1
linux/virt/kvm
Sean Christopherson 66155de93b KVM: x86: Disallow read-only memslots for SEV-ES and SEV-SNP (and TDX)
Disallow read-only memslots for SEV-{ES,SNP} VM types, as KVM can't
directly emulate instructions for ES/SNP, and instead the guest must
explicitly request emulation.  Unless the guest explicitly requests
emulation without accessing memory, ES/SNP relies on KVM creating an MMIO
SPTE, with the subsequent #NPF being reflected into the guest as a #VC.

But for read-only memslots, KVM deliberately doesn't create MMIO SPTEs,
because except for ES/SNP, doing so requires setting reserved bits in the
SPTE, i.e. the SPTE can't be readable while also generating a #VC on
writes.  Because KVM never creates MMIO SPTEs and jumps directly to
emulation, the guest never gets a #VC.  And since KVM simply resumes the
guest if ES/SNP guests trigger emulation, KVM effectively puts the vCPU
into an infinite #NPF loop if the vCPU attempts to write read-only memory.

Disallow read-only memory for all VMs with protected state, i.e. for
upcoming TDX VMs as well as ES/SNP VMs.  For TDX, it's actually possible
to support read-only memory, as TDX uses EPT Violation #VE to reflect the
fault into the guest, e.g. KVM could configure read-only SPTEs with RX
protections and SUPPRESS_VE=0.  But there is no strong use case for
supporting read-only memslots on TDX, e.g. the main historical usage is
to emulate option ROMs, but TDX disallows executing from shared memory.
And if someone comes along with a legitimate, strong use case, the
restriction can always be lifted for TDX.

Don't bother trying to retroactively apply the restriction to SEV-ES
VMs that are created as type KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM.  Read-only memslots can't
possibly work for SEV-ES, i.e. disallowing such memslots is really just
means reporting an error to userspace instead of silently hanging vCPUs.
Trying to deal with the ordering between KVM_SEV_INIT and memslot creation
isn't worth the marginal benefit it would provide userspace.

Fixes: 26c44aa9e0 ("KVM: SEV: define VM types for SEV and SEV-ES")
Fixes: 1dfe571c12 ("KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support")
Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@google.com>
Cc: Ackerly Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240809190319.1710470-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2024-08-14 12:28:24 -04:00
..
async_pf.c Revert "KVM: async_pf: avoid recursive flushing of work items" 2024-06-03 08:55:55 -07:00
async_pf.h
binary_stats.c
coalesced_mmio.c
coalesced_mmio.h
dirty_ring.c KVM: Discard zero mask with function kvm_dirty_ring_reset 2024-06-20 17:20:11 -04:00
eventfd.c KVM: eventfd: Use synchronize_srcu_expedited() on shutdown 2024-08-13 12:09:35 -04:00
guest_memfd.c KVM: guest_memfd: abstract how prepared folios are recorded 2024-07-26 14:46:15 -04:00
irqchip.c KVM: Setup empty IRQ routing when creating a VM 2024-06-11 14:18:34 -07:00
Kconfig KVM: rename CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_GMEM_* to CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_* 2024-07-26 14:46:14 -04:00
kvm_main.c KVM: x86: Disallow read-only memslots for SEV-ES and SEV-SNP (and TDX) 2024-08-14 12:28:24 -04:00
kvm_mm.h KVM: Drop unused @may_block param from gfn_to_pfn_cache_invalidate_start() 2024-04-11 12:58:53 -07:00
Makefile.kvm KVM: Add KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD ioctl() for guest-specific backing memory 2023-11-14 08:01:03 -05:00
pfncache.c KVM: Validate hva in kvm_gpc_activate_hva() to fix __kvm_gpc_refresh() WARN 2024-06-28 08:31:46 -07:00
vfio.c KVM: Treat the device list as an rculist 2024-04-25 13:19:55 +01:00
vfio.h