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5199 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
James Morris
2b82892565 Merge branch 'master' into next
Conflicts:
	security/keys/internal.h
	security/keys/process_keys.c
	security/keys/request_key.c

Fixed conflicts above by using the non 'tsk' versions.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 11:29:12 +11:00
David Howells
3a3b7ce933 CRED: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions
Allow kernel services to override LSM settings appropriate to the actions
performed by a task by duplicating a set of credentials, modifying it and then
using task_struct::cred to point to it when performing operations on behalf of
a task.

This is used, for example, by CacheFiles which has to transparently access the
cache on behalf of a process that thinks it is doing, say, NFS accesses with a
potentially inappropriate (with respect to accessing the cache) set of
credentials.

This patch provides two LSM hooks for modifying a task security record:

 (*) security_kernel_act_as() which allows modification of the security datum
     with which a task acts on other objects (most notably files).

 (*) security_kernel_create_files_as() which allows modification of the
     security datum that is used to initialise the security data on a file that
     a task creates.

The patch also provides four new credentials handling functions, which wrap the
LSM functions:

 (1) prepare_kernel_cred()

     Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service to use, based either on
     a daemon's credentials or on init_cred.  All the keyrings are cleared.

 (2) set_security_override()

     Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials to a specific security
     context, assuming permission from the LSM policy.

 (3) set_security_override_from_ctx()

     As (2), but takes the security context as a string.

 (4) set_create_files_as()

     Set the file creation LSM security ID in a set of credentials to be the
     same as that on a particular inode.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [Smack changes]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:28 +11:00
David Howells
3b11a1dece CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task
Differentiate the objective and real subjective credentials from the effective
subjective credentials on a task by introducing a second credentials pointer
into the task_struct.

task_struct::real_cred then refers to the objective and apparent real
subjective credentials of a task, as perceived by the other tasks in the
system.

task_struct::cred then refers to the effective subjective credentials of a
task, as used by that task when it's actually running.  These are not visible
to the other tasks in the system.

__task_cred(task) then refers to the objective/real credentials of the task in
question.

current_cred() refers to the effective subjective credentials of the current
task.

prepare_creds() uses the objective creds as a base and commit_creds() changes
both pointers in the task_struct (indeed commit_creds() requires them to be the
same).

override_creds() and revert_creds() change the subjective creds pointer only,
and the former returns the old subjective creds.  These are used by NFSD,
faccessat() and do_coredump(), and will by used by CacheFiles.

In SELinux, current_has_perm() is provided as an alternative to
task_has_perm().  This uses the effective subjective context of current,
whereas task_has_perm() uses the objective/real context of the subject.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:26 +11:00
David Howells
98870ab0a5 CRED: Documentation
Document credentials and the new credentials API.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:26 +11:00
David Howells
a6f76f23d2 CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials
Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set
up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point
of no return.

This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.

This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:

 (1) execve().

     The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part,
     replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred).  This means that
     all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point
     of no return with no possibility of failure.

     I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with:

	cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective)

     but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1
     (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd
     be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()).

     The following sequence of events now happens:

     (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is
     	 locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of
     	 creds that we make.

     (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current
     	 task's credentials and prepare it.  This copy is then assigned to
     	 bprm->cred.

  	 This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free()
     	 unnecessary, and so they've been removed.

     (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately
     	 after (a) rather than later on in the code.  The result is stored in
     	 bprm->unsafe for future reference.

     (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times.

     	 (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds
     	     attached to bprm->cred.  Personality bit clearance is recorded,
     	     but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet
     	     fail.

         (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds().  This should
	     calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred.

	     This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of
	     security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed).
	     Anything that might fail must be done at this point.

         (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1.

	     bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security
	     calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes.  This allows SELinux
	     in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and
	     not on the interpreter.

     (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution.  This
     	 performs the following steps with regard to credentials:

	 (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that
	     may not be covered by commit_creds().

         (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from
             (c.i).

     (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the
     	 new credentials.  This performs the following steps with regard to
     	 credentials:

         (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security
             requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that
             must be done before the credentials are changed.

	     This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and
	     security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed.
	     This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail
	     must have been done in (c.ii).

         (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single
             assignment (more or less).  Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable
             should be part of struct creds.

	 (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing
	     PTRACE_ATTACH to take place.

         (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding
             are now immutable.

         (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security
             alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed.
             SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers.

     (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds()
     	 to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock
     	 cred_replace_mutex.  No changes to the credentials will have been
     	 made.

 (2) LSM interface.

     A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:

     (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security()
     (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security()

     	 Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those.

     (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
     (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds()

     	 Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(),
     	 security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds().

     (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security()

     	 Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds().

     (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds()

     	 New.  The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up
     	 as appropriate.  bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the
     	 second and subsequent calls.

     (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds()
     (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds()

     	 New.  Apply the security effects of the new credentials.  This
     	 includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux.  This function may not
     	 fail.  When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied
     	 to the process; when the latter is called, they have.

 	 The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not.

 (3) SELinux.

     SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
     interface changes mentioned above:

     (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using
     	 the credentials-under-construction approach.

     (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on
     	 to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open().

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:24 +11:00
David Howells
d84f4f992c CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management.  This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.

A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().

With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:

	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
	int ret = blah(new);
	if (ret < 0) {
		abort_creds(new);
		return ret;
	}
	return commit_creds(new);

There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.

To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const.  The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers.  Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:

  (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.

  (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.

The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).

This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.

This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:

 (1) execve().

     This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
     security code rather than altering the current creds directly.

 (2) Temporary credential overrides.

     do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
     temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
     preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
     on the thread being dumped.

     This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
     credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
     the task's objective credentials.

 (3) LSM interface.

     A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:

     (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
     (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()

     	 Removed in favour of security_capset().

     (*) security_capset(), ->capset()

     	 New.  This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
     	 creds and the proposed capability sets.  It should fill in the new
     	 creds or return an error.  All pointers, barring the pointer to the
     	 new creds, are now const.

     (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()

     	 Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
     	 killed if it's an error.

     (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()

     	 Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().

     (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()

     	 New.  Free security data attached to cred->security.

     (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()

     	 New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.

     (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()

     	 New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
     	 security by commit_creds().

     (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()

     	 Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().

     (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()

     	 Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid().  This is used by
     	 cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
     	 setuid() changes.  Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
     	 than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().

     (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()

     	 Removed.  Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
     	 directly to init's credentials.

	 NOTE!  This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
	 longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.

     (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
     (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()

     	 Changed.  These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
     	 refer to the security context.

 (4) sys_capset().

     This has been simplified and uses less locking.  The LSM functions it
     calls have been merged.

 (5) reparent_to_kthreadd().

     This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
     commit_thread() to point that way.

 (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()

     __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
     beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
     user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
     successful.

     switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
     folded into that.  commit_creds() should take care of protecting
     __sigqueue_alloc().

 (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.

     The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
     abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
     it.

     security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section.  This
     guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.

     The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().

     Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
     commit_creds().

     The get functions all simply access the data directly.

 (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().

     security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
     want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
     rather than through an argument.

     Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
     if it doesn't end up using it.

 (9) Keyrings.

     A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:

     (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
     	 all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
     	 They may want separating out again later.

     (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
     	 rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.

     (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
     	 thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
     	 keyring.

     (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
     	 the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.

     (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
     	 credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
     	 process or session keyrings (they're shared).

(10) Usermode helper.

     The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
     subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer.  This set
     of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
     after it has been cloned.

     call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
     call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used.  A
     special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
     specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.

     call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
     supplied keyring as the new session keyring.

(11) SELinux.

     SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
     interface changes mentioned above:

     (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
     	 current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
     	 that covers getting the ptracer's SID.  Whilst this lock ensures that
     	 the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
     	 until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
     	 lock.

(12) is_single_threaded().

     This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
     a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
     wants to use it too.

     The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
     with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough.  We really want
     to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).

(13) nfsd.

     The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
     credentials it is going to use.  It really needs to pass the credentials
     down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
     in this series have been applied.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:23 +11:00
David Howells
6cc88bc45c CRED: Rename is_single_threaded() to is_wq_single_threaded()
Rename is_single_threaded() to is_wq_single_threaded() so that a new
is_single_threaded() can be created that refers to tasks rather than
waitqueues.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:21 +11:00
David Howells
bb952bb98a CRED: Separate per-task-group keyrings from signal_struct
Separate per-task-group keyrings from signal_struct and dangle their anchor
from the cred struct rather than the signal_struct.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:20 +11:00
David Howells
c69e8d9c01 CRED: Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds
Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds.
This means that it will be possible for the credentials of a task to be
replaced without another task (a) requiring a full lock to read them, and (b)
seeing deallocated memory.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:19 +11:00
David Howells
86a264abe5 CRED: Wrap current->cred and a few other accessors
Wrap current->cred and a few other accessors to hide their actual
implementation.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:18 +11:00
David Howells
f1752eec61 CRED: Detach the credentials from task_struct
Detach the credentials from task_struct, duplicating them in copy_process()
and releasing them in __put_task_struct().

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:17 +11:00
David Howells
b6dff3ec5e CRED: Separate task security context from task_struct
Separate the task security context from task_struct.  At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.

Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.

With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:16 +11:00
David Howells
1cdcbec1a3 CRED: Neuter sys_capset()
Take away the ability for sys_capset() to affect processes other than current.

This means that current will not need to lock its own credentials when reading
them against interference by other processes.

This has effectively been the case for a while anyway, since:

 (1) Without LSM enabled, sys_capset() is disallowed.

 (2) With file-based capabilities, sys_capset() is neutered.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:14 +11:00
David Howells
8bbf4976b5 KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument
Alter the use of the key instantiation and negation functions' link-to-keyring
arguments.  Currently this specifies a keyring in the target process to link
the key into, creating the keyring if it doesn't exist.  This, however, can be
a problem for copy-on-write credentials as it means that the instantiating
process can alter the credentials of the requesting process.

This patch alters the behaviour such that:

 (1) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given a specific
     keyring by ID (ringid >= 0), then that keyring will be used.

 (2) If keyctl_instantiate_key() or keyctl_negate_key() are given one of the
     special constants that refer to the requesting process's keyrings
     (KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING, all <= 0), then:

     (a) If sys_request_key() was given a keyring to use (destringid) then the
     	 key will be attached to that keyring.

     (b) If sys_request_key() was given a NULL keyring, then the key being
     	 instantiated will be attached to the default keyring as set by
     	 keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring().

 (3) No extra link will be made.

Decision point (1) follows current behaviour, and allows those instantiators
who've searched for a specifically named keyring in the requestor's keyring so
as to partition the keys by type to still have their named keyrings.

Decision point (2) allows the requestor to make sure that the key or keys that
get produced by request_key() go where they want, whilst allowing the
instantiator to request that the key is retained.  This is mainly useful for
situations where the instantiator makes a secondary request, the key for which
should be retained by the initial requestor:

	+-----------+        +--------------+        +--------------+
	|           |        |              |        |              |
	| Requestor |------->| Instantiator |------->| Instantiator |
	|           |        |              |        |              |
	+-----------+        +--------------+        +--------------+
	           request_key()           request_key()

This might be useful, for example, in Kerberos, where the requestor requests a
ticket, and then the ticket instantiator requests the TGT, which someone else
then has to go and fetch.  The TGT, however, should be retained in the
keyrings of the requestor, not the first instantiator.  To make this explict
an extra special keyring constant is also added.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:14 +11:00
David Howells
76aac0e9a1 CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the core kernel
Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from
the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds.

Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id().

Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id().  In some places it makes more
sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be
addressed by later patches.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
Cc: containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-14 10:39:12 +11:00
Linus Torvalds
4ffaf869c7 Merge branch 'sched-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'sched-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
  sched: fix init_idle()'s use of sched_clock()
  sched: fix stale value in average load per task
2008-11-12 17:22:44 -08:00
Andrew Morton
7e036d040a kernel/kprobes.c: don't pad kretprobe_table_locks[] on uniprocessor builds
We only need the cacheline padding on SMP kernels.  Saves 6k:

   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
   5713     388    8840   14941    3a5d kernel/kprobes.o
   5713     388    2632    8733    221d kernel/kprobes.o

Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com>
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-11-12 17:17:17 -08:00
Masami Hiramatsu
a189d0350f kprobes: disable preempt for module_text_address() and kernel_text_address()
__register_kprobe() can be preempted after checking probing address but
before module_text_address() or try_module_get(), and in this interval
the module can be unloaded.  In that case, try_module_get(probed_mod)
will access to invalid address, or kprobe will probe invalid address.

This patch uses preempt_disable() to protect it and uses
__module_text_address() and __kernel_text_address().

Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com>
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@ct.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-11-12 17:17:16 -08:00
Li Zefan
3b1b3f6e57 freezer_cg: disable writing freezer.state of root cgroup
With this change, control file 'freezer.state' doesn't exist in root
cgroup, making root cgroup unfreezable.

I think it's reasonable to disallow freeze tasks in the root cgroup.  And
then we can avoid fork overhead when freezer subsystem is compiled but not
used.

Also make writing invalid value to freezer.state returns EINVAL rather
than EIO.  This is more consistent with other cgroup subsystem.

Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-11-12 17:17:16 -08:00
Li Zefan
687446760b freezer_cg: remove task_lock from freezer_fork()
In theory the task can be moved to another cgroup and the freezer will be
freed right after task_lock is dropped, so the lock results in zero
protection.

But in the case of freezer_fork() no lock is needed, since the task is not
in tasklist yet so it won't be moved to another cgroup, so task->cgroups
won't be changed or invalidated.

Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-11-12 17:17:16 -08:00
Ingo Molnar
5cbd54ef47 sched: fix init_idle()'s use of sched_clock()
Maciej Rutecki reported:

> I have this bug during suspend to disk:
>
> [  188.592151] Enabling non-boot CPUs ...
> [  188.592151] SMP alternatives: switching to SMP code
> [  188.666058] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible
> [00000000]
> code: suspend_to_disk/2934
> [  188.666064] caller is native_sched_clock+0x2b/0x80

Which, as noted by Linus, was caused by me, via:

  7cbaef9c "sched: optimize sched_clock() a bit"

Move the rq locking a bit earlier in the initialization sequence,
that will make the sched_clock() call in init_idle() non-preemptible.

Reported-by: Maciej Rutecki <maciej.rutecki@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-12 20:05:50 +01:00
Balbir Singh
a2d477778e sched: fix stale value in average load per task
Impact: fix load balancer load average calculation accuracy

cpu_avg_load_per_task() returns a stale value when nr_running is 0.
It returns an older stale (caculated when nr_running was non zero) value.

This patch returns and sets rq->avg_load_per_task to zero when nr_running
is 0.

Compile and boot tested on a x86_64 box.

Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-12 12:33:50 +01:00
Peter Zijlstra
621a0d5207 hrtimer: clean up unused callback modes
Impact: cleanup

git grep HRTIMER_CB_IRQSAFE revealed half the callback modes are actually
unused.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-12 09:54:40 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
f21f237cf5 Merge branch 'timers-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'timers-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
  timers: handle HRTIMER_CB_IRQSAFE_UNLOCKED correctly from softirq context
  nohz: disable tick_nohz_kick_tick() for now
  irq: call __irq_enter() before calling the tick_idle_check
  x86: HPET: enter hpet_interrupt_handler with interrupts disabled
  x86: HPET: read from HPET_Tn_CMP() not HPET_T0_CMP
  x86: HPET: convert WARN_ON to WARN_ON_ONCE
2008-11-11 10:53:50 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
2f96cb57cd Merge branch 'sched-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'sched-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
  sched: release buddies on yield
  fix for account_group_exec_runtime(), make sure ->signal can't be freed under rq->lock
  sched: clean up debug info
2008-11-11 10:52:25 -08:00
Eric Paris
637d32dc72 Capabilities: BUG when an invalid capability is requested
If an invalid (large) capability is requested the capabilities system
may panic as it is dereferencing an array of fixed (short) length.  Its
possible (and actually often happens) that the capability system
accidentally stumbled into a valid memory region but it also regularly
happens that it hits invalid memory and BUGs.  If such an operation does
get past cap_capable then the selinux system is sure to have problems as
it already does a (simple) validity check and BUG.  This is known to
happen by the broken and buggy firegl driver.

This patch cleanly checks all capable calls and BUG if a call is for an
invalid capability.  This will likely break the firegl driver for some
situations, but it is the right thing to do.  Garbage into a security
system gets you killed/bugged

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-11 22:01:24 +11:00
Peter Zijlstra
2002c69595 sched: release buddies on yield
Clear buddies on yield, so that the buddy rules don't schedule them
despite them being placed right-most.

This fixed a performance regression with yield-happy binary JVMs.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Tested-by: Lin Ming <ming.m.lin@intel.com>
2008-11-11 11:57:22 +01:00
Eric Paris
e68b75a027 When the capset syscall is used it is not possible for audit to record the
actual capbilities being added/removed.  This patch adds a new record type
which emits the target pid and the eff, inh, and perm cap sets.

example output if you audit capset syscalls would be:

type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1225743140.465:76): arch=c000003e syscall=126 success=yes exit=0 a0=17f2014 a1=17f201c a2=80000000 a3=7fff2ab7f060 items=0 ppid=2160 pid=2223 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=1 comm="setcap" exe="/usr/sbin/setcap" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=UNKNOWN[1322] msg=audit(1225743140.465:76): pid=0 cap_pi=ffffffffffffffff cap_pp=ffffffffffffffff cap_pe=ffffffffffffffff

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-11 21:48:22 +11:00
Eric Paris
3fc689e96c Any time fcaps or a setuid app under SECURE_NOROOT is used to result in a
non-zero pE we will crate a new audit record which contains the entire set
of known information about the executable in question, fP, fI, fE, fversion
and includes the process's pE, pI, pP.  Before and after the bprm capability
are applied.  This record type will only be emitted from execve syscalls.

an example of making ping use fcaps instead of setuid:

setcap "cat_net_raw+pe" /bin/ping

type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): arch=c000003e syscall=59 success=yes exit=0 a0=1457f30 a1=14606b0 a2=1463940 a3=321b770a70 items=2 ppid=2929 pid=2963 auid=0 uid=500 gid=500 euid=500 suid=500 fsuid=500 egid=500 sgid=500 fsgid=500 tty=pts0 ses=3 comm="ping" exe="/bin/ping" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=UNKNOWN[1321] msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): fver=2 fp=0000000000002000 fi=0000000000000000 fe=1 old_pp=0000000000000000 old_pi=0000000000000000 old_pe=0000000000000000 new_pp=0000000000002000 new_pi=0000000000000000 new_pe=0000000000002000
type=EXECVE msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): argc=2 a0="ping" a1="127.0.0.1"
type=CWD msg=audit(1225742021.015:236):  cwd="/home/test"
type=PATH msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): item=0 name="/bin/ping" inode=49256 dev=fd:00 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t:s0 cap_fp=0000000000002000 cap_fe=1 cap_fver=2
type=PATH msg=audit(1225742021.015:236): item=1 name=(null) inode=507915 dev=fd:00 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ld_so_t:s0

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11:00
Eric Paris
851f7ff56d This patch will print cap_permitted and cap_inheritable data in the PATH
records of any file that has file capabilities set.  Files which do not
have fcaps set will not have different PATH records.

An example audit record if you run:
setcap "cap_net_admin+pie" /bin/bash
/bin/bash

type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): arch=c000003e syscall=59 success=yes exit=0 a0=2119230 a1=210da30 a2=20ee290 a3=8 items=2 ppid=2149 pid=2923 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=3 comm="ping" exe="/bin/ping" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=EXECVE msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): argc=2 a0="ping" a1="www.google.com"
type=CWD msg=audit(1225741937.363:230):  cwd="/root"
type=PATH msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): item=0 name="/bin/ping" inode=49256 dev=fd:00 mode=0104755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t:s0 cap_fp=0000000000002000 cap_fi=0000000000002000 cap_fe=1 cap_fver=2
type=PATH msg=audit(1225741937.363:230): item=1 name=(null) inode=507915 dev=fd:00 mode=0100755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:ld_so_t:s0

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11:00
Gautham R Shenoy
5d5254f0d3 timers: handle HRTIMER_CB_IRQSAFE_UNLOCKED correctly from softirq context
Impact: fix incorrect locking triggered during hotplug-intense stress-tests

While migrating the the CB_IRQSAFE_UNLOCKED timers during a cpu-offline,
we queue them on the cb_pending list, so that they won't go
stale.

Thus, when the callbacks of the timers run from the softirq context,
they could run into potential deadlocks, since these callbacks
assume that they're running with irq's disabled, thereby annoying
lockdep!

Fix this by emulating hardirq context while running these callbacks from
the hrtimer softirq.

=================================
[ INFO: inconsistent lock state ]
2.6.27 #2
--------------------------------
inconsistent {in-hardirq-W} -> {hardirq-on-W} usage.
ksoftirqd/0/4 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE1:SE0] takes:
 (&rq->lock){++..}, at: [<c011db84>] sched_rt_period_timer+0x9e/0x1fc
{in-hardirq-W} state was registered at:
  [<c014103c>] __lock_acquire+0x549/0x121e
  [<c0107890>] native_sched_clock+0x88/0x99
  [<c013aa12>] clocksource_get_next+0x39/0x3f
  [<c0139abc>] update_wall_time+0x616/0x7df
  [<c0141d6b>] lock_acquire+0x5a/0x74
  [<c0121724>] scheduler_tick+0x3a/0x18d
  [<c047ed45>] _spin_lock+0x1c/0x45
  [<c0121724>] scheduler_tick+0x3a/0x18d
  [<c0121724>] scheduler_tick+0x3a/0x18d
  [<c012c436>] update_process_times+0x3a/0x44
  [<c013c044>] tick_periodic+0x63/0x6d
  [<c013c062>] tick_handle_periodic+0x14/0x5e
  [<c010568c>] timer_interrupt+0x44/0x4a
  [<c0150c9f>] handle_IRQ_event+0x13/0x3d
  [<c0151c14>] handle_level_irq+0x79/0xbd
  [<c0105634>] do_IRQ+0x69/0x7d
  [<c01041e4>] common_interrupt+0x28/0x30
  [<c047007b>] aac_probe_one+0x1a3/0x3f3
  [<c047ec2d>] _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x36/0x39
  [<c01512b4>] setup_irq+0x1be/0x1f9
  [<c065d70b>] start_kernel+0x259/0x2c5
  [<ffffffff>] 0xffffffff
irq event stamp: 50102
hardirqs last  enabled at (50102): [<c047ebf4>] _spin_unlock_irq+0x20/0x23
hardirqs last disabled at (50101): [<c047edc2>] _spin_lock_irq+0xa/0x4b
softirqs last  enabled at (50088): [<c0128ba6>] do_softirq+0x37/0x4d
softirqs last disabled at (50099): [<c0128ba6>] do_softirq+0x37/0x4d

other info that might help us debug this:
no locks held by ksoftirqd/0/4.

stack backtrace:
Pid: 4, comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 2.6.27 #2
 [<c013f6cb>] print_usage_bug+0x13e/0x147
 [<c013fef5>] mark_lock+0x493/0x797
 [<c01410b1>] __lock_acquire+0x5be/0x121e
 [<c0141d6b>] lock_acquire+0x5a/0x74
 [<c011db84>] sched_rt_period_timer+0x9e/0x1fc
 [<c047ed45>] _spin_lock+0x1c/0x45
 [<c011db84>] sched_rt_period_timer+0x9e/0x1fc
 [<c011db84>] sched_rt_period_timer+0x9e/0x1fc
 [<c01210fd>] finish_task_switch+0x41/0xbd
 [<c0107890>] native_sched_clock+0x88/0x99
 [<c011dae6>] sched_rt_period_timer+0x0/0x1fc
 [<c0136dda>] run_hrtimer_pending+0x54/0xe5
 [<c011dae6>] sched_rt_period_timer+0x0/0x1fc
 [<c0128afb>] __do_softirq+0x7b/0xef
 [<c0128ba6>] do_softirq+0x37/0x4d
 [<c0128c12>] ksoftirqd+0x56/0xc5
 [<c0128bbc>] ksoftirqd+0x0/0xc5
 [<c0134649>] kthread+0x38/0x5d
 [<c0134611>] kthread+0x0/0x5d
 [<c0104477>] kernel_thread_helper+0x7/0x10
 =======================

Signed-off-by: Gautham R Shenoy <ego@in.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Acked-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-11 10:46:42 +01:00
Ingo Molnar
45b86a96f1 Merge branch 'devel' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-2.6-trace into tracing/urgent 2008-11-11 09:16:20 +01:00
Oleg Nesterov
ad474caca3 fix for account_group_exec_runtime(), make sure ->signal can't be freed under rq->lock
Impact: fix hang/crash on ia64 under high load

This is ugly, but the simplest patch by far.

Unlike other similar routines, account_group_exec_runtime() could be
called "implicitly" from within scheduler after exit_notify(). This
means we can race with the parent doing release_task(), we can't just
check ->signal != NULL.

Change __exit_signal() to do spin_unlock_wait(&task_rq(tsk)->lock)
before __cleanup_signal() to make sure ->signal can't be freed under
task_rq(tsk)->lock. Note that task_rq_unlock_wait() doesn't care
about the case when tsk changes cpu/rq under us, this should be OK.

Thanks to Ingo who nacked my previous buggy patch.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Reported-by: Doug Chapman <doug.chapman@hp.com>
2008-11-11 08:01:43 +01:00
Steven Rostedt
4143c5cb36 ring-buffer: prevent infinite looping on time stamping
Impact: removal of unnecessary looping

The lockless part of the ring buffer allows for reentry into the code
from interrupts. A timestamp is taken, a test is preformed and if it
detects that an interrupt occurred that did tracing, it tries again.

The problem arises if the timestamp code itself causes a trace.
The detection will detect this and loop again. The difference between
this and an interrupt doing tracing, is that this will fail every time,
and cause an infinite loop.

Currently, we test if the loop happens 1000 times, and if so, it will
produce a warning and disable the ring buffer.

The problem with this approach is that it makes it difficult to perform
some types of tracing (tracing the timestamp code itself).

Each trace entry has a delta timestamp from the previous entry.
If a trace entry is reserved but and interrupt occurs and traces before
the previous entry is commited, the delta timestamp for that entry will
be zero. This actually makes sense in terms of tracing, because the
interrupt entry happened before the preempted entry was commited, so
one may consider the two happening at the same time. The order is
still preserved in the buffer.

With this idea, instead of trying to get a new timestamp if an interrupt
made it in between the timestamp and the test, the entry could simply
make the delta zero and continue. This will prevent interrupts or
tracers in the timer code from causing the above loop.

Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <srostedt@redhat.com>
2008-11-10 21:47:37 -05:00
Steven Rostedt
bf5e6519b8 ftrace: disable tracing on resize
Impact: fix for bug on resize

This patch addresses the bug found here:

 http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11996

When ftrace converted to the new unified trace buffer, the resizing of
the buffer was not protected as much as it was originally. If tracing
is performed while the resize occurs, then the buffer can be corrupted.

This patch disables all ftrace buffer modifications before a resize
takes place.

Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <srostedt@redhat.com>
2008-11-10 21:47:35 -05:00
Thomas Gleixner
ae99286b4f nohz: disable tick_nohz_kick_tick() for now
Impact: nohz powersavings and wakeup regression

commit fb02fbc14d (NOHZ: restart tick
device from irq_enter()) causes a serious wakeup regression.

While the patch is correct it does not take into account that spurious
wakeups happen on x86. A fix for this issue is available, but we just
revert to the .27 behaviour and let long running softirqs screw
themself.

Disable it for now.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2008-11-10 22:39:27 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
ee5f80a993 irq: call __irq_enter() before calling the tick_idle_check
Impact: avoid spurious ksoftirqd wakeups

The tick idle check which is called from irq_enter() was run before
the call to __irq_enter() which did not set the in_interrupt() bits in
preempt_count. That way the raise of a softirq woke up softirqd for
nothing as the softirq was handled on return from interrupt.

Call __irq_enter() before calling into the tick idle check code.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-10 22:36:39 +01:00
Peter Zijlstra
5ac5c4d604 sched: clean up debug info
Impact: clean up and fix debug info printout

While looking over the sched_debug code I noticed that we printed the rq
schedstats for every cfs_rq, ammend this.

Also change nr_spead_over into an int, and fix a little buglet in
min_vruntime printing.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-10 10:51:51 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
cb56d98e2a Merge branch 'cpus4096' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'cpus4096' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
  cpumask: introduce new API, without changing anything, v3
  cpumask: new API, v2
  cpumask: introduce new API, without changing anything
2008-11-09 12:20:56 -08:00
Li Zefan
ca3273f964 sched: fix memory leak in a failure path
Impact: fix rare memory leak in the sched-domains manual reconfiguration code

In the failure path, rd is not attached to a sched domain,
so it causes a leak.

Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-07 08:29:58 +01:00
Li Zefan
f29c9b1ccb sched: fix a bug in sched domain degenerate
Impact: re-add incorrectly eliminated sched domain layers

(1) on i386 with SCHED_SMT and SCHED_MC enabled
	# mount -t cgroup -o cpuset xxx /mnt
	# echo 0 > /mnt/cpuset.sched_load_balance
	# mkdir /mnt/0
	# echo 0 > /mnt/0/cpuset.cpus
	# dmesg
	CPU0 attaching sched-domain:
	 domain 0: span 0 level CPU
	  groups: 0

(2) on i386 with SCHED_MC enabled but SCHED_SMT disabled
	# same with (1)
	# dmesg
	CPU0 attaching NULL sched-domain.

The bug is that some sched domains may be skipped unintentionally when
degenerating (optimizing) sched domains.

Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-07 08:29:57 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
e252f4db18 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-2.6-block
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-2.6-block:
  Block: use round_jiffies_up()
  Add round_jiffies_up and related routines
  block: fix __blkdev_get() for removable devices
  generic-ipi: fix the smp_mb() placement
  blk: move blk_delete_timer call in end_that_request_last
  block: add timer on blkdev_dequeue_request() not elv_next_request()
  bio: define __BIOVEC_PHYS_MERGEABLE
  block: remove unused ll_new_mergeable()
2008-11-06 15:53:47 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
067ab19923 Merge branch 'sched-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip
* 'sched-fixes-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
  sched: re-tune balancing
  sched: fix buddies for group scheduling
  sched: backward looking buddy
  sched: fix fair preempt check
  sched: cleanup fair task selection
2008-11-06 15:45:40 -08:00
Li Zefan
24eb089950 cgroups: fix invalid cgrp->dentry before cgroup has been completely removed
This fixes an oops when reading /proc/sched_debug.

A cgroup won't be removed completely until finishing cgroup_diput(), so we
shouldn't invalidate cgrp->dentry in cgroup_rmdir().  Otherwise, when a
group is being removed while cgroup_path() gets called, we may trigger
NULL dereference BUG.

The bug can be reproduced:

 # cat test.sh
 #!/bin/sh
 mount -t cgroup -o cpu xxx /mnt
 for (( ; ; ))
 {
	mkdir /mnt/sub
	rmdir /mnt/sub
 }
 # ./test.sh &
 # cat /proc/sched_debug

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000038
IP: [<c045a47f>] cgroup_path+0x39/0x90
...
Call Trace:
 [<c0420344>] ? print_cfs_rq+0x6e/0x75d
 [<c0421160>] ? sched_debug_show+0x72d/0xc1e
...

Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>		[2.6.26.x, 2.6.27.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-11-06 15:41:19 -08:00
Rusty Russell
2d3854a37e cpumask: introduce new API, without changing anything
Impact: introduce new APIs

We want to deprecate cpumasks on the stack, as we are headed for
gynormous numbers of CPUs.  Eventually, we want to head towards an
undefined 'struct cpumask' so they can never be declared on stack.

1) New cpumask functions which take pointers instead of copies.
   (cpus_* -> cpumask_*)

2) Several new helpers to reduce requirements for temporary cpumasks
   (cpumask_first_and, cpumask_next_and, cpumask_any_and)

3) Helpers for declaring cpumasks on or offstack for large NR_CPUS
   (cpumask_var_t, alloc_cpumask_var and free_cpumask_var)

4) 'struct cpumask' for explicitness and to mark new-style code.

5) Make iterator functions stop at nr_cpu_ids (a runtime constant),
   not NR_CPUS for time efficiency and for smaller dynamic allocations
   in future.

6) cpumask_copy() so we can allocate less than a full cpumask eventually
   (for alloc_cpumask_var), and so we can eliminate the 'struct cpumask'
   definition eventually.

7) work_on_cpu() helper for doing task on a CPU, rather than saving old
   cpumask for current thread and manipulating it.

8) smp_call_function_many() which is smp_call_function_mask() except
   taking a cpumask pointer.

Note that this patch simply introduces the new functions and leaves
the obsolescent ones in place.  This is to simplify the transition
patches.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-06 09:05:33 +01:00
Alan Stern
9c133c469d Add round_jiffies_up and related routines
This patch (as1158b) adds round_jiffies_up() and friends.  These
routines work like the analogous round_jiffies() functions, except
that they will never round down.

The new routines will be useful for timeouts where we don't care
exactly when the timer expires, provided it doesn't expire too soon.

Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
2008-11-06 08:42:48 +01:00
Suresh Siddha
561920a0d2 generic-ipi: fix the smp_mb() placement
smp_mb() is needed (to make the memory operations visible globally) before
sending the ipi on the sender and the receiver (on Alpha atleast) needs
smp_read_barrier_depends() in the handler before reading the call_single_queue
list in a lock-free fashion.

On x86, x2apic mode register accesses for sending IPI's don't have serializing
semantics. So the need for smp_mb() before sending the IPI becomes more
critical in x2apic mode.

Remove the unnecessary smp_mb() in csd_flag_wait(), as the presence of that
smp_mb() doesn't mean anything on the sender, when the ipi receiver is not
doing any thing special (like memory fence) after clearing the CSD_FLAG_WAIT.

Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
2008-11-06 08:41:56 +01:00
Serge E. Hallyn
1f29fae297 file capabilities: add no_file_caps switch (v4)
Add a no_file_caps boot option when file capabilities are
compiled into the kernel (CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y).

This allows distributions to ship a kernel with file capabilities
compiled in, without forcing users to use (and understand and
trust) them.

When no_file_caps is specified at boot, then when a process executes
a file, any file capabilities stored with that file will not be
used in the calculation of the process' new capability sets.

This means that booting with the no_file_caps boot option will
not be the same as booting a kernel with file capabilities
compiled out - in particular a task with  CAP_SETPCAP will not
have any chance of passing capabilities to another task (which
isn't "really" possible anyway, and which may soon by killed
altogether by David Howells in any case), and it will instead
be able to put new capabilities in its pI.  However since fI
will always be empty and pI is masked with fI, it gains the
task nothing.

We also support the extra prctl options, setting securebits and
dropping capabilities from the per-process bounding set.

The other remaining difference is that killpriv, task_setscheduler,
setioprio, and setnice will continue to be hooked.  That will
be noticable in the case where a root task changed its uid
while keeping some caps, and another task owned by the new uid
tries to change settings for the more privileged task.

Changelog:
	Nov 05 2008: (v4) trivial port on top of always-start-\
		with-clear-caps patch
	Sep 23 2008: nixed file_caps_enabled when file caps are
		not compiled in as it isn't used.
		Document no_file_caps in kernel-parameters.txt.

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-06 07:14:51 +08:00
Peter Zijlstra
02479099c2 sched: fix buddies for group scheduling
Impact: scheduling order fix for group scheduling

For each level in the hierarchy, set the buddy to point to the right entity.
Therefore, when we do the hierarchical schedule, we have a fair chance of
ending up where we meant to.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Acked-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-05 10:30:15 +01:00
Peter Zijlstra
4793241be4 sched: backward looking buddy
Impact: improve/change/fix wakeup-buddy scheduling

Currently we only have a forward looking buddy, that is, we prefer to
schedule to the task we last woke up, under the presumption that its
going to consume the data we just produced, and therefore will have
cache hot benefits.

This allows co-waking producer/consumer task pairs to run ahead of the
pack for a little while, keeping their cache warm. Without this, we
would interleave all pairs, utterly trashing the cache.

This patch introduces a backward looking buddy, that is, suppose that
in the above scenario, the consumer preempts the producer before it
can go to sleep, we will therefore miss the wakeup from consumer to
producer (its already running, after all), breaking the cycle and
reverting to the cache-trashing interleaved schedule pattern.

The backward buddy will try to schedule back to the task that woke us
up in case the forward buddy is not available, under the assumption
that the last task will be the one with the most cache hot task around
barring current.

This will basically allow a task to continue after it got preempted.

In order to avoid starvation, we allow either buddy to get wakeup_gran
ahead of the pack.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Acked-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-05 10:30:14 +01:00