2019-06-01 01:08:55 -07:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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2011-10-14 05:25:16 -07:00
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation
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* Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation
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*
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* Author:
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* Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@nokia.com>
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* <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
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*
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* File: sign.c
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* implements signature (RSA) verification
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* pkcs decoding is based on LibTomCrypt code
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*/
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#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/key.h>
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#include <linux/crypto.h>
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#include <crypto/hash.h>
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#include <crypto/sha.h>
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#include <keys/user-type.h>
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#include <linux/mpi.h>
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#include <linux/digsig.h>
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static struct crypto_shash *shash;
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2013-01-30 02:30:05 -07:00
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static const char *pkcs_1_v1_5_decode_emsa(const unsigned char *msg,
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unsigned long msglen,
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unsigned long modulus_bitlen,
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unsigned long *outlen)
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2011-10-14 05:25:16 -07:00
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{
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unsigned long modulus_len, ps_len, i;
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modulus_len = (modulus_bitlen >> 3) + (modulus_bitlen & 7 ? 1 : 0);
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/* test message size */
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if ((msglen > modulus_len) || (modulus_len < 11))
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2013-01-30 02:30:05 -07:00
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return NULL;
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2011-10-14 05:25:16 -07:00
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/* separate encoded message */
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2013-01-30 02:30:05 -07:00
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if (msg[0] != 0x00 || msg[1] != 0x01)
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return NULL;
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2011-10-14 05:25:16 -07:00
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for (i = 2; i < modulus_len - 1; i++)
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if (msg[i] != 0xFF)
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break;
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/* separator check */
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2012-01-26 10:13:26 -07:00
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if (msg[i] != 0)
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2011-10-14 05:25:16 -07:00
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/* There was no octet with hexadecimal value 0x00
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to separate ps from m. */
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2013-01-30 02:30:05 -07:00
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return NULL;
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2011-10-14 05:25:16 -07:00
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ps_len = i - 2;
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*outlen = (msglen - (2 + ps_len + 1));
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2013-01-30 02:30:05 -07:00
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return msg + 2 + ps_len + 1;
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2011-10-14 05:25:16 -07:00
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}
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/*
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* RSA Signature verification with public key
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*/
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static int digsig_verify_rsa(struct key *key,
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const char *sig, int siglen,
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const char *h, int hlen)
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{
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int err = -EINVAL;
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unsigned long len;
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unsigned long mlen, mblen;
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unsigned nret, l;
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2012-01-26 10:13:26 -07:00
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int head, i;
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2013-01-30 02:30:05 -07:00
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unsigned char *out1 = NULL;
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const char *m;
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2011-10-14 05:25:16 -07:00
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MPI in = NULL, res = NULL, pkey[2];
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2015-10-21 06:04:48 -07:00
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uint8_t *p, *datap;
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const uint8_t *endp;
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const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
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2011-10-14 05:25:16 -07:00
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struct pubkey_hdr *pkh;
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down_read(&key->sem);
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2017-03-01 08:11:23 -07:00
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ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key);
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2012-01-26 10:13:25 -07:00
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2017-10-09 12:43:20 -07:00
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if (!ukp) {
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/* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */
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err = -EKEYREVOKED;
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goto err1;
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}
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2012-01-26 10:13:25 -07:00
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if (ukp->datalen < sizeof(*pkh))
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goto err1;
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2011-10-14 05:25:16 -07:00
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pkh = (struct pubkey_hdr *)ukp->data;
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if (pkh->version != 1)
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goto err1;
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if (pkh->algo != PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA)
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goto err1;
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if (pkh->nmpi != 2)
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goto err1;
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datap = pkh->mpi;
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2012-01-26 10:13:25 -07:00
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endp = ukp->data + ukp->datalen;
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2011-10-14 05:25:16 -07:00
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for (i = 0; i < pkh->nmpi; i++) {
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unsigned int remaining = endp - datap;
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pkey[i] = mpi_read_from_buffer(datap, &remaining);
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lib/mpi: mpi_read_from_buffer(): return error code
mpi_read_from_buffer() reads a MPI from a buffer into a newly allocated
MPI instance. It expects the buffer's leading two bytes to contain the
number of bits, followed by the actual payload.
On failure, it returns NULL and updates the in/out argument ret_nread
somewhat inconsistently:
- If the given buffer is too short to contain the leading two bytes
encoding the number of bits or their value is unsupported, then
ret_nread will be cleared.
- If the allocation of the resulting MPI instance fails, ret_nread is left
as is.
The only user of mpi_read_from_buffer(), digsig_verify_rsa(), simply checks
for a return value of NULL and returns -ENOMEM if that happens.
While this is all of cosmetic nature only, there is another error condition
which currently isn't detectable by the caller of mpi_read_from_buffer():
if the given buffer is too small to hold the number of bits as encoded in
its first two bytes, the return value will be non-NULL and *ret_nread > 0.
In preparation of communicating this condition to the caller, let
mpi_read_from_buffer() return error values by means of the ERR_PTR()
mechanism.
Make the sole caller of mpi_read_from_buffer(), digsig_verify_rsa(),
check the return value for IS_ERR() rather than == NULL. If IS_ERR() is
true, return the associated error value rather than the fixed -ENOMEM.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-05-26 14:19:51 -07:00
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if (IS_ERR(pkey[i])) {
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err = PTR_ERR(pkey[i]);
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2012-01-26 10:13:24 -07:00
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goto err;
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lib/mpi: mpi_read_from_buffer(): return error code
mpi_read_from_buffer() reads a MPI from a buffer into a newly allocated
MPI instance. It expects the buffer's leading two bytes to contain the
number of bits, followed by the actual payload.
On failure, it returns NULL and updates the in/out argument ret_nread
somewhat inconsistently:
- If the given buffer is too short to contain the leading two bytes
encoding the number of bits or their value is unsupported, then
ret_nread will be cleared.
- If the allocation of the resulting MPI instance fails, ret_nread is left
as is.
The only user of mpi_read_from_buffer(), digsig_verify_rsa(), simply checks
for a return value of NULL and returns -ENOMEM if that happens.
While this is all of cosmetic nature only, there is another error condition
which currently isn't detectable by the caller of mpi_read_from_buffer():
if the given buffer is too small to hold the number of bits as encoded in
its first two bytes, the return value will be non-NULL and *ret_nread > 0.
In preparation of communicating this condition to the caller, let
mpi_read_from_buffer() return error values by means of the ERR_PTR()
mechanism.
Make the sole caller of mpi_read_from_buffer(), digsig_verify_rsa(),
check the return value for IS_ERR() rather than == NULL. If IS_ERR() is
true, return the associated error value rather than the fixed -ENOMEM.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-05-26 14:19:51 -07:00
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}
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2011-10-14 05:25:16 -07:00
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datap += remaining;
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}
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mblen = mpi_get_nbits(pkey[0]);
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2013-01-30 02:30:05 -07:00
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mlen = DIV_ROUND_UP(mblen, 8);
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2011-10-14 05:25:16 -07:00
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2016-05-26 14:19:52 -07:00
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if (mlen == 0) {
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err = -EINVAL;
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2012-01-26 10:13:25 -07:00
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goto err;
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2016-05-26 14:19:52 -07:00
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}
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err = -ENOMEM;
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2011-10-14 05:25:16 -07:00
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out1 = kzalloc(mlen, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!out1)
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goto err;
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nret = siglen;
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in = mpi_read_from_buffer(sig, &nret);
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lib/mpi: mpi_read_from_buffer(): return error code
mpi_read_from_buffer() reads a MPI from a buffer into a newly allocated
MPI instance. It expects the buffer's leading two bytes to contain the
number of bits, followed by the actual payload.
On failure, it returns NULL and updates the in/out argument ret_nread
somewhat inconsistently:
- If the given buffer is too short to contain the leading two bytes
encoding the number of bits or their value is unsupported, then
ret_nread will be cleared.
- If the allocation of the resulting MPI instance fails, ret_nread is left
as is.
The only user of mpi_read_from_buffer(), digsig_verify_rsa(), simply checks
for a return value of NULL and returns -ENOMEM if that happens.
While this is all of cosmetic nature only, there is another error condition
which currently isn't detectable by the caller of mpi_read_from_buffer():
if the given buffer is too small to hold the number of bits as encoded in
its first two bytes, the return value will be non-NULL and *ret_nread > 0.
In preparation of communicating this condition to the caller, let
mpi_read_from_buffer() return error values by means of the ERR_PTR()
mechanism.
Make the sole caller of mpi_read_from_buffer(), digsig_verify_rsa(),
check the return value for IS_ERR() rather than == NULL. If IS_ERR() is
true, return the associated error value rather than the fixed -ENOMEM.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-05-26 14:19:51 -07:00
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if (IS_ERR(in)) {
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err = PTR_ERR(in);
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2011-10-14 05:25:16 -07:00
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goto err;
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lib/mpi: mpi_read_from_buffer(): return error code
mpi_read_from_buffer() reads a MPI from a buffer into a newly allocated
MPI instance. It expects the buffer's leading two bytes to contain the
number of bits, followed by the actual payload.
On failure, it returns NULL and updates the in/out argument ret_nread
somewhat inconsistently:
- If the given buffer is too short to contain the leading two bytes
encoding the number of bits or their value is unsupported, then
ret_nread will be cleared.
- If the allocation of the resulting MPI instance fails, ret_nread is left
as is.
The only user of mpi_read_from_buffer(), digsig_verify_rsa(), simply checks
for a return value of NULL and returns -ENOMEM if that happens.
While this is all of cosmetic nature only, there is another error condition
which currently isn't detectable by the caller of mpi_read_from_buffer():
if the given buffer is too small to hold the number of bits as encoded in
its first two bytes, the return value will be non-NULL and *ret_nread > 0.
In preparation of communicating this condition to the caller, let
mpi_read_from_buffer() return error values by means of the ERR_PTR()
mechanism.
Make the sole caller of mpi_read_from_buffer(), digsig_verify_rsa(),
check the return value for IS_ERR() rather than == NULL. If IS_ERR() is
true, return the associated error value rather than the fixed -ENOMEM.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-05-26 14:19:51 -07:00
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}
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2011-10-14 05:25:16 -07:00
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res = mpi_alloc(mpi_get_nlimbs(in) * 2);
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if (!res)
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goto err;
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err = mpi_powm(res, in, pkey[1], pkey[0]);
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if (err)
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goto err;
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if (mpi_get_nlimbs(res) * BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB > mlen) {
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err = -EINVAL;
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goto err;
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}
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p = mpi_get_buffer(res, &l, NULL);
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if (!p) {
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err = -EINVAL;
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goto err;
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}
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len = mlen;
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head = len - l;
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memset(out1, 0, head);
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memcpy(out1 + head, p, l);
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2013-01-25 07:54:20 -07:00
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kfree(p);
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2013-01-30 02:30:05 -07:00
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m = pkcs_1_v1_5_decode_emsa(out1, len, mblen, &len);
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2011-10-14 05:25:16 -07:00
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2013-01-30 02:30:05 -07:00
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if (!m || len != hlen || memcmp(m, h, hlen))
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2012-09-12 03:26:55 -07:00
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err = -EINVAL;
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2011-10-14 05:25:16 -07:00
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err:
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mpi_free(in);
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mpi_free(res);
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kfree(out1);
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2012-01-26 10:13:24 -07:00
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while (--i >= 0)
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mpi_free(pkey[i]);
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2011-10-14 05:25:16 -07:00
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err1:
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up_read(&key->sem);
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return err;
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}
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/**
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* digsig_verify() - digital signature verification with public key
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* @keyring: keyring to search key in
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* @sig: digital signature
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2014-06-04 16:11:57 -07:00
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* @siglen: length of the signature
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2011-10-14 05:25:16 -07:00
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* @data: data
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* @datalen: length of the data
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2014-06-04 16:11:57 -07:00
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*
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* Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise
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2011-10-14 05:25:16 -07:00
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*
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* Verifies data integrity against digital signature.
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* Currently only RSA is supported.
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* Normally hash of the content is used as a data for this function.
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*
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*/
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int digsig_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, int siglen,
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const char *data, int datalen)
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{
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int err = -ENOMEM;
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struct signature_hdr *sh = (struct signature_hdr *)sig;
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struct shash_desc *desc = NULL;
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unsigned char hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
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struct key *key;
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char name[20];
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if (siglen < sizeof(*sh) + 2)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (sh->algo != PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA)
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return -ENOTSUPP;
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sprintf(name, "%llX", __be64_to_cpup((uint64_t *)sh->keyid));
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if (keyring) {
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/* search in specific keyring */
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key_ref_t kref;
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kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1UL),
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2019-06-26 13:02:32 -07:00
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&key_type_user, name, true);
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2011-10-14 05:25:16 -07:00
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if (IS_ERR(kref))
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2013-11-12 16:09:51 -07:00
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key = ERR_CAST(kref);
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2011-10-14 05:25:16 -07:00
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else
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key = key_ref_to_ptr(kref);
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} else {
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keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow
the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will also allow a
greater range of subjects to represented.
============
WHY DO THIS?
============
The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of
which should be grouped together.
For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a
key:
(1) Changing a key's ownership.
(2) Changing a key's security information.
(3) Setting a keyring's restriction.
And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime:
(4) Setting an expiry time.
(5) Revoking a key.
and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache:
(6) Invalidating a key.
Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with
controlling access to that key.
Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content
and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission. It can, however,
be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token
for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a
key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is
probably okay.
As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers:
(1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search.
(2) Permitting keyrings to be joined.
(3) Invalidation.
But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really
need to be controlled separately.
Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the
administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like
to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks.
===============
WHAT IS CHANGED
===============
The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions:
(1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be
changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring.
(2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked.
The SEARCH permission is split to create:
(1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found.
(2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring.
(3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated.
The WRITE permission is also split to create:
(1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be
added, removed and replaced in a keyring.
(2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely. This is
split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator.
(3) REVOKE - see above.
Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are
unioned together. An ACE specifies a subject, such as:
(*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key
(*) Owner - permitted to the key owner
(*) Group - permitted to the key group
(*) Everyone - permitted to everyone
Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that
you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to
everyone else.
Further subjects may be made available by later patches.
The ACE also specifies a permissions mask. The set of permissions is now:
VIEW Can view the key metadata
READ Can read the key content
WRITE Can update/modify the key content
SEARCH Can find the key by searching/requesting
LINK Can make a link to the key
SET_SECURITY Can change owner, ACL, expiry
INVAL Can invalidate
REVOKE Can revoke
JOIN Can join this keyring
CLEAR Can clear this keyring
The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated.
The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set,
or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token.
The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL.
The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE.
The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an
existing keyring.
The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually
created keyrings only.
======================
BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY
======================
To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the
permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless
KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be
returned.
It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate
ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero.
SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY. WRITE
permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR. JOIN is turned
on if a keyring is being altered.
The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions
mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs.
It will make the following mappings:
(1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH
(2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR
(3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set
(4) CLEAR -> WRITE
Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match
the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR.
=======
TESTING
=======
This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests:
(1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now
returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed
if the type doesn't have ->read(). You still can't actually read the
key.
(2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't
work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2019-06-27 15:03:07 -07:00
|
|
|
key = request_key(&key_type_user, name, NULL, NULL);
|
2011-10-14 05:25:16 -07:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
|
|
|
|
pr_err("key not found, id: %s\n", name);
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(key);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
desc = kzalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(shash),
|
|
|
|
GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!desc)
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
desc->tfm = shash;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypto_shash_init(desc);
|
|
|
|
crypto_shash_update(desc, data, datalen);
|
|
|
|
crypto_shash_update(desc, sig, sizeof(*sh));
|
|
|
|
crypto_shash_final(desc, hash);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kfree(desc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* pass signature mpis address */
|
|
|
|
err = digsig_verify_rsa(key, sig + sizeof(*sh), siglen - sizeof(*sh),
|
|
|
|
hash, sizeof(hash));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
key_put(key);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return err ? -EINVAL : 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(digsig_verify);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __init digsig_init(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
shash = crypto_alloc_shash("sha1", 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(shash)) {
|
|
|
|
pr_err("shash allocation failed\n");
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(shash);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void __exit digsig_cleanup(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
crypto_free_shash(shash);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
module_init(digsig_init);
|
|
|
|
module_exit(digsig_cleanup);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
|