kevin/linux
1
Fork 0
Code

Documentation: security-bugs.rst: update preferences when dealing with the linux-distros group

Browse Source 
Because the linux-distros group forces reporters to release information
about reported bugs, and they impose arbitrary deadlines in having those
bugs fixed despite not actually being kernel developers, the kernel
security team recommends not interacting with them at all as this just
causes confusion and the early-release of reported security problems.

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2023063020-throat-pantyhose-f110@gregkh
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Greg Kroah-Hartman 2023-06-30 09:14:20 +02:00
parent fdf0eaf114
commit 4fee0915e6
1 changed files with 11 additions and 13 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

24
Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst
View File

@ -63,20 +63,18 @@ information submitted to the security list and any followup discussions
of the report are treated confidentially even after the embargo has been
lifted, in perpetuity.
Coordination
------------
Coordination with other groups
------------------------------
Fixes for sensitive bugs, such as those that might lead to privilege
escalations, may need to be coordinated with the private
<linux-distros@vs.openwall.org> mailing list so that distribution vendors
are well prepared to issue a fixed kernel upon public disclosure of the
upstream fix. Distros will need some time to test the proposed patch and
will generally request at least a few days of embargo, and vendor update
publication prefers to happen Tuesday through Thursday. When appropriate,
the security team can assist with this coordination, or the reporter can
include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix
the email Subject line with "[vs]" as described in the linux-distros wiki:
<http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros#how-to-use-the-lists>
The kernel security team strongly recommends that reporters of potential
security issues NEVER contact the "linux-distros" mailing list until
AFTER discussing it with the kernel security team. Do not Cc: both
lists at once. You may contact the linux-distros mailing list after a
fix has been agreed on and you fully understand the requirements that
doing so will impose on you and the kernel community.
The different lists have different goals and the linux-distros rules do
not contribute to actually fixing any potential security problems.
CVE assignment
--------------