ac8b270b61
When BHI mitigation is enabled, if SYSENTER is invoked with the TF flag set
then entry_SYSENTER_compat() uses CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY and calls the
clear_bhb_loop() before the TF flag is cleared. This causes the #DB handler
(exc_debug_kernel()) to issue a warning because single-step is used outside the
entry_SYSENTER_compat() function.
To address this issue, entry_SYSENTER_compat() should use CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY
after making sure the TF flag is cleared.
The problem can be reproduced with the following sequence:
$ cat sysenter_step.c
int main()
{ asm("pushf; pop %ax; bts $8,%ax; push %ax; popf; sysenter"); }
$ gcc -o sysenter_step sysenter_step.c
$ ./sysenter_step
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
The program is expected to crash, and the #DB handler will issue a warning.
Kernel log:
WARNING: CPU: 27 PID: 7000 at arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1009 exc_debug_kernel+0xd2/0x160
...
RIP: 0010:exc_debug_kernel+0xd2/0x160
...
Call Trace:
<#DB>
? show_regs+0x68/0x80
? __warn+0x8c/0x140
? exc_debug_kernel+0xd2/0x160
? report_bug+0x175/0x1a0
? handle_bug+0x44/0x90
? exc_invalid_op+0x1c/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30
? exc_debug_kernel+0xd2/0x160
exc_debug+0x43/0x50
asm_exc_debug+0x1e/0x40
RIP: 0010:clear_bhb_loop+0x0/0xb0
...
</#DB>
<TASK>
? entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x8d
</TASK>
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Fixes: 7390db8aea
("x86/bhi: Add support for clearing branch history at syscall entry")
Reported-by: Suman Maity <suman.m.maity@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240524070459.3674025-1-alexandre.chartre@oracle.com
300 lines
9.3 KiB
ArmAsm
300 lines
9.3 KiB
ArmAsm
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
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/*
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* Compatibility mode system call entry point for x86-64.
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*
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* Copyright 2000-2002 Andi Kleen, SuSE Labs.
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*/
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#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
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#include <asm/current.h>
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#include <asm/errno.h>
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#include <asm/thread_info.h>
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#include <asm/segment.h>
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#include <asm/irqflags.h>
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#include <asm/asm.h>
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#include <asm/smap.h>
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#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
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#include <linux/linkage.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#include "calling.h"
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.section .entry.text, "ax"
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/*
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* 32-bit SYSENTER entry.
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*
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* 32-bit system calls through the vDSO's __kernel_vsyscall enter here
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* on 64-bit kernels running on Intel CPUs.
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*
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* The SYSENTER instruction, in principle, should *only* occur in the
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* vDSO. In practice, a small number of Android devices were shipped
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* with a copy of Bionic that inlined a SYSENTER instruction. This
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* never happened in any of Google's Bionic versions -- it only happened
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* in a narrow range of Intel-provided versions.
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*
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* SYSENTER loads SS, RSP, CS, and RIP from previously programmed MSRs.
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* IF and VM in RFLAGS are cleared (IOW: interrupts are off).
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* SYSENTER does not save anything on the stack,
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* and does not save old RIP (!!!), RSP, or RFLAGS.
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*
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* Arguments:
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* eax system call number
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* ebx arg1
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* ecx arg2
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* edx arg3
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* esi arg4
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* edi arg5
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* ebp user stack
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* 0(%ebp) arg6
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*/
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SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSENTER_compat)
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UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY
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ENDBR
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/* Interrupts are off on entry. */
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swapgs
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pushq %rax
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SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
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popq %rax
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movq PER_CPU_VAR(pcpu_hot + X86_top_of_stack), %rsp
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/* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */
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pushq $__USER_DS /* pt_regs->ss */
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pushq $0 /* pt_regs->sp = 0 (placeholder) */
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/*
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* Push flags. This is nasty. First, interrupts are currently
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* off, but we need pt_regs->flags to have IF set. Second, if TS
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* was set in usermode, it's still set, and we're singlestepping
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* through this code. do_SYSENTER_32() will fix up IF.
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*/
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pushfq /* pt_regs->flags (except IF = 0) */
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pushq $__USER32_CS /* pt_regs->cs */
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pushq $0 /* pt_regs->ip = 0 (placeholder) */
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SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
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/*
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* User tracing code (ptrace or signal handlers) might assume that
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* the saved RAX contains a 32-bit number when we're invoking a 32-bit
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* syscall. Just in case the high bits are nonzero, zero-extend
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* the syscall number. (This could almost certainly be deleted
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* with no ill effects.)
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*/
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movl %eax, %eax
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pushq %rax /* pt_regs->orig_ax */
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PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rax=$-ENOSYS
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UNWIND_HINT_REGS
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cld
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/*
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* SYSENTER doesn't filter flags, so we need to clear NT and AC
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* ourselves. To save a few cycles, we can check whether
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* either was set instead of doing an unconditional popfq.
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* This needs to happen before enabling interrupts so that
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* we don't get preempted with NT set.
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*
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* If TF is set, we will single-step all the way to here -- do_debug
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* will ignore all the traps. (Yes, this is slow, but so is
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* single-stepping in general. This allows us to avoid having
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* a more complicated code to handle the case where a user program
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* forces us to single-step through the SYSENTER entry code.)
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*
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* NB.: .Lsysenter_fix_flags is a label with the code under it moved
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* out-of-line as an optimization: NT is unlikely to be set in the
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* majority of the cases and instead of polluting the I$ unnecessarily,
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* we're keeping that code behind a branch which will predict as
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* not-taken and therefore its instructions won't be fetched.
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*/
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testl $X86_EFLAGS_NT|X86_EFLAGS_AC|X86_EFLAGS_TF, EFLAGS(%rsp)
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jnz .Lsysenter_fix_flags
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.Lsysenter_flags_fixed:
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/*
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* CPU bugs mitigations mechanisms can call other functions. They
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* should be invoked after making sure TF is cleared because
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* single-step is ignored only for instructions inside the
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* entry_SYSENTER_compat function.
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*/
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IBRS_ENTER
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UNTRAIN_RET
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CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY
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movq %rsp, %rdi
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call do_SYSENTER_32
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jmp sysret32_from_system_call
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.Lsysenter_fix_flags:
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pushq $X86_EFLAGS_FIXED
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popfq
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jmp .Lsysenter_flags_fixed
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SYM_INNER_LABEL(__end_entry_SYSENTER_compat, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
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SYM_CODE_END(entry_SYSENTER_compat)
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/*
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* 32-bit SYSCALL entry.
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*
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* 32-bit system calls through the vDSO's __kernel_vsyscall enter here
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* on 64-bit kernels running on AMD CPUs.
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*
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* The SYSCALL instruction, in principle, should *only* occur in the
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* vDSO. In practice, it appears that this really is the case.
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* As evidence:
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*
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* - The calling convention for SYSCALL has changed several times without
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* anyone noticing.
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*
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* - Prior to the in-kernel X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS fixup, anything
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* user task that did SYSCALL without immediately reloading SS
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* would randomly crash.
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*
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* - Most programmers do not directly target AMD CPUs, and the 32-bit
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* SYSCALL instruction does not exist on Intel CPUs. Even on AMD
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* CPUs, Linux disables the SYSCALL instruction on 32-bit kernels
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* because the SYSCALL instruction in legacy/native 32-bit mode (as
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* opposed to compat mode) is sufficiently poorly designed as to be
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* essentially unusable.
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*
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* 32-bit SYSCALL saves RIP to RCX, clears RFLAGS.RF, then saves
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* RFLAGS to R11, then loads new SS, CS, and RIP from previously
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* programmed MSRs. RFLAGS gets masked by a value from another MSR
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* (so CLD and CLAC are not needed). SYSCALL does not save anything on
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* the stack and does not change RSP.
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*
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* Note: RFLAGS saving+masking-with-MSR happens only in Long mode
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* (in legacy 32-bit mode, IF, RF and VM bits are cleared and that's it).
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* Don't get confused: RFLAGS saving+masking depends on Long Mode Active bit
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* (EFER.LMA=1), NOT on bitness of userspace where SYSCALL executes
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* or target CS descriptor's L bit (SYSCALL does not read segment descriptors).
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*
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* Arguments:
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* eax system call number
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* ecx return address
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* ebx arg1
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* ebp arg2 (note: not saved in the stack frame, should not be touched)
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* edx arg3
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* esi arg4
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* edi arg5
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* esp user stack
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* 0(%esp) arg6
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*/
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SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_compat)
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UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY
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ENDBR
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/* Interrupts are off on entry. */
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swapgs
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/* Stash user ESP */
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movl %esp, %r8d
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/* Use %rsp as scratch reg. User ESP is stashed in r8 */
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SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rsp
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/* Switch to the kernel stack */
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movq PER_CPU_VAR(pcpu_hot + X86_top_of_stack), %rsp
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SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_safe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
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ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
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/* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */
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pushq $__USER_DS /* pt_regs->ss */
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pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->sp */
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pushq %r11 /* pt_regs->flags */
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pushq $__USER32_CS /* pt_regs->cs */
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pushq %rcx /* pt_regs->ip */
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SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_compat_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
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movl %eax, %eax /* discard orig_ax high bits */
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pushq %rax /* pt_regs->orig_ax */
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PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rcx=%rbp rax=$-ENOSYS
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UNWIND_HINT_REGS
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IBRS_ENTER
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UNTRAIN_RET
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CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY
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movq %rsp, %rdi
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call do_fast_syscall_32
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sysret32_from_system_call:
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/* XEN PV guests always use IRET path */
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ALTERNATIVE "testb %al, %al; jz swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", \
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"jmp swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", X86_FEATURE_XENPV
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/*
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* Opportunistic SYSRET
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*
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* We are not going to return to userspace from the trampoline
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* stack. So let's erase the thread stack right now.
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*/
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STACKLEAK_ERASE
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IBRS_EXIT
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movq RBX(%rsp), %rbx /* pt_regs->rbx */
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movq RBP(%rsp), %rbp /* pt_regs->rbp */
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movq EFLAGS(%rsp), %r11 /* pt_regs->flags (in r11) */
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movq RIP(%rsp), %rcx /* pt_regs->ip (in rcx) */
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addq $RAX, %rsp /* Skip r8-r15 */
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popq %rax /* pt_regs->rax */
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popq %rdx /* Skip pt_regs->cx */
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popq %rdx /* pt_regs->dx */
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popq %rsi /* pt_regs->si */
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popq %rdi /* pt_regs->di */
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/*
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* USERGS_SYSRET32 does:
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* GSBASE = user's GS base
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* EIP = ECX
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* RFLAGS = R11
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* CS = __USER32_CS
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* SS = __USER_DS
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*
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* ECX will not match pt_regs->cx, but we're returning to a vDSO
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* trampoline that will fix up RCX, so this is okay.
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*
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* R12-R15 are callee-saved, so they contain whatever was in them
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* when the system call started, which is already known to user
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* code. We zero R8-R10 to avoid info leaks.
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*/
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movq RSP-ORIG_RAX(%rsp), %rsp
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SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETL_compat_unsafe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
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ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
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/*
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* The original userspace %rsp (RSP-ORIG_RAX(%rsp)) is stored
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* on the process stack which is not mapped to userspace and
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* not readable after we SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3. Delay the CR3
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* switch until after after the last reference to the process
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* stack.
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*
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* %r8/%r9 are zeroed before the sysret, thus safe to clobber.
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*/
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SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3_NOSTACK scratch_reg=%r8 scratch_reg2=%r9
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xorl %r8d, %r8d
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xorl %r9d, %r9d
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xorl %r10d, %r10d
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swapgs
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CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
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sysretl
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SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETL_compat_end, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
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ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
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int3
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SYM_CODE_END(entry_SYSCALL_compat)
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/*
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* int 0x80 is used by 32 bit mode as a system call entry. Normally idt entries
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* point to C routines, however since this is a system call interface the branch
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* history needs to be scrubbed to protect against BHI attacks, and that
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* scrubbing needs to take place in assembly code prior to entering any C
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* routines.
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*/
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SYM_CODE_START(int80_emulation)
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ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
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UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
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CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY
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jmp do_int80_emulation
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SYM_CODE_END(int80_emulation)
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