1
linux/security/selinux/avc.c
Eric Paris 0bce952799 SELinux: print denials for buggy kernel with unknown perms
Historically we've seen cases where permissions are requested for classes
where they do not exist.  In particular we have seen CIFS forget to set
i_mode to indicate it is a directory so when we later check something like
remove_name we have problems since it wasn't defined in tclass file.  This
used to result in a avc which included the permission 0x2000 or something.
Currently the kernel will deny the operations (good thing) but will not
print ANY information (bad thing).  First the auditdeny field is no
extended to include unknown permissions.  After that is fixed the logic in
avc_dump_query to output this information isn't right since it will remove
the permission from the av and print the phrase "<NULL>".  This takes us
back to the behavior before the classmap rewrite.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-11-24 14:30:49 +11:00

827 lines
21 KiB
C

/*
* Implementation of the kernel access vector cache (AVC).
*
* Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
* James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
*
* Update: KaiGai, Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
* Replaced the avc_lock spinlock by RCU.
*
* Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
* as published by the Free Software Foundation.
*/
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/stddef.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/dcache.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <linux/un.h>
#include <net/af_unix.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
#include <net/ipv6.h>
#include "avc.h"
#include "avc_ss.h"
#include "classmap.h"
#define AVC_CACHE_SLOTS 512
#define AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD 512
#define AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM 16
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
#define avc_cache_stats_incr(field) \
do { \
per_cpu(avc_cache_stats, get_cpu()).field++; \
put_cpu(); \
} while (0)
#else
#define avc_cache_stats_incr(field) do {} while (0)
#endif
struct avc_entry {
u32 ssid;
u32 tsid;
u16 tclass;
struct av_decision avd;
};
struct avc_node {
struct avc_entry ae;
struct hlist_node list; /* anchored in avc_cache->slots[i] */
struct rcu_head rhead;
};
struct avc_cache {
struct hlist_head slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* head for avc_node->list */
spinlock_t slots_lock[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* lock for writes */
atomic_t lru_hint; /* LRU hint for reclaim scan */
atomic_t active_nodes;
u32 latest_notif; /* latest revocation notification */
};
struct avc_callback_node {
int (*callback) (u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 perms,
u32 *out_retained);
u32 events;
u32 ssid;
u32 tsid;
u16 tclass;
u32 perms;
struct avc_callback_node *next;
};
/* Exported via selinufs */
unsigned int avc_cache_threshold = AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats) = { 0 };
#endif
static struct avc_cache avc_cache;
static struct avc_callback_node *avc_callbacks;
static struct kmem_cache *avc_node_cachep;
static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
{
return (ssid ^ (tsid<<2) ^ (tclass<<4)) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
}
/**
* avc_dump_av - Display an access vector in human-readable form.
* @tclass: target security class
* @av: access vector
*/
static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av)
{
const char **perms;
int i, perm;
if (av == 0) {
audit_log_format(ab, " null");
return;
}
perms = secclass_map[tclass-1].perms;
audit_log_format(ab, " {");
i = 0;
perm = 1;
while (i < (sizeof(av) * 8)) {
if ((perm & av) && perms[i]) {
audit_log_format(ab, " %s", perms[i]);
av &= ~perm;
}
i++;
perm <<= 1;
}
if (av)
audit_log_format(ab, " 0x%x", av);
audit_log_format(ab, " }");
}
/**
* avc_dump_query - Display a SID pair and a class in human-readable form.
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
*/
static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
{
int rc;
char *scontext;
u32 scontext_len;
rc = security_sid_to_context(ssid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
if (rc)
audit_log_format(ab, "ssid=%d", ssid);
else {
audit_log_format(ab, "scontext=%s", scontext);
kfree(scontext);
}
rc = security_sid_to_context(tsid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
if (rc)
audit_log_format(ab, " tsid=%d", tsid);
else {
audit_log_format(ab, " tcontext=%s", scontext);
kfree(scontext);
}
BUG_ON(tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(secclass_map));
audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", secclass_map[tclass-1].name);
}
/**
* avc_init - Initialize the AVC.
*
* Initialize the access vector cache.
*/
void __init avc_init(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&avc_cache.slots[i]);
spin_lock_init(&avc_cache.slots_lock[i]);
}
atomic_set(&avc_cache.active_nodes, 0);
atomic_set(&avc_cache.lru_hint, 0);
avc_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_node", sizeof(struct avc_node),
0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "AVC INITIALIZED\n");
}
int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page)
{
int i, chain_len, max_chain_len, slots_used;
struct avc_node *node;
struct hlist_head *head;
rcu_read_lock();
slots_used = 0;
max_chain_len = 0;
for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
head = &avc_cache.slots[i];
if (!hlist_empty(head)) {
struct hlist_node *next;
slots_used++;
chain_len = 0;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, next, head, list)
chain_len++;
if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
max_chain_len = chain_len;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "entries: %d\nbuckets used: %d/%d\n"
"longest chain: %d\n",
atomic_read(&avc_cache.active_nodes),
slots_used, AVC_CACHE_SLOTS, max_chain_len);
}
static void avc_node_free(struct rcu_head *rhead)
{
struct avc_node *node = container_of(rhead, struct avc_node, rhead);
kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
}
static void avc_node_delete(struct avc_node *node)
{
hlist_del_rcu(&node->list);
call_rcu(&node->rhead, avc_node_free);
atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
}
static void avc_node_kill(struct avc_node *node)
{
kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
}
static void avc_node_replace(struct avc_node *new, struct avc_node *old)
{
hlist_replace_rcu(&old->list, &new->list);
call_rcu(&old->rhead, avc_node_free);
atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
}
static inline int avc_reclaim_node(void)
{
struct avc_node *node;
int hvalue, try, ecx;
unsigned long flags;
struct hlist_head *head;
struct hlist_node *next;
spinlock_t *lock;
for (try = 0, ecx = 0; try < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; try++) {
hvalue = atomic_inc_return(&avc_cache.lru_hint) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(lock, flags))
continue;
rcu_read_lock();
hlist_for_each_entry(node, next, head, list) {
avc_node_delete(node);
avc_cache_stats_incr(reclaims);
ecx++;
if (ecx >= AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM) {
rcu_read_unlock();
spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
goto out;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
}
out:
return ecx;
}
static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void)
{
struct avc_node *node;
node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!node)
goto out;
INIT_RCU_HEAD(&node->rhead);
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&node->list);
avc_cache_stats_incr(allocations);
if (atomic_inc_return(&avc_cache.active_nodes) > avc_cache_threshold)
avc_reclaim_node();
out:
return node;
}
static void avc_node_populate(struct avc_node *node, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
{
node->ae.ssid = ssid;
node->ae.tsid = tsid;
node->ae.tclass = tclass;
memcpy(&node->ae.avd, avd, sizeof(node->ae.avd));
}
static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
{
struct avc_node *node, *ret = NULL;
int hvalue;
struct hlist_head *head;
struct hlist_node *next;
hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, next, head, list) {
if (ssid == node->ae.ssid &&
tclass == node->ae.tclass &&
tsid == node->ae.tsid) {
ret = node;
break;
}
}
return ret;
}
/**
* avc_lookup - Look up an AVC entry.
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
*
* Look up an AVC entry that is valid for the
* (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
* based on @tclass. If a valid AVC entry exists,
* then this function return the avc_node.
* Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
*/
static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
{
struct avc_node *node;
avc_cache_stats_incr(lookups);
node = avc_search_node(ssid, tsid, tclass);
if (node)
avc_cache_stats_incr(hits);
else
avc_cache_stats_incr(misses);
return node;
}
static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert)
{
int ret = 0;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(notif_lock);
unsigned long flag;
spin_lock_irqsave(&notif_lock, flag);
if (is_insert) {
if (seqno < avc_cache.latest_notif) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: avc: seqno %d < latest_notif %d\n",
seqno, avc_cache.latest_notif);
ret = -EAGAIN;
}
} else {
if (seqno > avc_cache.latest_notif)
avc_cache.latest_notif = seqno;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&notif_lock, flag);
return ret;
}
/**
* avc_insert - Insert an AVC entry.
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
* @avd: resulting av decision
*
* Insert an AVC entry for the SID pair
* (@ssid, @tsid) and class @tclass.
* The access vectors and the sequence number are
* normally provided by the security server in
* response to a security_compute_av() call. If the
* sequence number @avd->seqno is not less than the latest
* revocation notification, then the function copies
* the access vectors into a cache entry, returns
* avc_node inserted. Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
*/
static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
{
struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL;
int hvalue;
unsigned long flag;
if (avc_latest_notif_update(avd->seqno, 1))
goto out;
node = avc_alloc_node();
if (node) {
struct hlist_head *head;
struct hlist_node *next;
spinlock_t *lock;
hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
hlist_for_each_entry(pos, next, head, list) {
if (pos->ae.ssid == ssid &&
pos->ae.tsid == tsid &&
pos->ae.tclass == tclass) {
avc_node_replace(node, pos);
goto found;
}
}
hlist_add_head_rcu(&node->list, head);
found:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
}
out:
return node;
}
/**
* avc_audit_pre_callback - SELinux specific information
* will be called by generic audit code
* @ab: the audit buffer
* @a: audit_data
*/
static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
{
struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
audit_log_format(ab, "avc: %s ",
ad->selinux_audit_data.denied ? "denied" : "granted");
avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass,
ad->selinux_audit_data.audited);
audit_log_format(ab, " for ");
}
/**
* avc_audit_post_callback - SELinux specific information
* will be called by generic audit code
* @ab: the audit buffer
* @a: audit_data
*/
static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
{
struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
audit_log_format(ab, " ");
avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.ssid,
ad->selinux_audit_data.tsid,
ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass);
}
/**
* avc_audit - Audit the granting or denial of permissions.
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
* @requested: requested permissions
* @avd: access vector decisions
* @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit
* @a: auxiliary audit data
*
* Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance
* with the policy. This function is typically called by
* avc_has_perm() after a permission check, but can also be
* called directly by callers who use avc_has_perm_noaudit()
* in order to separate the permission check from the auditing.
* For example, this separation is useful when the permission check must
* be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released
* before calling the auditing code.
*/
void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a)
{
struct common_audit_data stack_data;
u32 denied, audited;
denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
if (denied) {
audited = denied;
if (!(audited & avd->auditdeny))
return;
} else if (result) {
audited = denied = requested;
} else {
audited = requested;
if (!(audited & avd->auditallow))
return;
}
if (!a) {
a = &stack_data;
memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
a->type = LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT;
}
a->selinux_audit_data.tclass = tclass;
a->selinux_audit_data.requested = requested;
a->selinux_audit_data.ssid = ssid;
a->selinux_audit_data.tsid = tsid;
a->selinux_audit_data.audited = audited;
a->selinux_audit_data.denied = denied;
a->lsm_pre_audit = avc_audit_pre_callback;
a->lsm_post_audit = avc_audit_post_callback;
common_lsm_audit(a);
}
/**
* avc_add_callback - Register a callback for security events.
* @callback: callback function
* @events: security events
* @ssid: source security identifier or %SECSID_WILD
* @tsid: target security identifier or %SECSID_WILD
* @tclass: target security class
* @perms: permissions
*
* Register a callback function for events in the set @events
* related to the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) and
* and the permissions @perms, interpreting
* @perms based on @tclass. Returns %0 on success or
* -%ENOMEM if insufficient memory exists to add the callback.
*/
int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 perms,
u32 *out_retained),
u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 perms)
{
struct avc_callback_node *c;
int rc = 0;
c = kmalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!c) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
c->callback = callback;
c->events = events;
c->ssid = ssid;
c->tsid = tsid;
c->perms = perms;
c->next = avc_callbacks;
avc_callbacks = c;
out:
return rc;
}
static inline int avc_sidcmp(u32 x, u32 y)
{
return (x == y || x == SECSID_WILD || y == SECSID_WILD);
}
/**
* avc_update_node Update an AVC entry
* @event : Updating event
* @perms : Permission mask bits
* @ssid,@tsid,@tclass : identifier of an AVC entry
* @seqno : sequence number when decision was made
*
* if a valid AVC entry doesn't exist,this function returns -ENOENT.
* if kmalloc() called internal returns NULL, this function returns -ENOMEM.
* otherwise, this function update the AVC entry. The original AVC-entry object
* will release later by RCU.
*/
static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
u32 seqno)
{
int hvalue, rc = 0;
unsigned long flag;
struct avc_node *pos, *node, *orig = NULL;
struct hlist_head *head;
struct hlist_node *next;
spinlock_t *lock;
node = avc_alloc_node();
if (!node) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
/* Lock the target slot */
hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
hlist_for_each_entry(pos, next, head, list) {
if (ssid == pos->ae.ssid &&
tsid == pos->ae.tsid &&
tclass == pos->ae.tclass &&
seqno == pos->ae.avd.seqno){
orig = pos;
break;
}
}
if (!orig) {
rc = -ENOENT;
avc_node_kill(node);
goto out_unlock;
}
/*
* Copy and replace original node.
*/
avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, &orig->ae.avd);
switch (event) {
case AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT:
node->ae.avd.allowed |= perms;
break;
case AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE:
case AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE:
node->ae.avd.allowed &= ~perms;
break;
case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_ENABLE:
node->ae.avd.auditallow |= perms;
break;
case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE:
node->ae.avd.auditallow &= ~perms;
break;
case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE:
node->ae.avd.auditdeny |= perms;
break;
case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE:
node->ae.avd.auditdeny &= ~perms;
break;
}
avc_node_replace(node, orig);
out_unlock:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
out:
return rc;
}
/**
* avc_flush - Flush the cache
*/
static void avc_flush(void)
{
struct hlist_head *head;
struct hlist_node *next;
struct avc_node *node;
spinlock_t *lock;
unsigned long flag;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
head = &avc_cache.slots[i];
lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[i];
spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
/*
* With preemptable RCU, the outer spinlock does not
* prevent RCU grace periods from ending.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
hlist_for_each_entry(node, next, head, list)
avc_node_delete(node);
rcu_read_unlock();
spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
}
}
/**
* avc_ss_reset - Flush the cache and revalidate migrated permissions.
* @seqno: policy sequence number
*/
int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
{
struct avc_callback_node *c;
int rc = 0, tmprc;
avc_flush();
for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) {
if (c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
tmprc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
0, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
/* save the first error encountered for the return
value and continue processing the callbacks */
if (!rc)
rc = tmprc;
}
}
avc_latest_notif_update(seqno, 0);
return rc;
}
/**
* avc_has_perm_noaudit - Check permissions but perform no auditing.
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
* @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
* @flags: AVC_STRICT or 0
* @avd: access vector decisions
*
* Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
* for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
* based on @tclass, and call the security server on a cache miss to obtain
* a new decision and add it to the cache. Return a copy of the decisions
* in @avd. Return %0 if all @requested permissions are granted,
* -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or another -errno upon
* other errors. This function is typically called by avc_has_perm(),
* but may also be called directly to separate permission checking from
* auditing, e.g. in cases where a lock must be held for the check but
* should be released for the auditing.
*/
int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
unsigned flags,
struct av_decision *in_avd)
{
struct avc_node *node;
struct av_decision avd_entry, *avd;
int rc = 0;
u32 denied;
BUG_ON(!requested);
rcu_read_lock();
node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
if (!node) {
rcu_read_unlock();
if (in_avd)
avd = in_avd;
else
avd = &avd_entry;
rc = security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd);
if (rc)
goto out;
rcu_read_lock();
node = avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
} else {
if (in_avd)
memcpy(in_avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*in_avd));
avd = &node->ae.avd;
}
denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed);
if (denied) {
if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
rc = -EACCES;
else if (!selinux_enforcing || (avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))
avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, ssid,
tsid, tclass, avd->seqno);
else
rc = -EACCES;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
out:
return rc;
}
/**
* avc_has_perm - Check permissions and perform any appropriate auditing.
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
* @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
* @auditdata: auxiliary audit data
*
* Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
* for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
* based on @tclass, and call the security server on a cache miss to obtain
* a new decision and add it to the cache. Audit the granting or denial of
* permissions in accordance with the policy. Return %0 if all @requested
* permissions are granted, -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or
* another -errno upon other errors.
*/
int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
{
struct av_decision avd;
int rc;
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd);
avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata);
return rc;
}
u32 avc_policy_seqno(void)
{
return avc_cache.latest_notif;
}
void avc_disable(void)
{
/*
* If you are looking at this because you have realized that we are
* not destroying the avc_node_cachep it might be easy to fix, but
* I don't know the memory barrier semantics well enough to know. It's
* possible that some other task dereferenced security_ops when
* it still pointed to selinux operations. If that is the case it's
* possible that it is about to use the avc and is about to need the
* avc_node_cachep. I know I could wrap the security.c security_ops call
* in an rcu_lock, but seriously, it's not worth it. Instead I just flush
* the cache and get that memory back.
*/
if (avc_node_cachep) {
avc_flush();
/* kmem_cache_destroy(avc_node_cachep); */
}
}