a8f80e8ff9
The networking code checks CAP_SYS_MODULE before using request_module() to try to load a kernel module. While this seems reasonable it's actually weakening system security since we have to allow CAP_SYS_MODULE for things like /sbin/ip and bluetoothd which need to be able to trigger module loads. CAP_SYS_MODULE actually grants those binaries the ability to directly load any code into the kernel. We should instead be protecting modprobe and the modules on disk, rather than granting random programs the ability to load code directly into the kernel. Instead we are going to gate those networking checks on CAP_NET_ADMIN which still limits them to root but which does not grant those processes the ability to load arbitrary code into the kernel. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
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| .. | ||
| drivers | ||
| kcomedilib | ||
| comedi_compat32.c | ||
| comedi_compat32.h | ||
| comedi_fops.c | ||
| comedi_fops.h | ||
| comedi_ksyms.c | ||
| comedi.h | ||
| comedidev.h | ||
| comedilib.h | ||
| drivers.c | ||
| Kconfig | ||
| Makefile | ||
| pci_ids.h | ||
| proc.c | ||
| range.c | ||
| TODO | ||
| wrapper.h | ||