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linux/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
David Gstir 04de7589e0 KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix NULL dereference in AEAD crypto operation
When sealing or unsealing a key blob we currently do not wait for
the AEAD cipher operation to finish and simply return after submitting
the request. If there is some load on the system we can exit before
the cipher operation is done and the buffer we read from/write to
is already removed from the stack. This will e.g. result in NULL
pointer dereference errors in the DCP driver during blob creation.

Fix this by waiting for the AEAD cipher operation to finish before
resuming the seal and unseal calls.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: 0e28bf61a5 ("KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key")
Reported-by: Parthiban N <parthiban@linumiz.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/254d3bb1-6dbc-48b4-9c08-77df04baee2f@linumiz.com/
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
2024-11-04 21:24:24 +02:00

343 lines
8.4 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Copyright (C) 2021 sigma star gmbh
*/
#include <crypto/aead.h>
#include <crypto/aes.h>
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include <crypto/gcm.h>
#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/printk.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <soc/fsl/dcp.h>
#define DCP_BLOB_VERSION 1
#define DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN 16
/**
* DOC: dcp blob format
*
* The Data Co-Processor (DCP) provides hardware-bound AES keys using its
* AES encryption engine only. It does not provide direct key sealing/unsealing.
* To make DCP hardware encryption keys usable as trust source, we define
* our own custom format that uses a hardware-bound key to secure the sealing
* key stored in the key blob.
*
* Whenever a new trusted key using DCP is generated, we generate a random 128-bit
* blob encryption key (BEK) and 128-bit nonce. The BEK and nonce are used to
* encrypt the trusted key payload using AES-128-GCM.
*
* The BEK itself is encrypted using the hardware-bound key using the DCP's AES
* encryption engine with AES-128-ECB. The encrypted BEK, generated nonce,
* BEK-encrypted payload and authentication tag make up the blob format together
* with a version number, payload length and authentication tag.
*/
/**
* struct dcp_blob_fmt - DCP BLOB format.
*
* @fmt_version: Format version, currently being %1.
* @blob_key: Random AES 128 key which is used to encrypt @payload,
* @blob_key itself is encrypted with OTP or UNIQUE device key in
* AES-128-ECB mode by DCP.
* @nonce: Random nonce used for @payload encryption.
* @payload_len: Length of the plain text @payload.
* @payload: The payload itself, encrypted using AES-128-GCM and @blob_key,
* GCM auth tag of size DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN is attached at the end of it.
*
* The total size of a DCP BLOB is sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + @payload_len +
* DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN.
*/
struct dcp_blob_fmt {
__u8 fmt_version;
__u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
__u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
__le32 payload_len;
__u8 payload[];
} __packed;
static bool use_otp_key;
module_param_named(dcp_use_otp_key, use_otp_key, bool, 0);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(dcp_use_otp_key, "Use OTP instead of UNIQUE key for sealing");
static bool skip_zk_test;
module_param_named(dcp_skip_zk_test, skip_zk_test, bool, 0);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(dcp_skip_zk_test, "Don't test whether device keys are zero'ed");
static unsigned int calc_blob_len(unsigned int payload_len)
{
return sizeof(struct dcp_blob_fmt) + payload_len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN;
}
static int do_dcp_crypto(u8 *in, u8 *out, bool do_encrypt)
{
struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
u8 paes_key[DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE];
DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
int res = 0;
if (use_otp_key)
paes_key[0] = DCP_PAES_KEY_OTP;
else
paes_key[0] = DCP_PAES_KEY_UNIQUE;
tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb-paes-dcp", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL);
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
res = PTR_ERR(tfm);
tfm = NULL;
goto out;
}
req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
if (!req) {
res = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
crypto_req_done, &wait);
res = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, paes_key, sizeof(paes_key));
if (res < 0)
goto out;
sg_init_one(&src_sg, in, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, AES_KEYSIZE_128,
NULL);
if (do_encrypt)
res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
else
res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req), &wait);
out:
skcipher_request_free(req);
crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
return res;
}
static int do_aead_crypto(u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len, u8 *key, u8 *nonce,
bool do_encrypt)
{
struct aead_request *aead_req = NULL;
struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
struct crypto_aead *aead;
int ret;
DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
aead = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(aead)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(aead);
goto out;
}
ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(aead, DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("Can't set crypto auth tag len: %d\n", ret);
goto free_aead;
}
aead_req = aead_request_alloc(aead, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!aead_req) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto free_aead;
}
sg_init_one(&src_sg, in, len);
if (do_encrypt) {
/*
* If we encrypt our buffer has extra space for the auth tag.
*/
sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN);
} else {
sg_init_one(&dst_sg, out, len);
}
aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, len, nonce);
aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
crypto_req_done, &wait);
aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, 0);
if (crypto_aead_setkey(aead, key, AES_KEYSIZE_128)) {
pr_err("Can't set crypto AEAD key\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto free_req;
}
if (do_encrypt)
ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req), &wait);
else
ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req), &wait);
free_req:
aead_request_free(aead_req);
free_aead:
crypto_free_aead(aead);
out:
return ret;
}
static int decrypt_blob_key(u8 *encrypted_key, u8 *plain_key)
{
return do_dcp_crypto(encrypted_key, plain_key, false);
}
static int encrypt_blob_key(u8 *plain_key, u8 *encrypted_key)
{
return do_dcp_crypto(plain_key, encrypted_key, true);
}
static int trusted_dcp_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
{
struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob;
int blen, ret;
u8 plain_blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
blen = calc_blob_len(p->key_len);
if (blen > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
return -E2BIG;
b->fmt_version = DCP_BLOB_VERSION;
get_random_bytes(b->nonce, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
get_random_bytes(plain_blob_key, AES_KEYSIZE_128);
ret = do_aead_crypto(p->key, b->payload, p->key_len, plain_blob_key,
b->nonce, true);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Unable to encrypt blob payload: %i\n", ret);
goto out;
}
ret = encrypt_blob_key(plain_blob_key, b->blob_key);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Unable to encrypt blob key: %i\n", ret);
goto out;
}
put_unaligned_le32(p->key_len, &b->payload_len);
p->blob_len = blen;
ret = 0;
out:
memzero_explicit(plain_blob_key, sizeof(plain_blob_key));
return ret;
}
static int trusted_dcp_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
{
struct dcp_blob_fmt *b = (struct dcp_blob_fmt *)p->blob;
int blen, ret;
u8 plain_blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
if (b->fmt_version != DCP_BLOB_VERSION) {
pr_err("DCP blob has bad version: %i, expected %i\n",
b->fmt_version, DCP_BLOB_VERSION);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
p->key_len = le32_to_cpu(b->payload_len);
blen = calc_blob_len(p->key_len);
if (blen != p->blob_len) {
pr_err("DCP blob has bad length: %i != %i\n", blen,
p->blob_len);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ret = decrypt_blob_key(b->blob_key, plain_blob_key);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Unable to decrypt blob key: %i\n", ret);
goto out;
}
ret = do_aead_crypto(b->payload, p->key, p->key_len + DCP_BLOB_AUTHLEN,
plain_blob_key, b->nonce, false);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Unwrap of DCP payload failed: %i\n", ret);
goto out;
}
ret = 0;
out:
memzero_explicit(plain_blob_key, sizeof(plain_blob_key));
return ret;
}
static int test_for_zero_key(void)
{
/*
* Encrypting a plaintext of all 0x55 bytes will yield
* this ciphertext in case the DCP test key is used.
*/
static const u8 bad[] = {0x9a, 0xda, 0xe0, 0x54, 0xf6, 0x3d, 0xfa, 0xff,
0x5e, 0xa1, 0x8e, 0x45, 0xed, 0xf6, 0xea, 0x6f};
void *buf = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (skip_zk_test)
goto out;
buf = kmalloc(AES_BLOCK_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
memset(buf, 0x55, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
ret = do_dcp_crypto(buf, buf, true);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (memcmp(buf, bad, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0) {
pr_warn("Device neither in secure nor trusted mode!\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
}
out:
kfree(buf);
return ret;
}
static int trusted_dcp_init(void)
{
int ret;
if (use_otp_key)
pr_info("Using DCP OTP key\n");
ret = test_for_zero_key();
if (ret) {
pr_warn("Test for zero'ed keys failed: %i\n", ret);
return -EINVAL;
}
return register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
}
static void trusted_dcp_exit(void)
{
unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
}
struct trusted_key_ops dcp_trusted_key_ops = {
.exit = trusted_dcp_exit,
.init = trusted_dcp_init,
.seal = trusted_dcp_seal,
.unseal = trusted_dcp_unseal,
.migratable = 0,
};