1
linux/security/keys/request_key.c

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/* request_key.c: request a key from userspace
*
* Copyright (C) 2004-6 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* See Documentation/keys-request-key.txt
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/kmod.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
#include <linux/keyctl.h>
#include "internal.h"
struct key_construction {
struct list_head link; /* link in construction queue */
struct key *key; /* key being constructed */
};
/* when waiting for someone else's keys, you get added to this */
DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(request_key_conswq);
/*****************************************************************************/
/*
* request userspace finish the construction of a key
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 02:02:47 -07:00
* - execute "/sbin/request-key <op> <key> <uid> <gid> <keyring> <keyring> <keyring>"
*/
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 02:02:47 -07:00
static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key *key,
struct key *authkey,
const char *op,
void *aux)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
key_serial_t prkey, sskey;
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 02:02:47 -07:00
struct key *keyring;
char *argv[9], *envp[3], uid_str[12], gid_str[12];
char key_str[12], keyring_str[3][12];
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 02:02:47 -07:00
char desc[20];
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
int ret, i;
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 02:02:47 -07:00
kenter("{%d},{%d},%s", key->serial, authkey->serial, op);
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 02:02:47 -07:00
/* allocate a new session keyring */
sprintf(desc, "_req.%u", key->serial);
keyring = keyring_alloc(desc, current->fsuid, current->fsgid, current,
KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 02:02:47 -07:00
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto error_alloc;
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
}
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 02:02:47 -07:00
/* attach the auth key to the session keyring */
ret = __key_link(keyring, authkey);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_link;
/* record the UID and GID */
sprintf(uid_str, "%d", current->fsuid);
sprintf(gid_str, "%d", current->fsgid);
/* we say which key is under construction */
sprintf(key_str, "%d", key->serial);
/* we specify the process's default keyrings */
sprintf(keyring_str[0], "%d",
tsk->thread_keyring ? tsk->thread_keyring->serial : 0);
prkey = 0;
if (tsk->signal->process_keyring)
prkey = tsk->signal->process_keyring->serial;
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
sprintf(keyring_str[1], "%d", prkey);
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
if (tsk->signal->session_keyring) {
rcu_read_lock();
sskey = rcu_dereference(tsk->signal->session_keyring)->serial;
rcu_read_unlock();
}
else {
sskey = tsk->user->session_keyring->serial;
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
}
sprintf(keyring_str[2], "%d", sskey);
/* set up a minimal environment */
i = 0;
envp[i++] = "HOME=/";
envp[i++] = "PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin";
envp[i] = NULL;
/* set up the argument list */
i = 0;
argv[i++] = "/sbin/request-key";
argv[i++] = (char *) op;
argv[i++] = key_str;
argv[i++] = uid_str;
argv[i++] = gid_str;
argv[i++] = keyring_str[0];
argv[i++] = keyring_str[1];
argv[i++] = keyring_str[2];
argv[i] = NULL;
/* do it */
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 02:02:47 -07:00
ret = call_usermodehelper_keys(argv[0], argv, envp, keyring, 1);
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 02:02:47 -07:00
error_link:
key_put(keyring);
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 02:02:47 -07:00
error_alloc:
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ret;
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 02:02:47 -07:00
} /* end call_sbin_request_key() */
/*****************************************************************************/
/*
* call out to userspace for the key
* - called with the construction sem held, but the sem is dropped here
* - we ignore program failure and go on key status instead
*/
static struct key *__request_key_construction(struct key_type *type,
const char *description,
const char *callout_info,
void *aux,
unsigned long flags)
{
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 02:02:47 -07:00
request_key_actor_t actor;
struct key_construction cons;
struct timespec now;
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 02:02:47 -07:00
struct key *key, *authkey;
[PATCH] keys: Discard key spinlock and use RCU for key payload The attached patch changes the key implementation in a number of ways: (1) It removes the spinlock from the key structure. (2) The key flags are now accessed using atomic bitops instead of write-locking the key spinlock and using C bitwise operators. The three instantiation flags are dealt with with the construction semaphore held during the request_key/instantiate/negate sequence, thus rendering the spinlock superfluous. The key flags are also now bit numbers not bit masks. (3) The key payload is now accessed using RCU. This permits the recursive keyring search algorithm to be simplified greatly since no locks need be taken other than the usual RCU preemption disablement. Searching now does not require any locks or semaphores to be held; merely that the starting keyring be pinned. (4) The keyring payload now includes an RCU head so that it can be disposed of by call_rcu(). This requires that the payload be copied on unlink to prevent introducing races in copy-down vs search-up. (5) The user key payload is now a structure with the data following it. It includes an RCU head like the keyring payload and for the same reason. It also contains a data length because the data length in the key may be changed on another CPU whilst an RCU protected read is in progress on the payload. This would then see the supposed RCU payload and the on-key data length getting out of sync. I'm tempted to drop the key's datalen entirely, except that it's used in conjunction with quota management and so is a little tricky to get rid of. (6) Update the keys documentation. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:49 -07:00
int ret, negated;
kenter("%s,%s,%s,%lx", type->name, description, callout_info, flags);
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
/* create a key and add it to the queue */
key = key_alloc(type, description,
current->fsuid, current->fsgid, current, KEY_POS_ALL,
flags);
if (IS_ERR(key))
goto alloc_failed;
[PATCH] keys: Discard key spinlock and use RCU for key payload The attached patch changes the key implementation in a number of ways: (1) It removes the spinlock from the key structure. (2) The key flags are now accessed using atomic bitops instead of write-locking the key spinlock and using C bitwise operators. The three instantiation flags are dealt with with the construction semaphore held during the request_key/instantiate/negate sequence, thus rendering the spinlock superfluous. The key flags are also now bit numbers not bit masks. (3) The key payload is now accessed using RCU. This permits the recursive keyring search algorithm to be simplified greatly since no locks need be taken other than the usual RCU preemption disablement. Searching now does not require any locks or semaphores to be held; merely that the starting keyring be pinned. (4) The keyring payload now includes an RCU head so that it can be disposed of by call_rcu(). This requires that the payload be copied on unlink to prevent introducing races in copy-down vs search-up. (5) The user key payload is now a structure with the data following it. It includes an RCU head like the keyring payload and for the same reason. It also contains a data length because the data length in the key may be changed on another CPU whilst an RCU protected read is in progress on the payload. This would then see the supposed RCU payload and the on-key data length getting out of sync. I'm tempted to drop the key's datalen entirely, except that it's used in conjunction with quota management and so is a little tricky to get rid of. (6) Update the keys documentation. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:49 -07:00
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags);
cons.key = key;
list_add_tail(&cons.link, &key->user->consq);
/* we drop the construction sem here on behalf of the caller */
up_write(&key_construction_sem);
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 02:02:47 -07:00
/* allocate an authorisation key */
authkey = request_key_auth_new(key, callout_info);
if (IS_ERR(authkey)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(authkey);
authkey = NULL;
goto alloc_authkey_failed;
}
/* make the call */
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 02:02:47 -07:00
actor = call_sbin_request_key;
if (type->request_key)
actor = type->request_key;
ret = actor(key, authkey, "create", aux);
if (ret < 0)
goto request_failed;
/* if the key wasn't instantiated, then we want to give an error */
ret = -ENOKEY;
[PATCH] keys: Discard key spinlock and use RCU for key payload The attached patch changes the key implementation in a number of ways: (1) It removes the spinlock from the key structure. (2) The key flags are now accessed using atomic bitops instead of write-locking the key spinlock and using C bitwise operators. The three instantiation flags are dealt with with the construction semaphore held during the request_key/instantiate/negate sequence, thus rendering the spinlock superfluous. The key flags are also now bit numbers not bit masks. (3) The key payload is now accessed using RCU. This permits the recursive keyring search algorithm to be simplified greatly since no locks need be taken other than the usual RCU preemption disablement. Searching now does not require any locks or semaphores to be held; merely that the starting keyring be pinned. (4) The keyring payload now includes an RCU head so that it can be disposed of by call_rcu(). This requires that the payload be copied on unlink to prevent introducing races in copy-down vs search-up. (5) The user key payload is now a structure with the data following it. It includes an RCU head like the keyring payload and for the same reason. It also contains a data length because the data length in the key may be changed on another CPU whilst an RCU protected read is in progress on the payload. This would then see the supposed RCU payload and the on-key data length getting out of sync. I'm tempted to drop the key's datalen entirely, except that it's used in conjunction with quota management and so is a little tricky to get rid of. (6) Update the keys documentation. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:49 -07:00
if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
goto request_failed;
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 02:02:47 -07:00
key_revoke(authkey);
key_put(authkey);
down_write(&key_construction_sem);
list_del(&cons.link);
up_write(&key_construction_sem);
/* also give an error if the key was negatively instantiated */
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 02:02:47 -07:00
check_not_negative:
[PATCH] keys: Discard key spinlock and use RCU for key payload The attached patch changes the key implementation in a number of ways: (1) It removes the spinlock from the key structure. (2) The key flags are now accessed using atomic bitops instead of write-locking the key spinlock and using C bitwise operators. The three instantiation flags are dealt with with the construction semaphore held during the request_key/instantiate/negate sequence, thus rendering the spinlock superfluous. The key flags are also now bit numbers not bit masks. (3) The key payload is now accessed using RCU. This permits the recursive keyring search algorithm to be simplified greatly since no locks need be taken other than the usual RCU preemption disablement. Searching now does not require any locks or semaphores to be held; merely that the starting keyring be pinned. (4) The keyring payload now includes an RCU head so that it can be disposed of by call_rcu(). This requires that the payload be copied on unlink to prevent introducing races in copy-down vs search-up. (5) The user key payload is now a structure with the data following it. It includes an RCU head like the keyring payload and for the same reason. It also contains a data length because the data length in the key may be changed on another CPU whilst an RCU protected read is in progress on the payload. This would then see the supposed RCU payload and the on-key data length getting out of sync. I'm tempted to drop the key's datalen entirely, except that it's used in conjunction with quota management and so is a little tricky to get rid of. (6) Update the keys documentation. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:49 -07:00
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) {
key_put(key);
key = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
}
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 02:02:47 -07:00
out:
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
kleave(" = %p", key);
return key;
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 02:02:47 -07:00
request_failed:
key_revoke(authkey);
key_put(authkey);
alloc_authkey_failed:
/* it wasn't instantiated
* - remove from construction queue
* - mark the key as dead
*/
[PATCH] keys: Discard key spinlock and use RCU for key payload The attached patch changes the key implementation in a number of ways: (1) It removes the spinlock from the key structure. (2) The key flags are now accessed using atomic bitops instead of write-locking the key spinlock and using C bitwise operators. The three instantiation flags are dealt with with the construction semaphore held during the request_key/instantiate/negate sequence, thus rendering the spinlock superfluous. The key flags are also now bit numbers not bit masks. (3) The key payload is now accessed using RCU. This permits the recursive keyring search algorithm to be simplified greatly since no locks need be taken other than the usual RCU preemption disablement. Searching now does not require any locks or semaphores to be held; merely that the starting keyring be pinned. (4) The keyring payload now includes an RCU head so that it can be disposed of by call_rcu(). This requires that the payload be copied on unlink to prevent introducing races in copy-down vs search-up. (5) The user key payload is now a structure with the data following it. It includes an RCU head like the keyring payload and for the same reason. It also contains a data length because the data length in the key may be changed on another CPU whilst an RCU protected read is in progress on the payload. This would then see the supposed RCU payload and the on-key data length getting out of sync. I'm tempted to drop the key's datalen entirely, except that it's used in conjunction with quota management and so is a little tricky to get rid of. (6) Update the keys documentation. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:49 -07:00
negated = 0;
down_write(&key_construction_sem);
list_del(&cons.link);
/* check it didn't get instantiated between the check and the down */
[PATCH] keys: Discard key spinlock and use RCU for key payload The attached patch changes the key implementation in a number of ways: (1) It removes the spinlock from the key structure. (2) The key flags are now accessed using atomic bitops instead of write-locking the key spinlock and using C bitwise operators. The three instantiation flags are dealt with with the construction semaphore held during the request_key/instantiate/negate sequence, thus rendering the spinlock superfluous. The key flags are also now bit numbers not bit masks. (3) The key payload is now accessed using RCU. This permits the recursive keyring search algorithm to be simplified greatly since no locks need be taken other than the usual RCU preemption disablement. Searching now does not require any locks or semaphores to be held; merely that the starting keyring be pinned. (4) The keyring payload now includes an RCU head so that it can be disposed of by call_rcu(). This requires that the payload be copied on unlink to prevent introducing races in copy-down vs search-up. (5) The user key payload is now a structure with the data following it. It includes an RCU head like the keyring payload and for the same reason. It also contains a data length because the data length in the key may be changed on another CPU whilst an RCU protected read is in progress on the payload. This would then see the supposed RCU payload and the on-key data length getting out of sync. I'm tempted to drop the key's datalen entirely, except that it's used in conjunction with quota management and so is a little tricky to get rid of. (6) Update the keys documentation. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:49 -07:00
if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags);
negated = 1;
}
[PATCH] keys: Discard key spinlock and use RCU for key payload The attached patch changes the key implementation in a number of ways: (1) It removes the spinlock from the key structure. (2) The key flags are now accessed using atomic bitops instead of write-locking the key spinlock and using C bitwise operators. The three instantiation flags are dealt with with the construction semaphore held during the request_key/instantiate/negate sequence, thus rendering the spinlock superfluous. The key flags are also now bit numbers not bit masks. (3) The key payload is now accessed using RCU. This permits the recursive keyring search algorithm to be simplified greatly since no locks need be taken other than the usual RCU preemption disablement. Searching now does not require any locks or semaphores to be held; merely that the starting keyring be pinned. (4) The keyring payload now includes an RCU head so that it can be disposed of by call_rcu(). This requires that the payload be copied on unlink to prevent introducing races in copy-down vs search-up. (5) The user key payload is now a structure with the data following it. It includes an RCU head like the keyring payload and for the same reason. It also contains a data length because the data length in the key may be changed on another CPU whilst an RCU protected read is in progress on the payload. This would then see the supposed RCU payload and the on-key data length getting out of sync. I'm tempted to drop the key's datalen entirely, except that it's used in conjunction with quota management and so is a little tricky to get rid of. (6) Update the keys documentation. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:49 -07:00
clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags);
up_write(&key_construction_sem);
[PATCH] keys: Discard key spinlock and use RCU for key payload The attached patch changes the key implementation in a number of ways: (1) It removes the spinlock from the key structure. (2) The key flags are now accessed using atomic bitops instead of write-locking the key spinlock and using C bitwise operators. The three instantiation flags are dealt with with the construction semaphore held during the request_key/instantiate/negate sequence, thus rendering the spinlock superfluous. The key flags are also now bit numbers not bit masks. (3) The key payload is now accessed using RCU. This permits the recursive keyring search algorithm to be simplified greatly since no locks need be taken other than the usual RCU preemption disablement. Searching now does not require any locks or semaphores to be held; merely that the starting keyring be pinned. (4) The keyring payload now includes an RCU head so that it can be disposed of by call_rcu(). This requires that the payload be copied on unlink to prevent introducing races in copy-down vs search-up. (5) The user key payload is now a structure with the data following it. It includes an RCU head like the keyring payload and for the same reason. It also contains a data length because the data length in the key may be changed on another CPU whilst an RCU protected read is in progress on the payload. This would then see the supposed RCU payload and the on-key data length getting out of sync. I'm tempted to drop the key's datalen entirely, except that it's used in conjunction with quota management and so is a little tricky to get rid of. (6) Update the keys documentation. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:49 -07:00
if (!negated)
goto check_not_negative; /* surprisingly, the key got
* instantiated */
/* set the timeout and store in the session keyring if we can */
now = current_kernel_time();
key->expiry = now.tv_sec + key_negative_timeout;
if (current->signal->session_keyring) {
struct key *keyring;
rcu_read_lock();
keyring = rcu_dereference(current->signal->session_keyring);
atomic_inc(&keyring->usage);
rcu_read_unlock();
key_link(keyring, key);
key_put(keyring);
}
key_put(key);
/* notify anyone who was waiting */
wake_up_all(&request_key_conswq);
key = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto out;
[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-08 02:02:47 -07:00
alloc_failed:
up_write(&key_construction_sem);
goto out;
} /* end __request_key_construction() */
/*****************************************************************************/
/*
* call out to userspace to request the key
* - we check the construction queue first to see if an appropriate key is
* already being constructed by userspace
*/
static struct key *request_key_construction(struct key_type *type,
const char *description,
const char *callout_info,
void *aux,
struct key_user *user,
unsigned long flags)
{
struct key_construction *pcons;
struct key *key, *ckey;
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(myself, current);
kenter("%s,%s,{%d},%s,%lx",
type->name, description, user->uid, callout_info, flags);
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
/* see if there's such a key under construction already */
down_write(&key_construction_sem);
list_for_each_entry(pcons, &user->consq, link) {
ckey = pcons->key;
if (ckey->type != type)
continue;
if (type->match(ckey, description))
goto found_key_under_construction;
}
/* see about getting userspace to construct the key */
key = __request_key_construction(type, description, callout_info, aux,
flags);
error:
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
kleave(" = %p", key);
return key;
/* someone else has the same key under construction
* - we want to keep an eye on their key
*/
found_key_under_construction:
atomic_inc(&ckey->usage);
up_write(&key_construction_sem);
/* wait for the key to be completed one way or another */
add_wait_queue(&request_key_conswq, &myself);
for (;;) {
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
[PATCH] keys: Discard key spinlock and use RCU for key payload The attached patch changes the key implementation in a number of ways: (1) It removes the spinlock from the key structure. (2) The key flags are now accessed using atomic bitops instead of write-locking the key spinlock and using C bitwise operators. The three instantiation flags are dealt with with the construction semaphore held during the request_key/instantiate/negate sequence, thus rendering the spinlock superfluous. The key flags are also now bit numbers not bit masks. (3) The key payload is now accessed using RCU. This permits the recursive keyring search algorithm to be simplified greatly since no locks need be taken other than the usual RCU preemption disablement. Searching now does not require any locks or semaphores to be held; merely that the starting keyring be pinned. (4) The keyring payload now includes an RCU head so that it can be disposed of by call_rcu(). This requires that the payload be copied on unlink to prevent introducing races in copy-down vs search-up. (5) The user key payload is now a structure with the data following it. It includes an RCU head like the keyring payload and for the same reason. It also contains a data length because the data length in the key may be changed on another CPU whilst an RCU protected read is in progress on the payload. This would then see the supposed RCU payload and the on-key data length getting out of sync. I'm tempted to drop the key's datalen entirely, except that it's used in conjunction with quota management and so is a little tricky to get rid of. (6) Update the keys documentation. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:49 -07:00
if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &ckey->flags))
break;
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
if (signal_pending(current))
break;
schedule();
}
set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
remove_wait_queue(&request_key_conswq, &myself);
/* we'll need to search this process's keyrings to see if the key is
* now there since we can't automatically assume it's also available
* there */
key_put(ckey);
ckey = NULL;
key = NULL; /* request a retry */
goto error;
} /* end request_key_construction() */
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
/*****************************************************************************/
/*
* link a freshly minted key to an appropriate destination keyring
*/
static void request_key_link(struct key *key, struct key *dest_keyring)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct key *drop = NULL;
kenter("{%d},%p", key->serial, dest_keyring);
/* find the appropriate keyring */
if (!dest_keyring) {
switch (tsk->jit_keyring) {
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:
dest_keyring = tsk->thread_keyring;
if (dest_keyring)
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:
dest_keyring = tsk->signal->process_keyring;
if (dest_keyring)
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING:
rcu_read_lock();
dest_keyring = key_get(
rcu_dereference(tsk->signal->session_keyring));
rcu_read_unlock();
drop = dest_keyring;
if (dest_keyring)
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
dest_keyring = current->user->session_keyring;
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING:
dest_keyring = current->user->uid_keyring;
break;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING:
default:
BUG();
}
}
/* and attach the key to it */
key_link(dest_keyring, key);
key_put(drop);
kleave("");
} /* end request_key_link() */
/*****************************************************************************/
/*
* request a key
* - search the process's keyrings
* - check the list of keys being created or updated
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
* - call out to userspace for a key if supplementary info was provided
* - cache the key in an appropriate keyring
*/
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
const char *description,
const char *callout_info,
void *aux,
struct key *dest_keyring,
unsigned long flags)
{
struct key_user *user;
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
kenter("%s,%s,%s,%p,%p,%lx",
type->name, description, callout_info, aux,
dest_keyring, flags);
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
/* search all the process keyrings for a key */
key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match,
current);
kdebug("search 1: %p", key_ref);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
}
else if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EAGAIN) {
key = ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR(key_ref));
}
else {
/* the search failed, but the keyrings were searchable, so we
* should consult userspace if we can */
key = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
if (!callout_info)
goto error;
/* - get hold of the user's construction queue */
user = key_user_lookup(current->fsuid);
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
if (!user)
goto nomem;
for (;;) {
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
if (signal_pending(current))
goto interrupted;
/* ask userspace (returns NULL if it waited on a key
* being constructed) */
key = request_key_construction(type, description,
callout_info, aux,
user, flags);
if (key)
break;
/* someone else made the key we want, so we need to
* search again as it might now be available to us */
key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description,
type->match,
current);
kdebug("search 2: %p", key_ref);
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
break;
}
if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EAGAIN) {
key = ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR(key_ref));
break;
}
}
key_user_put(user);
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
/* link the new key into the appropriate keyring */
if (!IS_ERR(key))
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
request_key_link(key, dest_keyring);
}
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
error:
kleave(" = %p", key);
return key;
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
nomem:
key = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
goto error;
interrupted:
key_user_put(user);
key = ERR_PTR(-EINTR);
goto error;
} /* end request_key_and_link() */
/*****************************************************************************/
/*
* request a key
* - search the process's keyrings
* - check the list of keys being created or updated
* - call out to userspace for a key if supplementary info was provided
*/
struct key *request_key(struct key_type *type,
const char *description,
const char *callout_info)
{
return request_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info, NULL,
NULL, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 22:00:56 -07:00
} /* end request_key() */
EXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key);
/*****************************************************************************/
/*
* request a key with auxiliary data for the upcaller
* - search the process's keyrings
* - check the list of keys being created or updated
* - call out to userspace for a key if supplementary info was provided
*/
struct key *request_key_with_auxdata(struct key_type *type,
const char *description,
const char *callout_info,
void *aux)
{
return request_key_and_link(type, description, callout_info, aux,
NULL, KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA);
} /* end request_key_with_auxdata() */
EXPORT_SYMBOL(request_key_with_auxdata);