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linux/fs/verity/signature.c
Fan Wu 7c373e4f14 fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs
This patch enhances fsverity's capabilities to support both integrity and
authenticity protection by introducing the exposure of built-in
signatures through a new LSM hook. This functionality allows LSMs,
e.g. IPE, to enforce policies based on the authenticity and integrity of
files, specifically focusing on built-in fsverity signatures. It enables
a policy enforcement layer within LSMs for fsverity, offering granular
control over the usage of authenticity claims. For instance, a policy
could be established to only permit the execution of all files with
verified built-in fsverity signatures.

The introduction of a security_inode_setintegrity() hook call within
fsverity's workflow ensures that the verified built-in signature of a file
is exposed to LSMs. This enables LSMs to recognize and label fsverity files
that contain a verified built-in fsverity signature. This hook is invoked
subsequent to the fsverity_verify_signature() process, guaranteeing the
signature's verification against fsverity's keyring. This mechanism is
crucial for maintaining system security, as it operates in kernel space,
effectively thwarting attempts by malicious binaries to bypass user space
stack interactions.

The second to last commit in this patch set will add a link to the IPE
documentation in fsverity.rst.

Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2024-08-20 14:03:18 -04:00

139 lines
4.3 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Verification of builtin signatures
*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
*/
/*
* This file implements verification of fs-verity builtin signatures. Please
* take great care before using this feature. It is not the only way to do
* signatures with fs-verity, and the alternatives (such as userspace signature
* verification, and IMA appraisal) can be much better. For details about the
* limitations of this feature, see Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst.
*/
#include "fsverity_private.h"
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/verification.h>
/*
* /proc/sys/fs/verity/require_signatures
* If 1, all verity files must have a valid builtin signature.
*/
int fsverity_require_signatures;
/*
* Keyring that contains the trusted X.509 certificates.
*
* Only root (kuid=0) can modify this. Also, root may use
* keyctl_restrict_keyring() to prevent any more additions.
*/
static struct key *fsverity_keyring;
/**
* fsverity_verify_signature() - check a verity file's signature
* @vi: the file's fsverity_info
* @signature: the file's built-in signature
* @sig_size: size of signature in bytes, or 0 if no signature
*
* If the file includes a signature of its fs-verity file digest, verify it
* against the certificates in the fs-verity keyring. Note that signatures
* are verified regardless of the state of the 'fsverity_require_signatures'
* variable and the LSM subsystem relies on this behavior to help enforce
* file integrity policies. Please discuss changes with the LSM list
* (thank you!).
*
* Return: 0 on success (signature valid or not required); -errno on failure
*/
int fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi,
const u8 *signature, size_t sig_size)
{
const struct inode *inode = vi->inode;
const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg = vi->tree_params.hash_alg;
struct fsverity_formatted_digest *d;
int err;
if (sig_size == 0) {
if (fsverity_require_signatures) {
fsverity_err(inode,
"require_signatures=1, rejecting unsigned file!");
return -EPERM;
}
return 0;
}
if (fsverity_keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree == 0) {
/*
* The ".fs-verity" keyring is empty, due to builtin signatures
* being supported by the kernel but not actually being used.
* In this case, verify_pkcs7_signature() would always return an
* error, usually ENOKEY. It could also be EBADMSG if the
* PKCS#7 is malformed, but that isn't very important to
* distinguish. So, just skip to ENOKEY to avoid the attack
* surface of the PKCS#7 parser, which would otherwise be
* reachable by any task able to execute FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY.
*/
fsverity_err(inode,
"fs-verity keyring is empty, rejecting signed file!");
return -ENOKEY;
}
d = kzalloc(sizeof(*d) + hash_alg->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!d)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(d->magic, "FSVerity", 8);
d->digest_algorithm = cpu_to_le16(hash_alg - fsverity_hash_algs);
d->digest_size = cpu_to_le16(hash_alg->digest_size);
memcpy(d->digest, vi->file_digest, hash_alg->digest_size);
err = verify_pkcs7_signature(d, sizeof(*d) + hash_alg->digest_size,
signature, sig_size, fsverity_keyring,
VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
NULL, NULL);
kfree(d);
if (err) {
if (err == -ENOKEY)
fsverity_err(inode,
"File's signing cert isn't in the fs-verity keyring");
else if (err == -EKEYREJECTED)
fsverity_err(inode, "Incorrect file signature");
else if (err == -EBADMSG)
fsverity_err(inode, "Malformed file signature");
else
fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d verifying file signature",
err);
return err;
}
err = security_inode_setintegrity(inode,
LSM_INT_FSVERITY_BUILTINSIG_VALID,
signature,
sig_size);
if (err) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d exposing file signature to LSMs",
err);
return err;
}
return 0;
}
void __init fsverity_init_signature(void)
{
fsverity_keyring =
keyring_alloc(".fs-verity", KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0),
current_cred(), KEY_POS_SEARCH |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_WRITE |
KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_SETATTR,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(fsverity_keyring))
panic("failed to allocate \".fs-verity\" keyring");
}