master
87 Commits
Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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Arnd Bergmann
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54233a4254 |
uretprobe: change syscall number, again
Despite multiple attempts to get the syscall number assignment right for the newly added uretprobe syscall, we ended up with a bit of a mess: - The number is defined as 467 based on the assumption that the xattrat family of syscalls would use 463 through 466, but those did not make it into 6.11. - The include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h file still lists the number 463, but the new scripts/syscall.tbl that was supposed to have the same data lists 467 instead as the number for arc, arm64, csky, hexagon, loongarch, nios2, openrisc and riscv. None of these architectures actually provide a uretprobe syscall. - All the other architectures (powerpc, arm, mips, ...) don't list this syscall at all. There are two ways to make it consistent again: either list it with the same syscall number on all architectures, or only list it on x86 but not in scripts/syscall.tbl and asm-generic/unistd.h. Based on the most recent discussion, it seems like we won't need it anywhere else, so just remove the inconsistent assignment and instead move the x86 number to the next available one in the architecture specific range, which is 335. Fixes: |
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Linus Torvalds
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91bd008d4e |
Probes updates for v6.11:
Uprobes: - x86/shstk: Make return uprobe work with shadow stack. - Add uretprobe syscall which speeds up the uretprobe 10-30% faster. This syscall is automatically used from user-space trampolines which are generated by the uretprobe. If this syscall is used by normal user program, it will cause SIGILL. Note that this is currently only implemented on x86_64. (This also has 2 fixes for adjusting the syscall number to avoid conflict with new *attrat syscalls.) - uprobes/perf: fix user stack traces in the presence of pending uretprobe. This corrects the uretprobe's trampoline address in the stacktrace with correct return address. - selftests/x86: Add a return uprobe with shadow stack test. - selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall related tests. . test case for register integrity check. . test case with register changing case. . test case for uretprobe syscall without uprobes (expected to be failed). . test case for uretprobe with shadow stack. - selftests/bpf: add test validating uprobe/uretprobe stack traces - MAINTAINERS: Add uprobes entry. This does not specify the tree but to clarify who maintains and reviews the uprobes. Kprobes: - tracing/kprobes: Test case cleanups. Replace redundant WARN_ON_ONCE() + pr_warn() with WARN_ONCE() and remove unnecessary code from selftest. - tracing/kprobes: Add symbol counting check when module loads. This checks the uniqueness of the probed symbol on modules. The same check has already done for kernel symbols. (This also has a fix for build error with CONFIG_MODULES=n) Cleanup: - Add MODULE_DESCRIPTION() macros for fprobe and kprobe examples. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQFPBAABCgA5FiEEh7BulGwFlgAOi5DV2/sHvwUrPxsFAmaWYxwbHG1hc2FtaS5o aXJhbWF0c3VAZ21haWwuY29tAAoJENv7B78FKz8bsUgH/3JcSzDZujQWCZ1f4fJn QecvTFSYcCl6ck8+/3wm4EsgeCXIFOyPnoPc7k2Gm+l6Dlk1DKGV6wV4tuKFUq9X 9mplcwoVA0Ln+EX9zv9v4s99yUGxcU9xjgC9XT7J52SvqYncPIi6dR0Z9wlJBmyd Bx3cZk+wSzCYaoqYngI2fKlzsEcYgDIP999fQPRi0HGzNZujc4xeJyjCTC/48yWO 9kreRQq6wFdgRQTwMcR/fKPDKIGZQCU8jkXv5crVV5K3rNaBcwBmCJJMP8PzPU0V UQ0+8RZK+Qk8SBwXcMNVRqm/efTderob4IYxP8OBe5wjAIE7+vu8r6sqwxRIS54M Cyg= =DRSr -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'probes-v6.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace Pull probes updates from Masami Hiramatsu: "Uprobes: - x86/shstk: Make return uprobe work with shadow stack - Add uretprobe syscall which speeds up the uretprobe 10-30% faster. This syscall is automatically used from user-space trampolines which are generated by the uretprobe. If this syscall is used by normal user program, it will cause SIGILL. Note that this is currently only implemented on x86_64. (This also has two fixes for adjusting the syscall number to avoid conflict with new *attrat syscalls.) - uprobes/perf: fix user stack traces in the presence of pending uretprobe. This corrects the uretprobe's trampoline address in the stacktrace with correct return address - selftests/x86: Add a return uprobe with shadow stack test - selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall related tests. - test case for register integrity check - test case with register changing case - test case for uretprobe syscall without uprobes (expected to fail) - test case for uretprobe with shadow stack - selftests/bpf: add test validating uprobe/uretprobe stack traces - MAINTAINERS: Add uprobes entry. This does not specify the tree but to clarify who maintains and reviews the uprobes Kprobes: - tracing/kprobes: Test case cleanups. Replace redundant WARN_ON_ONCE() + pr_warn() with WARN_ONCE() and remove unnecessary code from selftest - tracing/kprobes: Add symbol counting check when module loads. This checks the uniqueness of the probed symbol on modules. The same check has already done for kernel symbols (This also has a fix for build error with CONFIG_MODULES=n) Cleanup: - Add MODULE_DESCRIPTION() macros for fprobe and kprobe examples" * tag 'probes-v6.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace: MAINTAINERS: Add uprobes entry selftests/bpf: Change uretprobe syscall number in uprobe_syscall test uprobe: Change uretprobe syscall scope and number tracing/kprobes: Fix build error when find_module() is not available tracing/kprobes: Add symbol counting check when module loads selftests/bpf: add test validating uprobe/uretprobe stack traces perf,uprobes: fix user stack traces in the presence of pending uretprobes tracing/kprobe: Remove cleanup code unrelated to selftest tracing/kprobe: Integrate test warnings into WARN_ONCE selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe shadow stack test selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall call from user space test selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall test for regs changes selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall test for regs integrity selftests/x86: Add return uprobe shadow stack test uprobe: Add uretprobe syscall to speed up return probe uprobe: Wire up uretprobe system call x86/shstk: Make return uprobe work with shadow stack samples: kprobes: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() macros fprobe: add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() macro |
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Linus Torvalds
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2439a5eaa7 |
- Add a spectre_bhi=vmexit mitigation option aimed at cloud
environments - Remove duplicated Spectre cmdline option documentation - Add separate macro definitions for syscall handlers which do not return in order to address objtool warnings -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmaVXXMACgkQEsHwGGHe VUrd3A/9FFJZcpxdpWJikyEskb3CO1xthfM/6QvV5U3/Nldpz4aROEteqsMYc+xB OcA/RkCc8mBBFuydZjNxlNwyMXkoab/rQJC/Dz7q1O61sho4RWk8yCh6xM1JRofF WeKGCClz1KnsCc8FlVaHAEhp6gBMJiiqawjXBklfHhUqmbY7UZgcAyeM3uMIwAEG qCS7opOSZVijJadoyvROf5na23hggUVO++qS4HYT66G3bI3MdEEWp06dUxXBD/Er 2zRAY6III4wuGTxe8L49ftsyW9RS7AKY2rUmhpffkeA8tLYBfXogYVSQYyR3S9Ou gZg9Yeu64rjqZZUYpzRR+kATUpuSKO6nQBHxd+ICRIUbzSmXUNzvPTi5SWSWh2vC HTLgFbGXxg8fLlpqCJ21oaU982w3eteOJ+wgf/AH3hBykFljck9EcaGsaQ5OfeDE MA0XaDy2V4jypyxmLpRfRIWJWtNVTgza2Jl0Dg3X+UipAXtvCvJzW1ZJ0ksA+2P0 K1GeWy4tC51uFndeYpNC1eQ0cJjv1mfAugHcqgVdAhwMYUZdXchaPJHr/fcF7AEG xjV7fnoGK6WKKUni+Tnmom3FzBVDztKAtZ4iYgwIWReRj9bKLhP2k779rMXkCftt WtiencSCtVn+K/4acYBx0vbRKlDv769Lq64FZ8xNgGw6uRXjhhM= =AP9P -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.11_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 cpu mitigation updates from Borislav Petkov: - Add a spectre_bhi=vmexit mitigation option aimed at cloud environments - Remove duplicated Spectre cmdline option documentation - Add separate macro definitions for syscall handlers which do not return in order to address objtool warnings * tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.11_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/bugs: Add 'spectre_bhi=vmexit' cmdline option x86/bugs: Remove duplicate Spectre cmdline option descriptions x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn |
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Jiri Olsa
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63ded11097 |
uprobe: Change uretprobe syscall scope and number
After discussing with Arnd [1] it's preferable to change uretprobe
syscall number to 467 to omit the merge conflict with xattrat syscalls.
Also changing the ABI to 'common' which will ease up the global
scripts/syscall.tbl management. One consequence is we generate uretprobe
syscall numbers for ABIs that do not support uretprobe syscall, but the
syscall still returns -ENOSYS when called in that ABI.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/784a34e5-4654-44c9-9c07-f9f4ffd952a0@app.fastmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240712135228.1619332-2-jolsa@kernel.org/
Fixes:
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Josh Poimboeuf
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9142be9e64 |
x86/syscall: Mark exit[_group] syscall handlers __noreturn
The direct-call syscall dispatch function doesn't know that the exit()
and exit_group() syscall handlers don't return, so the call sites aren't
optimized accordingly.
Fix that by marking the exit syscall declarations __noreturn.
Fixes the following warnings:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: x64_sys_call+0x2804: __x64_sys_exit() is missing a __noreturn annotation
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: ia32_sys_call+0x29b6: __ia32_sys_exit_group() is missing a __noreturn annotation
Fixes:
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Marcin Juszkiewicz
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9aae1baa1c |
x86, arm: Add missing license tag to syscall tables files
syscall*.tbl files were added to make it easier to check which system calls are supported on each architecture and to check for their numbers. Arm and x86 files lack Linux-syscall-note license exception present in files for all other architectures. Signed-off-by: Marcin Juszkiewicz <marcin@juszkiewicz.com.pl> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240229145101.553998-1-marcin@juszkiewicz.com.pl |
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Jiri Olsa
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190fec72df |
uprobe: Wire up uretprobe system call
Wiring up uretprobe system call, which comes in following changes. We need to do the wiring before, because the uretprobe implementation needs the syscall number. Note at the moment uretprobe syscall is supported only for native 64-bit process. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240611112158.40795-3-jolsa@kernel.org/ Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> |
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Jeff Xu
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ff388fe5c4 |
mseal: wire up mseal syscall
Patch series "Introduce mseal", v10. This patchset proposes a new mseal() syscall for the Linux kernel. In a nutshell, mseal() protects the VMAs of a given virtual memory range against modifications, such as changes to their permission bits. Modern CPUs support memory permissions, such as the read/write (RW) and no-execute (NX) bits. Linux has supported NX since the release of kernel version 2.6.8 in August 2004 [1]. The memory permission feature improves the security stance on memory corruption bugs, as an attacker cannot simply write to arbitrary memory and point the code to it. The memory must be marked with the X bit, or else an exception will occur. Internally, the kernel maintains the memory permissions in a data structure called VMA (vm_area_struct). mseal() additionally protects the VMA itself against modifications of the selected seal type. Memory sealing is useful to mitigate memory corruption issues where a corrupted pointer is passed to a memory management system. For example, such an attacker primitive can break control-flow integrity guarantees since read-only memory that is supposed to be trusted can become writable or .text pages can get remapped. Memory sealing can automatically be applied by the runtime loader to seal .text and .rodata pages and applications can additionally seal security critical data at runtime. A similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT [3] flag and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall [4]. Also, Chrome wants to adopt this feature for their CFI work [2] and this patchset has been designed to be compatible with the Chrome use case. Two system calls are involved in sealing the map: mmap() and mseal(). The new mseal() is an syscall on 64 bit CPU, and with following signature: int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags) addr/len: memory range. flags: reserved. mseal() blocks following operations for the given memory range. 1> Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size, via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore can be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes. 2> Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location, via mremap(). 3> Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED). 4> Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any specific risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because the use case is unclear. In any case, users can rely on merging to expand a sealed VMA. 5> mprotect() and pkey_mprotect(). 6> Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED) for anonymous memory, when users don't have write permission to the memory. Those behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, effectively a memset(0) for anonymous memory. The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttger’s work in V8 CFI [5]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this API. Indeed, the Chrome browser has very specific requirements for sealing, which are distinct from those of most applications. For example, in the case of libc, sealing is only applied to read-only (RO) or read-execute (RX) memory segments (such as .text and .RELRO) to prevent them from becoming writable, the lifetime of those mappings are tied to the lifetime of the process. Chrome wants to seal two large address space reservations that are managed by different allocators. The memory is mapped RW- and RWX respectively but write access to it is restricted using pkeys (or in the future ARM permission overlay extensions). The lifetime of those mappings are not tied to the lifetime of the process, therefore, while the memory is sealed, the allocators still need to free or discard the unused memory. For example, with madvise(DONTNEED). However, always allowing madvise(DONTNEED) on this range poses a security risk. For example if a jump instruction crosses a page boundary and the second page gets discarded, it will overwrite the target bytes with zeros and change the control flow. Checking write-permission before the discard operation allows us to control when the operation is valid. In this case, the madvise will only succeed if the executing thread has PKEY write permissions and PKRU changes are protected in software by control-flow integrity. Although the initial version of this patch series is targeting the Chrome browser as its first user, it became evident during upstream discussions that we would also want to ensure that the patch set eventually is a complete solution for memory sealing and compatible with other use cases. The specific scenario currently in mind is glibc's use case of loading and sealing ELF executables. To this end, Stephen is working on a change to glibc to add sealing support to the dynamic linker, which will seal all non-writable segments at startup. Once this work is completed, all applications will be able to automatically benefit from these new protections. In closing, I would like to formally acknowledge the valuable contributions received during the RFC process, which were instrumental in shaping this patch: Jann Horn: raising awareness and providing valuable insights on the destructive madvise operations. Liam R. Howlett: perf optimization. Linus Torvalds: assisting in defining system call signature and scope. Theo de Raadt: sharing the experiences and insight gained from implementing mimmutable() in OpenBSD. MM perf benchmarks ================== This patch adds a loop in the mprotect/munmap/madvise(DONTNEED) to check the VMAs’ sealing flag, so that no partial update can be made, when any segment within the given memory range is sealed. To measure the performance impact of this loop, two tests are developed. [8] The first is measuring the time taken for a particular system call, by using clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC). The second is using PERF_COUNT_HW_REF_CPU_CYCLES (exclude user space). Both tests have similar results. The tests have roughly below sequence: for (i = 0; i < 1000, i++) create 1000 mappings (1 page per VMA) start the sampling for (j = 0; j < 1000, j++) mprotect one mapping stop and save the sample delete 1000 mappings calculates all samples. Below tests are performed on Intel(R) Pentium(R) Gold 7505 @ 2.00GHz, 4G memory, Chromebook. Based on the latest upstream code: The first test (measuring time) syscall__ vmas t t_mseal delta_ns per_vma % munmap__ 1 909 944 35 35 104% munmap__ 2 1398 1502 104 52 107% munmap__ 4 2444 2594 149 37 106% munmap__ 8 4029 4323 293 37 107% munmap__ 16 6647 6935 288 18 104% munmap__ 32 11811 12398 587 18 105% mprotect 1 439 465 26 26 106% mprotect 2 1659 1745 86 43 105% mprotect 4 3747 3889 142 36 104% mprotect 8 6755 6969 215 27 103% mprotect 16 13748 14144 396 25 103% mprotect 32 27827 28969 1142 36 104% madvise_ 1 240 262 22 22 109% madvise_ 2 366 442 76 38 121% madvise_ 4 623 751 128 32 121% madvise_ 8 1110 1324 215 27 119% madvise_ 16 2127 2451 324 20 115% madvise_ 32 4109 4642 534 17 113% The second test (measuring cpu cycle) syscall__ vmas cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma % munmap__ 1 1790 1890 100 100 106% munmap__ 2 2819 3033 214 107 108% munmap__ 4 4959 5271 312 78 106% munmap__ 8 8262 8745 483 60 106% munmap__ 16 13099 14116 1017 64 108% munmap__ 32 23221 24785 1565 49 107% mprotect 1 906 967 62 62 107% mprotect 2 3019 3203 184 92 106% mprotect 4 6149 6569 420 105 107% mprotect 8 9978 10524 545 68 105% mprotect 16 20448 21427 979 61 105% mprotect 32 40972 42935 1963 61 105% madvise_ 1 434 497 63 63 115% madvise_ 2 752 899 147 74 120% madvise_ 4 1313 1513 200 50 115% madvise_ 8 2271 2627 356 44 116% madvise_ 16 4312 4883 571 36 113% madvise_ 32 8376 9319 943 29 111% Based on the result, for 6.8 kernel, sealing check adds 20-40 nano seconds, or around 50-100 CPU cycles, per VMA. In addition, I applied the sealing to 5.10 kernel: The first test (measuring time) syscall__ vmas t tmseal delta_ns per_vma % munmap__ 1 357 390 33 33 109% munmap__ 2 442 463 21 11 105% munmap__ 4 614 634 20 5 103% munmap__ 8 1017 1137 120 15 112% munmap__ 16 1889 2153 263 16 114% munmap__ 32 4109 4088 -21 -1 99% mprotect 1 235 227 -7 -7 97% mprotect 2 495 464 -30 -15 94% mprotect 4 741 764 24 6 103% mprotect 8 1434 1437 2 0 100% mprotect 16 2958 2991 33 2 101% mprotect 32 6431 6608 177 6 103% madvise_ 1 191 208 16 16 109% madvise_ 2 300 324 24 12 108% madvise_ 4 450 473 23 6 105% madvise_ 8 753 806 53 7 107% madvise_ 16 1467 1592 125 8 108% madvise_ 32 2795 3405 610 19 122% The second test (measuring cpu cycle) syscall__ nbr_vma cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma % munmap__ 1 684 715 31 31 105% munmap__ 2 861 898 38 19 104% munmap__ 4 1183 1235 51 13 104% munmap__ 8 1999 2045 46 6 102% munmap__ 16 3839 3816 -23 -1 99% munmap__ 32 7672 7887 216 7 103% mprotect 1 397 443 46 46 112% mprotect 2 738 788 50 25 107% mprotect 4 1221 1256 35 9 103% mprotect 8 2356 2429 72 9 103% mprotect 16 4961 4935 -26 -2 99% mprotect 32 9882 10172 291 9 103% madvise_ 1 351 380 29 29 108% madvise_ 2 565 615 49 25 109% madvise_ 4 872 933 61 15 107% madvise_ 8 1508 1640 132 16 109% madvise_ 16 3078 3323 245 15 108% madvise_ 32 5893 6704 811 25 114% For 5.10 kernel, sealing check adds 0-15 ns in time, or 10-30 CPU cycles, there is even decrease in some cases. It might be interesting to compare 5.10 and 6.8 kernel The first test (measuring time) syscall__ vmas t_5_10 t_6_8 delta_ns per_vma % munmap__ 1 357 909 552 552 254% munmap__ 2 442 1398 956 478 316% munmap__ 4 614 2444 1830 458 398% munmap__ 8 1017 4029 3012 377 396% munmap__ 16 1889 6647 4758 297 352% munmap__ 32 4109 11811 7702 241 287% mprotect 1 235 439 204 204 187% mprotect 2 495 1659 1164 582 335% mprotect 4 741 3747 3006 752 506% mprotect 8 1434 6755 5320 665 471% mprotect 16 2958 13748 10790 674 465% mprotect 32 6431 27827 21397 669 433% madvise_ 1 191 240 49 49 125% madvise_ 2 300 366 67 33 122% madvise_ 4 450 623 173 43 138% madvise_ 8 753 1110 357 45 147% madvise_ 16 1467 2127 660 41 145% madvise_ 32 2795 4109 1314 41 147% The second test (measuring cpu cycle) syscall__ vmas cpu_5_10 c_6_8 delta_cpu per_vma % munmap__ 1 684 1790 1106 1106 262% munmap__ 2 861 2819 1958 979 327% munmap__ 4 1183 4959 3776 944 419% munmap__ 8 1999 8262 6263 783 413% munmap__ 16 3839 13099 9260 579 341% munmap__ 32 7672 23221 15549 486 303% mprotect 1 397 906 509 509 228% mprotect 2 738 3019 2281 1140 409% mprotect 4 1221 6149 4929 1232 504% mprotect 8 2356 9978 7622 953 423% mprotect 16 4961 20448 15487 968 412% mprotect 32 9882 40972 31091 972 415% madvise_ 1 351 434 82 82 123% madvise_ 2 565 752 186 93 133% madvise_ 4 872 1313 442 110 151% madvise_ 8 1508 2271 763 95 151% madvise_ 16 3078 4312 1234 77 140% madvise_ 32 5893 8376 2483 78 142% From 5.10 to 6.8 munmap: added 250-550 ns in time, or 500-1100 in cpu cycle, per vma. mprotect: added 200-750 ns in time, or 500-1200 in cpu cycle, per vma. madvise: added 33-50 ns in time, or 70-110 in cpu cycle, per vma. In comparison to mseal, which adds 20-40 ns or 50-100 CPU cycles, the increase from 5.10 to 6.8 is significantly larger, approximately ten times greater for munmap and mprotect. When I discuss the mm performance with Brian Makin, an engineer who worked on performance, it was brought to my attention that such performance benchmarks, which measuring millions of mm syscall in a tight loop, may not accurately reflect real-world scenarios, such as that of a database service. Also this is tested using a single HW and ChromeOS, the data from another HW or distribution might be different. It might be best to take this data with a grain of salt. This patch (of 5): Wire up mseal syscall for all architectures. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-1-jeffxu@chromium.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-2-jeffxu@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> [Bug #2] Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com> Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com> Cc: Stephen Röttger <sroettger@google.com> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Amer Al Shanawany <amer.shanawany@gmail.com> Cc: Javier Carrasco <javier.carrasco.cruz@gmail.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> |
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H.J. Lu
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2883f01ec3 |
x86/shstk: Enable shadow stacks for x32
1. Add shadow stack support to x32 signal. 2. Use the 64-bit map_shadow_stack syscall for x32. 3. Set up shadow stack for x32. Tested with shadow stack enabled x32 glibc on Intel Tiger Lake: I configured x32 glibc with --enable-cet, build glibc and run all glibc tests with shadow stack enabled. There are no regressions. I verified that shadow stack is enabled via /proc/pid/status. Signed-off-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Tested-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240315140433.1966543-1-hjl.tools@gmail.com |
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Linus Torvalds
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063a7ce32d |
lsm/stable-6.8 PR 20240105
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJIBAABCAAyFiEES0KozwfymdVUl37v6iDy2pc3iXMFAmWYKUIUHHBhdWxAcGF1 bC1tb29yZS5jb20ACgkQ6iDy2pc3iXNyHw/+IKnqL1MZ5QS+/HtSzi4jCL47N9yZ OHLol6XswyEGHH9myKPPGnT5lVA93v98v4ty2mws7EJUSGZQQUntYBPbU9Gi40+B XDzYSRocoj96sdlKeOJMgaWo3NBRD9HYSoGPDNWZixy6m+bLPk/Dqhn3FabKf1lo 2qQSmstvChFRmVNkmgaQnBCAtWVqla4EJEL0EKX6cspHbuzRNTeJdTPn6Q/zOUVL O2znOZuEtSVpYS7yg3uJT0hHD8H0GnIciAcDAhyPSBL5Uk5l6gwJiACcdRfLRbgp QM5Z4qUFdKljV5XBCzYnfhhrx1df08h1SG84El8UK8HgTTfOZfYmawByJRWNJSQE TdCmtyyvEbfb61CKBFVwD7Tzb9/y8WgcY5N3Un8uCQqRzFIO+6cghHri5NrVhifp nPFlP4klxLHh3d7ZVekLmCMHbpaacRyJKwLy+f/nwbBEID47jpPkvZFIpbalat+r QaKRBNWdTeV+GZ+Yu0uWsI029aQnpcO1kAnGg09fl6b/dsmxeKOVWebir25AzQ++ a702S8HRmj80X+VnXHU9a64XeGtBH7Nq0vu0lGHQPgwhSx/9P6/qICEPwsIriRjR I9OulWt4OBPDtlsonHFgDs+lbnd0Z0GJUwYT8e9pjRDMxijVO9lhAXyglVRmuNR8 to2ByKP5BO+Vh8Y= =Py+n -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull security module updates from Paul Moore: - Add three new syscalls: lsm_list_modules(), lsm_get_self_attr(), and lsm_set_self_attr(). The first syscall simply lists the LSMs enabled, while the second and third get and set the current process' LSM attributes. Yes, these syscalls may provide similar functionality to what can be found under /proc or /sys, but they were designed to support multiple, simultaneaous (stacked) LSMs from the start as opposed to the current /proc based solutions which were created at a time when only one LSM was allowed to be active at a given time. We have spent considerable time discussing ways to extend the existing /proc interfaces to support multiple, simultaneaous LSMs and even our best ideas have been far too ugly to support as a kernel API; after +20 years in the kernel, I felt the LSM layer had established itself enough to justify a handful of syscalls. Support amongst the individual LSM developers has been nearly unanimous, with a single objection coming from Tetsuo (TOMOYO) as he is worried that the LSM_ID_XXX token concept will make it more difficult for out-of-tree LSMs to survive. Several members of the LSM community have demonstrated the ability for out-of-tree LSMs to continue to exist by picking high/unused LSM_ID values as well as pointing out that many kernel APIs rely on integer identifiers, e.g. syscalls (!), but unfortunately Tetsuo's objections remain. My personal opinion is that while I have no interest in penalizing out-of-tree LSMs, I'm not going to penalize in-tree development to support out-of-tree development, and I view this as a necessary step forward to support the push for expanded LSM stacking and reduce our reliance on /proc and /sys which has occassionally been problematic for some container users. Finally, we have included the linux-api folks on (all?) recent revisions of the patchset and addressed all of their concerns. - Add a new security_file_ioctl_compat() LSM hook to handle the 32-bit ioctls on 64-bit systems problem. This patch includes support for all of the existing LSMs which provide ioctl hooks, although it turns out only SELinux actually cares about the individual ioctls. It is worth noting that while Casey (Smack) and Tetsuo (TOMOYO) did not give explicit ACKs to this patch, they did both indicate they are okay with the changes. - Fix a potential memory leak in the CALIPSO code when IPv6 is disabled at boot. While it's good that we are fixing this, I doubt this is something users are seeing in the wild as you need to both disable IPv6 and then attempt to configure IPv6 labeled networking via NetLabel/CALIPSO; that just doesn't make much sense. Normally this would go through netdev, but Jakub asked me to take this patch and of all the trees I maintain, the LSM tree seemed like the best fit. - Update the LSM MAINTAINERS entry with additional information about our process docs, patchwork, bug reporting, etc. I also noticed that the Lockdown LSM is missing a dedicated MAINTAINERS entry so I've added that to the pull request. I've been working with one of the major Lockdown authors/contributors to see if they are willing to step up and assume a Lockdown maintainer role; hopefully that will happen soon, but in the meantime I'll continue to look after it. - Add a handful of mailmap entries for Serge Hallyn and myself. * tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (27 commits) lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook lsm: Add a __counted_by() annotation to lsm_ctx.ctx calipso: fix memory leak in netlbl_calipso_add_pass() selftests: remove the LSM_ID_IMA check in lsm/lsm_list_modules_test MAINTAINERS: add an entry for the lockdown LSM MAINTAINERS: update the LSM entry mailmap: add entries for Serge Hallyn's dead accounts mailmap: update/replace my old email addresses lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static lsm: convert security_setselfattr() to use memdup_user() lsm: align based on pointer length in lsm_fill_user_ctx() lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx() lsm: correct error codes in security_getselfattr() lsm: cleanup the size counters in security_getselfattr() lsm: don't yet account for IMA in LSM_CONFIG_COUNT calculation lsm: drop LSM_ID_IMA LSM: selftests for Linux Security Module syscalls SELinux: Add selfattr hooks AppArmor: Add selfattr hooks Smack: implement setselfattr and getselfattr hooks ... |
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Miklos Szeredi
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d8b0f54650
|
wire up syscalls for statmount/listmount
Wire up all archs. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231025140205.3586473-7-mszeredi@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> |
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Casey Schaufler
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5f42375904 |
LSM: wireup Linux Security Module syscalls
Wireup lsm_get_self_attr, lsm_set_self_attr and lsm_list_modules system calls. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> [PM: forward ported beyond v6.6 due merge window changes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
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Linus Torvalds
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1e0c505e13 |
asm-generic updates for v6.7
The ia64 architecture gets its well-earned retirement as planned, now that there is one last (mostly) working release that will be maintained as an LTS kernel. The architecture specific system call tables are updated for the added map_shadow_stack() syscall and to remove references to the long-gone sys_lookup_dcookie() syscall. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEiK/NIGsWEZVxh/FrYKtH/8kJUicFAmVC40IACgkQYKtH/8kJ Uidhmw/9EX+aWSXGoObJ3fngaNSMw+PmrEuP8qEKBHxfKHcCdX3hc451Oh4GlhaQ tru91pPwgNvN2/rfoKusxT+V4PemGIzfNni/04rp+P0kvmdw5otQ2yNhsQNsfVmq XGWvkxF4P2GO6bkjjfR/1dDq7GtlyXtwwPDKeLbYb6TnJOZjtx+EAN27kkfSn1Ms R4Sa3zJ+DfHUmHL5S9g+7UD/CZ5GfKNmIskI4Mz5GsfoUz/0iiU+Bge/9sdcdSJQ kmbLy5YnVzfooLZ3TQmBFsO3iAMWb0s/mDdtyhqhTVmTUshLolkPYyKnPFvdupyv shXcpEST2XJNeaDRnL2K4zSCdxdbnCZHDpjfl9wfioBg7I8NfhXKpf1jYZHH1de4 LXq8ndEFEOVQw/zSpYWfQq1sux8Jiqr+UK/ukbVeFWiGGIUs91gEWtPAf8T0AZo9 ujkJvaWGl98O1g5wmBu0/dAR6QcFJMDfVwbmlIFpU8O+MEaz6X8mM+O5/T0IyTcD eMbAUjj4uYcU7ihKzHEv/0SS9Of38kzff67CLN5k8wOP/9NlaGZ78o1bVle9b52A BdhrsAefFiWHp1jT6Y9Rg4HOO/TguQ9e6EWSKOYFulsiLH9LEFaB9RwZLeLytV0W vlAgY9rUW77g1OJcb7DoNv33nRFuxsKqsnz3DEIXtgozo9CzbYI= =H1vH -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'asm-generic-6.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic Pull ia64 removal and asm-generic updates from Arnd Bergmann: - The ia64 architecture gets its well-earned retirement as planned, now that there is one last (mostly) working release that will be maintained as an LTS kernel. - The architecture specific system call tables are updated for the added map_shadow_stack() syscall and to remove references to the long-gone sys_lookup_dcookie() syscall. * tag 'asm-generic-6.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic: hexagon: Remove unusable symbols from the ptrace.h uapi asm-generic: Fix spelling of architecture arch: Reserve map_shadow_stack() syscall number for all architectures syscalls: Cleanup references to sys_lookup_dcookie() Documentation: Drop or replace remaining mentions of IA64 lib/raid6: Drop IA64 support Documentation: Drop IA64 from feature descriptions kernel: Drop IA64 support from sig_fault handlers arch: Remove Itanium (IA-64) architecture |
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Sohil Mehta
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ccab211af3 |
syscalls: Cleanup references to sys_lookup_dcookie()
commit 'be65de6b03aa ("fs: Remove dcookies support")' removed the syscall definition for lookup_dcookie. However, syscall tables still point to the old sys_lookup_dcookie() definition. Update syscall tables of all architectures to directly point to sys_ni_syscall() instead. Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> # for perf Acked-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> |
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peterz@infradead.org
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0f4b5f9722 |
futex: Add sys_futex_requeue()
Finish off the 'simple' futex2 syscall group by adding sys_futex_requeue(). Unlike sys_futex_{wait,wake}() its arguments are too numerous to fit into a regular syscall. As such, use struct futex_waitv to pass the 'source' and 'destination' futexes to the syscall. This syscall implements what was previously known as FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE and uses {val, uaddr, flags} for source and {uaddr, flags} for destination. This design explicitly allows requeueing between different types of futex by having a different flags word per uaddr. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230921105248.511860556@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net |
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peterz@infradead.org
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cb8c4312af |
futex: Add sys_futex_wait()
To complement sys_futex_waitv()/wake(), add sys_futex_wait(). This syscall implements what was previously known as FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET except it uses 'unsigned long' for the value and bitmask arguments, takes timespec and clockid_t arguments for the absolute timeout and uses FUTEX2 flags. The 'unsigned long' allows FUTEX2_SIZE_U64 on 64bit platforms. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230921105248.164324363@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net |
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peterz@infradead.org
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9f6c532f59 |
futex: Add sys_futex_wake()
To complement sys_futex_waitv() add sys_futex_wake(). This syscall implements what was previously known as FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET except it uses 'unsigned long' for the bitmask and takes FUTEX2 flags. The 'unsigned long' allows FUTEX2_SIZE_U64 on 64bit platforms. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230921105247.936205525@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net |
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Linus Torvalds
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df57721f9a |
Add x86 shadow stack support
Convert IBT selftest to asm to fix objtool warning -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEV76QKkVc4xCGURexaDWVMHDJkrAFAmTv1QQACgkQaDWVMHDJ krAUwhAAn6TOwHJK8BSkHeiQhON1nrlP3c5cv0AyZ2NP8RYDrZrSZvhpYBJ6wgKC Cx5CGq5nn9twYsYS3KsktLKDfR3lRdsQ7K9qtyFtYiaeaVKo+7gEKl/K+klwai8/ gninQWHk0zmSCja8Vi77q52WOMkQKapT8+vaON9EVDO8dVEi+CvhAIfPwMafuiwO Rk4X86SzoZu9FP79LcCg9XyGC/XbM2OG9eNUTSCKT40qTTKm5y4gix687NvAlaHR ko5MTsdl0Wfp6Qk0ohT74LnoA2c1g/FluvZIM33ci/2rFpkf9Hw7ip3lUXqn6CPx rKiZ+pVRc0xikVWkraMfIGMJfUd2rhelp8OyoozD7DB7UZw40Q4RW4N5tgq9Fhe9 MQs3p1v9N8xHdRKl365UcOczUxNAmv4u0nV5gY/4FMC6VjldCl2V9fmqYXyzFS4/ Ogg4FSd7c2JyGFKPs+5uXyi+RY2qOX4+nzHOoKD7SY616IYqtgKoz5usxETLwZ6s VtJOmJL0h//z0A7tBliB0zd+SQ5UQQBDC2XouQH2fNX2isJMn0UDmWJGjaHgK6Hh 8jVp6LNqf+CEQS387UxckOyj7fu438hDky1Ggaw4YqowEOhQeqLVO4++x+HITrbp AupXfbJw9h9cMN63Yc0gVxXQ9IMZ+M7UxLtZ3Cd8/PVztNy/clA= =3UUm -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 shadow stack support from Dave Hansen: "This is the long awaited x86 shadow stack support, part of Intel's Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). CET consists of two related security features: shadow stacks and indirect branch tracking. This series implements just the shadow stack part of this feature, and just for userspace. The main use case for shadow stack is providing protection against return oriented programming attacks. It works by maintaining a secondary (shadow) stack using a special memory type that has protections against modification. When executing a CALL instruction, the processor pushes the return address to both the normal stack and to the special permission shadow stack. Upon RET, the processor pops the shadow stack copy and compares it to the normal stack copy. For more information, refer to the links below for the earlier versions of this patch set" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220130211838.8382-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230613001108.3040476-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/ * tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (47 commits) x86/shstk: Change order of __user in type x86/ibt: Convert IBT selftest to asm x86/shstk: Don't retry vm_munmap() on -EINTR x86/kbuild: Fix Documentation/ reference x86/shstk: Move arch detail comment out of core mm x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall x86/shstk: Check that signal frame is shadow stack mem x86/shstk: Check that SSP is aligned on sigreturn x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support ... |
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Rick Edgecombe
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c35559f94e |
x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall
When operating with shadow stacks enabled, the kernel will automatically allocate shadow stacks for new threads, however in some cases userspace will need additional shadow stacks. The main example of this is the ucontext family of functions, which require userspace allocating and pivoting to userspace managed stacks. Unlike most other user memory permissions, shadow stacks need to be provisioned with special data in order to be useful. They need to be setup with a restore token so that userspace can pivot to them via the RSTORSSP instruction. But, the security design of shadow stacks is that they should not be written to except in limited circumstances. This presents a problem for userspace, as to how userspace can provision this special data, without allowing for the shadow stack to be generally writable. Previously, a new PROT_SHADOW_STACK was attempted, which could be mprotect()ed from RW permissions after the data was provisioned. This was found to not be secure enough, as other threads could write to the shadow stack during the writable window. The kernel can use a special instruction, WRUSS, to write directly to userspace shadow stacks. So the solution can be that memory can be mapped as shadow stack permissions from the beginning (never generally writable in userspace), and the kernel itself can write the restore token. First, a new madvise() flag was explored, which could operate on the PROT_SHADOW_STACK memory. This had a couple of downsides: 1. Extra checks were needed in mprotect() to prevent writable memory from ever becoming PROT_SHADOW_STACK. 2. Extra checks/vma state were needed in the new madvise() to prevent restore tokens being written into the middle of pre-used shadow stacks. It is ideal to prevent restore tokens being added at arbitrary locations, so the check was to make sure the shadow stack had never been written to. 3. It stood out from the rest of the madvise flags, as more of direct action than a hint at future desired behavior. So rather than repurpose two existing syscalls (mmap, madvise) that don't quite fit, just implement a new map_shadow_stack syscall to allow userspace to map and setup new shadow stacks in one step. While ucontext is the primary motivator, userspace may have other unforeseen reasons to setup its own shadow stacks using the WRSS instruction. Towards this provide a flag so that stacks can be optionally setup securely for the common case of ucontext without enabling WRSS. Or potentially have the kernel set up the shadow stack in some new way. The following example demonstrates how to create a new shadow stack with map_shadow_stack: void *shstk = map_shadow_stack(addr, stack_size, SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN); Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-35-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com |
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Palmer Dabbelt
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78252deb02
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arch: Register fchmodat2, usually as syscall 452
This registers the new fchmodat2 syscall in most places as nuber 452, with alpha being the exception where it's 562. I found all these sites by grepping for fspick, which I assume has found me everything. Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com> Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Message-Id: <a677d521f048e4ca439e7080a5328f21eb8e960e.1689092120.git.legion@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> |
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Nhat Pham
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cf264e1329 |
cachestat: implement cachestat syscall
There is currently no good way to query the page cache state of large file sets and directory trees. There is mincore(), but it scales poorly: the kernel writes out a lot of bitmap data that userspace has to aggregate, when the user really doesn not care about per-page information in that case. The user also needs to mmap and unmap each file as it goes along, which can be quite slow as well. Some use cases where this information could come in handy: * Allowing database to decide whether to perform an index scan or direct table queries based on the in-memory cache state of the index. * Visibility into the writeback algorithm, for performance issues diagnostic. * Workload-aware writeback pacing: estimating IO fulfilled by page cache (and IO to be done) within a range of a file, allowing for more frequent syncing when and where there is IO capacity, and batching when there is not. * Computing memory usage of large files/directory trees, analogous to the du tool for disk usage. More information about these use cases could be found in the following thread: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230315170934.GA97793@cmpxchg.org/ This patch implements a new syscall that queries cache state of a file and summarizes the number of cached pages, number of dirty pages, number of pages marked for writeback, number of (recently) evicted pages, etc. in a given range. Currently, the syscall is only wired in for x86 architecture. NAME cachestat - query the page cache statistics of a file. SYNOPSIS #include <sys/mman.h> struct cachestat_range { __u64 off; __u64 len; }; struct cachestat { __u64 nr_cache; __u64 nr_dirty; __u64 nr_writeback; __u64 nr_evicted; __u64 nr_recently_evicted; }; int cachestat(unsigned int fd, struct cachestat_range *cstat_range, struct cachestat *cstat, unsigned int flags); DESCRIPTION cachestat() queries the number of cached pages, number of dirty pages, number of pages marked for writeback, number of evicted pages, number of recently evicted pages, in the bytes range given by `off` and `len`. An evicted page is a page that is previously in the page cache but has been evicted since. A page is recently evicted if its last eviction was recent enough that its reentry to the cache would indicate that it is actively being used by the system, and that there is memory pressure on the system. These values are returned in a cachestat struct, whose address is given by the `cstat` argument. The `off` and `len` arguments must be non-negative integers. If `len` > 0, the queried range is [`off`, `off` + `len`]. If `len` == 0, we will query in the range from `off` to the end of the file. The `flags` argument is unused for now, but is included for future extensibility. User should pass 0 (i.e no flag specified). Currently, hugetlbfs is not supported. Because the status of a page can change after cachestat() checks it but before it returns to the application, the returned values may contain stale information. RETURN VALUE On success, cachestat returns 0. On error, -1 is returned, and errno is set to indicate the error. ERRORS EFAULT cstat or cstat_args points to an invalid address. EINVAL invalid flags. EBADF invalid file descriptor. EOPNOTSUPP file descriptor is of a hugetlbfs file [nphamcs@gmail.com: replace rounddown logic with the existing helper] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230504022044.3675469-1-nphamcs@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230503013608.2431726-3-nphamcs@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Nhat Pham <nphamcs@gmail.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> |
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Aneesh Kumar K.V
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21b084fdf2 |
mm/mempolicy: wire up syscall set_mempolicy_home_node
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211202123810.267175-4-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ben Widawsky <ben.widawsky@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com> Cc: <linux-api@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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André Almeida
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039c0ec9bb |
futex,x86: Wire up sys_futex_waitv()
Wire up syscall entry point for x86 arch, for both i386 and x86_64. Signed-off-by: André Almeida <andrealmeid@collabora.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210923171111.300673-18-andrealmeid@collabora.com |
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Arnd Bergmann
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59ab844eed |
compat: remove some compat entry points
These are all handled correctly when calling the native system call entry point, so remove the special cases. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210727144859.4150043-6-arnd@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Suren Baghdasaryan
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dce4910396 |
mm: wire up syscall process_mrelease
Split off from prev patch in the series that implements the syscall. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210809185259.405936-2-surenb@google.com Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@inai.de> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Mike Rapoport
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7bb7f2ac24 |
arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call where relevant
Wire up memfd_secret system call on architectures that define ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP, namely arm64, risc-v and x86. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-7-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Jan Kara
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65ffb3d69e |
quota: Wire up quotactl_fd syscall
Wire up the quotactl_fd syscall. Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> |
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Jan Kara
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5b9fedb31e |
quota: Disable quotactl_path syscall
In commit
|
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Linus Torvalds
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17ae69aba8 |
Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEgycj0O+d1G2aycA8rZhLv9lQBTwFAmCInP4ACgkQrZhLv9lQ BTza0g//dTeb9woC9H7qlEhK4l9yk62lTss60Q8X7m7ZSNfdL4tiEbi64SgK+iOW OOegbrOEb8Kzh4KJJYmVlVZ5YUWyH4szgmee1wnylBdsWiWaPLPF3Cflz77apy6T TiiBsJd7rRE29FKheaMt34B41BMh8QHESN+DzjzJWsFoi/uNxjgSs2W16XuSupKu bpRmB1pYNXMlrkzz7taL05jndZYE5arVriqlxgAsuLOFOp/ER7zecrjImdCM/4kL W6ej0R1fz2Geh6CsLBJVE+bKWSQ82q5a4xZEkSYuQHXgZV5eywE5UKu8ssQcRgQA VmGUY5k73rfY9Ofupf2gCaf/JSJNXKO/8Xjg0zAdklKtmgFjtna5Tyg9I90j7zn+ 5swSpKuRpilN8MQH+6GWAnfqQlNoviTOpFeq3LwBtNVVOh08cOg6lko/bmebBC+R TeQPACKS0Q0gCDPm9RYoU1pMUuYgfOwVfVRZK1prgi2Co7ZBUMOvYbNoKYoPIydr ENBYljlU1OYwbzgR2nE+24fvhU8xdNOVG1xXYPAEHShu+p7dLIWRLhl8UCtRQpSR 1ofeVaJjgjrp29O+1OIQjB2kwCaRdfv/Gq1mztE/VlMU/r++E62OEzcH0aS+mnrg yzfyUdI8IFv1q6FGT9yNSifWUWxQPmOKuC8kXsKYfqfJsFwKmHM= =uCN4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris: "Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün. Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing. From Mickaël's cover letter: "The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict themselves. Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD Pledge/Unveil. In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features. This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing, init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]" The cover letter and v34 posting is here: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/ See also: https://landlock.io/ This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several years" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2] * tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features landlock: Add user and kernel documentation samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example selftests/landlock: Add user space tests landlock: Add syscall implementations arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls fs,security: Add sb_delete hook landlock: Support filesystem access-control LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock landlock: Add ptrace restrictions landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials landlock: Add ruleset and domain management landlock: Add object management |
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Mickaël Salaün
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a49f4f81cb |
arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
Wire up the following system calls for all architectures: * landlock_create_ruleset(2) * landlock_add_rule(2) * landlock_restrict_self(2) Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-10-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> |
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Sascha Hauer
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fa8b90070a |
quota: wire up quotactl_path
Wire up the quotactl_path syscall added in the previous patch. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210304123541.30749-3-s.hauer@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> |
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Christian Brauner
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2a1867219c
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fs: add mount_setattr()
This implements the missing mount_setattr() syscall. While the new mount
api allows to change the properties of a superblock there is currently
no way to change the properties of a mount or a mount tree using file
descriptors which the new mount api is based on. In addition the old
mount api has the restriction that mount options cannot be applied
recursively. This hasn't changed since changing mount options on a
per-mount basis was implemented in [1] and has been a frequent request
not just for convenience but also for security reasons. The legacy
mount syscall is unable to accommodate this behavior without introducing
a whole new set of flags because MS_REC | MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND |
MS_RDONLY | MS_NOEXEC | [...] only apply the mount option to the topmost
mount. Changing MS_REC to apply to the whole mount tree would mean
introducing a significant uapi change and would likely cause significant
regressions.
The new mount_setattr() syscall allows to recursively clear and set
mount options in one shot. Multiple calls to change mount options
requesting the same changes are idempotent:
int mount_setattr(int dfd, const char *path, unsigned flags,
struct mount_attr *uattr, size_t usize);
Flags to modify path resolution behavior are specified in the @flags
argument. Currently, AT_EMPTY_PATH, AT_RECURSIVE, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW,
and AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT are supported. If useful, additional lookup flags to
restrict path resolution as introduced with openat2() might be supported
in the future.
The mount_setattr() syscall can be expected to grow over time and is
designed with extensibility in mind. It follows the extensible syscall
pattern we have used with other syscalls such as openat2(), clone3(),
sched_{set,get}attr(), and others.
The set of mount options is passed in the uapi struct mount_attr which
currently has the following layout:
struct mount_attr {
__u64 attr_set;
__u64 attr_clr;
__u64 propagation;
__u64 userns_fd;
};
The @attr_set and @attr_clr members are used to clear and set mount
options. This way a user can e.g. request that a set of flags is to be
raised such as turning mounts readonly by raising MOUNT_ATTR_RDONLY in
@attr_set while at the same time requesting that another set of flags is
to be lowered such as removing noexec from a mount tree by specifying
MOUNT_ATTR_NOEXEC in @attr_clr.
Note, since the MOUNT_ATTR_<atime> values are an enum starting from 0,
not a bitmap, users wanting to transition to a different atime setting
cannot simply specify the atime setting in @attr_set, but must also
specify MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME in the @attr_clr field. So we ensure that
MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME can't be partially set in @attr_clr and that @attr_set
can't have any atime bits set if MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME isn't set in
@attr_clr.
The @propagation field lets callers specify the propagation type of a
mount tree. Propagation is a single property that has four different
settings and as such is not really a flag argument but an enum.
Specifically, it would be unclear what setting and clearing propagation
settings in combination would amount to. The legacy mount() syscall thus
forbids the combination of multiple propagation settings too. The goal
is to keep the semantics of mount propagation somewhat simple as they
are overly complex as it is.
The @userns_fd field lets user specify a user namespace whose idmapping
becomes the idmapping of the mount. This is implemented and explained in
detail in the next patch.
[1]: commit
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Willem de Bruijn
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b0a0c2615f |
epoll: wire up syscall epoll_pwait2
Split off from prev patch in the series that implements the syscall. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201121144401.3727659-4-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Linus Torvalds
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ed8780e3f2 |
A couple of x86 fixes which missed rc1 due to my stupidity:
- Drop lazy TLB mode before switching to the temporary address space for text patching. text_poke() switches to the temporary mm which clears the lazy mode and restores the original mm afterwards. Due to clearing lazy mode this might restore a already dead mm if exit_mmap() runs in parallel on another CPU. - Document the x32 syscall design fail vs. syscall numbers 512-547 properly. - Fix the ORC unwinder to handle the inactive task frame correctly. This was unearthed due to the slightly different code generation of GCC10. - Use an up to date screen_info for the boot params of kexec instead of the possibly stale and invalid version which happened to be valid when the kexec kernel was loaded. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJHBAABCgAxFiEEQp8+kY+LLUocC4bMphj1TA10mKEFAl+Yf5YTHHRnbHhAbGlu dXRyb25peC5kZQAKCRCmGPVMDXSYoY6HD/4vlFNTVR19JhICQM64XINoaWOOjdIq M3wWyh+lmW5+JqNYCYY3M5LX2ZLwYOlNgabE1W6KJgnJsN26GRztBN3z037Vllka lS1pONg2a3StpVUEJ3AGDnFgaYrKRSyHBhi/0TazXmvOlscjwPIPxI53oLohyc23 vSd9ivIFl9jD894OsLjJtWt1rKK6k9p4FqR8bv+u/GwtYGQk9HXlk/XW/uOeH3oU ozQhlHCnqN9VnHGHS/nRz3BwIiPJRCYl7h4PdC4MqT+WL1e4pIKEJqyN9uPWeC6L b7DzX5KVO0Zcvgvl5OtuR6radXzrMvBwcY6BSOxylfoM+7SIE24PlRFW24EQGKv2 WHtOKSGsvooU8KWVw4FvHUkSFAgNWUTjZ9x1kzEw1oUANceJUuM74n4rIFUXv3Kf gxhcPm2flrB3WrHKuXtQ3QxD9SyGuqk4QUraeNMYyS3DqnnBycgUkd72KiY9H0g8 9XBvHEFs5G9apA8MSdumHKgrluHVcvdpe3YGy0/vugJvolSvDWkx3EbxpWbhilYS WyboQGOwSH1vgEGHHnoiksY/Ofhv+rxBknDUJOiJazVZFbOwFvdKIPDNTQTjrzw1 NENSBtMkCLG8XvuZ1E1l57wd7BN7fJENYLnG2k9gUsnouWV0pK6x8w9GPn9DW4Do 0IB3hScRgIIuvQ== =e60h -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86-urgent-2020-10-27' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner: "A couple of x86 fixes which missed rc1 due to my stupidity: - Drop lazy TLB mode before switching to the temporary address space for text patching. text_poke() switches to the temporary mm which clears the lazy mode and restores the original mm afterwards. Due to clearing lazy mode this might restore a already dead mm if exit_mmap() runs in parallel on another CPU. - Document the x32 syscall design fail vs. syscall numbers 512-547 properly. - Fix the ORC unwinder to handle the inactive task frame correctly. This was unearthed due to the slightly different code generation of gcc-10. - Use an up to date screen_info for the boot params of kexec instead of the possibly stale and invalid version which happened to be valid when the kexec kernel was loaded" * tag 'x86-urgent-2020-10-27' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/alternative: Don't call text_poke() in lazy TLB mode x86/syscalls: Document the fact that syscalls 512-547 are a legacy mistake x86/unwind/orc: Fix inactive tasks with stack pointer in %sp on GCC 10 compiled kernels hyperv_fb: Update screen_info after removing old framebuffer x86/kexec: Use up-to-dated screen_info copy to fill boot params |
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Minchan Kim
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ecb8ac8b1f |
mm/madvise: introduce process_madvise() syscall: an external memory hinting API
There is usecase that System Management Software(SMS) want to give a memory hint like MADV_[COLD|PAGEEOUT] to other processes and in the case of Android, it is the ActivityManagerService. The information required to make the reclaim decision is not known to the app. Instead, it is known to the centralized userspace daemon(ActivityManagerService), and that daemon must be able to initiate reclaim on its own without any app involvement. To solve the issue, this patch introduces a new syscall process_madvise(2). It uses pidfd of an external process to give the hint. It also supports vector address range because Android app has thousands of vmas due to zygote so it's totally waste of CPU and power if we should call the syscall one by one for each vma.(With testing 2000-vma syscall vs 1-vector syscall, it showed 15% performance improvement. I think it would be bigger in real practice because the testing ran very cache friendly environment). Another potential use case for the vector range is to amortize the cost ofTLB shootdowns for multiple ranges when using MADV_DONTNEED; this could benefit users like TCP receive zerocopy and malloc implementations. In future, we could find more usecases for other advises so let's make it happens as API since we introduce a new syscall at this moment. With that, existing madvise(2) user could replace it with process_madvise(2) with their own pid if they want to have batch address ranges support feature. ince it could affect other process's address range, only privileged process(PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS) or something else(e.g., being the same UID) gives it the right to ptrace the process could use it successfully. The flag argument is reserved for future use if we need to extend the API. I think supporting all hints madvise has/will supported/support to process_madvise is rather risky. Because we are not sure all hints make sense from external process and implementation for the hint may rely on the caller being in the current context so it could be error-prone. Thus, I just limited hints as MADV_[COLD|PAGEOUT] in this patch. If someone want to add other hints, we could hear the usecase and review it for each hint. It's safer for maintenance rather than introducing a buggy syscall but hard to fix it later. So finally, the API is as follows, ssize_t process_madvise(int pidfd, const struct iovec *iovec, unsigned long vlen, int advice, unsigned int flags); DESCRIPTION The process_madvise() system call is used to give advice or directions to the kernel about the address ranges from external process as well as local process. It provides the advice to address ranges of process described by iovec and vlen. The goal of such advice is to improve system or application performance. The pidfd selects the process referred to by the PID file descriptor specified in pidfd. (See pidofd_open(2) for further information) The pointer iovec points to an array of iovec structures, defined in <sys/uio.h> as: struct iovec { void *iov_base; /* starting address */ size_t iov_len; /* number of bytes to be advised */ }; The iovec describes address ranges beginning at address(iov_base) and with size length of bytes(iov_len). The vlen represents the number of elements in iovec. The advice is indicated in the advice argument, which is one of the following at this moment if the target process specified by pidfd is external. MADV_COLD MADV_PAGEOUT Permission to provide a hint to external process is governed by a ptrace access mode PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS check; see ptrace(2). The process_madvise supports every advice madvise(2) has if target process is in same thread group with calling process so user could use process_madvise(2) to extend existing madvise(2) to support vector address ranges. RETURN VALUE On success, process_madvise() returns the number of bytes advised. This return value may be less than the total number of requested bytes, if an error occurred. The caller should check return value to determine whether a partial advice occurred. FAQ: Q.1 - Why does any external entity have better knowledge? Quote from Sandeep "For Android, every application (including the special SystemServer) are forked from Zygote. The reason of course is to share as many libraries and classes between the two as possible to benefit from the preloading during boot. After applications start, (almost) all of the APIs end up calling into this SystemServer process over IPC (binder) and back to the application. In a fully running system, the SystemServer monitors every single process periodically to calculate their PSS / RSS and also decides which process is "important" to the user for interactivity. So, because of how these processes start _and_ the fact that the SystemServer is looping to monitor each process, it does tend to *know* which address range of the application is not used / useful. Besides, we can never rely on applications to clean things up themselves. We've had the "hey app1, the system is low on memory, please trim your memory usage down" notifications for a long time[1]. They rely on applications honoring the broadcasts and very few do. So, if we want to avoid the inevitable killing of the application and restarting it, some way to be able to tell the OS about unimportant memory in these applications will be useful. - ssp Q.2 - How to guarantee the race(i.e., object validation) between when giving a hint from an external process and get the hint from the target process? process_madvise operates on the target process's address space as it exists at the instant that process_madvise is called. If the space target process can run between the time the process_madvise process inspects the target process address space and the time that process_madvise is actually called, process_madvise may operate on memory regions that the calling process does not expect. It's the responsibility of the process calling process_madvise to close this race condition. For example, the calling process can suspend the target process with ptrace, SIGSTOP, or the freezer cgroup so that it doesn't have an opportunity to change its own address space before process_madvise is called. Another option is to operate on memory regions that the caller knows a priori will be unchanged in the target process. Yet another option is to accept the race for certain process_madvise calls after reasoning that mistargeting will do no harm. The suggested API itself does not provide synchronization. It also apply other APIs like move_pages, process_vm_write. The race isn't really a problem though. Why is it so wrong to require that callers do their own synchronization in some manner? Nobody objects to write(2) merely because it's possible for two processes to open the same file and clobber each other's writes --- instead, we tell people to use flock or something. Think about mmap. It never guarantees newly allocated address space is still valid when the user tries to access it because other threads could unmap the memory right before. That's where we need synchronization by using other API or design from userside. It shouldn't be part of API itself. If someone needs more fine-grained synchronization rather than process level, there were two ideas suggested - cookie[2] and anon-fd[3]. Both are applicable via using last reserved argument of the API but I don't think it's necessary right now since we have already ways to prevent the race so don't want to add additional complexity with more fine-grained optimization model. To make the API extend, it reserved an unsigned long as last argument so we could support it in future if someone really needs it. Q.3 - Why doesn't ptrace work? Injecting an madvise in the target process using ptrace would not work for us because such injected madvise would have to be executed by the target process, which means that process would have to be runnable and that creates the risk of the abovementioned race and hinting a wrong VMA. Furthermore, we want to act the hint in caller's context, not the callee's, because the callee is usually limited in cpuset/cgroups or even freezed state so they can't act by themselves quick enough, which causes more thrashing/kill. It doesn't work if the target process are ptraced(e.g., strace, debugger, minidump) because a process can have at most one ptracer. [1] https://developer.android.com/topic/performance/memory" [2] process_getinfo for getting the cookie which is updated whenever vma of process address layout are changed - Daniel Colascione - https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190520035254.57579-1-minchan@kernel.org/T/#m7694416fd179b2066a2c62b5b139b14e3894e224 [3] anonymous fd which is used for the object(i.e., address range) validation - Michal Hocko - https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200120112722.GY18451@dhcp22.suse.cz/ [minchan@kernel.org: fix process_madvise build break for arm64] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200303145756.GA219683@google.com [minchan@kernel.org: fix build error for mips of process_madvise] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508052517.GA197378@google.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix patch ordering issue] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix arm64 whoops] [minchan@kernel.org: make process_madvise() vlen arg have type size_t, per Florian] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix i386 build] [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix syscall numbering] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200905142639.49fc3f1a@canb.auug.org.au [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: madvise.c needs compat.h] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200908204547.285646b4@canb.auug.org.au [minchan@kernel.org: fix mips build] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200909173655.GC2435453@google.com [yuehaibing@huawei.com: remove duplicate header which is included twice] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200915121550.30584-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com [minchan@kernel.org: do not use helper functions for process_madvise] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200921175539.GB387368@google.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: pidfd_get_pid() gained an argument] [sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix up for "iov_iter: transparently handle compat iovecs in import_iovec"] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200928212542.468e1fef@canb.auug.org.au Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@linux.intel.com> Cc: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: John Dias <joaodias@google.com> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com> Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com> Cc: SeongJae Park <sj38.park@gmail.com> Cc: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@google.com> Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de> Cc: <linux-man@vger.kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200302193630.68771-3-minchan@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508183320.GA125527@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200622192900.22757-4-minchan@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200901000633.1920247-4-minchan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Andy Lutomirski
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c3b484c439 |
x86/syscalls: Document the fact that syscalls 512-547 are a legacy mistake
Since this commit:
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Christoph Hellwig
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c3973b401e |
mm: remove compat_process_vm_{readv,writev}
Now that import_iovec handles compat iovecs, the native syscalls can be used for the compat case as well. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
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Christoph Hellwig
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598b3cec83 |
fs: remove compat_sys_vmsplice
Now that import_iovec handles compat iovecs, the native vmsplice syscall can be used for the compat case as well. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
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Christoph Hellwig
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5f764d624a |
fs: remove the compat readv/writev syscalls
Now that import_iovec handles compat iovecs, the native readv and writev syscalls can be used for the compat case as well. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
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Xiaoming Ni
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88db0aa242 |
all arch: remove system call sys_sysctl
Since commit
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Linus Torvalds
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47ec5303d7 |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next
Pull networking updates from David Miller: 1) Support 6Ghz band in ath11k driver, from Rajkumar Manoharan. 2) Support UDP segmentation in code TSO code, from Eric Dumazet. 3) Allow flashing different flash images in cxgb4 driver, from Vishal Kulkarni. 4) Add drop frames counter and flow status to tc flower offloading, from Po Liu. 5) Support n-tuple filters in cxgb4, from Vishal Kulkarni. 6) Various new indirect call avoidance, from Eric Dumazet and Brian Vazquez. 7) Fix BPF verifier failures on 32-bit pointer arithmetic, from Yonghong Song. 8) Support querying and setting hardware address of a port function via devlink, use this in mlx5, from Parav Pandit. 9) Support hw ipsec offload on bonding slaves, from Jarod Wilson. 10) Switch qca8k driver over to phylink, from Jonathan McDowell. 11) In bpftool, show list of processes holding BPF FD references to maps, programs, links, and btf objects. From Andrii Nakryiko. 12) Several conversions over to generic power management, from Vaibhav Gupta. 13) Add support for SO_KEEPALIVE et al. to bpf_setsockopt(), from Dmitry Yakunin. 14) Various https url conversions, from Alexander A. Klimov. 15) Timestamping and PHC support for mscc PHY driver, from Antoine Tenart. 16) Support bpf iterating over tcp and udp sockets, from Yonghong Song. 17) Support 5GBASE-T i40e NICs, from Aleksandr Loktionov. 18) Add kTLS RX HW offload support to mlx5e, from Tariq Toukan. 19) Fix the ->ndo_start_xmit() return type to be netdev_tx_t in several drivers. From Luc Van Oostenryck. 20) XDP support for xen-netfront, from Denis Kirjanov. 21) Support receive buffer autotuning in MPTCP, from Florian Westphal. 22) Support EF100 chip in sfc driver, from Edward Cree. 23) Add XDP support to mvpp2 driver, from Matteo Croce. 24) Support MPTCP in sock_diag, from Paolo Abeni. 25) Commonize UDP tunnel offloading code by creating udp_tunnel_nic infrastructure, from Jakub Kicinski. 26) Several pci_ --> dma_ API conversions, from Christophe JAILLET. 27) Add FLOW_ACTION_POLICE support to mlxsw, from Ido Schimmel. 28) Add SK_LOOKUP bpf program type, from Jakub Sitnicki. 29) Refactor a lot of networking socket option handling code in order to avoid set_fs() calls, from Christoph Hellwig. 30) Add rfc4884 support to icmp code, from Willem de Bruijn. 31) Support TBF offload in dpaa2-eth driver, from Ioana Ciornei. 32) Support XDP_REDIRECT in qede driver, from Alexander Lobakin. 33) Support PCI relaxed ordering in mlx5 driver, from Aya Levin. 34) Support TCP syncookies in MPTCP, from Flowian Westphal. 35) Fix several tricky cases of PMTU handling wrt. briding, from Stefano Brivio. * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2056 commits) net: thunderx: initialize VF's mailbox mutex before first usage usb: hso: remove bogus check for EINPROGRESS usb: hso: no complaint about kmalloc failure hso: fix bailout in error case of probe ip_tunnel_core: Fix build for archs without _HAVE_ARCH_IPV6_CSUM selftests/net: relax cpu affinity requirement in msg_zerocopy test mptcp: be careful on subflow creation selftests: rtnetlink: make kci_test_encap() return sub-test result selftests: rtnetlink: correct the final return value for the test net: dsa: sja1105: use detected device id instead of DT one on mismatch tipc: set ub->ifindex for local ipv6 address ipv6: add ipv6_dev_find() net: openvswitch: silence suspicious RCU usage warning Revert "vxlan: fix tos value before xmit" ptp: only allow phase values lower than 1 period farsync: switch from 'pci_' to 'dma_' API wan: wanxl: switch from 'pci_' to 'dma_' API hv_netvsc: do not use VF device if link is down dpaa2-eth: Fix passing zero to 'PTR_ERR' warning net: macb: Properly handle phylink on at91sam9x ... |
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Christoph Hellwig
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55db9c0e85 |
net: remove compat_sys_{get,set}sockopt
Now that the ->compat_{get,set}sockopt proto_ops methods are gone there is no good reason left to keep the compat syscalls separate. This fixes the odd use of unsigned int for the compat_setsockopt optlen and the missing sock_use_custom_sol_socket. It would also easily allow running the eBPF hooks for the compat syscalls, but such a large change in behavior does not belong into a consolidation patch like this one. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
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Christian Brauner
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9b4feb630e
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arch: wire-up close_range()
This wires up the close_range() syscall into all arches at once. Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc) Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86@kernel.org |
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Miklos Szeredi
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c8ffd8bcdd |
vfs: add faccessat2 syscall
POSIX defines faccessat() as having a fourth "flags" argument, while the linux syscall doesn't have it. Glibc tries to emulate AT_EACCESS and AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, but AT_EACCESS emulation is broken. Add a new faccessat(2) syscall with the added flags argument and implement both flags. The value of AT_EACCESS is defined in glibc headers to be the same as AT_REMOVEDIR. Use this value for the kernel interface as well, together with the explanatory comment. Also add AT_EMPTY_PATH support, which is not documented by POSIX, but can be useful and is trivial to implement. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> |
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Brian Gerst
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cab56d3484 |
x86/entry: Remove ABI prefixes from functions in syscall tables
Move the ABI prefixes to the __SYSCALL_[abi]() macros. This allows removal of the need to strip the prefix for UML. Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200313195144.164260-13-brgerst@gmail.com |
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Brian Gerst
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d3b1b776ee |
x86/entry/64: Remove ptregs qualifier from syscall table
Now that the fast syscall path is removed, the ptregs qualifier is unused. Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200313195144.164260-10-brgerst@gmail.com |
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Brian Gerst
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27dd84fafc |
x86/entry/64: Use syscall wrappers for x32_rt_sigreturn
Add missing syscall wrapper for x32_rt_sigreturn(). Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200313195144.164260-6-brgerst@gmail.com |
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Linus Torvalds
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83fa805bcb |
threads-v5.6
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEABYKAB0WIQRAhzRXHqcMeLMyaSiRxhvAZXjcogUCXjFo8wAKCRCRxhvAZXjc omaGAQDVwCHQekqxp2eC8EJH4Pkt+Bn1BLrA25stlTo93YBPHgEAsPVUCRNcrZAl VncYmxCfpt3Yu0S/MTVXu5xrRiIXPQk= =uqTN -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'threads-v5.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux Pull thread management updates from Christian Brauner: "Sargun Dhillon over the last cycle has worked on the pidfd_getfd() syscall. This syscall allows for the retrieval of file descriptors of a process based on its pidfd. A task needs to have ptrace_may_access() permissions with PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS (suggested by Oleg and Andy) on the target. One of the main use-cases is in combination with seccomp's user notification feature. As a reminder, seccomp's user notification feature was made available in v5.0. It allows a task to retrieve a file descriptor for its seccomp filter. The file descriptor is usually handed of to a more privileged supervising process. The supervisor can then listen for syscall events caught by the seccomp filter of the supervisee and perform actions in lieu of the supervisee, usually emulating syscalls. pidfd_getfd() is needed to expand its uses. There are currently two major users that wait on pidfd_getfd() and one future user: - Netflix, Sargun said, is working on a service mesh where users should be able to connect to a dns-based VIP. When a user connects to e.g. 1.2.3.4:80 that runs e.g. service "foo" they will be redirected to an envoy process. This service mesh uses seccomp user notifications and pidfd to intercept all connect calls and instead of connecting them to 1.2.3.4:80 connects them to e.g. 127.0.0.1:8080. - LXD uses the seccomp notifier heavily to intercept and emulate mknod() and mount() syscalls for unprivileged containers/processes. With pidfd_getfd() more uses-cases e.g. bridging socket connections will be possible. - The patchset has also seen some interest from the browser corner. Right now, Firefox is using a SECCOMP_RET_TRAP sandbox managed by a broker process. In the future glibc will start blocking all signals during dlopen() rendering this type of sandbox impossible. Hence, in the future Firefox will switch to a seccomp-user-nofication based sandbox which also makes use of file descriptor retrieval. The thread for this can be found at https://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2019-12/msg00079.html With pidfd_getfd() it is e.g. possible to bridge socket connections for the supervisee (binding to a privileged port) and taking actions on file descriptors on behalf of the supervisee in general. Sargun's first version was using an ioctl on pidfds but various people pushed for it to be a proper syscall which he duely implemented as well over various review cycles. Selftests are of course included. I've also added instructions how to deal with merge conflicts below. There's also a small fix coming from the kernel mentee project to correctly annotate struct sighand_struct with __rcu to fix various sparse warnings. We've received a few more such fixes and even though they are mostly trivial I've decided to postpone them until after -rc1 since they came in rather late and I don't want to risk introducing build warnings. Finally, there's a new prctl() command PR_{G,S}ET_IO_FLUSHER which is needed to avoid allocation recursions triggerable by storage drivers that have userspace parts that run in the IO path (e.g. dm-multipath, iscsi, etc). These allocation recursions deadlock the device. The new prctl() allows such privileged userspace components to avoid allocation recursions by setting the PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO and PF_LESS_THROTTLE flags. The patch carries the necessary acks from the relevant maintainers and is routed here as part of prctl() thread-management." * tag 'threads-v5.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: prctl: PR_{G,S}ET_IO_FLUSHER to support controlling memory reclaim sched.h: Annotate sighand_struct with __rcu test: Add test for pidfd getfd arch: wire up pidfd_getfd syscall pid: Implement pidfd_getfd syscall vfs, fdtable: Add fget_task helper |
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Aleksa Sarai
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fddb5d430a |
open: introduce openat2(2) syscall
/* Background. */
For a very long time, extending openat(2) with new features has been
incredibly frustrating. This stems from the fact that openat(2) is
possibly the most famous counter-example to the mantra "don't silently
accept garbage from userspace" -- it doesn't check whether unknown flags
are present[1].
This means that (generally) the addition of new flags to openat(2) has
been fraught with backwards-compatibility issues (O_TMPFILE has to be
defined as __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY|[O_RDWR or O_WRONLY] to ensure old
kernels gave errors, since it's insecure to silently ignore the
flag[2]). All new security-related flags therefore have a tough road to
being added to openat(2).
Userspace also has a hard time figuring out whether a particular flag is
supported on a particular kernel. While it is now possible with
contemporary kernels (thanks to [3]), older kernels will expose unknown
flag bits through fcntl(F_GETFL). Giving a clear -EINVAL during
openat(2) time matches modern syscall designs and is far more
fool-proof.
In addition, the newly-added path resolution restriction LOOKUP flags
(which we would like to expose to user-space) don't feel related to the
pre-existing O_* flag set -- they affect all components of path lookup.
We'd therefore like to add a new flag argument.
Adding a new syscall allows us to finally fix the flag-ignoring problem,
and we can make it extensible enough so that we will hopefully never
need an openat3(2).
/* Syscall Prototype. */
/*
* open_how is an extensible structure (similar in interface to
* clone3(2) or sched_setattr(2)). The size parameter must be set to
* sizeof(struct open_how), to allow for future extensions. All future
* extensions will be appended to open_how, with their zero value
* acting as a no-op default.
*/
struct open_how { /* ... */ };
int openat2(int dfd, const char *pathname,
struct open_how *how, size_t size);
/* Description. */
The initial version of 'struct open_how' contains the following fields:
flags
Used to specify openat(2)-style flags. However, any unknown flag
bits or otherwise incorrect flag combinations (like O_PATH|O_RDWR)
will result in -EINVAL. In addition, this field is 64-bits wide to
allow for more O_ flags than currently permitted with openat(2).
mode
The file mode for O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.
Must be set to zero if flags does not contain O_CREAT or O_TMPFILE.
resolve
Restrict path resolution (in contrast to O_* flags they affect all
path components). The current set of flags are as follows (at the
moment, all of the RESOLVE_ flags are implemented as just passing
the corresponding LOOKUP_ flag).
RESOLVE_NO_XDEV => LOOKUP_NO_XDEV
RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS => LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS
RESOLVE_NO_MAGICLINKS => LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS
RESOLVE_BENEATH => LOOKUP_BENEATH
RESOLVE_IN_ROOT => LOOKUP_IN_ROOT
open_how does not contain an embedded size field, because it is of
little benefit (userspace can figure out the kernel open_how size at
runtime fairly easily without it). It also only contains u64s (even
though ->mode arguably should be a u16) to avoid having padding fields
which are never used in the future.
Note that as a result of the new how->flags handling, O_PATH|O_TMPFILE
is no longer permitted for openat(2). As far as I can tell, this has
always been a bug and appears to not be used by userspace (and I've not
seen any problems on my machines by disallowing it). If it turns out
this breaks something, we can special-case it and only permit it for
openat(2) but not openat2(2).
After input from Florian Weimer, the new open_how and flag definitions
are inside a separate header from uapi/linux/fcntl.h, to avoid problems
that glibc has with importing that header.
/* Testing. */
In a follow-up patch there are over 200 selftests which ensure that this
syscall has the correct semantics and will correctly handle several
attack scenarios.
In addition, I've written a userspace library[4] which provides
convenient wrappers around openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) (this is necessary
because no other syscalls support RESOLVE_IN_ROOT, and thus lots of care
must be taken when using RESOLVE_IN_ROOT'd file descriptors with other
syscalls). During the development of this patch, I've run numerous
verification tests using libpathrs (showing that the API is reasonably
usable by userspace).
/* Future Work. */
Additional RESOLVE_ flags have been suggested during the review period.
These can be easily implemented separately (such as blocking auto-mount
during resolution).
Furthermore, there are some other proposed changes to the openat(2)
interface (the most obvious example is magic-link hardening[5]) which
would be a good opportunity to add a way for userspace to restrict how
O_PATH file descriptors can be re-opened.
Another possible avenue of future work would be some kind of
CHECK_FIELDS[6] flag which causes the kernel to indicate to userspace
which openat2(2) flags and fields are supported by the current kernel
(to avoid userspace having to go through several guesses to figure it
out).
[1]: https://lwn.net/Articles/588444/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFyyxJL1LyXZeBsf2ypriraj5ut1XkNDsunRBqgVjZU_6Q@mail.gmail.com
[3]: commit
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Sargun Dhillon
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9a2cef09c8
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arch: wire up pidfd_getfd syscall
This wires up the pidfd_getfd syscall for all architectures. Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200107175927.4558-4-sargun@sargun.me Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> |