2007-07-09 11:56:42 -07:00
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
# Generic algorithms support
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
config XOR_BLOCKS
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
#
|
async_tx: add the async_tx api
The async_tx api provides methods for describing a chain of asynchronous
bulk memory transfers/transforms with support for inter-transactional
dependencies. It is implemented as a dmaengine client that smooths over
the details of different hardware offload engine implementations. Code
that is written to the api can optimize for asynchronous operation and the
api will fit the chain of operations to the available offload resources.
I imagine that any piece of ADMA hardware would register with the
'async_*' subsystem, and a call to async_X would be routed as
appropriate, or be run in-line. - Neil Brown
async_tx exploits the capabilities of struct dma_async_tx_descriptor to
provide an api of the following general format:
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *
async_<operation>(..., struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *depend_tx,
dma_async_tx_callback cb_fn, void *cb_param)
{
struct dma_chan *chan = async_tx_find_channel(depend_tx, <operation>);
struct dma_device *device = chan ? chan->device : NULL;
int int_en = cb_fn ? 1 : 0;
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx = device ?
device->device_prep_dma_<operation>(chan, len, int_en) : NULL;
if (tx) { /* run <operation> asynchronously */
...
tx->tx_set_dest(addr, tx, index);
...
tx->tx_set_src(addr, tx, index);
...
async_tx_submit(chan, tx, flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
} else { /* run <operation> synchronously */
...
<operation>
...
async_tx_sync_epilog(flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
}
return tx;
}
async_tx_find_channel() returns a capable channel from its pool. The
channel pool is organized as a per-cpu array of channel pointers. The
async_tx_rebalance() routine is tasked with managing these arrays. In the
uniprocessor case async_tx_rebalance() tries to spread responsibility
evenly over channels of similar capabilities. For example if there are two
copy+xor channels, one will handle copy operations and the other will
handle xor. In the SMP case async_tx_rebalance() attempts to spread the
operations evenly over the cpus, e.g. cpu0 gets copy channel0 and xor
channel0 while cpu1 gets copy channel 1 and xor channel 1. When a
dependency is specified async_tx_find_channel defaults to keeping the
operation on the same channel. A xor->copy->xor chain will stay on one
channel if it supports both operation types, otherwise the transaction will
transition between a copy and a xor resource.
Currently the raid5 implementation in the MD raid456 driver has been
converted to the async_tx api. A driver for the offload engines on the
Intel Xscale series of I/O processors, iop-adma, is provided in a later
commit. With the iop-adma driver and async_tx, raid456 is able to offload
copy, xor, and xor-zero-sum operations to hardware engines.
On iop342 tiobench showed higher throughput for sequential writes (20 - 30%
improvement) and sequential reads to a degraded array (40 - 55%
improvement). For the other cases performance was roughly equal, +/- a few
percentage points. On a x86-smp platform the performance of the async_tx
implementation (in synchronous mode) was also +/- a few percentage points
of the original implementation. According to 'top' on iop342 CPU
utilization drops from ~50% to ~15% during a 'resync' while the speed
according to /proc/mdstat doubles from ~25 MB/s to ~50 MB/s.
The tiobench command line used for testing was: tiobench --size 2048
--block 4096 --block 131072 --dir /mnt/raid --numruns 5
* iop342 had 1GB of memory available
Details:
* if CONFIG_DMA_ENGINE=n the asynchronous path is compiled away by making
async_tx_find_channel a static inline routine that always returns NULL
* when a callback is specified for a given transaction an interrupt will
fire at operation completion time and the callback will occur in a
tasklet. if the the channel does not support interrupts then a live
polling wait will be performed
* the api is written as a dmaengine client that requests all available
channels
* In support of dependencies the api implicitly schedules channel-switch
interrupts. The interrupt triggers the cleanup tasklet which causes
pending operations to be scheduled on the next channel
* Xor engines treat an xor destination address differently than a software
xor routine. To the software routine the destination address is an implied
source, whereas engines treat it as a write-only destination. This patch
modifies the xor_blocks routine to take a an explicit destination address
to mirror the hardware.
Changelog:
* fixed a leftover debug print
* don't allow callbacks in async_interrupt_cond
* fixed xor_block changes
* fixed usage of ASYNC_TX_XOR_DROP_DEST
* drop dma mapping methods, suggested by Chris Leech
* printk warning fixups from Andrew Morton
* don't use inline in C files, Adrian Bunk
* select the API when MD is enabled
* BUG_ON xor source counts <= 1
* implicitly handle hardware concerns like channel switching and
interrupts, Neil Brown
* remove the per operation type list, and distribute operation capabilities
evenly amongst the available channels
* simplify async_tx_find_channel to optimize the fast path
* introduce the channel_table_initialized flag to prevent early calls to
the api
* reorganize the code to mimic crypto
* include mm.h as not all archs include it in dma-mapping.h
* make the Kconfig options non-user visible, Adrian Bunk
* move async_tx under crypto since it is meant as 'core' functionality, and
the two may share algorithms in the future
* move large inline functions into c files
* checkpatch.pl fixes
* gpl v2 only correction
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-By: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
2007-01-02 11:10:44 -07:00
|
|
|
# async_tx api: hardware offloaded memory transfer/transform support
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
#
|
async_tx: add the async_tx api
The async_tx api provides methods for describing a chain of asynchronous
bulk memory transfers/transforms with support for inter-transactional
dependencies. It is implemented as a dmaengine client that smooths over
the details of different hardware offload engine implementations. Code
that is written to the api can optimize for asynchronous operation and the
api will fit the chain of operations to the available offload resources.
I imagine that any piece of ADMA hardware would register with the
'async_*' subsystem, and a call to async_X would be routed as
appropriate, or be run in-line. - Neil Brown
async_tx exploits the capabilities of struct dma_async_tx_descriptor to
provide an api of the following general format:
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *
async_<operation>(..., struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *depend_tx,
dma_async_tx_callback cb_fn, void *cb_param)
{
struct dma_chan *chan = async_tx_find_channel(depend_tx, <operation>);
struct dma_device *device = chan ? chan->device : NULL;
int int_en = cb_fn ? 1 : 0;
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx = device ?
device->device_prep_dma_<operation>(chan, len, int_en) : NULL;
if (tx) { /* run <operation> asynchronously */
...
tx->tx_set_dest(addr, tx, index);
...
tx->tx_set_src(addr, tx, index);
...
async_tx_submit(chan, tx, flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
} else { /* run <operation> synchronously */
...
<operation>
...
async_tx_sync_epilog(flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
}
return tx;
}
async_tx_find_channel() returns a capable channel from its pool. The
channel pool is organized as a per-cpu array of channel pointers. The
async_tx_rebalance() routine is tasked with managing these arrays. In the
uniprocessor case async_tx_rebalance() tries to spread responsibility
evenly over channels of similar capabilities. For example if there are two
copy+xor channels, one will handle copy operations and the other will
handle xor. In the SMP case async_tx_rebalance() attempts to spread the
operations evenly over the cpus, e.g. cpu0 gets copy channel0 and xor
channel0 while cpu1 gets copy channel 1 and xor channel 1. When a
dependency is specified async_tx_find_channel defaults to keeping the
operation on the same channel. A xor->copy->xor chain will stay on one
channel if it supports both operation types, otherwise the transaction will
transition between a copy and a xor resource.
Currently the raid5 implementation in the MD raid456 driver has been
converted to the async_tx api. A driver for the offload engines on the
Intel Xscale series of I/O processors, iop-adma, is provided in a later
commit. With the iop-adma driver and async_tx, raid456 is able to offload
copy, xor, and xor-zero-sum operations to hardware engines.
On iop342 tiobench showed higher throughput for sequential writes (20 - 30%
improvement) and sequential reads to a degraded array (40 - 55%
improvement). For the other cases performance was roughly equal, +/- a few
percentage points. On a x86-smp platform the performance of the async_tx
implementation (in synchronous mode) was also +/- a few percentage points
of the original implementation. According to 'top' on iop342 CPU
utilization drops from ~50% to ~15% during a 'resync' while the speed
according to /proc/mdstat doubles from ~25 MB/s to ~50 MB/s.
The tiobench command line used for testing was: tiobench --size 2048
--block 4096 --block 131072 --dir /mnt/raid --numruns 5
* iop342 had 1GB of memory available
Details:
* if CONFIG_DMA_ENGINE=n the asynchronous path is compiled away by making
async_tx_find_channel a static inline routine that always returns NULL
* when a callback is specified for a given transaction an interrupt will
fire at operation completion time and the callback will occur in a
tasklet. if the the channel does not support interrupts then a live
polling wait will be performed
* the api is written as a dmaengine client that requests all available
channels
* In support of dependencies the api implicitly schedules channel-switch
interrupts. The interrupt triggers the cleanup tasklet which causes
pending operations to be scheduled on the next channel
* Xor engines treat an xor destination address differently than a software
xor routine. To the software routine the destination address is an implied
source, whereas engines treat it as a write-only destination. This patch
modifies the xor_blocks routine to take a an explicit destination address
to mirror the hardware.
Changelog:
* fixed a leftover debug print
* don't allow callbacks in async_interrupt_cond
* fixed xor_block changes
* fixed usage of ASYNC_TX_XOR_DROP_DEST
* drop dma mapping methods, suggested by Chris Leech
* printk warning fixups from Andrew Morton
* don't use inline in C files, Adrian Bunk
* select the API when MD is enabled
* BUG_ON xor source counts <= 1
* implicitly handle hardware concerns like channel switching and
interrupts, Neil Brown
* remove the per operation type list, and distribute operation capabilities
evenly amongst the available channels
* simplify async_tx_find_channel to optimize the fast path
* introduce the channel_table_initialized flag to prevent early calls to
the api
* reorganize the code to mimic crypto
* include mm.h as not all archs include it in dma-mapping.h
* make the Kconfig options non-user visible, Adrian Bunk
* move async_tx under crypto since it is meant as 'core' functionality, and
the two may share algorithms in the future
* move large inline functions into c files
* checkpatch.pl fixes
* gpl v2 only correction
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-By: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
2007-01-02 11:10:44 -07:00
|
|
|
source "crypto/async_tx/Kconfig"
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
|
async_tx: add the async_tx api
The async_tx api provides methods for describing a chain of asynchronous
bulk memory transfers/transforms with support for inter-transactional
dependencies. It is implemented as a dmaengine client that smooths over
the details of different hardware offload engine implementations. Code
that is written to the api can optimize for asynchronous operation and the
api will fit the chain of operations to the available offload resources.
I imagine that any piece of ADMA hardware would register with the
'async_*' subsystem, and a call to async_X would be routed as
appropriate, or be run in-line. - Neil Brown
async_tx exploits the capabilities of struct dma_async_tx_descriptor to
provide an api of the following general format:
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *
async_<operation>(..., struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *depend_tx,
dma_async_tx_callback cb_fn, void *cb_param)
{
struct dma_chan *chan = async_tx_find_channel(depend_tx, <operation>);
struct dma_device *device = chan ? chan->device : NULL;
int int_en = cb_fn ? 1 : 0;
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx = device ?
device->device_prep_dma_<operation>(chan, len, int_en) : NULL;
if (tx) { /* run <operation> asynchronously */
...
tx->tx_set_dest(addr, tx, index);
...
tx->tx_set_src(addr, tx, index);
...
async_tx_submit(chan, tx, flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
} else { /* run <operation> synchronously */
...
<operation>
...
async_tx_sync_epilog(flags, depend_tx, cb_fn, cb_param);
}
return tx;
}
async_tx_find_channel() returns a capable channel from its pool. The
channel pool is organized as a per-cpu array of channel pointers. The
async_tx_rebalance() routine is tasked with managing these arrays. In the
uniprocessor case async_tx_rebalance() tries to spread responsibility
evenly over channels of similar capabilities. For example if there are two
copy+xor channels, one will handle copy operations and the other will
handle xor. In the SMP case async_tx_rebalance() attempts to spread the
operations evenly over the cpus, e.g. cpu0 gets copy channel0 and xor
channel0 while cpu1 gets copy channel 1 and xor channel 1. When a
dependency is specified async_tx_find_channel defaults to keeping the
operation on the same channel. A xor->copy->xor chain will stay on one
channel if it supports both operation types, otherwise the transaction will
transition between a copy and a xor resource.
Currently the raid5 implementation in the MD raid456 driver has been
converted to the async_tx api. A driver for the offload engines on the
Intel Xscale series of I/O processors, iop-adma, is provided in a later
commit. With the iop-adma driver and async_tx, raid456 is able to offload
copy, xor, and xor-zero-sum operations to hardware engines.
On iop342 tiobench showed higher throughput for sequential writes (20 - 30%
improvement) and sequential reads to a degraded array (40 - 55%
improvement). For the other cases performance was roughly equal, +/- a few
percentage points. On a x86-smp platform the performance of the async_tx
implementation (in synchronous mode) was also +/- a few percentage points
of the original implementation. According to 'top' on iop342 CPU
utilization drops from ~50% to ~15% during a 'resync' while the speed
according to /proc/mdstat doubles from ~25 MB/s to ~50 MB/s.
The tiobench command line used for testing was: tiobench --size 2048
--block 4096 --block 131072 --dir /mnt/raid --numruns 5
* iop342 had 1GB of memory available
Details:
* if CONFIG_DMA_ENGINE=n the asynchronous path is compiled away by making
async_tx_find_channel a static inline routine that always returns NULL
* when a callback is specified for a given transaction an interrupt will
fire at operation completion time and the callback will occur in a
tasklet. if the the channel does not support interrupts then a live
polling wait will be performed
* the api is written as a dmaengine client that requests all available
channels
* In support of dependencies the api implicitly schedules channel-switch
interrupts. The interrupt triggers the cleanup tasklet which causes
pending operations to be scheduled on the next channel
* Xor engines treat an xor destination address differently than a software
xor routine. To the software routine the destination address is an implied
source, whereas engines treat it as a write-only destination. This patch
modifies the xor_blocks routine to take a an explicit destination address
to mirror the hardware.
Changelog:
* fixed a leftover debug print
* don't allow callbacks in async_interrupt_cond
* fixed xor_block changes
* fixed usage of ASYNC_TX_XOR_DROP_DEST
* drop dma mapping methods, suggested by Chris Leech
* printk warning fixups from Andrew Morton
* don't use inline in C files, Adrian Bunk
* select the API when MD is enabled
* BUG_ON xor source counts <= 1
* implicitly handle hardware concerns like channel switching and
interrupts, Neil Brown
* remove the per operation type list, and distribute operation capabilities
evenly amongst the available channels
* simplify async_tx_find_channel to optimize the fast path
* introduce the channel_table_initialized flag to prevent early calls to
the api
* reorganize the code to mimic crypto
* include mm.h as not all archs include it in dma-mapping.h
* make the Kconfig options non-user visible, Adrian Bunk
* move async_tx under crypto since it is meant as 'core' functionality, and
the two may share algorithms in the future
* move large inline functions into c files
* checkpatch.pl fixes
* gpl v2 only correction
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-By: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
2007-01-02 11:10:44 -07:00
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
# Cryptographic API Configuration
|
|
|
|
#
|
2007-05-17 22:11:01 -07:00
|
|
|
menuconfig CRYPTO
|
2008-03-30 01:36:09 -07:00
|
|
|
tristate "Cryptographic API"
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This option provides the core Cryptographic API.
|
|
|
|
|
2006-08-21 04:08:13 -07:00
|
|
|
if CRYPTO
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
comment "Crypto core or helper"
|
|
|
|
|
2008-08-04 23:13:08 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_FIPS
|
|
|
|
bool "FIPS 200 compliance"
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This options enables the fips boot option which is
|
|
|
|
required if you want to system to operate in a FIPS 200
|
|
|
|
certification. You should say no unless you know what
|
|
|
|
this is.
|
|
|
|
|
2006-08-21 04:08:13 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
2008-12-10 05:29:44 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
|
2006-08-21 04:08:13 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This option provides the API for cryptographic algorithms.
|
|
|
|
|
2008-12-10 05:29:44 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
|
2007-08-30 00:36:14 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_AEAD
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
2008-12-10 05:29:44 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AEAD2
|
2007-08-30 00:36:14 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
|
2008-12-10 05:29:44 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_AEAD2
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
|
|
|
|
|
2006-08-21 07:07:53 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
2008-12-10 05:29:44 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER2
|
2006-08-21 07:07:53 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2008-12-10 05:29:44 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER2
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_RNG2
|
2006-08-21 07:07:53 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2006-08-19 05:24:23 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
2008-12-10 05:29:44 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH2
|
2006-08-19 05:24:23 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
|
2008-12-10 05:29:44 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_HASH2
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
|
|
|
|
|
2008-08-14 05:15:52 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_RNG
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
2008-12-10 05:29:44 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_RNG2
|
2008-08-14 05:15:52 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
|
2008-12-10 05:29:44 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_RNG2
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI2
|
|
|
|
|
2006-09-20 18:31:44 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
|
|
|
tristate "Cryptographic algorithm manager"
|
2008-12-10 05:29:44 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER2
|
2006-09-20 18:31:44 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Create default cryptographic template instantiations such as
|
|
|
|
cbc(aes).
|
|
|
|
|
2008-12-10 05:29:44 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_MANAGER2
|
|
|
|
def_tristate CRYPTO_MANAGER || (CRYPTO_MANAGER!=n && CRYPTO_ALGAPI=y)
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AEAD2
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH2
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER2
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_GF128MUL
|
|
|
|
tristate "GF(2^128) multiplication functions (EXPERIMENTAL)"
|
2006-10-27 20:15:24 -07:00
|
|
|
depends on EXPERIMENTAL
|
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
Efficient table driven implementation of multiplications in the
|
|
|
|
field GF(2^128). This is needed by some cypher modes. This
|
|
|
|
option will be selected automatically if you select such a
|
|
|
|
cipher mode. Only select this option by hand if you expect to load
|
|
|
|
an external module that requires these functions.
|
2006-10-27 20:15:24 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_NULL
|
|
|
|
tristate "Null algorithms"
|
2006-08-21 04:08:13 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2008-02-17 18:00:05 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
|
2008-11-07 17:09:56 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
These are 'Null' algorithms, used by IPsec, which do nothing.
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CRYPTD
|
|
|
|
tristate "Software async crypto daemon"
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
|
2008-05-14 06:23:00 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
This is a generic software asynchronous crypto daemon that
|
|
|
|
converts an arbitrary synchronous software crypto algorithm
|
|
|
|
into an asynchronous algorithm that executes in a kernel thread.
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_AUTHENC
|
|
|
|
tristate "Authenc support"
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AEAD
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
Authenc: Combined mode wrapper for IPsec.
|
|
|
|
This is required for IPSec.
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_TEST
|
|
|
|
tristate "Testing module"
|
|
|
|
depends on m
|
2008-07-31 02:08:25 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
Quick & dirty crypto test module.
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
comment "Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data"
|
2007-11-10 05:08:25 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CCM
|
|
|
|
tristate "CCM support"
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_CTR
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AEAD
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
Support for Counter with CBC MAC. Required for IPsec.
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_GCM
|
|
|
|
tristate "GCM/GMAC support"
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_CTR
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AEAD
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_GF128MUL
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
Support for Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and Galois Message
|
|
|
|
Authentication Code (GMAC). Required for IPSec.
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SEQIV
|
|
|
|
tristate "Sequence Number IV Generator"
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AEAD
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
|
2008-08-14 05:21:31 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_RNG
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
This IV generator generates an IV based on a sequence number by
|
|
|
|
xoring it with a salt. This algorithm is mainly useful for CTR
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
comment "Block modes"
|
2006-11-29 00:59:44 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CBC
|
|
|
|
tristate "CBC support"
|
2006-09-20 18:44:08 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
|
2006-10-16 04:28:58 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
2006-09-20 18:44:08 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
CBC: Cipher Block Chaining mode
|
|
|
|
This block cipher algorithm is required for IPSec.
|
2006-09-20 18:44:08 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CTR
|
|
|
|
tristate "CTR support"
|
2006-09-20 18:44:08 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_SEQIV
|
2006-10-16 04:28:58 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
2006-09-20 18:44:08 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
CTR: Counter mode
|
2006-09-20 18:44:08 -07:00
|
|
|
This block cipher algorithm is required for IPSec.
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CTS
|
|
|
|
tristate "CTS support"
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
CTS: Cipher Text Stealing
|
|
|
|
This is the Cipher Text Stealing mode as described by
|
|
|
|
Section 8 of rfc2040 and referenced by rfc3962.
|
|
|
|
(rfc3962 includes errata information in its Appendix A)
|
|
|
|
This mode is required for Kerberos gss mechanism support
|
|
|
|
for AES encryption.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_ECB
|
|
|
|
tristate "ECB support"
|
2006-12-15 18:09:02 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
ECB: Electronic CodeBook mode
|
|
|
|
This is the simplest block cipher algorithm. It simply encrypts
|
|
|
|
the input block by block.
|
2006-12-15 18:09:02 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2006-11-25 15:43:10 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_LRW
|
|
|
|
tristate "LRW support (EXPERIMENTAL)"
|
|
|
|
depends on EXPERIMENTAL
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_GF128MUL
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
LRW: Liskov Rivest Wagner, a tweakable, non malleable, non movable
|
|
|
|
narrow block cipher mode for dm-crypt. Use it with cipher
|
|
|
|
specification string aes-lrw-benbi, the key must be 256, 320 or 384.
|
|
|
|
The first 128, 192 or 256 bits in the key are used for AES and the
|
|
|
|
rest is used to tie each cipher block to its logical position.
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_PCBC
|
|
|
|
tristate "PCBC support"
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
PCBC: Propagating Cipher Block Chaining mode
|
|
|
|
This block cipher algorithm is required for RxRPC.
|
|
|
|
|
2007-09-19 05:23:13 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_XTS
|
|
|
|
tristate "XTS support (EXPERIMENTAL)"
|
|
|
|
depends on EXPERIMENTAL
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_GF128MUL
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
XTS: IEEE1619/D16 narrow block cipher use with aes-xts-plain,
|
|
|
|
key size 256, 384 or 512 bits. This implementation currently
|
|
|
|
can't handle a sectorsize which is not a multiple of 16 bytes.
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
comment "Hash modes"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_HMAC
|
|
|
|
tristate "HMAC support"
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
[CRYPTO] ctr: Add CTR (Counter) block cipher mode
This patch implements CTR mode for IPsec.
It is based off of RFC 3686.
Please note:
1. CTR turns a block cipher into a stream cipher.
Encryption is done in blocks, however the last block
may be a partial block.
A "counter block" is encrypted, creating a keystream
that is xor'ed with the plaintext. The counter portion
of the counter block is incremented after each block
of plaintext is encrypted.
Decryption is performed in same manner.
2. The CTR counterblock is composed of,
nonce + IV + counter
The size of the counterblock is equivalent to the
blocksize of the cipher.
sizeof(nonce) + sizeof(IV) + sizeof(counter) = blocksize
The CTR template requires the name of the cipher
algorithm, the sizeof the nonce, and the sizeof the iv.
ctr(cipher,sizeof_nonce,sizeof_iv)
So for example,
ctr(aes,4,8)
specifies the counterblock will be composed of 4 bytes
from a nonce, 8 bytes from the iv, and 4 bytes for counter
since aes has a blocksize of 16 bytes.
3. The counter portion of the counter block is stored
in big endian for conformance to rfc 3686.
Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2007-10-22 17:50:32 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication (RFC2104).
|
|
|
|
This is required for IPSec.
|
[CRYPTO] ctr: Add CTR (Counter) block cipher mode
This patch implements CTR mode for IPsec.
It is based off of RFC 3686.
Please note:
1. CTR turns a block cipher into a stream cipher.
Encryption is done in blocks, however the last block
may be a partial block.
A "counter block" is encrypted, creating a keystream
that is xor'ed with the plaintext. The counter portion
of the counter block is incremented after each block
of plaintext is encrypted.
Decryption is performed in same manner.
2. The CTR counterblock is composed of,
nonce + IV + counter
The size of the counterblock is equivalent to the
blocksize of the cipher.
sizeof(nonce) + sizeof(IV) + sizeof(counter) = blocksize
The CTR template requires the name of the cipher
algorithm, the sizeof the nonce, and the sizeof the iv.
ctr(cipher,sizeof_nonce,sizeof_iv)
So for example,
ctr(aes,4,8)
specifies the counterblock will be composed of 4 bytes
from a nonce, 8 bytes from the iv, and 4 bytes for counter
since aes has a blocksize of 16 bytes.
3. The counter portion of the counter block is stored
in big endian for conformance to rfc 3686.
Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2007-10-22 17:50:32 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_XCBC
|
|
|
|
tristate "XCBC support"
|
|
|
|
depends on EXPERIMENTAL
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_MANAGER
|
2008-03-24 06:26:16 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
XCBC: Keyed-Hashing with encryption algorithm
|
|
|
|
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3566.txt
|
|
|
|
http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/modes/proposedmodes/
|
|
|
|
xcbc-mac/xcbc-mac-spec.pdf
|
2008-03-24 06:26:16 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
comment "Digest"
|
2007-11-26 07:24:11 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CRC32C
|
|
|
|
tristate "CRC32c CRC algorithm"
|
2008-07-08 05:54:28 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
2007-12-12 05:25:13 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
Castagnoli, et al Cyclic Redundancy-Check Algorithm. Used
|
|
|
|
by iSCSI for header and data digests and by others.
|
2008-11-07 00:11:47 -07:00
|
|
|
See Castagnoli93. Module will be crc32c.
|
2007-12-12 05:25:13 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-08-06 18:57:03 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CRC32C_INTEL
|
|
|
|
tristate "CRC32c INTEL hardware acceleration"
|
|
|
|
depends on X86
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
In Intel processor with SSE4.2 supported, the processor will
|
|
|
|
support CRC32C implementation using hardware accelerated CRC32
|
|
|
|
instruction. This option will create 'crc32c-intel' module,
|
|
|
|
which will enable any routine to use the CRC32 instruction to
|
|
|
|
gain performance compared with software implementation.
|
|
|
|
Module will be crc32c-intel.
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_MD4
|
|
|
|
tristate "MD4 digest algorithm"
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2007-04-16 03:49:20 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
MD4 message digest algorithm (RFC1320).
|
2007-04-16 03:49:20 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_MD5
|
|
|
|
tristate "MD5 digest algorithm"
|
2006-08-21 04:08:13 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
MD5 message digest algorithm (RFC1321).
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_MICHAEL_MIC
|
|
|
|
tristate "Michael MIC keyed digest algorithm"
|
2006-12-15 18:13:14 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
Michael MIC is used for message integrity protection in TKIP
|
|
|
|
(IEEE 802.11i). This algorithm is required for TKIP, but it
|
|
|
|
should not be used for other purposes because of the weakness
|
|
|
|
of the algorithm.
|
2006-12-15 18:13:14 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-05-07 07:17:37 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_RMD128
|
2008-07-16 04:28:00 -07:00
|
|
|
tristate "RIPEMD-128 digest algorithm"
|
2008-11-07 18:10:40 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
2008-07-16 04:28:00 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
RIPEMD-128 (ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004).
|
2008-05-07 07:17:37 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-07-16 04:28:00 -07:00
|
|
|
RIPEMD-128 is a 128-bit cryptographic hash function. It should only
|
|
|
|
to be used as a secure replacement for RIPEMD. For other use cases
|
|
|
|
RIPEMD-160 should be used.
|
2008-05-07 07:17:37 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-07-16 04:28:00 -07:00
|
|
|
Developed by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers and Bart Preneel.
|
|
|
|
See <http://home.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html>
|
2008-05-07 07:17:37 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_RMD160
|
2008-07-16 04:28:00 -07:00
|
|
|
tristate "RIPEMD-160 digest algorithm"
|
2008-11-07 18:18:51 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_HASH
|
2008-07-16 04:28:00 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
RIPEMD-160 (ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004).
|
2008-05-07 07:17:37 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-07-16 04:28:00 -07:00
|
|
|
RIPEMD-160 is a 160-bit cryptographic hash function. It is intended
|
|
|
|
to be used as a secure replacement for the 128-bit hash functions
|
|
|
|
MD4, MD5 and it's predecessor RIPEMD
|
|
|
|
(not to be confused with RIPEMD-128).
|
2008-05-07 07:17:37 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-07-16 04:28:00 -07:00
|
|
|
It's speed is comparable to SHA1 and there are no known attacks
|
|
|
|
against RIPEMD-160.
|
2008-05-09 06:30:27 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-07-16 04:28:00 -07:00
|
|
|
Developed by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers and Bart Preneel.
|
|
|
|
See <http://home.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html>
|
2008-05-09 06:30:27 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_RMD256
|
2008-07-16 04:28:00 -07:00
|
|
|
tristate "RIPEMD-256 digest algorithm"
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
RIPEMD-256 is an optional extension of RIPEMD-128 with a
|
|
|
|
256 bit hash. It is intended for applications that require
|
|
|
|
longer hash-results, without needing a larger security level
|
|
|
|
(than RIPEMD-128).
|
2008-05-09 06:30:27 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-07-16 04:28:00 -07:00
|
|
|
Developed by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers and Bart Preneel.
|
|
|
|
See <http://home.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html>
|
2008-05-09 06:30:27 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_RMD320
|
2008-07-16 04:28:00 -07:00
|
|
|
tristate "RIPEMD-320 digest algorithm"
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
RIPEMD-320 is an optional extension of RIPEMD-160 with a
|
|
|
|
320 bit hash. It is intended for applications that require
|
|
|
|
longer hash-results, without needing a larger security level
|
|
|
|
(than RIPEMD-160).
|
2008-05-09 06:30:27 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-07-16 04:28:00 -07:00
|
|
|
Developed by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers and Bart Preneel.
|
|
|
|
See <http://home.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html>
|
2008-05-07 07:17:37 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SHA1
|
|
|
|
tristate "SHA1 digest algorithm"
|
2006-08-21 04:08:13 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
SHA-1 secure hash standard (FIPS 180-1/DFIPS 180-2).
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SHA256
|
|
|
|
tristate "SHA224 and SHA256 digest algorithm"
|
2006-08-21 04:08:13 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
SHA256 secure hash standard (DFIPS 180-2).
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
This version of SHA implements a 256 bit hash with 128 bits of
|
|
|
|
security against collision attacks.
|
2006-06-20 03:37:23 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-07-16 04:28:00 -07:00
|
|
|
This code also includes SHA-224, a 224 bit hash with 112 bits
|
|
|
|
of security against collision attacks.
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SHA512
|
|
|
|
tristate "SHA384 and SHA512 digest algorithms"
|
2006-08-21 04:08:13 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2006-06-20 03:59:16 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
SHA512 secure hash standard (DFIPS 180-2).
|
2006-06-20 03:59:16 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
This version of SHA implements a 512 bit hash with 256 bits of
|
|
|
|
security against collision attacks.
|
2006-06-20 03:59:16 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
This code also includes SHA-384, a 384 bit hash with 192 bits
|
|
|
|
of security against collision attacks.
|
2006-06-20 03:59:16 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_TGR192
|
|
|
|
tristate "Tiger digest algorithms"
|
2006-08-21 04:08:13 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2006-06-20 04:12:02 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
Tiger hash algorithm 192, 160 and 128-bit hashes
|
2006-06-20 04:12:02 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
Tiger is a hash function optimized for 64-bit processors while
|
|
|
|
still having decent performance on 32-bit processors.
|
|
|
|
Tiger was developed by Ross Anderson and Eli Biham.
|
2006-06-20 04:12:02 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
<http://www.cs.technion.ac.il/~biham/Reports/Tiger/>.
|
2006-06-20 04:12:02 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_WP512
|
|
|
|
tristate "Whirlpool digest algorithms"
|
2006-08-21 04:08:13 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
Whirlpool hash algorithm 512, 384 and 256-bit hashes
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
Whirlpool-512 is part of the NESSIE cryptographic primitives.
|
|
|
|
Whirlpool will be part of the ISO/IEC 10118-3:2003(E) standard
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
<http://planeta.terra.com.br/informatica/paulobarreto/WhirlpoolPage.html>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
comment "Ciphers"
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_AES
|
|
|
|
tristate "AES cipher algorithms"
|
2006-08-21 04:08:13 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
AES cipher algorithms (FIPS-197). AES uses the Rijndael
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Rijndael appears to be consistently a very good performer in
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
both hardware and software across a wide range of computing
|
|
|
|
environments regardless of its use in feedback or non-feedback
|
|
|
|
modes. Its key setup time is excellent, and its key agility is
|
|
|
|
good. Rijndael's very low memory requirements make it very well
|
|
|
|
suited for restricted-space environments, in which it also
|
|
|
|
demonstrates excellent performance. Rijndael's operations are
|
|
|
|
among the easiest to defend against power and timing attacks.
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
The AES specifies three key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See <http://csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/aes/> for more information.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_AES_586
|
|
|
|
tristate "AES cipher algorithms (i586)"
|
2006-08-21 04:08:13 -07:00
|
|
|
depends on (X86 || UML_X86) && !64BIT
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2007-11-10 04:07:16 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AES
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
AES cipher algorithms (FIPS-197). AES uses the Rijndael
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Rijndael appears to be consistently a very good performer in
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
both hardware and software across a wide range of computing
|
|
|
|
environments regardless of its use in feedback or non-feedback
|
|
|
|
modes. Its key setup time is excellent, and its key agility is
|
|
|
|
good. Rijndael's very low memory requirements make it very well
|
|
|
|
suited for restricted-space environments, in which it also
|
|
|
|
demonstrates excellent performance. Rijndael's operations are
|
|
|
|
among the easiest to defend against power and timing attacks.
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
The AES specifies three key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits
|
2005-07-06 13:55:00 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See <http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/> for more information.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_AES_X86_64
|
|
|
|
tristate "AES cipher algorithms (x86_64)"
|
2006-08-21 04:08:13 -07:00
|
|
|
depends on (X86 || UML_X86) && 64BIT
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2007-11-08 06:25:04 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_AES
|
2005-07-06 13:55:00 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
AES cipher algorithms (FIPS-197). AES uses the Rijndael
|
2005-07-06 13:55:00 -07:00
|
|
|
algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Rijndael appears to be consistently a very good performer in
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
both hardware and software across a wide range of computing
|
|
|
|
environments regardless of its use in feedback or non-feedback
|
|
|
|
modes. Its key setup time is excellent, and its key agility is
|
|
|
|
good. Rijndael's very low memory requirements make it very well
|
|
|
|
suited for restricted-space environments, in which it also
|
|
|
|
demonstrates excellent performance. Rijndael's operations are
|
|
|
|
among the easiest to defend against power and timing attacks.
|
2005-07-06 13:55:00 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
The AES specifies three key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See <http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/> for more information.
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_ANUBIS
|
|
|
|
tristate "Anubis cipher algorithm"
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Anubis cipher algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Anubis is a variable key length cipher which can use keys from
|
|
|
|
128 bits to 320 bits in length. It was evaluated as a entrant
|
|
|
|
in the NESSIE competition.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
|
|
|
<https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/nessie/reports/>
|
|
|
|
<http://planeta.terra.com.br/informatica/paulobarreto/AnubisPage.html>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_ARC4
|
|
|
|
tristate "ARC4 cipher algorithm"
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
ARC4 cipher algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ARC4 is a stream cipher using keys ranging from 8 bits to 2048
|
|
|
|
bits in length. This algorithm is required for driver-based
|
|
|
|
WEP, but it should not be for other purposes because of the
|
|
|
|
weakness of the algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_BLOWFISH
|
|
|
|
tristate "Blowfish cipher algorithm"
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Blowfish cipher algorithm, by Bruce Schneier.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This is a variable key length cipher which can use keys from 32
|
|
|
|
bits to 448 bits in length. It's fast, simple and specifically
|
|
|
|
designed for use on "large microprocessors".
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
|
|
|
<http://www.schneier.com/blowfish.html>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CAMELLIA
|
|
|
|
tristate "Camellia cipher algorithms"
|
|
|
|
depends on CRYPTO
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Camellia cipher algorithms module.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Camellia is a symmetric key block cipher developed jointly
|
|
|
|
at NTT and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Camellia specifies three key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
|
|
|
<https://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/index_s.html>
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CAST5
|
|
|
|
tristate "CAST5 (CAST-128) cipher algorithm"
|
2006-08-21 04:08:13 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
The CAST5 encryption algorithm (synonymous with CAST-128) is
|
|
|
|
described in RFC2144.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_CAST6
|
|
|
|
tristate "CAST6 (CAST-256) cipher algorithm"
|
2006-08-21 04:08:13 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
The CAST6 encryption algorithm (synonymous with CAST-256) is
|
|
|
|
described in RFC2612.
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_DES
|
|
|
|
tristate "DES and Triple DES EDE cipher algorithms"
|
2006-08-21 04:08:13 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
DES cipher algorithm (FIPS 46-2), and Triple DES EDE (FIPS 46-3).
|
2005-09-01 17:42:46 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_FCRYPT
|
|
|
|
tristate "FCrypt cipher algorithm"
|
2006-08-21 04:08:13 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
FCrypt algorithm used by RxRPC.
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_KHAZAD
|
|
|
|
tristate "Khazad cipher algorithm"
|
2006-08-21 04:08:13 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Khazad cipher algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Khazad was a finalist in the initial NESSIE competition. It is
|
|
|
|
an algorithm optimized for 64-bit processors with good performance
|
|
|
|
on 32-bit processors. Khazad uses an 128 bit key size.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
|
|
|
<http://planeta.terra.com.br/informatica/paulobarreto/KhazadPage.html>
|
|
|
|
|
2007-11-23 04:45:00 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SALSA20
|
|
|
|
tristate "Salsa20 stream cipher algorithm (EXPERIMENTAL)"
|
|
|
|
depends on EXPERIMENTAL
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Salsa20 stream cipher algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Salsa20 is a stream cipher submitted to eSTREAM, the ECRYPT
|
|
|
|
Stream Cipher Project. See <http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/>
|
2007-12-10 00:52:56 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Salsa20 stream cipher algorithm is designed by Daniel J.
|
|
|
|
Bernstein <djb@cr.yp.to>. See <http://cr.yp.to/snuffle.html>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SALSA20_586
|
|
|
|
tristate "Salsa20 stream cipher algorithm (i586) (EXPERIMENTAL)"
|
|
|
|
depends on (X86 || UML_X86) && !64BIT
|
|
|
|
depends on EXPERIMENTAL
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Salsa20 stream cipher algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Salsa20 is a stream cipher submitted to eSTREAM, the ECRYPT
|
|
|
|
Stream Cipher Project. See <http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/>
|
2007-12-17 09:04:40 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Salsa20 stream cipher algorithm is designed by Daniel J.
|
|
|
|
Bernstein <djb@cr.yp.to>. See <http://cr.yp.to/snuffle.html>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SALSA20_X86_64
|
|
|
|
tristate "Salsa20 stream cipher algorithm (x86_64) (EXPERIMENTAL)"
|
|
|
|
depends on (X86 || UML_X86) && 64BIT
|
|
|
|
depends on EXPERIMENTAL
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Salsa20 stream cipher algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Salsa20 is a stream cipher submitted to eSTREAM, the ECRYPT
|
|
|
|
Stream Cipher Project. See <http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream/>
|
2007-11-23 04:45:00 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The Salsa20 stream cipher algorithm is designed by Daniel J.
|
|
|
|
Bernstein <djb@cr.yp.to>. See <http://cr.yp.to/snuffle.html>
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SEED
|
|
|
|
tristate "SEED cipher algorithm"
|
2006-08-21 04:08:13 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
SEED cipher algorithm (RFC4269).
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
SEED is a 128-bit symmetric key block cipher that has been
|
|
|
|
developed by KISA (Korea Information Security Agency) as a
|
|
|
|
national standard encryption algorithm of the Republic of Korea.
|
|
|
|
It is a 16 round block cipher with the key size of 128 bit.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
|
|
|
<http://www.kisa.or.kr/kisa/seed/jsp/seed_eng.jsp>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_SERPENT
|
|
|
|
tristate "Serpent cipher algorithm"
|
2006-08-21 04:08:13 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
Serpent cipher algorithm, by Anderson, Biham & Knudsen.
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
Keys are allowed to be from 0 to 256 bits in length, in steps
|
|
|
|
of 8 bits. Also includes the 'Tnepres' algorithm, a reversed
|
|
|
|
variant of Serpent for compatibility with old kerneli.org code.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
See also:
|
|
|
|
<http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/serpent.html>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_TEA
|
|
|
|
tristate "TEA, XTEA and XETA cipher algorithms"
|
2006-08-21 04:08:13 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
TEA cipher algorithm.
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
Tiny Encryption Algorithm is a simple cipher that uses
|
|
|
|
many rounds for security. It is very fast and uses
|
|
|
|
little memory.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Xtendend Tiny Encryption Algorithm is a modification to
|
|
|
|
the TEA algorithm to address a potential key weakness
|
|
|
|
in the TEA algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Xtendend Encryption Tiny Algorithm is a mis-implementation
|
|
|
|
of the XTEA algorithm for compatibility purposes.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_TWOFISH
|
|
|
|
tristate "Twofish cipher algorithm"
|
2006-10-21 21:49:17 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_TWOFISH_COMMON
|
2006-10-21 21:49:17 -07:00
|
|
|
help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
Twofish cipher algorithm.
|
2006-10-21 21:49:17 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
Twofish was submitted as an AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
|
|
|
|
candidate cipher by researchers at CounterPane Systems. It is a
|
|
|
|
16 round block cipher supporting key sizes of 128, 192, and 256
|
|
|
|
bits.
|
2006-10-21 21:49:17 -07:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
|
|
|
See also:
|
|
|
|
<http://www.schneier.com/twofish.html>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_TWOFISH_COMMON
|
|
|
|
tristate
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Common parts of the Twofish cipher algorithm shared by the
|
|
|
|
generic c and the assembler implementations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CRYPTO_TWOFISH_586
|
|
|
|
tristate "Twofish cipher algorithms (i586)"
|
|
|
|
depends on (X86 || UML_X86) && !64BIT
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_TWOFISH_COMMON
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Twofish cipher algorithm.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Twofish was submitted as an AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
|
|
|
|
candidate cipher by researchers at CounterPane Systems. It is a
|
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16 round block cipher supporting key sizes of 128, 192, and 256
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bits.
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2006-10-21 21:49:17 -07:00
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See also:
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2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
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<http://www.schneier.com/twofish.html>
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2006-10-21 21:49:17 -07:00
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2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
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config CRYPTO_TWOFISH_X86_64
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tristate "Twofish cipher algorithm (x86_64)"
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depends on (X86 || UML_X86) && 64BIT
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2006-08-21 04:08:13 -07:00
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select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
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2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
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select CRYPTO_TWOFISH_COMMON
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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help
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2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
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Twofish cipher algorithm (x86_64).
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2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
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2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
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Twofish was submitted as an AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
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candidate cipher by researchers at CounterPane Systems. It is a
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16 round block cipher supporting key sizes of 128, 192, and 256
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bits.
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See also:
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<http://www.schneier.com/twofish.html>
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comment "Compression"
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config CRYPTO_DEFLATE
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tristate "Deflate compression algorithm"
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select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
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select ZLIB_INFLATE
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select ZLIB_DEFLATE
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[CRYPTO] aead: Add authenc
This patch adds the authenc algorithm which constructs an AEAD algorithm
from an asynchronous block cipher and a hash. The construction is done
by concatenating the encrypted result from the cipher with the output
from the hash, as is used by the IPsec ESP protocol.
The authenc algorithm exists as a template with four parameters:
authenc(auth, authsize, enc, enckeylen).
The authentication algorithm, the authentication size (i.e., truncating
the output of the authentication algorithm), the encryption algorithm,
and the encryption key length. Both the size field and the key length
field are in bytes. For example, AES-128 with SHA1-HMAC would be
represented by
authenc(hmac(sha1), 12, cbc(aes), 16)
The key for the authenc algorithm is the concatenation of the keys for
the authentication algorithm with the encryption algorithm. For the
above example, if a key of length 36 bytes is given, then hmac(sha1)
would receive the first 20 bytes while the last 16 would be given to
cbc(aes).
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2007-08-30 01:24:15 -07:00
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help
|
2008-04-05 06:04:48 -07:00
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|
This is the Deflate algorithm (RFC1951), specified for use in
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IPSec with the IPCOMP protocol (RFC3173, RFC2394).
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You will most probably want this if using IPSec.
|
[CRYPTO] aead: Add authenc
This patch adds the authenc algorithm which constructs an AEAD algorithm
from an asynchronous block cipher and a hash. The construction is done
by concatenating the encrypted result from the cipher with the output
from the hash, as is used by the IPsec ESP protocol.
The authenc algorithm exists as a template with four parameters:
authenc(auth, authsize, enc, enckeylen).
The authentication algorithm, the authentication size (i.e., truncating
the output of the authentication algorithm), the encryption algorithm,
and the encryption key length. Both the size field and the key length
field are in bytes. For example, AES-128 with SHA1-HMAC would be
represented by
authenc(hmac(sha1), 12, cbc(aes), 16)
The key for the authenc algorithm is the concatenation of the keys for
the authentication algorithm with the encryption algorithm. For the
above example, if a key of length 36 bytes is given, then hmac(sha1)
would receive the first 20 bytes while the last 16 would be given to
cbc(aes).
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2007-08-30 01:24:15 -07:00
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2007-12-07 01:53:23 -07:00
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config CRYPTO_LZO
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|
|
tristate "LZO compression algorithm"
|
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|
|
select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
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|
|
|
select LZO_COMPRESS
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|
select LZO_DECOMPRESS
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|
|
|
help
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|
|
This is the LZO algorithm.
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|
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|
2008-08-14 05:15:52 -07:00
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|
|
comment "Random Number Generation"
|
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|
|
config CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG
|
|
|
|
tristate "Pseudo Random Number Generation for Cryptographic modules"
|
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|
|
select CRYPTO_AES
|
|
|
|
select CRYPTO_RNG
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|
|
|
select CRYPTO_FIPS
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This option enables the generic pseudo random number generator
|
|
|
|
for cryptographic modules. Uses the Algorithm specified in
|
|
|
|
ANSI X9.31 A.2.4
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|
|
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00
|
|
|
source "drivers/crypto/Kconfig"
|
|
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|
2006-08-21 04:08:13 -07:00
|
|
|
endif # if CRYPTO
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