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linux/drivers/s390/scsi/zfcp_fsf.h

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 07:07:57 -07:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* zfcp device driver
*
* Interface to the FSF support functions.
*
scsi: zfcp: report FC Endpoint Security in sysfs Add an interface to read Fibre Channel Endpoint Security information of FCP channels and their connections to FC remote ports. It comes in the form of new sysfs attributes that are attached to the CCW device representing the FCP device and its zfcp port objects. The read-only sysfs attribute "fc_security" of a CCW device representing a FCP device shows the FC Endpoint Security capabilities of the device. Possible values are: "unknown", "unsupported", "none", or a comma- separated list of one or more mnemonics and/or one hexadecimal value representing the supported FC Endpoint Security: Authentication: Authentication supported Encryption : Encryption supported The read-only sysfs attribute "fc_security" of a zfcp port object shows the FC Endpoint Security used on the connection between its parent FCP device and the FC remote port. Possible values are: "unknown", "unsupported", "none", or a mnemonic or hexadecimal value representing the FC Endpoint Security used: Authentication: Connection has been authenticated Encryption : Connection is encrypted Both sysfs attributes may return hexadecimal values instead of mnemonics, if the mnemonic lookup table does not contain an entry for the FC Endpoint Security reported by the FCP device. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200312174505.51294-7-maier@linux.ibm.com Reviewed-by: Fedor Loshakov <loshakov@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Steffen Maier <maier@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Remus <jremus@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Maier <maier@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
2020-03-12 10:45:01 -07:00
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2002, 2020
*/
#ifndef FSF_H
#define FSF_H
#include <linux/pfn.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <scsi/libfc.h>
#define FSF_QTCB_CURRENT_VERSION 0x00000001
/* FSF commands */
#define FSF_QTCB_FCP_CMND 0x00000001
#define FSF_QTCB_ABORT_FCP_CMND 0x00000002
#define FSF_QTCB_OPEN_PORT_WITH_DID 0x00000005
#define FSF_QTCB_OPEN_LUN 0x00000006
#define FSF_QTCB_CLOSE_LUN 0x00000007
#define FSF_QTCB_CLOSE_PORT 0x00000008
#define FSF_QTCB_CLOSE_PHYSICAL_PORT 0x00000009
#define FSF_QTCB_SEND_ELS 0x0000000B
#define FSF_QTCB_SEND_GENERIC 0x0000000C
#define FSF_QTCB_EXCHANGE_CONFIG_DATA 0x0000000D
#define FSF_QTCB_EXCHANGE_PORT_DATA 0x0000000E
#define FSF_QTCB_DOWNLOAD_CONTROL_FILE 0x00000012
#define FSF_QTCB_UPLOAD_CONTROL_FILE 0x00000013
/* FSF QTCB types */
#define FSF_IO_COMMAND 0x00000001
#define FSF_SUPPORT_COMMAND 0x00000002
#define FSF_CONFIG_COMMAND 0x00000003
#define FSF_PORT_COMMAND 0x00000004
/* FSF protocol states */
#define FSF_PROT_GOOD 0x00000001
#define FSF_PROT_QTCB_VERSION_ERROR 0x00000010
#define FSF_PROT_SEQ_NUMB_ERROR 0x00000020
#define FSF_PROT_UNSUPP_QTCB_TYPE 0x00000040
#define FSF_PROT_HOST_CONNECTION_INITIALIZING 0x00000080
#define FSF_PROT_FSF_STATUS_PRESENTED 0x00000100
#define FSF_PROT_DUPLICATE_REQUEST_ID 0x00000200
#define FSF_PROT_LINK_DOWN 0x00000400
#define FSF_PROT_REEST_QUEUE 0x00000800
#define FSF_PROT_ERROR_STATE 0x01000000
/* FSF states */
#define FSF_GOOD 0x00000000
#define FSF_PORT_ALREADY_OPEN 0x00000001
#define FSF_LUN_ALREADY_OPEN 0x00000002
#define FSF_PORT_HANDLE_NOT_VALID 0x00000003
#define FSF_LUN_HANDLE_NOT_VALID 0x00000004
#define FSF_HANDLE_MISMATCH 0x00000005
#define FSF_SERVICE_CLASS_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000006
#define FSF_FCPLUN_NOT_VALID 0x00000009
#define FSF_LUN_SHARING_VIOLATION 0x00000012
#define FSF_FCP_COMMAND_DOES_NOT_EXIST 0x00000022
#define FSF_DIRECTION_INDICATOR_NOT_VALID 0x00000030
#define FSF_CMND_LENGTH_NOT_VALID 0x00000033
#define FSF_MAXIMUM_NUMBER_OF_PORTS_EXCEEDED 0x00000040
#define FSF_MAXIMUM_NUMBER_OF_LUNS_EXCEEDED 0x00000041
#define FSF_ELS_COMMAND_REJECTED 0x00000050
#define FSF_GENERIC_COMMAND_REJECTED 0x00000051
#define FSF_PORT_BOXED 0x00000059
#define FSF_LUN_BOXED 0x0000005A
#define FSF_EXCHANGE_CONFIG_DATA_INCOMPLETE 0x0000005B
#define FSF_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MISMATCH 0x00000060
#define FSF_REQUEST_SIZE_TOO_LARGE 0x00000061
#define FSF_RESPONSE_SIZE_TOO_LARGE 0x00000062
#define FSF_SBAL_MISMATCH 0x00000063
#define FSF_INCONSISTENT_PROT_DATA 0x00000070
#define FSF_INVALID_PROT_PARM 0x00000071
#define FSF_BLOCK_GUARD_CHECK_FAILURE 0x00000081
#define FSF_APP_TAG_CHECK_FAILURE 0x00000082
#define FSF_REF_TAG_CHECK_FAILURE 0x00000083
#define FSF_SECURITY_ERROR 0x00000090
#define FSF_ADAPTER_STATUS_AVAILABLE 0x000000AD
#define FSF_FCP_RSP_AVAILABLE 0x000000AF
#define FSF_UNKNOWN_COMMAND 0x000000E2
#define FSF_UNKNOWN_OP_SUBTYPE 0x000000E3
#define FSF_INVALID_COMMAND_OPTION 0x000000E5
#define FSF_PROT_STATUS_QUAL_SIZE 16
#define FSF_STATUS_QUALIFIER_SIZE 16
/* FSF status qualifier, recommendations */
#define FSF_SQ_NO_RECOM 0x00
#define FSF_SQ_FCP_RSP_AVAILABLE 0x01
#define FSF_SQ_RETRY_IF_POSSIBLE 0x02
#define FSF_SQ_ULP_DEPENDENT_ERP_REQUIRED 0x03
#define FSF_SQ_INVOKE_LINK_TEST_PROCEDURE 0x04
#define FSF_SQ_COMMAND_ABORTED 0x06
#define FSF_SQ_NO_RETRY_POSSIBLE 0x07
/* FSF status qualifier (most significant 4 bytes), local link down */
#define FSF_PSQ_LINK_NO_LIGHT 0x00000004
#define FSF_PSQ_LINK_WRAP_PLUG 0x00000008
#define FSF_PSQ_LINK_NO_FCP 0x00000010
#define FSF_PSQ_LINK_FIRMWARE_UPDATE 0x00000020
#define FSF_PSQ_LINK_INVALID_WWPN 0x00000100
#define FSF_PSQ_LINK_NO_NPIV_SUPPORT 0x00000200
#define FSF_PSQ_LINK_NO_FCP_RESOURCES 0x00000400
#define FSF_PSQ_LINK_NO_FABRIC_RESOURCES 0x00000800
#define FSF_PSQ_LINK_FABRIC_LOGIN_UNABLE 0x00001000
#define FSF_PSQ_LINK_WWPN_ASSIGNMENT_CORRUPTED 0x00002000
#define FSF_PSQ_LINK_MODE_TABLE_CURRUPTED 0x00004000
#define FSF_PSQ_LINK_NO_WWPN_ASSIGNMENT 0x00008000
/* FSF status qualifier, security error */
#define FSF_SQ_SECURITY_REQUIRED 0x00000001
#define FSF_SQ_SECURITY_TIMEOUT 0x00000002
#define FSF_SQ_SECURITY_KM_UNAVAILABLE 0x00000003
#define FSF_SQ_SECURITY_RKM_UNAVAILABLE 0x00000004
#define FSF_SQ_SECURITY_AUTH_FAILURE 0x00000005
#define FSF_SQ_SECURITY_ENC_FAILURE 0x00000010
/* payload size in status read buffer */
#define FSF_STATUS_READ_PAYLOAD_SIZE 4032
/* number of status read buffers that should be sent by ULP */
#define FSF_STATUS_READS_RECOM 16
/* status types in status read buffer */
#define FSF_STATUS_READ_PORT_CLOSED 0x00000001
#define FSF_STATUS_READ_INCOMING_ELS 0x00000002
#define FSF_STATUS_READ_SENSE_DATA_AVAIL 0x00000003
#define FSF_STATUS_READ_BIT_ERROR_THRESHOLD 0x00000004
#define FSF_STATUS_READ_LINK_DOWN 0x00000005
#define FSF_STATUS_READ_LINK_UP 0x00000006
#define FSF_STATUS_READ_NOTIFICATION_LOST 0x00000009
#define FSF_STATUS_READ_FEATURE_UPDATE_ALERT 0x0000000C
#define FSF_STATUS_READ_VERSION_CHANGE 0x0000000D
/* status subtypes for link down */
#define FSF_STATUS_READ_SUB_NO_PHYSICAL_LINK 0x00000000
#define FSF_STATUS_READ_SUB_FDISC_FAILED 0x00000001
#define FSF_STATUS_READ_SUB_FIRMWARE_UPDATE 0x00000002
/* status subtypes for unsolicited status notification lost */
#define FSF_STATUS_READ_SUB_INCOMING_ELS 0x00000001
#define FSF_STATUS_READ_SUB_VERSION_CHANGE 0x00000100
/* status subtypes for version change */
#define FSF_STATUS_READ_SUB_LIC_CHANGE 0x00000001
/* topologie that is detected by the adapter */
#define FSF_TOPO_P2P 0x00000001
#define FSF_TOPO_FABRIC 0x00000002
#define FSF_TOPO_AL 0x00000003
/* data direction for FCP commands */
#define FSF_DATADIR_WRITE 0x00000001
#define FSF_DATADIR_READ 0x00000002
#define FSF_DATADIR_CMND 0x00000004
#define FSF_DATADIR_DIF_WRITE_INSERT 0x00000009
#define FSF_DATADIR_DIF_READ_STRIP 0x0000000a
#define FSF_DATADIR_DIF_WRITE_CONVERT 0x0000000b
#define FSF_DATADIR_DIF_READ_CONVERT 0X0000000c
/* data protection control flags */
#define FSF_APP_TAG_CHECK_ENABLE 0x10
/* fc service class */
#define FSF_CLASS_3 0x00000003
/* logging space behind QTCB */
#define FSF_QTCB_LOG_SIZE 1024
/* channel features */
#define FSF_FEATURE_NOTIFICATION_LOST 0x00000008
#define FSF_FEATURE_HBAAPI_MANAGEMENT 0x00000010
#define FSF_FEATURE_ELS_CT_CHAINED_SBALS 0x00000020
#define FSF_FEATURE_UPDATE_ALERT 0x00000100
#define FSF_FEATURE_MEASUREMENT_DATA 0x00000200
#define FSF_FEATURE_REQUEST_SFP_DATA 0x00000200
#define FSF_FEATURE_REPORT_SFP_DATA 0x00000800
scsi: zfcp: report FC Endpoint Security in sysfs Add an interface to read Fibre Channel Endpoint Security information of FCP channels and their connections to FC remote ports. It comes in the form of new sysfs attributes that are attached to the CCW device representing the FCP device and its zfcp port objects. The read-only sysfs attribute "fc_security" of a CCW device representing a FCP device shows the FC Endpoint Security capabilities of the device. Possible values are: "unknown", "unsupported", "none", or a comma- separated list of one or more mnemonics and/or one hexadecimal value representing the supported FC Endpoint Security: Authentication: Authentication supported Encryption : Encryption supported The read-only sysfs attribute "fc_security" of a zfcp port object shows the FC Endpoint Security used on the connection between its parent FCP device and the FC remote port. Possible values are: "unknown", "unsupported", "none", or a mnemonic or hexadecimal value representing the FC Endpoint Security used: Authentication: Connection has been authenticated Encryption : Connection is encrypted Both sysfs attributes may return hexadecimal values instead of mnemonics, if the mnemonic lookup table does not contain an entry for the FC Endpoint Security reported by the FCP device. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200312174505.51294-7-maier@linux.ibm.com Reviewed-by: Fedor Loshakov <loshakov@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Steffen Maier <maier@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Remus <jremus@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Maier <maier@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
2020-03-12 10:45:01 -07:00
#define FSF_FEATURE_FC_SECURITY 0x00001000
#define FSF_FEATURE_DIF_PROT_TYPE1 0x00010000
#define FSF_FEATURE_DIX_PROT_TCPIP 0x00020000
/* host connection features */
#define FSF_FEATURE_NPIV_MODE 0x00000001
/* option */
#define FSF_OPEN_LUN_SUPPRESS_BOXING 0x00000001
scsi: zfcp: report FC Endpoint Security in sysfs Add an interface to read Fibre Channel Endpoint Security information of FCP channels and their connections to FC remote ports. It comes in the form of new sysfs attributes that are attached to the CCW device representing the FCP device and its zfcp port objects. The read-only sysfs attribute "fc_security" of a CCW device representing a FCP device shows the FC Endpoint Security capabilities of the device. Possible values are: "unknown", "unsupported", "none", or a comma- separated list of one or more mnemonics and/or one hexadecimal value representing the supported FC Endpoint Security: Authentication: Authentication supported Encryption : Encryption supported The read-only sysfs attribute "fc_security" of a zfcp port object shows the FC Endpoint Security used on the connection between its parent FCP device and the FC remote port. Possible values are: "unknown", "unsupported", "none", or a mnemonic or hexadecimal value representing the FC Endpoint Security used: Authentication: Connection has been authenticated Encryption : Connection is encrypted Both sysfs attributes may return hexadecimal values instead of mnemonics, if the mnemonic lookup table does not contain an entry for the FC Endpoint Security reported by the FCP device. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200312174505.51294-7-maier@linux.ibm.com Reviewed-by: Fedor Loshakov <loshakov@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Steffen Maier <maier@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Remus <jremus@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Maier <maier@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
2020-03-12 10:45:01 -07:00
/* FC security algorithms */
#define FSF_FC_SECURITY_AUTH 0x00000001
#define FSF_FC_SECURITY_ENC_FCSP2 0x00000002
#define FSF_FC_SECURITY_ENC_ERAS 0x00000004
struct fsf_queue_designator {
u8 cssid;
u8 chpid;
u8 hla;
u8 ua;
u32 res1;
} __attribute__ ((packed));
struct fsf_bit_error_payload {
u32 res1;
u32 link_failure_error_count;
u32 loss_of_sync_error_count;
u32 loss_of_signal_error_count;
u32 primitive_sequence_error_count;
u32 invalid_transmission_word_error_count;
u32 crc_error_count;
u32 primitive_sequence_event_timeout_count;
u32 elastic_buffer_overrun_error_count;
u32 fcal_arbitration_timeout_count;
u32 advertised_receive_b2b_credit;
u32 current_receive_b2b_credit;
u32 advertised_transmit_b2b_credit;
u32 current_transmit_b2b_credit;
} __attribute__ ((packed));
struct fsf_link_down_info {
u32 error_code;
u32 res1;
u8 res2[2];
u8 primary_status;
u8 ioerr_code;
u8 action_code;
u8 reason_code;
u8 explanation_code;
u8 vendor_specific_code;
} __attribute__ ((packed));
struct fsf_version_change {
u32 current_version;
u32 previous_version;
} __packed;
struct fsf_status_read_buffer {
u32 status_type;
u32 status_subtype;
u32 length;
u32 res1;
struct fsf_queue_designator queue_designator;
u8 res2;
u8 d_id[3];
u32 class;
u64 fcp_lun;
u8 res3[24];
union {
u8 data[FSF_STATUS_READ_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
u32 word[FSF_STATUS_READ_PAYLOAD_SIZE/sizeof(u32)];
struct fsf_link_down_info link_down_info;
struct fsf_bit_error_payload bit_error;
struct fsf_version_change version_change;
} payload;
} __attribute__ ((packed));
struct fsf_qual_version_error {
u32 fsf_version;
u32 res1[3];
} __attribute__ ((packed));
struct fsf_qual_sequence_error {
u32 exp_req_seq_no;
u32 res1[3];
} __attribute__ ((packed));
struct fsf_qual_latency_info {
u32 channel_lat;
u32 fabric_lat;
u8 res1[8];
} __attribute__ ((packed));
union fsf_prot_status_qual {
u32 word[FSF_PROT_STATUS_QUAL_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
u64 doubleword[FSF_PROT_STATUS_QUAL_SIZE / sizeof(u64)];
struct fsf_qual_version_error version_error;
struct fsf_qual_sequence_error sequence_error;
struct fsf_link_down_info link_down_info;
struct fsf_qual_latency_info latency_info;
} __attribute__ ((packed));
struct fsf_qtcb_prefix {
u64 req_id;
u32 qtcb_version;
u32 ulp_info;
u32 qtcb_type;
u32 req_seq_no;
u32 prot_status;
union fsf_prot_status_qual prot_status_qual;
u8 res1[20];
} __attribute__ ((packed));
struct fsf_statistics_info {
u64 input_req;
u64 output_req;
u64 control_req;
u64 input_mb;
u64 output_mb;
u64 seconds_act;
} __attribute__ ((packed));
union fsf_status_qual {
u8 byte[FSF_STATUS_QUALIFIER_SIZE];
u16 halfword[FSF_STATUS_QUALIFIER_SIZE / sizeof (u16)];
u32 word[FSF_STATUS_QUALIFIER_SIZE / sizeof (u32)];
u64 doubleword[FSF_STATUS_QUALIFIER_SIZE / sizeof(u64)];
struct fsf_queue_designator fsf_queue_designator;
struct fsf_link_down_info link_down_info;
} __attribute__ ((packed));
struct fsf_qtcb_header {
u64 req_handle;
u32 fsf_command;
u32 res1;
u32 port_handle;
u32 lun_handle;
u32 res2;
u32 fsf_status;
union fsf_status_qual fsf_status_qual;
u8 res3[28];
u16 log_start;
u16 log_length;
u8 res4[16];
} __attribute__ ((packed));
#define FSF_PLOGI_MIN_LEN 112
#define FSF_FCP_CMND_SIZE 288
#define FSF_FCP_RSP_SIZE 128
struct fsf_qtcb_bottom_io {
u32 data_direction;
u32 service_class;
u8 res1;
u8 data_prot_flags;
u16 app_tag_value;
u32 ref_tag_value;
u32 fcp_cmnd_length;
u32 data_block_length;
u32 prot_data_length;
u8 res2[4];
union {
u8 byte[FSF_FCP_CMND_SIZE];
struct fcp_cmnd iu;
} fcp_cmnd;
union {
u8 byte[FSF_FCP_RSP_SIZE];
struct fcp_resp_with_ext iu;
} fcp_rsp;
u8 res3[64];
} __attribute__ ((packed));
struct fsf_qtcb_bottom_support {
u32 operation_subtype;
u8 res1[13];
u8 d_id[3];
u32 option;
u64 fcp_lun;
u64 res2;
u64 req_handle;
u32 service_class;
u8 res3[3];
u8 timeout;
u32 lun_access_info;
scsi: zfcp: report FC Endpoint Security in sysfs Add an interface to read Fibre Channel Endpoint Security information of FCP channels and their connections to FC remote ports. It comes in the form of new sysfs attributes that are attached to the CCW device representing the FCP device and its zfcp port objects. The read-only sysfs attribute "fc_security" of a CCW device representing a FCP device shows the FC Endpoint Security capabilities of the device. Possible values are: "unknown", "unsupported", "none", or a comma- separated list of one or more mnemonics and/or one hexadecimal value representing the supported FC Endpoint Security: Authentication: Authentication supported Encryption : Encryption supported The read-only sysfs attribute "fc_security" of a zfcp port object shows the FC Endpoint Security used on the connection between its parent FCP device and the FC remote port. Possible values are: "unknown", "unsupported", "none", or a mnemonic or hexadecimal value representing the FC Endpoint Security used: Authentication: Connection has been authenticated Encryption : Connection is encrypted Both sysfs attributes may return hexadecimal values instead of mnemonics, if the mnemonic lookup table does not contain an entry for the FC Endpoint Security reported by the FCP device. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200312174505.51294-7-maier@linux.ibm.com Reviewed-by: Fedor Loshakov <loshakov@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Steffen Maier <maier@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Remus <jremus@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Maier <maier@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
2020-03-12 10:45:01 -07:00
u32 connection_info;
u8 res4[176];
u32 els1_length;
u32 els2_length;
u32 req_buf_length;
u32 resp_buf_length;
u8 els[256];
} __attribute__ ((packed));
#define ZFCP_FSF_TIMER_INT_MASK 0x3FFF
struct fsf_qtcb_bottom_config {
u32 lic_version;
u32 feature_selection;
u32 high_qtcb_version;
u32 low_qtcb_version;
u32 max_qtcb_size;
u32 max_data_transfer_size;
u32 adapter_features;
u32 connection_features;
u32 fc_topology;
u32 fc_link_speed; /* one of ZFCP_FSF_PORTSPEED_* */
u32 adapter_type;
u8 res0;
u8 peer_d_id[3];
u16 status_read_buf_num;
u16 timer_interval;
u8 res2[9];
u8 s_id[3];
u8 nport_serv_param[128];
u8 res3[8];
u32 adapter_ports;
u32 hardware_version;
u8 serial_number[32];
u8 plogi_payload[112];
struct fsf_statistics_info stat_info;
u8 res4[112];
} __attribute__ ((packed));
struct fsf_qtcb_bottom_port {
u64 wwpn;
u32 fc_port_id;
u32 port_type;
u32 port_state;
u32 class_of_service; /* should be 0x00000006 for class 2 and 3 */
u8 supported_fc4_types[32]; /* should be 0x00000100 for scsi fcp */
u8 active_fc4_types[32];
u32 supported_speed; /* any combination of ZFCP_FSF_PORTSPEED_* */
u32 maximum_frame_size; /* fixed value of 2112 */
u64 seconds_since_last_reset;
u64 tx_frames;
u64 tx_words;
u64 rx_frames;
u64 rx_words;
u64 lip; /* 0 */
u64 nos; /* currently 0 */
u64 error_frames; /* currently 0 */
u64 dumped_frames; /* currently 0 */
u64 link_failure;
u64 loss_of_sync;
u64 loss_of_signal;
u64 psp_error_counts;
u64 invalid_tx_words;
u64 invalid_crcs;
u64 input_requests;
u64 output_requests;
u64 control_requests;
u64 input_mb; /* where 1 MByte == 1.000.000 Bytes */
u64 output_mb; /* where 1 MByte == 1.000.000 Bytes */
u8 cp_util;
u8 cb_util;
u8 a_util;
u8 res2;
s16 temperature;
u16 vcc;
u16 tx_bias;
u16 tx_power;
u16 rx_power;
union {
u16 raw;
struct {
u16 fec_active :1;
u16:7;
u16 connector_type :2;
u16 sfp_invalid :1;
u16 optical_port :1;
u16 port_tx_type :4;
};
} sfp_flags;
scsi: zfcp: report FC Endpoint Security in sysfs Add an interface to read Fibre Channel Endpoint Security information of FCP channels and their connections to FC remote ports. It comes in the form of new sysfs attributes that are attached to the CCW device representing the FCP device and its zfcp port objects. The read-only sysfs attribute "fc_security" of a CCW device representing a FCP device shows the FC Endpoint Security capabilities of the device. Possible values are: "unknown", "unsupported", "none", or a comma- separated list of one or more mnemonics and/or one hexadecimal value representing the supported FC Endpoint Security: Authentication: Authentication supported Encryption : Encryption supported The read-only sysfs attribute "fc_security" of a zfcp port object shows the FC Endpoint Security used on the connection between its parent FCP device and the FC remote port. Possible values are: "unknown", "unsupported", "none", or a mnemonic or hexadecimal value representing the FC Endpoint Security used: Authentication: Connection has been authenticated Encryption : Connection is encrypted Both sysfs attributes may return hexadecimal values instead of mnemonics, if the mnemonic lookup table does not contain an entry for the FC Endpoint Security reported by the FCP device. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200312174505.51294-7-maier@linux.ibm.com Reviewed-by: Fedor Loshakov <loshakov@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Steffen Maier <maier@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Remus <jremus@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Maier <maier@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
2020-03-12 10:45:01 -07:00
u32 fc_security_algorithms;
u8 res3[236];
} __attribute__ ((packed));
union fsf_qtcb_bottom {
struct fsf_qtcb_bottom_io io;
struct fsf_qtcb_bottom_support support;
struct fsf_qtcb_bottom_config config;
struct fsf_qtcb_bottom_port port;
};
struct fsf_qtcb {
struct fsf_qtcb_prefix prefix;
struct fsf_qtcb_header header;
union fsf_qtcb_bottom bottom;
u8 log[FSF_QTCB_LOG_SIZE];
} __attribute__ ((packed));
struct zfcp_blk_drv_data {
#define ZFCP_BLK_DRV_DATA_MAGIC 0x1
u32 magic;
#define ZFCP_BLK_LAT_VALID 0x1
#define ZFCP_BLK_REQ_ERROR 0x2
u16 flags;
u8 inb_usage;
u8 outb_usage;
u64 channel_lat;
u64 fabric_lat;
} __attribute__ ((packed));
/**
* struct zfcp_fsf_ct_els - zfcp data for ct or els request
* @req: scatter-gather list for request, points to &zfcp_fc_req.sg_req or BSG
* @resp: scatter-gather list for response, points to &zfcp_fc_req.sg_rsp or BSG
* @handler: handler function (called for response to the request)
* @handler_data: data passed to handler function
* @port: Optional pointer to port for zfcp internal ELS (only test link ADISC)
* @status: used to pass error status to calling function
* @d_id: Destination ID of either open WKA port for CT or of D_ID for ELS
*/
struct zfcp_fsf_ct_els {
struct scatterlist *req;
struct scatterlist *resp;
void (*handler)(void *);
void *handler_data;
struct zfcp_port *port;
int status;
u32 d_id;
};
#endif /* FSF_H */