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drivers/perf: arm_spe: Use perf_allow_kernel() for permissions

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Use perf_allow_kernel() for 'pa_enable' (physical addresses),
'pct_enable' (physical timestamps) and context IDs. This means that
perf_event_paranoid is now taken into account and LSM hooks can be used,
which is more consistent with other perf_event_open calls. For example
PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR uses perf_allow_kernel() rather than just
perfmon_capable().

This also indirectly fixes the following error message which is
misleading because perf_event_paranoid is not taken into account by
perfmon_capable():

  $ perf record -e arm_spe/pa_enable/

  Error:
  Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is
  limited. Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid
  setting ...

Suggested-by: Al Grant <al.grant@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240827145113.1224604-1-james.clark@linaro.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240807120039.GD37996@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net/
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
James Clark 2024-08-27 15:51:12 +01:00 committed by Will Deacon
parent db9e7a83d3
commit 5e9629d0ae
3 changed files with 14 additions and 12 deletions
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9
drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c
View File

@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
/* /*
* Cache if the event is allowed to trace Context information. * Cache if the event is allowed to trace Context information.
* This allows us to perform the check, i.e, perfmon_capable(), * This allows us to perform the check, i.e, perf_allow_kernel(),
* in the context of the event owner, once, during the event_init(). * in the context of the event owner, once, during the event_init().
*/ */
#define SPE_PMU_HW_FLAGS_CX 0x00001 #define SPE_PMU_HW_FLAGS_CX 0x00001
@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static_assert((PERF_EVENT_FLAG_ARCH & SPE_PMU_HW_FLAGS_CX) == SPE_PMU_HW_FLAGS_C
static void set_spe_event_has_cx(struct perf_event *event) static void set_spe_event_has_cx(struct perf_event *event)
{ {
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && perfmon_capable()) if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && !perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr))
event->hw.flags |= SPE_PMU_HW_FLAGS_CX; event->hw.flags |= SPE_PMU_HW_FLAGS_CX;
} }
@ -745,9 +745,8 @@ static int arm_spe_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
set_spe_event_has_cx(event); set_spe_event_has_cx(event);
reg = arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(event); reg = arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(event);
if (!perfmon_capable() && if (reg & (PMSCR_EL1_PA | PMSCR_EL1_PCT))
(reg & (PMSCR_EL1_PA | PMSCR_EL1_PCT))) return perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr);
return -EACCES;
return 0; return 0;
} }

8
include/linux/perf_event.h
View File

@ -1602,13 +1602,7 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1; return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1;
} }
static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr) int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr);
{
if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !perfmon_capable())
return -EACCES;
return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
}
static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr) static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
{ {

9
kernel/events/core.c
View File

@ -13351,6 +13351,15 @@ const struct perf_event_attr *perf_event_attrs(struct perf_event *event)
return &event->attr; return &event->attr;
} }
int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
{
if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !perfmon_capable())
return -EACCES;
return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(perf_allow_kernel);
/* /*
* Inherit an event from parent task to child task. * Inherit an event from parent task to child task.
* *