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Kernel developers working on confidential computing for virtualized environments in x86 operate under a set of assumptions regarding the Linux kernel threat model that differs from the traditional view. Historically, the Linux threat model acknowledges attackers residing in userspace, as well as a limited set of external attackers that are able to interact with the kernel through networking or limited HW-specific exposed interfaces (e.g. USB, thunderbolt). The goal of this document is to explain additional attack vectors that arise in the virtualized confidential computing space. Reviewed-by: Larry Dewey <larry.dewey@amd.com> Reviewed-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Co-developed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Carlos Bilbao <carlos.bilbao@amd.com> Message-ID: <98804f27-c2e7-74d6-d671-1eda927e19fe@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> |
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| .. | ||
| keys | ||
| secrets | ||
| tpm | ||
| credentials.rst | ||
| digsig.rst | ||
| IMA-templates.rst | ||
| index.rst | ||
| landlock.rst | ||
| lsm-development.rst | ||
| lsm.rst | ||
| sak.rst | ||
| SCTP.rst | ||
| self-protection.rst | ||
| siphash.rst | ||
| snp-tdx-threat-model.rst | ||