaq cpuid_to_apicid(%rip), %rbx
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.Lfind_cpunr:
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cmpl (%rbx,%rcx,4), %eax
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jz .Lsetup_cpu
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inc %ecx
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#ifdef CONFIG_FORCE_NR_CPUS
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cmpl $NR_CPUS, %ecx
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#else
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cmpl nr_cpu_ids(%rip), %ecx
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#endif
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jb .Lfind_cpunr
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/* APIC ID not found in the table. Drop the trampoline lock and bail. */
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movq trampoline_lock(%rip), %rax
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movl $0, (%rax)
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1: cli
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hlt
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jmp 1b
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.Lsetup_cpu:
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/* Get the per cpu offset for the given CPU# which is in ECX */
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movq __per_cpu_offset(,%rcx,8), %rdx
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#else
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xorl %edx, %edx /* zero-extended to clear all of RDX */
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#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
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/*
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* Setup a boot time stack - Any secondary CPU will have lost its stack
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* by now because the cr3-switch above unmaps the real-mode stack.
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*
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* RDX contains the per-cpu offset
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*/
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movq pcpu_hot + X86_current_task(%rdx), %rax
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movq TASK_threadsp(%rax), %rsp
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/*
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* Now that this CPU is running on its own stack, drop the realmode
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* protection. For the boot CPU the pointer is NULL!
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*/
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movq trampoline_lock(%rip), %rax
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testq %rax, %rax
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jz .Lsetup_gdt
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movl $0, (%rax)
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.Lsetup_gdt:
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/*
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* We must switch to a new descriptor in kernel space for the GDT
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* because soon the kernel won't have access anymore to the userspace
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* addresses where we're currently running on. We have to do that here
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* because in 32bit we couldn't load a 64bit linear address.
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*/
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subq $16, %rsp
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movw $(GDT_SIZE-1), (%rsp)
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leaq gdt_page(%rdx), %rax
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movq %rax, 2(%rsp)
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lgdt (%rsp)
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addq $16, %rsp
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/* set up data segments */
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xorl %eax,%eax
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movl %eax,%ds
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movl %eax,%ss
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movl %eax,%es
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/*
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* We don't really need to load %fs or %gs, but load them anyway
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* to kill any stale realmode selectors. This allows execution
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* under VT hardware.
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*/
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movl %eax,%fs
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movl %eax,%gs
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/* Set up %gs.
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*
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* The base of %gs always points to fixed_percpu_data. If the
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* stack protector canary is enabled, it is located at %gs:40.
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* Note that, on SMP, the boot cpu uses init data section until
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* the per cpu areas are set up.
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*/
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movl $MSR_GS_BASE,%ecx
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#ifndef CONFIG_SMP
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leaq INIT_PER_CPU_VAR(fixed_percpu_data)(%rip), %rdx
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#endif
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movl %edx, %eax
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shrq $32, %rdx
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wrmsr
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/* Setup and Load IDT */
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call early_setup_idt
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/* Check if nx is implemented */
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movl $0x80000001, %eax
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cpuid
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movl %edx,%edi
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/* Setup EFER (Extended Feature Enable Register) */
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movl $MSR_EFER, %ecx
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rdmsr
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/*
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* Preserve current value of EFER for comparison and to skip
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* EFER writes if no change was made (for TDX guest)
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*/
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movl %eax, %edx
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btsl $_EFER_SCE, %eax /* Enable System Call */
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btl $20,%edi /* No Execute supported? */
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jnc 1f
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btsl $_EFER_NX, %eax
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btsq $_PAGE_BIT_NX,early_pmd_flags(%rip)
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/* Avoid writing EFER if no change was made (for TDX guest) */
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1: cmpl %edx, %eax
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je 1f
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xor %edx, %edx
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wrmsr /* Make changes effective */
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1:
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/* Setup cr0 */
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movl $CR0_STATE, %eax
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/* Make changes effective */
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movq %rax, %cr0
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/* zero EFLAGS after setting rsp */
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pushq $0
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popfq
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/* Pass the boot_params pointer as first argument */
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movq %r15, %rdi
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.Ljump_to_C_code:
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xorl %ebp, %ebp # clear frame pointer
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ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
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callq *initial_code(%rip)
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ud2
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SYM_CODE_END(secondary_startup_64)
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#include "verify_cpu.S"
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#include "sev_verify_cbit.S"
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#if defined(CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU) && defined(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)
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/*
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* Entry point for soft restart of a CPU. Invoked from xxx_play_dead() for
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* restarting the boot CPU or for restarting SEV guest CPUs after CPU hot
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* unplug. Everything is set up already except the stack.
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*/
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SYM_CODE_START(soft_restart_cpu)
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ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
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UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK
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/* Find the idle task stack */
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movq PER_CPU_VAR(pcpu_hot + X86_current_task), %rcx
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movq TASK_threadsp(%rcx), %rsp
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jmp .Ljump_to_C_code
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SYM_CODE_END(soft_restart_cpu)
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#endif
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#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
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/*
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* VC Exception handler used during early boot when running on kernel
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* addresses, but before the switch to the idt_table can be made.
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* The early_idt_handler_array can't be used here because it calls into a lot
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* of __init code and this handler is also used during CPU offlining/onlining.
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* Therefore this handler ends up in the .text section so that it stays around
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* when .init.text is freed.
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*/
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SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(vc_boot_ghcb)
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UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=8
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ENDBR
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/* Build pt_regs */
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PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS
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/* Call C handler */
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movq %rsp, %rdi
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movq ORIG_RAX(%rsp), %rsi
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movq initial_vc_handler(%rip), %rax
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ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
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call *%rax
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/* Unwind pt_regs */
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POP_REGS
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/* Remove Error Code */
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addq $8, %rsp
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iretq
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SYM_CODE_END(vc_boot_ghcb)
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#endif
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/* Both SMP bootup and ACPI suspend change these variables */
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__REFDATA
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.balign 8
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SYM_DATA(initial_code, .quad x86_64_start_kernel)
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#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
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SYM_DATA(initial_vc_handler, .quad handle_vc_boot_ghcb)
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#endif
|
|
|
|
SYM_DATA(trampoline_lock, .quad 0);
|
|
__FINITDATA
|
|
|
|
__INIT
|
|
SYM_CODE_START(early_idt_handler_array)
|
|
i = 0
|
|
.rept NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS
|
|
.if ((EXCEPTION_ERRCODE_MASK >> i) & 1) == 0
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
|
|
ENDBR
|
|
pushq $0 # Dummy error code, to make stack frame uniform
|
|
.else
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=8
|
|
ENDBR
|
|
.endif
|
|
pushq $i # 72(%rsp) Vector number
|
|
jmp early_idt_handler_common
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
|
|
i = i + 1
|
|
.fill early_idt_handler_array + i*EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE - ., 1, 0xcc
|
|
.endr
|
|
SYM_CODE_END(early_idt_handler_array)
|
|
ANNOTATE_NOENDBR // early_idt_handler_array[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS]
|
|
|
|
SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(early_idt_handler_common)
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=16
|
|
/*
|
|
* The stack is the hardware frame, an error code or zero, and the
|
|
* vector number.
|
|
*/
|
|
cld
|
|
|
|
incl early_recursion_flag(%rip)
|
|
|
|
/* The vector number is currently in the pt_regs->di slot. */
|
|
pushq %rsi /* pt_regs->si */
|
|
movq 8(%rsp), %rsi /* RSI = vector number */
|
|
movq %rdi, 8(%rsp) /* pt_regs->di = RDI */
|
|
pushq %rdx /* pt_regs->dx */
|
|
pushq %rcx /* pt_regs->cx */
|
|
pushq %rax /* pt_regs->ax */
|
|
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r8 */
|
|
pushq %r9 /* pt_regs->r9 */
|
|
pushq %r10 /* pt_regs->r10 */
|
|
pushq %r11 /* pt_regs->r11 */
|
|
pushq %rbx /* pt_regs->bx */
|
|
pushq %rbp /* pt_regs->bp */
|
|
pushq %r12 /* pt_regs->r12 */
|
|
pushq %r13 /* pt_regs->r13 */
|
|
pushq %r14 /* pt_regs->r14 */
|
|
pushq %r15 /* pt_regs->r15 */
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_REGS
|
|
|
|
movq %rsp,%rdi /* RDI = pt_regs; RSI is already trapnr */
|
|
call do_early_exception
|
|
|
|
decl early_recursion_flag(%rip)
|
|
jmp restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel
|
|
SYM_CODE_END(early_idt_handler_common)
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
|
|
/*
|
|
* VC Exception handler used during very early boot. The
|
|
* early_idt_handler_array can't be used because it returns via the
|
|
* paravirtualized INTERRUPT_RETURN and pv-ops don't work that early.
|
|
*
|
|
* XXX it does, fix this.
|
|
*
|
|
* This handler will end up in the .init.text section and not be
|
|
* available to boot secondary CPUs.
|
|
*/
|
|
SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(vc_no_ghcb)
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=8
|
|
ENDBR
|
|
|
|
/* Build pt_regs */
|
|
PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS
|
|
|
|
/* Call C handler */
|
|
movq %rsp, %rdi
|
|
movq ORIG_RAX(%rsp), %rsi
|
|
call do_vc_no_ghcb
|
|
|
|
/* Unwind pt_regs */
|
|
POP_REGS
|
|
|
|
/* Remove Error Code */
|
|
addq $8, %rsp
|
|
|
|
/* Pure iret required here - don't use INTERRUPT_RETURN */
|
|
iretq
|
|
SYM_CODE_END(vc_no_ghcb)
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#define SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(name) \
|
|
SYM_START(name, SYM_L_GLOBAL, .balign PAGE_SIZE)
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
|
|
/*
|
|
* Each PGD needs to be 8k long and 8k aligned. We do not
|
|
* ever go out to userspace with these, so we do not
|
|
* strictly *need* the second page, but this allows us to
|
|
* have a single set_pgd() implementation that does not
|
|
* need to worry about whether it has 4k or 8k to work
|
|
* with.
|
|
*
|
|
* This ensures PGDs are 8k long:
|
|
*/
|
|
#define PTI_USER_PGD_FILL 512
|
|
/* This ensures they are 8k-aligned: */
|
|
#define SYM_DATA_START_PTI_ALIGNED(name) \
|
|
SYM_START(name, SYM_L_GLOBAL, .balign 2 * PAGE_SIZE)
|
|
#else
|
|
#define SYM_DATA_START_PTI_ALIGNED(name) \
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(name)
|
|
#define PTI_USER_PGD_FILL 0
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Automate the creation of 1 to 1 mapping pmd entries */
|
|
#define PMDS(START, PERM, COUNT) \
|
|
i = 0 ; \
|
|
.rept (COUNT) ; \
|
|
.quad (START) + (i << PMD_SHIFT) + (PERM) ; \
|
|
i = i + 1 ; \
|
|
.endr
|
|
|
|
__INITDATA
|
|
.balign 4
|
|
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PTI_ALIGNED(early_top_pgt)
|
|
.fill 511,8,0
|
|
.quad level3_kernel_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC
|
|
.fill PTI_USER_PGD_FILL,8,0
|
|
SYM_DATA_END(early_top_pgt)
|
|
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(early_dynamic_pgts)
|
|
.fill 512*EARLY_DYNAMIC_PAGE_TABLES,8,0
|
|
SYM_DATA_END(early_dynamic_pgts)
|
|
|
|
SYM_DATA(early_recursion_flag, .long 0)
|
|
|
|
.data
|
|
|
|
#if defined(CONFIG_XEN_PV) || defined(CONFIG_PVH)
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PTI_ALIGNED(init_top_pgt)
|
|
.quad level3_ident_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
|
|
.org init_top_pgt + L4_PAGE_OFFSET*8, 0
|
|
.quad level3_ident_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
|
|
.org init_top_pgt + L4_START_KERNEL*8, 0
|
|
/* (2^48-(2*1024*1024*1024))/(2^39) = 511 */
|
|
.quad level3_kernel_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC
|
|
.fill PTI_USER_PGD_FILL,8,0
|
|
SYM_DATA_END(init_top_pgt)
|
|
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(level3_ident_pgt)
|
|
.quad level2_ident_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
|
|
.fill 511, 8, 0
|
|
SYM_DATA_END(level3_ident_pgt)
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(level2_ident_pgt)
|
|
/*
|
|
* Since I easily can, map the first 1G.
|
|
* Don't set NX because code runs from these pages.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note: This sets _PAGE_GLOBAL despite whether
|
|
* the CPU supports it or it is enabled. But,
|
|
* the CPU should ignore the bit.
|
|
*/
|
|
PMDS(0, __PAGE_KERNEL_IDENT_LARGE_EXEC, PTRS_PER_PMD)
|
|
SYM_DATA_END(level2_ident_pgt)
|
|
#else
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PTI_ALIGNED(init_top_pgt)
|
|
.fill 512,8,0
|
|
.fill PTI_USER_PGD_FILL,8,0
|
|
SYM_DATA_END(init_top_pgt)
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(level4_kernel_pgt)
|
|
.fill 511,8,0
|
|
.quad level3_kernel_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC
|
|
SYM_DATA_END(level4_kernel_pgt)
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(level3_kernel_pgt)
|
|
.fill L3_START_KERNEL,8,0
|
|
/* (2^48-(2*1024*1024*1024)-((2^39)*511))/(2^30) = 510 */
|
|
.quad level2_kernel_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
|
|
.quad level2_fixmap_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map + _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC
|
|
SYM_DATA_END(level3_kernel_pgt)
|
|
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(level2_kernel_pgt)
|
|
/*
|
|
* Kernel high mapping.
|
|
*
|
|
* The kernel code+data+bss must be located below KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE in
|
|
* virtual address space, which is 1 GiB if RANDOMIZE_BASE is enabled,
|
|
* 512 MiB otherwise.
|
|
*
|
|
* (NOTE: after that starts the module area, see MODULES_VADDR.)
|
|
*
|
|
* This table is eventually used by the kernel during normal runtime.
|
|
* Care must be taken to clear out undesired bits later, like _PAGE_RW
|
|
* or _PAGE_GLOBAL in some cases.
|
|
*/
|
|
PMDS(0, __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC, KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE/PMD_SIZE)
|
|
SYM_DATA_END(level2_kernel_pgt)
|
|
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(level2_fixmap_pgt)
|
|
.fill (512 - 4 - FIXMAP_PMD_NUM),8,0
|
|
pgtno = 0
|
|
.rept (FIXMAP_PMD_NUM)
|
|
.quad level1_fixmap_pgt + (pgtno << PAGE_SHIFT) - __START_KERNEL_map \
|
|
+ _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC;
|
|
pgtno = pgtno + 1
|
|
.endr
|
|
/* 6 MB reserved space + a 2MB hole */
|
|
.fill 4,8,0
|
|
SYM_DATA_END(level2_fixmap_pgt)
|
|
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(level1_fixmap_pgt)
|
|
.rept (FIXMAP_PMD_NUM)
|
|
.fill 512,8,0
|
|
.endr
|
|
SYM_DATA_END(level1_fixmap_pgt)
|
|
|
|
#undef PMDS
|
|
|
|
.data
|
|
.align 16
|
|
|
|
SYM_DATA(smpboot_control, .long 0)
|
|
|
|
.align 16
|
|
/* This must match the first entry in level2_kernel_pgt */
|
|
SYM_DATA(phys_base, .quad 0x0)
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(phys_base)
|
|
|
|
#include "../../x86/xen/xen-head.S"
|
|
|
|
__PAGE_ALIGNED_BSS
|
|
SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(empty_zero_page)
|
|
.skip PAGE_SIZE
|
|
SYM_DATA_END(empty_zero_page)
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(empty_zero_page)
|
|
|