1
linux/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h

1484 lines
37 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-09 13:10:26 -07:00
/*
FUSE: Filesystem in Userspace
Copyright (C) 2001-2008 Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-09 13:10:26 -07:00
This program can be distributed under the terms of the GNU GPL.
See the file COPYING.
*/
#ifndef _FS_FUSE_I_H
#define _FS_FUSE_I_H
#ifndef pr_fmt
# define pr_fmt(fmt) "fuse: " fmt
#endif
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-09 13:10:26 -07:00
#include <linux/fuse.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-09 13:10:26 -07:00
#include <linux/wait.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
fuse: support writable mmap Quoting Linus (3 years ago, FUSE inclusion discussions): "User-space filesystems are hard to get right. I'd claim that they are almost impossible, unless you limit them somehow (shared writable mappings are the nastiest part - if you don't have those, you can reasonably limit your problems by limiting the number of dirty pages you accept through normal "write()" calls)." Instead of attempting the impossible, I've just waited for the dirty page accounting infrastructure to materialize (thanks to Peter Zijlstra and others). This nicely solved the biggest problem: limiting the number of pages used for write caching. Some small details remained, however, which this largish patch attempts to address. It provides a page writeback implementation for fuse, which is completely safe against VM related deadlocks. Performance may not be very good for certain usage patterns, but generally it should be acceptable. It has been tested extensively with fsx-linux and bash-shared-mapping. Fuse page writeback design -------------------------- fuse_writepage() allocates a new temporary page with GFP_NOFS|__GFP_HIGHMEM. It copies the contents of the original page, and queues a WRITE request to the userspace filesystem using this temp page. The writeback is finished instantly from the MM's point of view: the page is removed from the radix trees, and the PageDirty and PageWriteback flags are cleared. For the duration of the actual write, the NR_WRITEBACK_TEMP counter is incremented. The per-bdi writeback count is not decremented until the actual write completes. On dirtying the page, fuse waits for a previous write to finish before proceeding. This makes sure, there can only be one temporary page used at a time for one cached page. This approach is wasteful in both memory and CPU bandwidth, so why is this complication needed? The basic problem is that there can be no guarantee about the time in which the userspace filesystem will complete a write. It may be buggy or even malicious, and fail to complete WRITE requests. We don't want unrelated parts of the system to grind to a halt in such cases. Also a filesystem may need additional resources (particularly memory) to complete a WRITE request. There's a great danger of a deadlock if that allocation may wait for the writepage to finish. Currently there are several cases where the kernel can block on page writeback: - allocation order is larger than PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER - page migration - throttle_vm_writeout (through NR_WRITEBACK) - sync(2) Of course in some cases (fsync, msync) we explicitly want to allow blocking. So for these cases new code has to be added to fuse, since the VM is not tracking writeback pages for us any more. As an extra safetly measure, the maximum dirty ratio allocated to a single fuse filesystem is set to 1% by default. This way one (or several) buggy or malicious fuse filesystems cannot slow down the rest of the system by hogging dirty memory. With appropriate privileges, this limit can be raised through '/sys/class/bdi/<bdi>/max_ratio'. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-30 00:54:41 -07:00
#include <linux/rwsem.h>
#include <linux/rbtree.h>
#include <linux/poll.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/kref.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
#include <linux/refcount.h>
fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns In order to support mounts from namespaces other than init_user_ns, fuse must translate uids and gids to/from the userns of the process servicing requests on /dev/fuse. This patch does that, with a couple of restrictions on the namespace: - The userns for the fuse connection is fixed to the namespace from which /dev/fuse is opened. - The namespace must be the same as s_user_ns. These restrictions simplify the implementation by avoiding the need to pass around userns references and by allowing fuse to rely on the checks in setattr_prepare for ownership changes. Either restriction could be relaxed in the future if needed. For cuse the userns used is the opener of /dev/cuse. Semantically the cuse support does not appear safe for unprivileged users. Practically the permissions on /dev/cuse only make it accessible to the global root user. If something slips through the cracks in a user namespace the only users who will be able to use the cuse device are those users mapped into the user namespace. Translation in the posix acl is updated to use the uuser namespace of the filesystem. Avoiding cases which might bypass this translation is handled in a following change. This change is stronlgy based on a similar change from Seth Forshee and Dongsu Park. Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2018-02-21 10:18:07 -07:00
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-09 13:10:26 -07:00
fuse: add max_pages to init_out Replace FUSE_MAX_PAGES_PER_REQ with the configurable parameter max_pages to improve performance. Old RFC with detailed description of the problem and many fixes by Mitsuo Hayasaka (mitsuo.hayasaka.hu@hitachi.com): - https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/7/5/136 We've encountered performance degradation and fixed it on a big and complex virtual environment. Environment to reproduce degradation and improvement: 1. Add lag to user mode FUSE Add nanosleep(&(struct timespec){ 0, 1000 }, NULL); to xmp_write_buf in passthrough_fh.c 2. patch UM fuse with configurable max_pages parameter. The patch will be provided latter. 3. run test script and perform test on tmpfs fuse_test() { cd /tmp mkdir -p fusemnt passthrough_fh -o max_pages=$1 /tmp/fusemnt grep fuse /proc/self/mounts dd conv=fdatasync oflag=dsync if=/dev/zero of=fusemnt/tmp/tmp \ count=1K bs=1M 2>&1 | grep -v records rm fusemnt/tmp/tmp killall passthrough_fh } Test results: passthrough_fh /tmp/fusemnt fuse.passthrough_fh \ rw,nosuid,nodev,relatime,user_id=0,group_id=0 0 0 1073741824 bytes (1.1 GB) copied, 1.73867 s, 618 MB/s passthrough_fh /tmp/fusemnt fuse.passthrough_fh \ rw,nosuid,nodev,relatime,user_id=0,group_id=0,max_pages=256 0 0 1073741824 bytes (1.1 GB) copied, 1.15643 s, 928 MB/s Obviously with bigger lag the difference between 'before' and 'after' will be more significant. Mitsuo Hayasaka, in 2012 (https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/7/5/136), observed improvement from 400-550 to 520-740. Signed-off-by: Constantine Shulyupin <const@MakeLinux.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2018-09-06 05:37:06 -07:00
/** Default max number of pages that can be used in a single read request */
#define FUSE_DEFAULT_MAX_PAGES_PER_REQ 32
/** Maximum of max_pages received in init_out */
#define FUSE_MAX_MAX_PAGES 256
fuse: support writable mmap Quoting Linus (3 years ago, FUSE inclusion discussions): "User-space filesystems are hard to get right. I'd claim that they are almost impossible, unless you limit them somehow (shared writable mappings are the nastiest part - if you don't have those, you can reasonably limit your problems by limiting the number of dirty pages you accept through normal "write()" calls)." Instead of attempting the impossible, I've just waited for the dirty page accounting infrastructure to materialize (thanks to Peter Zijlstra and others). This nicely solved the biggest problem: limiting the number of pages used for write caching. Some small details remained, however, which this largish patch attempts to address. It provides a page writeback implementation for fuse, which is completely safe against VM related deadlocks. Performance may not be very good for certain usage patterns, but generally it should be acceptable. It has been tested extensively with fsx-linux and bash-shared-mapping. Fuse page writeback design -------------------------- fuse_writepage() allocates a new temporary page with GFP_NOFS|__GFP_HIGHMEM. It copies the contents of the original page, and queues a WRITE request to the userspace filesystem using this temp page. The writeback is finished instantly from the MM's point of view: the page is removed from the radix trees, and the PageDirty and PageWriteback flags are cleared. For the duration of the actual write, the NR_WRITEBACK_TEMP counter is incremented. The per-bdi writeback count is not decremented until the actual write completes. On dirtying the page, fuse waits for a previous write to finish before proceeding. This makes sure, there can only be one temporary page used at a time for one cached page. This approach is wasteful in both memory and CPU bandwidth, so why is this complication needed? The basic problem is that there can be no guarantee about the time in which the userspace filesystem will complete a write. It may be buggy or even malicious, and fail to complete WRITE requests. We don't want unrelated parts of the system to grind to a halt in such cases. Also a filesystem may need additional resources (particularly memory) to complete a WRITE request. There's a great danger of a deadlock if that allocation may wait for the writepage to finish. Currently there are several cases where the kernel can block on page writeback: - allocation order is larger than PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER - page migration - throttle_vm_writeout (through NR_WRITEBACK) - sync(2) Of course in some cases (fsync, msync) we explicitly want to allow blocking. So for these cases new code has to be added to fuse, since the VM is not tracking writeback pages for us any more. As an extra safetly measure, the maximum dirty ratio allocated to a single fuse filesystem is set to 1% by default. This way one (or several) buggy or malicious fuse filesystems cannot slow down the rest of the system by hogging dirty memory. With appropriate privileges, this limit can be raised through '/sys/class/bdi/<bdi>/max_ratio'. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-30 00:54:41 -07:00
/** Bias for fi->writectr, meaning new writepages must not be sent */
#define FUSE_NOWRITE INT_MIN
/** It could be as large as PATH_MAX, but would that have any uses? */
#define FUSE_NAME_MAX 1024
/** Number of dentries for each connection in the control filesystem */
#define FUSE_CTL_NUM_DENTRIES 5
/** List of active connections */
extern struct list_head fuse_conn_list;
/** Global mutex protecting fuse_conn_list and the control filesystem */
extern struct mutex fuse_mutex;
/** Module parameters */
extern unsigned max_user_bgreq;
extern unsigned max_user_congthresh;
/* One forget request */
struct fuse_forget_link {
struct fuse_forget_one forget_one;
struct fuse_forget_link *next;
};
/* Submount lookup tracking */
struct fuse_submount_lookup {
/** Refcount */
refcount_t count;
/** Unique ID, which identifies the inode between userspace
* and kernel */
u64 nodeid;
/** The request used for sending the FORGET message */
struct fuse_forget_link *forget;
};
/** Container for data related to mapping to backing file */
struct fuse_backing {
struct file *file;
struct cred *cred;
/** refcount */
refcount_t count;
struct rcu_head rcu;
};
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-09 13:10:26 -07:00
/** FUSE inode */
struct fuse_inode {
/** Inode data */
struct inode inode;
/** Unique ID, which identifies the inode between userspace
* and kernel */
u64 nodeid;
/** Number of lookups on this inode */
u64 nlookup;
/** The request used for sending the FORGET message */
struct fuse_forget_link *forget;
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-09 13:10:26 -07:00
/** Time in jiffies until the file attributes are valid */
u64 i_time;
/* Which attributes are invalid */
u32 inval_mask;
/** The sticky bit in inode->i_mode may have been removed, so
preserve the original mode */
umode_t orig_i_mode;
/* Cache birthtime */
struct timespec64 i_btime;
/** 64 bit inode number */
u64 orig_ino;
/** Version of last attribute change */
u64 attr_version;
union {
/* read/write io cache (regular file only) */
struct {
/* Files usable in writepage. Protected by fi->lock */
struct list_head write_files;
fuse: support writable mmap Quoting Linus (3 years ago, FUSE inclusion discussions): "User-space filesystems are hard to get right. I'd claim that they are almost impossible, unless you limit them somehow (shared writable mappings are the nastiest part - if you don't have those, you can reasonably limit your problems by limiting the number of dirty pages you accept through normal "write()" calls)." Instead of attempting the impossible, I've just waited for the dirty page accounting infrastructure to materialize (thanks to Peter Zijlstra and others). This nicely solved the biggest problem: limiting the number of pages used for write caching. Some small details remained, however, which this largish patch attempts to address. It provides a page writeback implementation for fuse, which is completely safe against VM related deadlocks. Performance may not be very good for certain usage patterns, but generally it should be acceptable. It has been tested extensively with fsx-linux and bash-shared-mapping. Fuse page writeback design -------------------------- fuse_writepage() allocates a new temporary page with GFP_NOFS|__GFP_HIGHMEM. It copies the contents of the original page, and queues a WRITE request to the userspace filesystem using this temp page. The writeback is finished instantly from the MM's point of view: the page is removed from the radix trees, and the PageDirty and PageWriteback flags are cleared. For the duration of the actual write, the NR_WRITEBACK_TEMP counter is incremented. The per-bdi writeback count is not decremented until the actual write completes. On dirtying the page, fuse waits for a previous write to finish before proceeding. This makes sure, there can only be one temporary page used at a time for one cached page. This approach is wasteful in both memory and CPU bandwidth, so why is this complication needed? The basic problem is that there can be no guarantee about the time in which the userspace filesystem will complete a write. It may be buggy or even malicious, and fail to complete WRITE requests. We don't want unrelated parts of the system to grind to a halt in such cases. Also a filesystem may need additional resources (particularly memory) to complete a WRITE request. There's a great danger of a deadlock if that allocation may wait for the writepage to finish. Currently there are several cases where the kernel can block on page writeback: - allocation order is larger than PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER - page migration - throttle_vm_writeout (through NR_WRITEBACK) - sync(2) Of course in some cases (fsync, msync) we explicitly want to allow blocking. So for these cases new code has to be added to fuse, since the VM is not tracking writeback pages for us any more. As an extra safetly measure, the maximum dirty ratio allocated to a single fuse filesystem is set to 1% by default. This way one (or several) buggy or malicious fuse filesystems cannot slow down the rest of the system by hogging dirty memory. With appropriate privileges, this limit can be raised through '/sys/class/bdi/<bdi>/max_ratio'. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-30 00:54:41 -07:00
/* Writepages pending on truncate or fsync */
struct list_head queued_writes;
fuse: support writable mmap Quoting Linus (3 years ago, FUSE inclusion discussions): "User-space filesystems are hard to get right. I'd claim that they are almost impossible, unless you limit them somehow (shared writable mappings are the nastiest part - if you don't have those, you can reasonably limit your problems by limiting the number of dirty pages you accept through normal "write()" calls)." Instead of attempting the impossible, I've just waited for the dirty page accounting infrastructure to materialize (thanks to Peter Zijlstra and others). This nicely solved the biggest problem: limiting the number of pages used for write caching. Some small details remained, however, which this largish patch attempts to address. It provides a page writeback implementation for fuse, which is completely safe against VM related deadlocks. Performance may not be very good for certain usage patterns, but generally it should be acceptable. It has been tested extensively with fsx-linux and bash-shared-mapping. Fuse page writeback design -------------------------- fuse_writepage() allocates a new temporary page with GFP_NOFS|__GFP_HIGHMEM. It copies the contents of the original page, and queues a WRITE request to the userspace filesystem using this temp page. The writeback is finished instantly from the MM's point of view: the page is removed from the radix trees, and the PageDirty and PageWriteback flags are cleared. For the duration of the actual write, the NR_WRITEBACK_TEMP counter is incremented. The per-bdi writeback count is not decremented until the actual write completes. On dirtying the page, fuse waits for a previous write to finish before proceeding. This makes sure, there can only be one temporary page used at a time for one cached page. This approach is wasteful in both memory and CPU bandwidth, so why is this complication needed? The basic problem is that there can be no guarantee about the time in which the userspace filesystem will complete a write. It may be buggy or even malicious, and fail to complete WRITE requests. We don't want unrelated parts of the system to grind to a halt in such cases. Also a filesystem may need additional resources (particularly memory) to complete a WRITE request. There's a great danger of a deadlock if that allocation may wait for the writepage to finish. Currently there are several cases where the kernel can block on page writeback: - allocation order is larger than PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER - page migration - throttle_vm_writeout (through NR_WRITEBACK) - sync(2) Of course in some cases (fsync, msync) we explicitly want to allow blocking. So for these cases new code has to be added to fuse, since the VM is not tracking writeback pages for us any more. As an extra safetly measure, the maximum dirty ratio allocated to a single fuse filesystem is set to 1% by default. This way one (or several) buggy or malicious fuse filesystems cannot slow down the rest of the system by hogging dirty memory. With appropriate privileges, this limit can be raised through '/sys/class/bdi/<bdi>/max_ratio'. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-30 00:54:41 -07:00
/* Number of sent writes, a negative bias
* (FUSE_NOWRITE) means more writes are blocked */
int writectr;
fuse: support writable mmap Quoting Linus (3 years ago, FUSE inclusion discussions): "User-space filesystems are hard to get right. I'd claim that they are almost impossible, unless you limit them somehow (shared writable mappings are the nastiest part - if you don't have those, you can reasonably limit your problems by limiting the number of dirty pages you accept through normal "write()" calls)." Instead of attempting the impossible, I've just waited for the dirty page accounting infrastructure to materialize (thanks to Peter Zijlstra and others). This nicely solved the biggest problem: limiting the number of pages used for write caching. Some small details remained, however, which this largish patch attempts to address. It provides a page writeback implementation for fuse, which is completely safe against VM related deadlocks. Performance may not be very good for certain usage patterns, but generally it should be acceptable. It has been tested extensively with fsx-linux and bash-shared-mapping. Fuse page writeback design -------------------------- fuse_writepage() allocates a new temporary page with GFP_NOFS|__GFP_HIGHMEM. It copies the contents of the original page, and queues a WRITE request to the userspace filesystem using this temp page. The writeback is finished instantly from the MM's point of view: the page is removed from the radix trees, and the PageDirty and PageWriteback flags are cleared. For the duration of the actual write, the NR_WRITEBACK_TEMP counter is incremented. The per-bdi writeback count is not decremented until the actual write completes. On dirtying the page, fuse waits for a previous write to finish before proceeding. This makes sure, there can only be one temporary page used at a time for one cached page. This approach is wasteful in both memory and CPU bandwidth, so why is this complication needed? The basic problem is that there can be no guarantee about the time in which the userspace filesystem will complete a write. It may be buggy or even malicious, and fail to complete WRITE requests. We don't want unrelated parts of the system to grind to a halt in such cases. Also a filesystem may need additional resources (particularly memory) to complete a WRITE request. There's a great danger of a deadlock if that allocation may wait for the writepage to finish. Currently there are several cases where the kernel can block on page writeback: - allocation order is larger than PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER - page migration - throttle_vm_writeout (through NR_WRITEBACK) - sync(2) Of course in some cases (fsync, msync) we explicitly want to allow blocking. So for these cases new code has to be added to fuse, since the VM is not tracking writeback pages for us any more. As an extra safetly measure, the maximum dirty ratio allocated to a single fuse filesystem is set to 1% by default. This way one (or several) buggy or malicious fuse filesystems cannot slow down the rest of the system by hogging dirty memory. With appropriate privileges, this limit can be raised through '/sys/class/bdi/<bdi>/max_ratio'. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-30 00:54:41 -07:00
/** Number of files/maps using page cache */
int iocachectr;
/* Waitq for writepage completion */
wait_queue_head_t page_waitq;
fuse: support writable mmap Quoting Linus (3 years ago, FUSE inclusion discussions): "User-space filesystems are hard to get right. I'd claim that they are almost impossible, unless you limit them somehow (shared writable mappings are the nastiest part - if you don't have those, you can reasonably limit your problems by limiting the number of dirty pages you accept through normal "write()" calls)." Instead of attempting the impossible, I've just waited for the dirty page accounting infrastructure to materialize (thanks to Peter Zijlstra and others). This nicely solved the biggest problem: limiting the number of pages used for write caching. Some small details remained, however, which this largish patch attempts to address. It provides a page writeback implementation for fuse, which is completely safe against VM related deadlocks. Performance may not be very good for certain usage patterns, but generally it should be acceptable. It has been tested extensively with fsx-linux and bash-shared-mapping. Fuse page writeback design -------------------------- fuse_writepage() allocates a new temporary page with GFP_NOFS|__GFP_HIGHMEM. It copies the contents of the original page, and queues a WRITE request to the userspace filesystem using this temp page. The writeback is finished instantly from the MM's point of view: the page is removed from the radix trees, and the PageDirty and PageWriteback flags are cleared. For the duration of the actual write, the NR_WRITEBACK_TEMP counter is incremented. The per-bdi writeback count is not decremented until the actual write completes. On dirtying the page, fuse waits for a previous write to finish before proceeding. This makes sure, there can only be one temporary page used at a time for one cached page. This approach is wasteful in both memory and CPU bandwidth, so why is this complication needed? The basic problem is that there can be no guarantee about the time in which the userspace filesystem will complete a write. It may be buggy or even malicious, and fail to complete WRITE requests. We don't want unrelated parts of the system to grind to a halt in such cases. Also a filesystem may need additional resources (particularly memory) to complete a WRITE request. There's a great danger of a deadlock if that allocation may wait for the writepage to finish. Currently there are several cases where the kernel can block on page writeback: - allocation order is larger than PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER - page migration - throttle_vm_writeout (through NR_WRITEBACK) - sync(2) Of course in some cases (fsync, msync) we explicitly want to allow blocking. So for these cases new code has to be added to fuse, since the VM is not tracking writeback pages for us any more. As an extra safetly measure, the maximum dirty ratio allocated to a single fuse filesystem is set to 1% by default. This way one (or several) buggy or malicious fuse filesystems cannot slow down the rest of the system by hogging dirty memory. With appropriate privileges, this limit can be raised through '/sys/class/bdi/<bdi>/max_ratio'. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-30 00:54:41 -07:00
/* waitq for direct-io completion */
wait_queue_head_t direct_io_waitq;
/* List of writepage requestst (pending or sent) */
struct rb_root writepages;
};
/* readdir cache (directory only) */
struct {
/* true if fully cached */
bool cached;
/* size of cache */
loff_t size;
/* position at end of cache (position of next entry) */
loff_t pos;
/* version of the cache */
u64 version;
/* modification time of directory when cache was
* started */
struct timespec64 mtime;
/* iversion of directory when cache was started */
u64 iversion;
/* protects above fields */
spinlock_t lock;
} rdc;
};
/** Miscellaneous bits describing inode state */
unsigned long state;
/** Lock for serializing lookup and readdir for back compatibility*/
struct mutex mutex;
/** Lock to protect write related fields */
spinlock_t lock;
#ifdef CONFIG_FUSE_DAX
/*
* Dax specific inode data
*/
struct fuse_inode_dax *dax;
#endif
/** Submount specific lookup tracking */
struct fuse_submount_lookup *submount_lookup;
#ifdef CONFIG_FUSE_PASSTHROUGH
/** Reference to backing file in passthrough mode */
struct fuse_backing *fb;
#endif
};
/** FUSE inode state bits */
enum {
/** Advise readdirplus */
FUSE_I_ADVISE_RDPLUS,
/** Initialized with readdirplus */
FUSE_I_INIT_RDPLUS,
fuse: hotfix truncate_pagecache() issue The way how fuse calls truncate_pagecache() from fuse_change_attributes() is completely wrong. Because, w/o i_mutex held, we never sure whether 'oldsize' and 'attr->size' are valid by the time of execution of truncate_pagecache(inode, oldsize, attr->size). In fact, as soon as we released fc->lock in the middle of fuse_change_attributes(), we completely loose control of actions which may happen with given inode until we reach truncate_pagecache. The list of potentially dangerous actions includes mmap-ed reads and writes, ftruncate(2) and write(2) extending file size. The typical outcome of doing truncate_pagecache() with outdated arguments is data corruption from user point of view. This is (in some sense) acceptable in cases when the issue is triggered by a change of the file on the server (i.e. externally wrt fuse operation), but it is absolutely intolerable in scenarios when a single fuse client modifies a file without any external intervention. A real life case I discovered by fsx-linux looked like this: 1. Shrinking ftruncate(2) comes to fuse_do_setattr(). The latter sends FUSE_SETATTR to the server synchronously, but before getting fc->lock ... 2. fuse_dentry_revalidate() is asynchronously called. It sends FUSE_LOOKUP to the server synchronously, then calls fuse_change_attributes(). The latter updates i_size, releases fc->lock, but before comparing oldsize vs attr->size.. 3. fuse_do_setattr() from the first step proceeds by acquiring fc->lock and updating attributes and i_size, but now oldsize is equal to outarg.attr.size because i_size has just been updated (step 2). Hence, fuse_do_setattr() returns w/o calling truncate_pagecache(). 4. As soon as ftruncate(2) completes, the user extends file size by write(2) making a hole in the middle of file, then reads data from the hole either by read(2) or mmap-ed read. The user expects to get zero data from the hole, but gets stale data because truncate_pagecache() is not executed yet. The scenario above illustrates one side of the problem: not truncating the page cache even though we should. Another side corresponds to truncating page cache too late, when the state of inode changed significantly. Theoretically, the following is possible: 1. As in the previous scenario fuse_dentry_revalidate() discovered that i_size changed (due to our own fuse_do_setattr()) and is going to call truncate_pagecache() for some 'new_size' it believes valid right now. But by the time that particular truncate_pagecache() is called ... 2. fuse_do_setattr() returns (either having called truncate_pagecache() or not -- it doesn't matter). 3. The file is extended either by write(2) or ftruncate(2) or fallocate(2). 4. mmap-ed write makes a page in the extended region dirty. The result will be the lost of data user wrote on the fourth step. The patch is a hotfix resolving the issue in a simplistic way: let's skip dangerous i_size update and truncate_pagecache if an operation changing file size is in progress. This simplistic approach looks correct for the cases w/o external changes. And to handle them properly, more sophisticated and intrusive techniques (e.g. NFS-like one) would be required. I'd like to postpone it until the issue is well discussed on the mailing list(s). Changed in v2: - improved patch description to cover both sides of the issue. Signed-off-by: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2013-08-30 06:06:04 -07:00
/** An operation changing file size is in progress */
FUSE_I_SIZE_UNSTABLE,
/* Bad inode */
FUSE_I_BAD,
/* Has btime */
FUSE_I_BTIME,
/* Wants or already has page cache IO */
FUSE_I_CACHE_IO_MODE,
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-09 13:10:26 -07:00
};
struct fuse_conn;
struct fuse_mount;
union fuse_file_args;
/** FUSE specific file data */
struct fuse_file {
/** Fuse connection for this file */
struct fuse_mount *fm;
/* Argument space reserved for open/release */
union fuse_file_args *args;
/** Kernel file handle guaranteed to be unique */
u64 kh;
/** File handle used by userspace */
u64 fh;
/** Node id of this file */
u64 nodeid;
/** Refcount */
refcount_t count;
/** FOPEN_* flags returned by open */
u32 open_flags;
/** Entry on inode's write_files list */
struct list_head write_entry;
/* Readdir related */
struct {
/* Dir stream position */
loff_t pos;
/* Offset in cache */
loff_t cache_off;
/* Version of cache we are reading */
u64 version;
} readdir;
/** RB node to be linked on fuse_conn->polled_files */
struct rb_node polled_node;
/** Wait queue head for poll */
wait_queue_head_t poll_wait;
/** Does file hold a fi->iocachectr refcount? */
enum { IOM_NONE, IOM_CACHED, IOM_UNCACHED } iomode;
fuse: implement open in passthrough mode After getting a backing file id with FUSE_DEV_IOC_BACKING_OPEN ioctl, a FUSE server can reply to an OPEN request with flag FOPEN_PASSTHROUGH and the backing file id. The FUSE server should reuse the same backing file id for all the open replies of the same FUSE inode and open will fail (with -EIO) if a the server attempts to open the same inode with conflicting io modes or to setup passthrough to two different backing files for the same FUSE inode. Using the same backing file id for several different inodes is allowed. Opening a new file with FOPEN_DIRECT_IO for an inode that is already open for passthrough is allowed, but only if the FOPEN_PASSTHROUGH flag and correct backing file id are specified as well. The read/write IO of such files will not use passthrough operations to the backing file, but mmap, which does not support direct_io, will use the backing file insead of using the page cache as it always did. Even though all FUSE passthrough files of the same inode use the same backing file as a backing inode reference, each FUSE file opens a unique instance of a backing_file object to store the FUSE path that was used to open the inode and the open flags of the specific open file. The per-file, backing_file object is released along with the FUSE file. The inode associated fuse_backing object is released when the last FUSE passthrough file of that inode is released AND when the backing file id is closed by the server using the FUSE_DEV_IOC_BACKING_CLOSE ioctl. Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2024-02-09 08:14:50 -07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_FUSE_PASSTHROUGH
/** Reference to backing file in passthrough mode */
struct file *passthrough;
const struct cred *cred;
#endif
/** Has flock been performed on this file? */
bool flock:1;
};
/** One input argument of a request */
struct fuse_in_arg {
unsigned size;
const void *value;
};
/** One output argument of a request */
struct fuse_arg {
unsigned size;
void *value;
};
/** FUSE page descriptor */
struct fuse_page_desc {
unsigned int length;
unsigned int offset;
};
struct fuse_args {
uint64_t nodeid;
uint32_t opcode;
uint8_t in_numargs;
uint8_t out_numargs;
uint8_t ext_idx;
bool force:1;
bool noreply:1;
bool nocreds:1;
bool in_pages:1;
bool out_pages:1;
bool user_pages:1;
bool out_argvar:1;
bool page_zeroing:1;
bool page_replace:1;
bool may_block:1;
bool is_ext:1;
bool is_pinned:1;
struct fuse_in_arg in_args[3];
struct fuse_arg out_args[2];
void (*end)(struct fuse_mount *fm, struct fuse_args *args, int error);
};
struct fuse_args_pages {
struct fuse_args args;
struct page **pages;
struct fuse_page_desc *descs;
unsigned int num_pages;
};
struct fuse_release_args {
struct fuse_args args;
struct fuse_release_in inarg;
struct inode *inode;
};
union fuse_file_args {
/* Used during open() */
struct fuse_open_out open_outarg;
/* Used during release() */
struct fuse_release_args release_args;
};
#define FUSE_ARGS(args) struct fuse_args args = {}
/** The request IO state (for asynchronous processing) */
struct fuse_io_priv {
struct kref refcnt;
int async;
spinlock_t lock;
unsigned reqs;
ssize_t bytes;
size_t size;
__u64 offset;
bool write;
fuse: Dont call set_page_dirty_lock() for ITER_BVEC pages for async_dio Commit 8fba54aebbdf ("fuse: direct-io: don't dirty ITER_BVEC pages") fixes the ITER_BVEC page deadlock for direct io in fuse by checking in fuse_direct_io(), whether the page is a bvec page or not, before locking it. However, this check is missed when the "async_dio" mount option is enabled. In this case, set_page_dirty_lock() is called from the req->end callback in request_end(), when the fuse thread is returning from userspace to respond to the read request. This will cause the same deadlock because the bvec condition is not checked in this path. Here is the stack of the deadlocked thread, while returning from userspace: [13706.656686] INFO: task glusterfs:3006 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [13706.657808] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [13706.658788] glusterfs D ffffffff816c80f0 0 3006 1 0x00000080 [13706.658797] ffff8800d6713a58 0000000000000086 ffff8800d9ad7000 ffff8800d9ad5400 [13706.658799] ffff88011ffd5cc0 ffff8800d6710008 ffff88011fd176c0 7fffffffffffffff [13706.658801] 0000000000000002 ffffffff816c80f0 ffff8800d6713a78 ffffffff816c790e [13706.658803] Call Trace: [13706.658809] [<ffffffff816c80f0>] ? bit_wait_io_timeout+0x80/0x80 [13706.658811] [<ffffffff816c790e>] schedule+0x3e/0x90 [13706.658813] [<ffffffff816ca7e5>] schedule_timeout+0x1b5/0x210 [13706.658816] [<ffffffff81073ffb>] ? gup_pud_range+0x1db/0x1f0 [13706.658817] [<ffffffff810668fe>] ? kvm_clock_read+0x1e/0x20 [13706.658819] [<ffffffff81066909>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0x10 [13706.658822] [<ffffffff810f5792>] ? ktime_get+0x52/0xc0 [13706.658824] [<ffffffff816c6f04>] io_schedule_timeout+0xa4/0x110 [13706.658826] [<ffffffff816c8126>] bit_wait_io+0x36/0x50 [13706.658828] [<ffffffff816c7d06>] __wait_on_bit_lock+0x76/0xb0 [13706.658831] [<ffffffffa0545636>] ? lock_request+0x46/0x70 [fuse] [13706.658834] [<ffffffff8118800a>] __lock_page+0xaa/0xb0 [13706.658836] [<ffffffff810c8500>] ? wake_atomic_t_function+0x40/0x40 [13706.658838] [<ffffffff81194d08>] set_page_dirty_lock+0x58/0x60 [13706.658841] [<ffffffffa054d968>] fuse_release_user_pages+0x58/0x70 [fuse] [13706.658844] [<ffffffffa0551430>] ? fuse_aio_complete+0x190/0x190 [fuse] [13706.658847] [<ffffffffa0551459>] fuse_aio_complete_req+0x29/0x90 [fuse] [13706.658849] [<ffffffffa05471e9>] request_end+0xd9/0x190 [fuse] [13706.658852] [<ffffffffa0549126>] fuse_dev_do_write+0x336/0x490 [fuse] [13706.658854] [<ffffffffa054963e>] fuse_dev_write+0x6e/0xa0 [fuse] [13706.658857] [<ffffffff812a9ef3>] ? security_file_permission+0x23/0x90 [13706.658859] [<ffffffff81205300>] do_iter_readv_writev+0x60/0x90 [13706.658862] [<ffffffffa05495d0>] ? fuse_dev_splice_write+0x350/0x350 [fuse] [13706.658863] [<ffffffff812062a1>] do_readv_writev+0x171/0x1f0 [13706.658866] [<ffffffff810b3d00>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x210/0x210 [13706.658868] [<ffffffff81206361>] vfs_writev+0x41/0x50 [13706.658870] [<ffffffff81206496>] SyS_writev+0x56/0xf0 [13706.658872] [<ffffffff810257a1>] ? syscall_trace_leave+0xf1/0x160 [13706.658874] [<ffffffff816cbb2e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71 Fix this by making should_dirty a fuse_io_priv parameter that can be checked in fuse_aio_complete_req(). Reported-by: Tiger Yang <tiger.yang@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Ashish Samant <ashish.samant@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2017-07-12 19:26:58 -07:00
bool should_dirty;
int err;
struct kiocb *iocb;
struct completion *done;
bool blocking;
};
#define FUSE_IO_PRIV_SYNC(i) \
{ \
.refcnt = KREF_INIT(1), \
.async = 0, \
.iocb = i, \
}
/**
* Request flags
*
* FR_ISREPLY: set if the request has reply
* FR_FORCE: force sending of the request even if interrupted
* FR_BACKGROUND: request is sent in the background
* FR_WAITING: request is counted as "waiting"
* FR_ABORTED: the request was aborted
* FR_INTERRUPTED: the request has been interrupted
* FR_LOCKED: data is being copied to/from the request
* FR_PENDING: request is not yet in userspace
* FR_SENT: request is in userspace, waiting for an answer
* FR_FINISHED: request is finished
* FR_PRIVATE: request is on private list
* FR_ASYNC: request is asynchronous
*/
enum fuse_req_flag {
FR_ISREPLY,
FR_FORCE,
FR_BACKGROUND,
FR_WAITING,
FR_ABORTED,
FR_INTERRUPTED,
FR_LOCKED,
FR_PENDING,
FR_SENT,
FR_FINISHED,
FR_PRIVATE,
FR_ASYNC,
};
/**
* A request to the client
*
* .waitq.lock protects the following fields:
* - FR_ABORTED
* - FR_LOCKED (may also be modified under fc->lock, tested under both)
*/
struct fuse_req {
/** This can be on either pending processing or io lists in
fuse_conn */
struct list_head list;
/** Entry on the interrupts list */
struct list_head intr_entry;
/* Input/output arguments */
struct fuse_args *args;
/** refcount */
refcount_t count;
/* Request flags, updated with test/set/clear_bit() */
unsigned long flags;
/* The request input header */
struct {
struct fuse_in_header h;
} in;
/* The request output header */
struct {
struct fuse_out_header h;
} out;
/** Used to wake up the task waiting for completion of request*/
wait_queue_head_t waitq;
virtio-fs: add virtiofs filesystem Add a basic file system module for virtio-fs. This does not yet contain shared data support between host and guest or metadata coherency speedups. However it is already significantly faster than virtio-9p. Design Overview =============== With the goal of designing something with better performance and local file system semantics, a bunch of ideas were proposed. - Use fuse protocol (instead of 9p) for communication between guest and host. Guest kernel will be fuse client and a fuse server will run on host to serve the requests. - For data access inside guest, mmap portion of file in QEMU address space and guest accesses this memory using dax. That way guest page cache is bypassed and there is only one copy of data (on host). This will also enable mmap(MAP_SHARED) between guests. - For metadata coherency, there is a shared memory region which contains version number associated with metadata and any guest changing metadata updates version number and other guests refresh metadata on next access. This is yet to be implemented. How virtio-fs differs from existing approaches ============================================== The unique idea behind virtio-fs is to take advantage of the co-location of the virtual machine and hypervisor to avoid communication (vmexits). DAX allows file contents to be accessed without communication with the hypervisor. The shared memory region for metadata avoids communication in the common case where metadata is unchanged. By replacing expensive communication with cheaper shared memory accesses, we expect to achieve better performance than approaches based on network file system protocols. In addition, this also makes it easier to achieve local file system semantics (coherency). These techniques are not applicable to network file system protocols since the communications channel is bypassed by taking advantage of shared memory on a local machine. This is why we decided to build virtio-fs rather than focus on 9P or NFS. Caching Modes ============= Like virtio-9p, different caching modes are supported which determine the coherency level as well. The “cache=FOO” and “writeback” options control the level of coherence between the guest and host filesystems. - cache=none metadata, data and pathname lookup are not cached in guest. They are always fetched from host and any changes are immediately pushed to host. - cache=always metadata, data and pathname lookup are cached in guest and never expire. - cache=auto metadata and pathname lookup cache expires after a configured amount of time (default is 1 second). Data is cached while the file is open (close to open consistency). - writeback/no_writeback These options control the writeback strategy. If writeback is disabled, then normal writes will immediately be synchronized with the host fs. If writeback is enabled, then writes may be cached in the guest until the file is closed or an fsync(2) performed. This option has no effect on mmap-ed writes or writes going through the DAX mechanism. Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2018-06-12 01:41:17 -07:00
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VIRTIO_FS)
/** virtio-fs's physically contiguous buffer for in and out args */
void *argbuf;
#endif
/** fuse_mount this request belongs to */
struct fuse_mount *fm;
};
struct fuse_iqueue;
/**
* Input queue callbacks
*
* Input queue signalling is device-specific. For example, the /dev/fuse file
* uses fiq->waitq and fasync to wake processes that are waiting on queue
* readiness. These callbacks allow other device types to respond to input
* queue activity.
*/
struct fuse_iqueue_ops {
/**
* Send one forget
*/
void (*send_forget)(struct fuse_iqueue *fiq, struct fuse_forget_link *link);
/**
* Send interrupt for request
*/
void (*send_interrupt)(struct fuse_iqueue *fiq, struct fuse_req *req);
/**
* Send one request
*/
void (*send_req)(struct fuse_iqueue *fiq, struct fuse_req *req);
virtio-fs: add virtiofs filesystem Add a basic file system module for virtio-fs. This does not yet contain shared data support between host and guest or metadata coherency speedups. However it is already significantly faster than virtio-9p. Design Overview =============== With the goal of designing something with better performance and local file system semantics, a bunch of ideas were proposed. - Use fuse protocol (instead of 9p) for communication between guest and host. Guest kernel will be fuse client and a fuse server will run on host to serve the requests. - For data access inside guest, mmap portion of file in QEMU address space and guest accesses this memory using dax. That way guest page cache is bypassed and there is only one copy of data (on host). This will also enable mmap(MAP_SHARED) between guests. - For metadata coherency, there is a shared memory region which contains version number associated with metadata and any guest changing metadata updates version number and other guests refresh metadata on next access. This is yet to be implemented. How virtio-fs differs from existing approaches ============================================== The unique idea behind virtio-fs is to take advantage of the co-location of the virtual machine and hypervisor to avoid communication (vmexits). DAX allows file contents to be accessed without communication with the hypervisor. The shared memory region for metadata avoids communication in the common case where metadata is unchanged. By replacing expensive communication with cheaper shared memory accesses, we expect to achieve better performance than approaches based on network file system protocols. In addition, this also makes it easier to achieve local file system semantics (coherency). These techniques are not applicable to network file system protocols since the communications channel is bypassed by taking advantage of shared memory on a local machine. This is why we decided to build virtio-fs rather than focus on 9P or NFS. Caching Modes ============= Like virtio-9p, different caching modes are supported which determine the coherency level as well. The “cache=FOO” and “writeback” options control the level of coherence between the guest and host filesystems. - cache=none metadata, data and pathname lookup are not cached in guest. They are always fetched from host and any changes are immediately pushed to host. - cache=always metadata, data and pathname lookup are cached in guest and never expire. - cache=auto metadata and pathname lookup cache expires after a configured amount of time (default is 1 second). Data is cached while the file is open (close to open consistency). - writeback/no_writeback These options control the writeback strategy. If writeback is disabled, then normal writes will immediately be synchronized with the host fs. If writeback is enabled, then writes may be cached in the guest until the file is closed or an fsync(2) performed. This option has no effect on mmap-ed writes or writes going through the DAX mechanism. Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2018-06-12 01:41:17 -07:00
/**
* Clean up when fuse_iqueue is destroyed
*/
void (*release)(struct fuse_iqueue *fiq);
};
/** /dev/fuse input queue operations */
extern const struct fuse_iqueue_ops fuse_dev_fiq_ops;
struct fuse_iqueue {
/** Connection established */
unsigned connected;
fuse: fix deadlock with aio poll and fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 #9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-09-08 20:15:18 -07:00
/** Lock protecting accesses to members of this structure */
spinlock_t lock;
/** Readers of the connection are waiting on this */
wait_queue_head_t waitq;
/** The next unique request id */
u64 reqctr;
/** The list of pending requests */
struct list_head pending;
/** Pending interrupts */
struct list_head interrupts;
/** Queue of pending forgets */
struct fuse_forget_link forget_list_head;
struct fuse_forget_link *forget_list_tail;
/** Batching of FORGET requests (positive indicates FORGET batch) */
int forget_batch;
/** O_ASYNC requests */
struct fasync_struct *fasync;
/** Device-specific callbacks */
const struct fuse_iqueue_ops *ops;
/** Device-specific state */
void *priv;
};
#define FUSE_PQ_HASH_BITS 8
#define FUSE_PQ_HASH_SIZE (1 << FUSE_PQ_HASH_BITS)
struct fuse_pqueue {
/** Connection established */
unsigned connected;
/** Lock protecting accessess to members of this structure */
spinlock_t lock;
/** Hash table of requests being processed */
struct list_head *processing;
/** The list of requests under I/O */
struct list_head io;
};
/**
* Fuse device instance
*/
struct fuse_dev {
/** Fuse connection for this device */
struct fuse_conn *fc;
/** Processing queue */
struct fuse_pqueue pq;
/** list entry on fc->devices */
struct list_head entry;
};
enum fuse_dax_mode {
FUSE_DAX_INODE_DEFAULT, /* default */
FUSE_DAX_ALWAYS, /* "-o dax=always" */
FUSE_DAX_NEVER, /* "-o dax=never" */
FUSE_DAX_INODE_USER, /* "-o dax=inode" */
};
static inline bool fuse_is_inode_dax_mode(enum fuse_dax_mode mode)
{
return mode == FUSE_DAX_INODE_DEFAULT || mode == FUSE_DAX_INODE_USER;
}
struct fuse_fs_context {
int fd;
struct file *file;
unsigned int rootmode;
kuid_t user_id;
kgid_t group_id;
bool is_bdev:1;
bool fd_present:1;
bool rootmode_present:1;
bool user_id_present:1;
bool group_id_present:1;
bool default_permissions:1;
bool allow_other:1;
bool destroy:1;
bool no_control:1;
bool no_force_umount:1;
bool legacy_opts_show:1;
enum fuse_dax_mode dax_mode;
unsigned int max_read;
unsigned int blksize;
const char *subtype;
/* DAX device, may be NULL */
struct dax_device *dax_dev;
/* fuse_dev pointer to fill in, should contain NULL on entry */
void **fudptr;
};
struct fuse_sync_bucket {
/* count is a possible scalability bottleneck */
atomic_t count;
wait_queue_head_t waitq;
struct rcu_head rcu;
};
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-09 13:10:26 -07:00
/**
* A Fuse connection.
*
* This structure is created, when the root filesystem is mounted, and
* is destroyed, when the client device is closed and the last
* fuse_mount is destroyed.
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-09 13:10:26 -07:00
*/
struct fuse_conn {
/** Lock protecting accessess to members of this structure */
spinlock_t lock;
/** Refcount */
refcount_t count;
/** Number of fuse_dev's */
atomic_t dev_count;
struct rcu_head rcu;
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-09 13:10:26 -07:00
/** The user id for this mount */
userns: Support fuse interacting with multiple user namespaces Use kuid_t and kgid_t in struct fuse_conn and struct fuse_mount_data. The connection between between a fuse filesystem and a fuse daemon is established when a fuse filesystem is mounted and provided with a file descriptor the fuse daemon created by opening /dev/fuse. For now restrict the communication of uids and gids between the fuse filesystem and the fuse daemon to the initial user namespace. Enforce this by verifying the file descriptor passed to the mount of fuse was opened in the initial user namespace. Ensuring the mount happens in the initial user namespace is not necessary as mounts from non-initial user namespaces are not yet allowed. In fuse_req_init_context convert the currrent fsuid and fsgid into the initial user namespace for the request that will be sent to the fuse daemon. In fuse_fill_attr convert the uid and gid passed from the fuse daemon from the initial user namespace into kuids and kgids. In iattr_to_fattr called from fuse_setattr convert kuids and kgids into the uids and gids in the initial user namespace before passing them to the fuse filesystem. In fuse_change_attributes_common called from fuse_dentry_revalidate, fuse_permission, fuse_geattr, and fuse_setattr, and fuse_iget convert the uid and gid from the fuse daemon into a kuid and a kgid to store on the fuse inode. By default fuse mounts are restricted to task whose uid, suid, and euid matches the fuse user_id and whose gid, sgid, and egid matches the fuse group id. Convert the user_id and group_id mount options into kuids and kgids at mount time, and use uid_eq and gid_eq to compare the in fuse_allow_task. Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-07 17:26:03 -07:00
kuid_t user_id;
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-09 13:10:26 -07:00
/** The group id for this mount */
userns: Support fuse interacting with multiple user namespaces Use kuid_t and kgid_t in struct fuse_conn and struct fuse_mount_data. The connection between between a fuse filesystem and a fuse daemon is established when a fuse filesystem is mounted and provided with a file descriptor the fuse daemon created by opening /dev/fuse. For now restrict the communication of uids and gids between the fuse filesystem and the fuse daemon to the initial user namespace. Enforce this by verifying the file descriptor passed to the mount of fuse was opened in the initial user namespace. Ensuring the mount happens in the initial user namespace is not necessary as mounts from non-initial user namespaces are not yet allowed. In fuse_req_init_context convert the currrent fsuid and fsgid into the initial user namespace for the request that will be sent to the fuse daemon. In fuse_fill_attr convert the uid and gid passed from the fuse daemon from the initial user namespace into kuids and kgids. In iattr_to_fattr called from fuse_setattr convert kuids and kgids into the uids and gids in the initial user namespace before passing them to the fuse filesystem. In fuse_change_attributes_common called from fuse_dentry_revalidate, fuse_permission, fuse_geattr, and fuse_setattr, and fuse_iget convert the uid and gid from the fuse daemon into a kuid and a kgid to store on the fuse inode. By default fuse mounts are restricted to task whose uid, suid, and euid matches the fuse user_id and whose gid, sgid, and egid matches the fuse group id. Convert the user_id and group_id mount options into kuids and kgids at mount time, and use uid_eq and gid_eq to compare the in fuse_allow_task. Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-07 17:26:03 -07:00
kgid_t group_id;
/** The pid namespace for this mount */
struct pid_namespace *pid_ns;
fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns In order to support mounts from namespaces other than init_user_ns, fuse must translate uids and gids to/from the userns of the process servicing requests on /dev/fuse. This patch does that, with a couple of restrictions on the namespace: - The userns for the fuse connection is fixed to the namespace from which /dev/fuse is opened. - The namespace must be the same as s_user_ns. These restrictions simplify the implementation by avoiding the need to pass around userns references and by allowing fuse to rely on the checks in setattr_prepare for ownership changes. Either restriction could be relaxed in the future if needed. For cuse the userns used is the opener of /dev/cuse. Semantically the cuse support does not appear safe for unprivileged users. Practically the permissions on /dev/cuse only make it accessible to the global root user. If something slips through the cracks in a user namespace the only users who will be able to use the cuse device are those users mapped into the user namespace. Translation in the posix acl is updated to use the uuser namespace of the filesystem. Avoiding cases which might bypass this translation is handled in a following change. This change is stronlgy based on a similar change from Seth Forshee and Dongsu Park. Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Cc: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2018-02-21 10:18:07 -07:00
/** The user namespace for this mount */
struct user_namespace *user_ns;
/** Maximum read size */
unsigned max_read;
/** Maximum write size */
unsigned max_write;
/** Maximum number of pages that can be used in a single request */
fuse: add max_pages to init_out Replace FUSE_MAX_PAGES_PER_REQ with the configurable parameter max_pages to improve performance. Old RFC with detailed description of the problem and many fixes by Mitsuo Hayasaka (mitsuo.hayasaka.hu@hitachi.com): - https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/7/5/136 We've encountered performance degradation and fixed it on a big and complex virtual environment. Environment to reproduce degradation and improvement: 1. Add lag to user mode FUSE Add nanosleep(&(struct timespec){ 0, 1000 }, NULL); to xmp_write_buf in passthrough_fh.c 2. patch UM fuse with configurable max_pages parameter. The patch will be provided latter. 3. run test script and perform test on tmpfs fuse_test() { cd /tmp mkdir -p fusemnt passthrough_fh -o max_pages=$1 /tmp/fusemnt grep fuse /proc/self/mounts dd conv=fdatasync oflag=dsync if=/dev/zero of=fusemnt/tmp/tmp \ count=1K bs=1M 2>&1 | grep -v records rm fusemnt/tmp/tmp killall passthrough_fh } Test results: passthrough_fh /tmp/fusemnt fuse.passthrough_fh \ rw,nosuid,nodev,relatime,user_id=0,group_id=0 0 0 1073741824 bytes (1.1 GB) copied, 1.73867 s, 618 MB/s passthrough_fh /tmp/fusemnt fuse.passthrough_fh \ rw,nosuid,nodev,relatime,user_id=0,group_id=0,max_pages=256 0 0 1073741824 bytes (1.1 GB) copied, 1.15643 s, 928 MB/s Obviously with bigger lag the difference between 'before' and 'after' will be more significant. Mitsuo Hayasaka, in 2012 (https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/7/5/136), observed improvement from 400-550 to 520-740. Signed-off-by: Constantine Shulyupin <const@MakeLinux.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2018-09-06 05:37:06 -07:00
unsigned int max_pages;
/** Constrain ->max_pages to this value during feature negotiation */
unsigned int max_pages_limit;
/** Input queue */
struct fuse_iqueue iq;
/** The next unique kernel file handle */
atomic64_t khctr;
/** rbtree of fuse_files waiting for poll events indexed by ph */
struct rb_root polled_files;
/** Maximum number of outstanding background requests */
unsigned max_background;
/** Number of background requests at which congestion starts */
unsigned congestion_threshold;
/** Number of requests currently in the background */
unsigned num_background;
/** Number of background requests currently queued for userspace */
unsigned active_background;
/** The list of background requests set aside for later queuing */
struct list_head bg_queue;
/** Protects: max_background, congestion_threshold, num_background,
* active_background, bg_queue, blocked */
spinlock_t bg_lock;
/** Flag indicating that INIT reply has been received. Allocating
* any fuse request will be suspended until the flag is set */
int initialized;
/** Flag indicating if connection is blocked. This will be
the case before the INIT reply is received, and if there
are too many outstading backgrounds requests */
int blocked;
/** waitq for blocked connection */
wait_queue_head_t blocked_waitq;
/** Connection established, cleared on umount, connection
abort and device release */
unsigned connected;
/** Connection aborted via sysfs */
bool aborted;
/** Connection failed (version mismatch). Cannot race with
setting other bitfields since it is only set once in INIT
reply, before any other request, and never cleared */
unsigned conn_error:1;
/** Connection successful. Only set in INIT */
unsigned conn_init:1;
/** Do readahead asynchronously? Only set in INIT */
unsigned async_read:1;
/** Return an unique read error after abort. Only set in INIT */
unsigned abort_err:1;
/** Do not send separate SETATTR request before open(O_TRUNC) */
unsigned atomic_o_trunc:1;
/** Filesystem supports NFS exporting. Only set in INIT */
unsigned export_support:1;
/** write-back cache policy (default is write-through) */
unsigned writeback_cache:1;
/** allow parallel lookups and readdir (default is serialized) */
unsigned parallel_dirops:1;
/** handle fs handles killing suid/sgid/cap on write/chown/trunc */
unsigned handle_killpriv:1;
/** cache READLINK responses in page cache */
unsigned cache_symlinks:1;
/* show legacy mount options */
unsigned int legacy_opts_show:1;
/*
* fs kills suid/sgid/cap on write/chown/trunc. suid is killed on
* write/trunc only if caller did not have CAP_FSETID. sgid is killed
* on write/truncate only if caller did not have CAP_FSETID as well as
* file has group execute permission.
*/
unsigned handle_killpriv_v2:1;
/*
* The following bitfields are only for optimization purposes
* and hence races in setting them will not cause malfunction
*/
/** Is open/release not implemented by fs? */
unsigned no_open:1;
/** Is opendir/releasedir not implemented by fs? */
unsigned no_opendir:1;
/** Is fsync not implemented by fs? */
unsigned no_fsync:1;
/** Is fsyncdir not implemented by fs? */
unsigned no_fsyncdir:1;
/** Is flush not implemented by fs? */
unsigned no_flush:1;
/** Is setxattr not implemented by fs? */
unsigned no_setxattr:1;
/** Does file server support extended setxattr */
unsigned setxattr_ext:1;
/** Is getxattr not implemented by fs? */
unsigned no_getxattr:1;
/** Is listxattr not implemented by fs? */
unsigned no_listxattr:1;
/** Is removexattr not implemented by fs? */
unsigned no_removexattr:1;
/** Are posix file locking primitives not implemented by fs? */
unsigned no_lock:1;
/** Is access not implemented by fs? */
unsigned no_access:1;
/** Is create not implemented by fs? */
unsigned no_create:1;
/** Is interrupt not implemented by fs? */
unsigned no_interrupt:1;
/** Is bmap not implemented by fs? */
unsigned no_bmap:1;
/** Is poll not implemented by fs? */
unsigned no_poll:1;
/** Do multi-page cached writes */
unsigned big_writes:1;
/** Don't apply umask to creation modes */
unsigned dont_mask:1;
/** Are BSD file locking primitives not implemented by fs? */
unsigned no_flock:1;
/** Is fallocate not implemented by fs? */
unsigned no_fallocate:1;
/** Is rename with flags implemented by fs? */
unsigned no_rename2:1;
/** Use enhanced/automatic page cache invalidation. */
unsigned auto_inval_data:1;
/** Filesystem is fully responsible for page cache invalidation. */
fuse: allow filesystems to have precise control over data cache On networked filesystems file data can be changed externally. FUSE provides notification messages for filesystem to inform kernel that metadata or data region of a file needs to be invalidated in local page cache. That provides the basis for filesystem implementations to invalidate kernel cache explicitly based on observed filesystem-specific events. FUSE has also "automatic" invalidation mode(*) when the kernel automatically invalidates data cache of a file if it sees mtime change. It also automatically invalidates whole data cache of a file if it sees file size being changed. The automatic mode has corresponding capability - FUSE_AUTO_INVAL_DATA. However, due to probably historical reason, that capability controls only whether mtime change should be resulting in automatic invalidation or not. A change in file size always results in invalidating whole data cache of a file irregardless of whether FUSE_AUTO_INVAL_DATA was negotiated(+). The filesystem I write[1] represents data arrays stored in networked database as local files suitable for mmap. It is read-only filesystem - changes to data are committed externally via database interfaces and the filesystem only glues data into contiguous file streams suitable for mmap and traditional array processing. The files are big - starting from hundreds gigabytes and more. The files change regularly, and frequently by data being appended to their end. The size of files thus changes frequently. If a file was accessed locally and some part of its data got into page cache, we want that data to stay cached unless there is memory pressure, or unless corresponding part of the file was actually changed. However current FUSE behaviour - when it sees file size change - is to invalidate the whole file. The data cache of the file is thus completely lost even on small size change, and despite that the filesystem server is careful to accurately translate database changes into FUSE invalidation messages to kernel. Let's fix it: if a filesystem, through new FUSE_EXPLICIT_INVAL_DATA capability, indicates to kernel that it is fully responsible for data cache invalidation, then the kernel won't invalidate files data cache on size change and only truncate that cache to new size in case the size decreased. (*) see 72d0d248ca "fuse: add FUSE_AUTO_INVAL_DATA init flag", eed2179efe "fuse: invalidate inode mapping if mtime changes" (+) in writeback mode the kernel does not invalidate data cache on file size change, but neither it allows the filesystem to set the size due to external event (see 8373200b12 "fuse: Trust kernel i_size only") [1] https://lab.nexedi.com/kirr/wendelin.core/blob/a50f1d9f/wcfs/wcfs.go#L20 Signed-off-by: Kirill Smelkov <kirr@nexedi.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2019-03-27 04:14:15 -07:00
unsigned explicit_inval_data:1;
/** Does the filesystem support readdirplus? */
unsigned do_readdirplus:1;
/** Does the filesystem want adaptive readdirplus? */
unsigned readdirplus_auto:1;
/** Does the filesystem support asynchronous direct-IO submission? */
unsigned async_dio:1;
/** Is lseek not implemented by fs? */
unsigned no_lseek:1;
/** Does the filesystem support posix acls? */
unsigned posix_acl:1;
/** Check permissions based on the file mode or not? */
unsigned default_permissions:1;
/** Allow other than the mounter user to access the filesystem ? */
unsigned allow_other:1;
/** Does the filesystem support copy_file_range? */
unsigned no_copy_file_range:1;
/* Send DESTROY request */
unsigned int destroy:1;
/* Delete dentries that have gone stale */
unsigned int delete_stale:1;
/** Do not create entry in fusectl fs */
unsigned int no_control:1;
/** Do not allow MNT_FORCE umount */
unsigned int no_force_umount:1;
/* Auto-mount submounts announced by the server */
unsigned int auto_submounts:1;
virtiofs: propagate sync() to file server Even if POSIX doesn't mandate it, linux users legitimately expect sync() to flush all data and metadata to physical storage when it is located on the same system. This isn't happening with virtiofs though: sync() inside the guest returns right away even though data still needs to be flushed from the host page cache. This is easily demonstrated by doing the following in the guest: $ dd if=/dev/zero of=/mnt/foo bs=1M count=5K ; strace -T -e sync sync 5120+0 records in 5120+0 records out 5368709120 bytes (5.4 GB, 5.0 GiB) copied, 5.22224 s, 1.0 GB/s sync() = 0 <0.024068> and start the following in the host when the 'dd' command completes in the guest: $ strace -T -e fsync /usr/bin/sync virtiofs/foo fsync(3) = 0 <10.371640> There are no good reasons not to honor the expected behavior of sync() actually: it gives an unrealistic impression that virtiofs is super fast and that data has safely landed on HW, which isn't the case obviously. Implement a ->sync_fs() superblock operation that sends a new FUSE_SYNCFS request type for this purpose. Provision a 64-bit placeholder for possible future extensions. Since the file server cannot handle the wait == 0 case, we skip it to avoid a gratuitous roundtrip. Note that this is per-superblock: a FUSE_SYNCFS is send for the root mount and for each submount. Like with FUSE_FSYNC and FUSE_FSYNCDIR, lack of support for FUSE_SYNCFS in the file server is treated as permanent success. This ensures compatibility with older file servers: the client will get the current behavior of sync() not being propagated to the file server. Note that such an operation allows the file server to DoS sync(). Since a typical FUSE file server is an untrusted piece of software running in userspace, this is disabled by default. Only enable it with virtiofs for now since virtiofsd is supposedly trusted by the guest kernel. Reported-by: Robert Krawitz <rlk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2021-05-20 08:46:54 -07:00
/* Propagate syncfs() to server */
unsigned int sync_fs:1;
fuse: send security context of inode on file When a new inode is created, send its security context to server along with creation request (FUSE_CREAT, FUSE_MKNOD, FUSE_MKDIR and FUSE_SYMLINK). This gives server an opportunity to create new file and set security context (possibly atomically). In all the configurations it might not be possible to set context atomically. Like nfs and ceph, use security_dentry_init_security() to dermine security context of inode and send it with create, mkdir, mknod, and symlink requests. Following is the information sent to server. fuse_sectx_header, fuse_secctx, xattr_name, security_context - struct fuse_secctx_header This contains total number of security contexts being sent and total size of all the security contexts (including size of fuse_secctx_header). - struct fuse_secctx This contains size of security context which follows this structure. There is one fuse_secctx instance per security context. - xattr name string This string represents name of xattr which should be used while setting security context. - security context This is the actual security context whose size is specified in fuse_secctx struct. Also add the FUSE_SECURITY_CTX flag for the `flags` field of the fuse_init_out struct. When this flag is set the kernel will append the security context for a newly created inode to the request (create, mkdir, mknod, and symlink). The server is responsible for ensuring that the inode appears atomically (preferrably) with the requested security context. For example, If the server is using SELinux and backed by a "real" linux file system that supports extended attributes it can write the security context value to /proc/thread-self/attr/fscreate before making the syscall to create the inode. This patch is based on patch from Chirantan Ekbote <chirantan@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2021-11-11 07:32:49 -07:00
/* Initialize security xattrs when creating a new inode */
unsigned int init_security:1;
/* Add supplementary group info when creating a new inode */
unsigned int create_supp_group:1;
/* Does the filesystem support per inode DAX? */
unsigned int inode_dax:1;
/* Is tmpfile not implemented by fs? */
unsigned int no_tmpfile:1;
/* Relax restrictions to allow shared mmap in FOPEN_DIRECT_IO mode */
unsigned int direct_io_allow_mmap:1;
/* Is statx not implemented by fs? */
unsigned int no_statx:1;
/** Passthrough support for read/write IO */
unsigned int passthrough:1;
/** Maximum stack depth for passthrough backing files */
int max_stack_depth;
/** The number of requests waiting for completion */
atomic_t num_waiting;
/** Negotiated minor version */
unsigned minor;
/** Entry on the fuse_conn_list */
struct list_head entry;
/** Device ID from the root super block */
dev_t dev;
/** Dentries in the control filesystem */
struct dentry *ctl_dentry[FUSE_CTL_NUM_DENTRIES];
/** number of dentries used in the above array */
int ctl_ndents;
/** Key for lock owner ID scrambling */
u32 scramble_key[4];
/** Version counter for attribute changes */
atomic64_t attr_version;
/** Called on final put */
void (*release)(struct fuse_conn *);
/**
* Read/write semaphore to hold when accessing the sb of any
* fuse_mount belonging to this connection
*/
struct rw_semaphore killsb;
/** List of device instances belonging to this connection */
struct list_head devices;
#ifdef CONFIG_FUSE_DAX
/* Dax mode */
enum fuse_dax_mode dax_mode;
/* Dax specific conn data, non-NULL if DAX is enabled */
struct fuse_conn_dax *dax;
#endif
/** List of filesystems using this connection */
struct list_head mounts;
/* New writepages go into this bucket */
struct fuse_sync_bucket __rcu *curr_bucket;
#ifdef CONFIG_FUSE_PASSTHROUGH
/** IDR for backing files ids */
struct idr backing_files_map;
#endif
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-09 13:10:26 -07:00
};
/*
* Represents a mounted filesystem, potentially a submount.
*
* This object allows sharing a fuse_conn between separate mounts to
* allow submounts with dedicated superblocks and thus separate device
* IDs.
*/
struct fuse_mount {
/* Underlying (potentially shared) connection to the FUSE server */
struct fuse_conn *fc;
/*
* Super block for this connection (fc->killsb must be held when
* accessing this).
*/
struct super_block *sb;
/* Entry on fc->mounts */
struct list_head fc_entry;
struct rcu_head rcu;
};
static inline struct fuse_mount *get_fuse_mount_super(struct super_block *sb)
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-09 13:10:26 -07:00
{
return sb->s_fs_info;
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-09 13:10:26 -07:00
}
static inline struct fuse_conn *get_fuse_conn_super(struct super_block *sb)
{
return get_fuse_mount_super(sb)->fc;
}
static inline struct fuse_mount *get_fuse_mount(struct inode *inode)
{
return get_fuse_mount_super(inode->i_sb);
}
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-09 13:10:26 -07:00
static inline struct fuse_conn *get_fuse_conn(struct inode *inode)
{
return get_fuse_mount_super(inode->i_sb)->fc;
[PATCH] FUSE - core This patch adds FUSE core. This contains the following files: o inode.c - superblock operations (alloc_inode, destroy_inode, read_inode, clear_inode, put_super, show_options) - registers FUSE filesystem o fuse_i.h - private header file Requirements ============ The most important difference between orinary filesystems and FUSE is the fact, that the filesystem data/metadata is provided by a userspace process run with the privileges of the mount "owner" instead of the kernel, or some remote entity usually running with elevated privileges. The security implication of this is that a non-privileged user must not be able to use this capability to compromise the system. Obvious requirements arising from this are: - mount owner should not be able to get elevated privileges with the help of the mounted filesystem - mount owner should not be able to induce undesired behavior in other users' or the super user's processes - mount owner should not get illegitimate access to information from other users' and the super user's processes These are currently ensured with the following constraints: 1) mount is only allowed to directory or file which the mount owner can modify without limitation (write access + no sticky bit for directories) 2) nosuid,nodev mount options are forced 3) any process running with fsuid different from the owner is denied all access to the filesystem 1) and 2) are ensured by the "fusermount" mount utility which is a setuid root application doing the actual mount operation. 3) is ensured by a check in the permission() method in kernel I started thinking about doing 3) in a different way because Christoph H. made a big deal out of it, saying that FUSE is unacceptable into mainline in this form. The suggested use of private namespaces would be OK, but in their current form have many limitations that make their use impractical (as discussed in this thread). Suggested improvements that would address these limitations: - implement shared subtrees - allow a process to join an existing namespace (make namespaces first-class objects) - implement the namespace creation/joining in a PAM module With all that in place the check of owner against current->fsuid may be removed from the FUSE kernel module, without compromising the security requirements. Suid programs still interesting questions, since they get access even to the private namespace causing some information leak (exact order/timing of filesystem operations performed), giving some ptrace-like capabilities to unprivileged users. BTW this problem is not strictly limited to the namespace approach, since suid programs setting fsuid and accessing users' files will succeed with the current approach too. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-09 13:10:26 -07:00
}
static inline struct fuse_inode *get_fuse_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
return container_of(inode, struct fuse_inode, inode);
}
static inline u64 get_node_id(struct inode *inode)
{
return get_fuse_inode(inode)->nodeid;
}
static inline int invalid_nodeid(u64 nodeid)
{
return !nodeid || nodeid == FUSE_ROOT_ID;
}
static inline u64 fuse_get_attr_version(struct fuse_conn *fc)
{
return atomic64_read(&fc->attr_version);
}
static inline bool fuse_stale_inode(const struct inode *inode, int generation,
struct fuse_attr *attr)
{
return inode->i_generation != generation ||
inode_wrong_type(inode, attr->mode);
}
static inline void fuse_make_bad(struct inode *inode)
{
set_bit(FUSE_I_BAD, &get_fuse_inode(inode)->state);
}
static inline bool fuse_is_bad(struct inode *inode)
{
return unlikely(test_bit(FUSE_I_BAD, &get_fuse_inode(inode)->state));
}
static inline struct page **fuse_pages_alloc(unsigned int npages, gfp_t flags,
struct fuse_page_desc **desc)
{
struct page **pages;
pages = kzalloc(npages * (sizeof(struct page *) +
sizeof(struct fuse_page_desc)), flags);
*desc = (void *) (pages + npages);
return pages;
}
static inline void fuse_page_descs_length_init(struct fuse_page_desc *descs,
unsigned int index,
unsigned int nr_pages)
{
int i;
for (i = index; i < index + nr_pages; i++)
descs[i].length = PAGE_SIZE - descs[i].offset;
}
static inline void fuse_sync_bucket_dec(struct fuse_sync_bucket *bucket)
{
/* Need RCU protection to prevent use after free after the decrement */
rcu_read_lock();
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&bucket->count))
wake_up(&bucket->waitq);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
/** Device operations */
extern const struct file_operations fuse_dev_operations;
extern const struct dentry_operations fuse_dentry_operations;
extern const struct dentry_operations fuse_root_dentry_operations;
/**
* Get a filled in inode
*/
struct inode *fuse_iget(struct super_block *sb, u64 nodeid,
int generation, struct fuse_attr *attr,
u64 attr_valid, u64 attr_version);
int fuse_lookup_name(struct super_block *sb, u64 nodeid, const struct qstr *name,
struct fuse_entry_out *outarg, struct inode **inode);
/**
* Send FORGET command
*/
void fuse_queue_forget(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct fuse_forget_link *forget,
u64 nodeid, u64 nlookup);
struct fuse_forget_link *fuse_alloc_forget(void);
/*
* Initialize READ or READDIR request
*/
struct fuse_io_args {
union {
struct {
struct fuse_read_in in;
u64 attr_ver;
} read;
struct {
struct fuse_write_in in;
struct fuse_write_out out;
fuse: fix write deadlock There are two modes for write(2) and friends in fuse: a) write through (update page cache, send sync WRITE request to userspace) b) buffered write (update page cache, async writeout later) The write through method kept all the page cache pages locked that were used for the request. Keeping more than one page locked is deadlock prone and Qian Cai demonstrated this with trinity fuzzing. The reason for keeping the pages locked is that concurrent mapped reads shouldn't try to pull possibly stale data into the page cache. For full page writes, the easy way to fix this is to make the cached page be the authoritative source by marking the page PG_uptodate immediately. After this the page can be safely unlocked, since mapped/cached reads will take the written data from the cache. Concurrent mapped writes will now cause data in the original WRITE request to be updated; this however doesn't cause any data inconsistency and this scenario should be exceedingly rare anyway. If the WRITE request returns with an error in the above case, currently the page is not marked uptodate; this means that a concurrent read will always read consistent data. After this patch the page is uptodate between writing to the cache and receiving the error: there's window where a cached read will read the wrong data. While theoretically this could be a regression, it is unlikely to be one in practice, since this is normal for buffered writes. In case of a partial page write to an already uptodate page the locking is also unnecessary, with the above caveats. Partial write of a not uptodate page still needs to be handled. One way would be to read the complete page before doing the write. This is not possible, since it might break filesystems that don't expect any READ requests when the file was opened O_WRONLY. The other solution is to serialize the synchronous write with reads from the partial pages. The easiest way to do this is to keep the partial pages locked. The problem is that a write() may involve two such pages (one head and one tail). This patch fixes it by only locking the partial tail page. If there's a partial head page as well, then split that off as a separate WRITE request. Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/4794a3fa3742a5e84fb0f934944204b55730829b.camel@lca.pw/ Fixes: ea9b9907b82a ("fuse: implement perform_write") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.26 Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2020-10-21 13:12:49 -07:00
bool page_locked;
} write;
};
struct fuse_args_pages ap;
struct fuse_io_priv *io;
struct fuse_file *ff;
};
void fuse_read_args_fill(struct fuse_io_args *ia, struct file *file, loff_t pos,
size_t count, int opcode);
struct fuse_file *fuse_file_alloc(struct fuse_mount *fm, bool release);
void fuse_file_free(struct fuse_file *ff);
int fuse_finish_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file);
void fuse_sync_release(struct fuse_inode *fi, struct fuse_file *ff,
unsigned int flags);
/**
* Send RELEASE or RELEASEDIR request
*/
void fuse_release_common(struct file *file, bool isdir);
/**
* Send FSYNC or FSYNCDIR request
*/
int fuse_fsync_common(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end,
int datasync, int opcode);
/**
* Notify poll wakeup
*/
int fuse_notify_poll_wakeup(struct fuse_conn *fc,
struct fuse_notify_poll_wakeup_out *outarg);
/**
* Initialize file operations on a regular file
*/
void fuse_init_file_inode(struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags);
/**
* Initialize inode operations on regular files and special files
*/
void fuse_init_common(struct inode *inode);
/**
* Initialize inode and file operations on a directory
*/
void fuse_init_dir(struct inode *inode);
/**
* Initialize inode operations on a symlink
*/
void fuse_init_symlink(struct inode *inode);
/**
* Change attributes of an inode
*/
void fuse_change_attributes(struct inode *inode, struct fuse_attr *attr,
struct fuse_statx *sx,
u64 attr_valid, u64 attr_version);
fuse: support writable mmap Quoting Linus (3 years ago, FUSE inclusion discussions): "User-space filesystems are hard to get right. I'd claim that they are almost impossible, unless you limit them somehow (shared writable mappings are the nastiest part - if you don't have those, you can reasonably limit your problems by limiting the number of dirty pages you accept through normal "write()" calls)." Instead of attempting the impossible, I've just waited for the dirty page accounting infrastructure to materialize (thanks to Peter Zijlstra and others). This nicely solved the biggest problem: limiting the number of pages used for write caching. Some small details remained, however, which this largish patch attempts to address. It provides a page writeback implementation for fuse, which is completely safe against VM related deadlocks. Performance may not be very good for certain usage patterns, but generally it should be acceptable. It has been tested extensively with fsx-linux and bash-shared-mapping. Fuse page writeback design -------------------------- fuse_writepage() allocates a new temporary page with GFP_NOFS|__GFP_HIGHMEM. It copies the contents of the original page, and queues a WRITE request to the userspace filesystem using this temp page. The writeback is finished instantly from the MM's point of view: the page is removed from the radix trees, and the PageDirty and PageWriteback flags are cleared. For the duration of the actual write, the NR_WRITEBACK_TEMP counter is incremented. The per-bdi writeback count is not decremented until the actual write completes. On dirtying the page, fuse waits for a previous write to finish before proceeding. This makes sure, there can only be one temporary page used at a time for one cached page. This approach is wasteful in both memory and CPU bandwidth, so why is this complication needed? The basic problem is that there can be no guarantee about the time in which the userspace filesystem will complete a write. It may be buggy or even malicious, and fail to complete WRITE requests. We don't want unrelated parts of the system to grind to a halt in such cases. Also a filesystem may need additional resources (particularly memory) to complete a WRITE request. There's a great danger of a deadlock if that allocation may wait for the writepage to finish. Currently there are several cases where the kernel can block on page writeback: - allocation order is larger than PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER - page migration - throttle_vm_writeout (through NR_WRITEBACK) - sync(2) Of course in some cases (fsync, msync) we explicitly want to allow blocking. So for these cases new code has to be added to fuse, since the VM is not tracking writeback pages for us any more. As an extra safetly measure, the maximum dirty ratio allocated to a single fuse filesystem is set to 1% by default. This way one (or several) buggy or malicious fuse filesystems cannot slow down the rest of the system by hogging dirty memory. With appropriate privileges, this limit can be raised through '/sys/class/bdi/<bdi>/max_ratio'. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-30 00:54:41 -07:00
void fuse_change_attributes_common(struct inode *inode, struct fuse_attr *attr,
struct fuse_statx *sx,
u64 attr_valid, u32 cache_mask);
u32 fuse_get_cache_mask(struct inode *inode);
fuse: support writable mmap Quoting Linus (3 years ago, FUSE inclusion discussions): "User-space filesystems are hard to get right. I'd claim that they are almost impossible, unless you limit them somehow (shared writable mappings are the nastiest part - if you don't have those, you can reasonably limit your problems by limiting the number of dirty pages you accept through normal "write()" calls)." Instead of attempting the impossible, I've just waited for the dirty page accounting infrastructure to materialize (thanks to Peter Zijlstra and others). This nicely solved the biggest problem: limiting the number of pages used for write caching. Some small details remained, however, which this largish patch attempts to address. It provides a page writeback implementation for fuse, which is completely safe against VM related deadlocks. Performance may not be very good for certain usage patterns, but generally it should be acceptable. It has been tested extensively with fsx-linux and bash-shared-mapping. Fuse page writeback design -------------------------- fuse_writepage() allocates a new temporary page with GFP_NOFS|__GFP_HIGHMEM. It copies the contents of the original page, and queues a WRITE request to the userspace filesystem using this temp page. The writeback is finished instantly from the MM's point of view: the page is removed from the radix trees, and the PageDirty and PageWriteback flags are cleared. For the duration of the actual write, the NR_WRITEBACK_TEMP counter is incremented. The per-bdi writeback count is not decremented until the actual write completes. On dirtying the page, fuse waits for a previous write to finish before proceeding. This makes sure, there can only be one temporary page used at a time for one cached page. This approach is wasteful in both memory and CPU bandwidth, so why is this complication needed? The basic problem is that there can be no guarantee about the time in which the userspace filesystem will complete a write. It may be buggy or even malicious, and fail to complete WRITE requests. We don't want unrelated parts of the system to grind to a halt in such cases. Also a filesystem may need additional resources (particularly memory) to complete a WRITE request. There's a great danger of a deadlock if that allocation may wait for the writepage to finish. Currently there are several cases where the kernel can block on page writeback: - allocation order is larger than PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER - page migration - throttle_vm_writeout (through NR_WRITEBACK) - sync(2) Of course in some cases (fsync, msync) we explicitly want to allow blocking. So for these cases new code has to be added to fuse, since the VM is not tracking writeback pages for us any more. As an extra safetly measure, the maximum dirty ratio allocated to a single fuse filesystem is set to 1% by default. This way one (or several) buggy or malicious fuse filesystems cannot slow down the rest of the system by hogging dirty memory. With appropriate privileges, this limit can be raised through '/sys/class/bdi/<bdi>/max_ratio'. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-30 00:54:41 -07:00
/**
* Initialize the client device
*/
int fuse_dev_init(void);
/**
* Cleanup the client device
*/
void fuse_dev_cleanup(void);
int fuse_ctl_init(void);
void __exit fuse_ctl_cleanup(void);
/**
* Simple request sending that does request allocation and freeing
*/
ssize_t __fuse_simple_request(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct fuse_mount *fm,
struct fuse_args *args);
static inline ssize_t fuse_simple_request(struct fuse_mount *fm, struct fuse_args *args)
{
return __fuse_simple_request(&invalid_mnt_idmap, fm, args);
}
static inline ssize_t fuse_simple_idmap_request(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct fuse_mount *fm,
struct fuse_args *args)
{
return __fuse_simple_request(idmap, fm, args);
}
int fuse_simple_background(struct fuse_mount *fm, struct fuse_args *args,
gfp_t gfp_flags);
/**
* End a finished request
*/
void fuse_request_end(struct fuse_req *req);
/* Abort all requests */
void fuse_abort_conn(struct fuse_conn *fc);
void fuse_wait_aborted(struct fuse_conn *fc);
/**
* Invalidate inode attributes
*/
/* Attributes possibly changed on data modification */
#define FUSE_STATX_MODIFY (STATX_MTIME | STATX_CTIME | STATX_BLOCKS)
/* Attributes possibly changed on data and/or size modification */
#define FUSE_STATX_MODSIZE (FUSE_STATX_MODIFY | STATX_SIZE)
void fuse_invalidate_attr(struct inode *inode);
void fuse_invalidate_attr_mask(struct inode *inode, u32 mask);
void fuse_invalidate_entry_cache(struct dentry *entry);
void fuse_invalidate_atime(struct inode *inode);
u64 fuse_time_to_jiffies(u64 sec, u32 nsec);
#define ATTR_TIMEOUT(o) \
fuse_time_to_jiffies((o)->attr_valid, (o)->attr_valid_nsec)
void fuse_change_entry_timeout(struct dentry *entry, struct fuse_entry_out *o);
/**
* Acquire reference to fuse_conn
*/
struct fuse_conn *fuse_conn_get(struct fuse_conn *fc);
/**
* Initialize fuse_conn
*/
void fuse_conn_init(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct fuse_mount *fm,
struct user_namespace *user_ns,
const struct fuse_iqueue_ops *fiq_ops, void *fiq_priv);
/**
* Release reference to fuse_conn
*/
void fuse_conn_put(struct fuse_conn *fc);
struct fuse_dev *fuse_dev_alloc_install(struct fuse_conn *fc);
struct fuse_dev *fuse_dev_alloc(void);
void fuse_dev_install(struct fuse_dev *fud, struct fuse_conn *fc);
void fuse_dev_free(struct fuse_dev *fud);
void fuse_send_init(struct fuse_mount *fm);
/**
* Fill in superblock and initialize fuse connection
* @sb: partially-initialized superblock to fill in
* @ctx: mount context
*/
int fuse_fill_super_common(struct super_block *sb, struct fuse_fs_context *ctx);
/*
* Remove the mount from the connection
*
* Returns whether this was the last mount
*/
bool fuse_mount_remove(struct fuse_mount *fm);
/*
* Setup context ops for submounts
*/
int fuse_init_fs_context_submount(struct fs_context *fsc);
/*
* Shut down the connection (possibly sending DESTROY request).
*/
void fuse_conn_destroy(struct fuse_mount *fm);
/* Drop the connection and free the fuse mount */
void fuse_mount_destroy(struct fuse_mount *fm);
/**
* Add connection to control filesystem
*/
int fuse_ctl_add_conn(struct fuse_conn *fc);
/**
* Remove connection from control filesystem
*/
void fuse_ctl_remove_conn(struct fuse_conn *fc);
/**
* Is file type valid?
*/
int fuse_valid_type(int m);
bool fuse_invalid_attr(struct fuse_attr *attr);
/**
* Is current process allowed to perform filesystem operation?
*/
fuse: Rearrange fuse_allow_current_process checks This is a followup to a previous commit of mine [0], which added the allow_sys_admin_access && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) check. This patch rearranges the order of checks in fuse_allow_current_process without changing functionality. Commit 9ccf47b26b73 ("fuse: Add module param for CAP_SYS_ADMIN access bypassing allow_other") added allow_sys_admin_access && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) check to the beginning of the function, with the reasoning that allow_sys_admin_access should be an 'escape hatch' for users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN, allowing them to skip any subsequent checks. However, placing this new check first results in many capable() calls when allow_sys_admin_access is set, where another check would've also returned 1. This can be problematic when a BPF program is tracing capable() calls. At Meta we ran into such a scenario recently. On a host where allow_sys_admin_access is set but most of the FUSE access is from processes which would pass other checks - i.e. they don't need CAP_SYS_ADMIN 'escape hatch' - this results in an unnecessary capable() call for each fs op. We also have a daemon tracing capable() with BPF and doing some data collection, so tracing these extraneous capable() calls has the potential to regress performance for an application doing many FUSE ops. So rearrange the order of these checks such that CAP_SYS_ADMIN 'escape hatch' is checked last. Add a small helper, fuse_permissible_uidgid, to make the logic easier to understand. Previously, if allow_other is set on the fuse_conn, uid/git checking doesn't happen as current_in_userns result is returned. These semantics are maintained here: fuse_permissible_uidgid check only happens if allow_other is not set. Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com> Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2022-10-25 09:10:17 -07:00
bool fuse_allow_current_process(struct fuse_conn *fc);
u64 fuse_lock_owner_id(struct fuse_conn *fc, fl_owner_t id);
void fuse_flush_time_update(struct inode *inode);
void fuse_update_ctime(struct inode *inode);
int fuse_update_attributes(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, u32 mask);
fuse: support writable mmap Quoting Linus (3 years ago, FUSE inclusion discussions): "User-space filesystems are hard to get right. I'd claim that they are almost impossible, unless you limit them somehow (shared writable mappings are the nastiest part - if you don't have those, you can reasonably limit your problems by limiting the number of dirty pages you accept through normal "write()" calls)." Instead of attempting the impossible, I've just waited for the dirty page accounting infrastructure to materialize (thanks to Peter Zijlstra and others). This nicely solved the biggest problem: limiting the number of pages used for write caching. Some small details remained, however, which this largish patch attempts to address. It provides a page writeback implementation for fuse, which is completely safe against VM related deadlocks. Performance may not be very good for certain usage patterns, but generally it should be acceptable. It has been tested extensively with fsx-linux and bash-shared-mapping. Fuse page writeback design -------------------------- fuse_writepage() allocates a new temporary page with GFP_NOFS|__GFP_HIGHMEM. It copies the contents of the original page, and queues a WRITE request to the userspace filesystem using this temp page. The writeback is finished instantly from the MM's point of view: the page is removed from the radix trees, and the PageDirty and PageWriteback flags are cleared. For the duration of the actual write, the NR_WRITEBACK_TEMP counter is incremented. The per-bdi writeback count is not decremented until the actual write completes. On dirtying the page, fuse waits for a previous write to finish before proceeding. This makes sure, there can only be one temporary page used at a time for one cached page. This approach is wasteful in both memory and CPU bandwidth, so why is this complication needed? The basic problem is that there can be no guarantee about the time in which the userspace filesystem will complete a write. It may be buggy or even malicious, and fail to complete WRITE requests. We don't want unrelated parts of the system to grind to a halt in such cases. Also a filesystem may need additional resources (particularly memory) to complete a WRITE request. There's a great danger of a deadlock if that allocation may wait for the writepage to finish. Currently there are several cases where the kernel can block on page writeback: - allocation order is larger than PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER - page migration - throttle_vm_writeout (through NR_WRITEBACK) - sync(2) Of course in some cases (fsync, msync) we explicitly want to allow blocking. So for these cases new code has to be added to fuse, since the VM is not tracking writeback pages for us any more. As an extra safetly measure, the maximum dirty ratio allocated to a single fuse filesystem is set to 1% by default. This way one (or several) buggy or malicious fuse filesystems cannot slow down the rest of the system by hogging dirty memory. With appropriate privileges, this limit can be raised through '/sys/class/bdi/<bdi>/max_ratio'. Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-30 00:54:41 -07:00
void fuse_flush_writepages(struct inode *inode);
void fuse_set_nowrite(struct inode *inode);
void fuse_release_nowrite(struct inode *inode);
/**
* Scan all fuse_mounts belonging to fc to find the first where
* ilookup5() returns a result. Return that result and the
* respective fuse_mount in *fm (unless fm is NULL).
*
* The caller must hold fc->killsb.
*/
struct inode *fuse_ilookup(struct fuse_conn *fc, u64 nodeid,
struct fuse_mount **fm);
/**
* File-system tells the kernel to invalidate cache for the given node id.
*/
int fuse_reverse_inval_inode(struct fuse_conn *fc, u64 nodeid,
loff_t offset, loff_t len);
/**
* File-system tells the kernel to invalidate parent attributes and
* the dentry matching parent/name.
FUSE: Notifying the kernel of deletion. Allows a FUSE file-system to tell the kernel when a file or directory is deleted. If the specified dentry has the specified inode number, the kernel will unhash it. The current 'fuse_notify_inval_entry' does not cause the kernel to clean up directories that are in use properly, and as a result the users of those directories see incorrect semantics from the file-system. The error condition seen when 'fuse_notify_inval_entry' is used to notify of a deleted directory is avoided when 'fuse_notify_delete' is used instead. The following scenario demonstrates the difference: 1. User A chdirs into 'testdir' and starts reading 'testfile'. 2. User B rm -rf 'testdir'. 3. User B creates 'testdir'. 4. User C chdirs into 'testdir'. If you run the above within the same machine on any file-system (including fuse file-systems), there is no problem: user C is able to chdir into the new testdir. The old testdir is removed from the dentry tree, but still open by user A. If operations 2 and 3 are performed via the network such that the fuse file-system uses one of the notify functions to tell the kernel that the nodes are gone, then the following error occurs for user C while user A holds the original directory open: muirj@empacher:~> ls /test/testdir ls: cannot access /test/testdir: No such file or directory The issue here is that the kernel still has a dentry for testdir, and so it is requesting the attributes for the old directory, while the file-system is responding that the directory no longer exists. If on the other hand, if the file-system can notify the kernel that the directory is deleted using the new 'fuse_notify_delete' function, then the above ls will find the new directory as expected. Signed-off-by: John Muir <john@jmuir.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
2011-12-06 13:50:06 -07:00
*
* If the child_nodeid is non-zero and:
* - matches the inode number for the dentry matching parent/name,
* - is not a mount point
* - is a file or oan empty directory
* then the dentry is unhashed (d_delete()).
*/
int fuse_reverse_inval_entry(struct fuse_conn *fc, u64 parent_nodeid,
u64 child_nodeid, struct qstr *name, u32 flags);
int fuse_do_open(struct fuse_mount *fm, u64 nodeid, struct file *file,
bool isdir);
/**
* fuse_direct_io() flags
*/
/** If set, it is WRITE; otherwise - READ */
#define FUSE_DIO_WRITE (1 << 0)
/** CUSE pass fuse_direct_io() a file which f_mapping->host is not from FUSE */
#define FUSE_DIO_CUSE (1 << 1)
ssize_t fuse_direct_io(struct fuse_io_priv *io, struct iov_iter *iter,
loff_t *ppos, int flags);
long fuse_do_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg,
unsigned int flags);
long fuse_ioctl_common(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg, unsigned int flags);
__poll_t fuse_file_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
int fuse_dev_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file);
bool fuse_write_update_attr(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, ssize_t written);
int fuse_flush_times(struct inode *inode, struct fuse_file *ff);
int fuse_write_inode(struct inode *inode, struct writeback_control *wbc);
int fuse_do_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
struct iattr *attr, struct file *file);
void fuse_set_initialized(struct fuse_conn *fc);
void fuse_unlock_inode(struct inode *inode, bool locked);
bool fuse_lock_inode(struct inode *inode);
int fuse_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value,
size_t size, int flags, unsigned int extra_flags);
ssize_t fuse_getxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *value,
size_t size);
ssize_t fuse_listxattr(struct dentry *entry, char *list, size_t size);
int fuse_removexattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name);
extern const struct xattr_handler * const fuse_xattr_handlers[];
struct posix_acl;
fuse: fixes after adapting to new posix acl api This cycle we ported all filesystems to the new posix acl api. While looking at further simplifications in this area to remove the last remnants of the generic dummy posix acl handlers we realized that we regressed fuse daemons that don't set FUSE_POSIX_ACL but still make use of posix acls. With the change to a dedicated posix acl api interacting with posix acls doesn't go through the old xattr codepaths anymore and instead only relies the get acl and set acl inode operations. Before this change fuse daemons that don't set FUSE_POSIX_ACL were able to get and set posix acl albeit with two caveats. First, that posix acls aren't cached. And second, that they aren't used for permission checking in the vfs. We regressed that use-case as we currently refuse to retrieve any posix acls if they aren't enabled via FUSE_POSIX_ACL. So older fuse daemons would see a change in behavior. We can restore the old behavior in multiple ways. We could change the new posix acl api and look for a dedicated xattr handler and if we find one prefer that over the dedicated posix acl api. That would break the consistency of the new posix acl api so we would very much prefer not to do that. We could introduce a new ACL_*_CACHE sentinel that would instruct the vfs permission checking codepath to not call into the filesystem and ignore acls. But a more straightforward fix for v6.2 is to do the same thing that Overlayfs does and give fuse a separate get acl method for permission checking. Overlayfs uses this to express different needs for vfs permission lookup and acl based retrieval via the regular system call path as well. Let fuse do the same for now. This way fuse can continue to refuse to retrieve posix acls for daemons that don't set FUSE_POSXI_ACL for permission checking while allowing a fuse server to retrieve it via the usual system calls. In the future, we could extend the get acl inode operation to not just pass a simple boolean to indicate rcu lookup but instead make it a flag argument. Then in addition to passing the information that this is an rcu lookup to the filesystem we could also introduce a flag that tells the filesystem that this is a request from the vfs to use these acls for permission checking. Then fuse could refuse the get acl request for permission checking when the daemon doesn't have FUSE_POSIX_ACL set in the same get acl method. This would also help Overlayfs and allow us to remove the second method for it as well. But since that change is more invasive as we need to update the get acl inode operation for multiple filesystems we should not do this as a fix for v6.2. Instead we will do this for the v6.3 merge window. Fwiw, since posix acls are now always correctly translated in the new posix acl api we could also allow them to be used for daemons without FUSE_POSIX_ACL that are not mounted on the host. But this is behavioral change and again if dones should be done for v6.3. For now, let's just restore the original behavior. A nice side-effect of this change is that for fuse daemons with and without FUSE_POSIX_ACL the same code is used for posix acls in a backwards compatible way. This also means we can remove the legacy xattr handlers completely. We've also added comments to explain the expected behavior for daemons without FUSE_POSIX_ACL into the code. Fixes: 318e66856dde ("xattr: use posix acl api") Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee (Digital Ocean) <sforshee@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-01-20 04:55:04 -07:00
struct posix_acl *fuse_get_inode_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, bool rcu);
fs.idmapped.v6.3 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEABYKAB0WIQRAhzRXHqcMeLMyaSiRxhvAZXjcogUCY+5NlQAKCRCRxhvAZXjc orOaAP9i2h3OJy95nO2Fpde0Bt2UT+oulKCCcGlvXJ8/+TQpyQD/ZQq47gFQ0EAz Br5NxeyGeecAb0lHpFz+CpLGsxMrMwQ= =+BG5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'fs.idmapped.v6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping Pull vfs idmapping updates from Christian Brauner: - Last cycle we introduced the dedicated struct mnt_idmap type for mount idmapping and the required infrastucture in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). As promised in last cycle's pull request message this converts everything to rely on struct mnt_idmap. Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces that are relevant on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this was a potential source for bugs. This finishes the conversion. Instead of passing the plain namespace around this updates all places that currently take a pointer to a mnt_userns with a pointer to struct mnt_idmap. Now that the conversion is done all helpers down to the really low-level helpers only accept a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. Conflating mount and other idmappings will now cause the compiler to complain loudly thus eliminating the possibility of any bugs. This makes it impossible for filesystem developers to mix up mount and filesystem idmappings as they are two distinct types and require distinct helpers that cannot be used interchangeably. Everything associated with struct mnt_idmap is moved into a single separate file. With that change no code can poke around in struct mnt_idmap. It can only be interacted with through dedicated helpers. That means all filesystems are and all of the vfs is completely oblivious to the actual implementation of idmappings. We are now also able to extend struct mnt_idmap as we see fit. For example, we can decouple it completely from namespaces for users that don't require or don't want to use them at all. We can also extend the concept of idmappings so we can cover filesystem specific requirements. In combination with the vfs{g,u}id_t work we finished in v6.2 this makes this feature substantially more robust and thus difficult to implement wrong by a given filesystem and also protects the vfs. - Enable idmapped mounts for tmpfs and fulfill a longstanding request. A long-standing request from users had been to make it possible to create idmapped mounts for tmpfs. For example, to share the host's tmpfs mount between multiple sandboxes. This is a prerequisite for some advanced Kubernetes cases. Systemd also has a range of use-cases to increase service isolation. And there are more users of this. However, with all of the other work going on this was way down on the priority list but luckily someone other than ourselves picked this up. As usual the patch is tiny as all the infrastructure work had been done multiple kernel releases ago. In addition to all the tests that we already have I requested that Rodrigo add a dedicated tmpfs testsuite for idmapped mounts to xfstests. It is to be included into xfstests during the v6.3 development cycle. This should add a slew of additional tests. * tag 'fs.idmapped.v6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping: (26 commits) shmem: support idmapped mounts for tmpfs fs: move mnt_idmap fs: port vfs{g,u}id helpers to mnt_idmap fs: port fs{g,u}id helpers to mnt_idmap fs: port i_{g,u}id_into_vfs{g,u}id() to mnt_idmap fs: port i_{g,u}id_{needs_}update() to mnt_idmap quota: port to mnt_idmap fs: port privilege checking helpers to mnt_idmap fs: port inode_owner_or_capable() to mnt_idmap fs: port inode_init_owner() to mnt_idmap fs: port acl to mnt_idmap fs: port xattr to mnt_idmap fs: port ->permission() to pass mnt_idmap fs: port ->fileattr_set() to pass mnt_idmap fs: port ->set_acl() to pass mnt_idmap fs: port ->get_acl() to pass mnt_idmap fs: port ->tmpfile() to pass mnt_idmap fs: port ->rename() to pass mnt_idmap fs: port ->mknod() to pass mnt_idmap fs: port ->mkdir() to pass mnt_idmap ...
2023-02-20 12:53:11 -07:00
struct posix_acl *fuse_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
fuse: fixes after adapting to new posix acl api This cycle we ported all filesystems to the new posix acl api. While looking at further simplifications in this area to remove the last remnants of the generic dummy posix acl handlers we realized that we regressed fuse daemons that don't set FUSE_POSIX_ACL but still make use of posix acls. With the change to a dedicated posix acl api interacting with posix acls doesn't go through the old xattr codepaths anymore and instead only relies the get acl and set acl inode operations. Before this change fuse daemons that don't set FUSE_POSIX_ACL were able to get and set posix acl albeit with two caveats. First, that posix acls aren't cached. And second, that they aren't used for permission checking in the vfs. We regressed that use-case as we currently refuse to retrieve any posix acls if they aren't enabled via FUSE_POSIX_ACL. So older fuse daemons would see a change in behavior. We can restore the old behavior in multiple ways. We could change the new posix acl api and look for a dedicated xattr handler and if we find one prefer that over the dedicated posix acl api. That would break the consistency of the new posix acl api so we would very much prefer not to do that. We could introduce a new ACL_*_CACHE sentinel that would instruct the vfs permission checking codepath to not call into the filesystem and ignore acls. But a more straightforward fix for v6.2 is to do the same thing that Overlayfs does and give fuse a separate get acl method for permission checking. Overlayfs uses this to express different needs for vfs permission lookup and acl based retrieval via the regular system call path as well. Let fuse do the same for now. This way fuse can continue to refuse to retrieve posix acls for daemons that don't set FUSE_POSXI_ACL for permission checking while allowing a fuse server to retrieve it via the usual system calls. In the future, we could extend the get acl inode operation to not just pass a simple boolean to indicate rcu lookup but instead make it a flag argument. Then in addition to passing the information that this is an rcu lookup to the filesystem we could also introduce a flag that tells the filesystem that this is a request from the vfs to use these acls for permission checking. Then fuse could refuse the get acl request for permission checking when the daemon doesn't have FUSE_POSIX_ACL set in the same get acl method. This would also help Overlayfs and allow us to remove the second method for it as well. But since that change is more invasive as we need to update the get acl inode operation for multiple filesystems we should not do this as a fix for v6.2. Instead we will do this for the v6.3 merge window. Fwiw, since posix acls are now always correctly translated in the new posix acl api we could also allow them to be used for daemons without FUSE_POSIX_ACL that are not mounted on the host. But this is behavioral change and again if dones should be done for v6.3. For now, let's just restore the original behavior. A nice side-effect of this change is that for fuse daemons with and without FUSE_POSIX_ACL the same code is used for posix acls in a backwards compatible way. This also means we can remove the legacy xattr handlers completely. We've also added comments to explain the expected behavior for daemons without FUSE_POSIX_ACL into the code. Fixes: 318e66856dde ("xattr: use posix acl api") Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee (Digital Ocean) <sforshee@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-01-20 04:55:04 -07:00
struct dentry *dentry, int type);
fs.idmapped.v6.3 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEABYKAB0WIQRAhzRXHqcMeLMyaSiRxhvAZXjcogUCY+5NlQAKCRCRxhvAZXjc orOaAP9i2h3OJy95nO2Fpde0Bt2UT+oulKCCcGlvXJ8/+TQpyQD/ZQq47gFQ0EAz Br5NxeyGeecAb0lHpFz+CpLGsxMrMwQ= =+BG5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'fs.idmapped.v6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping Pull vfs idmapping updates from Christian Brauner: - Last cycle we introduced the dedicated struct mnt_idmap type for mount idmapping and the required infrastucture in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). As promised in last cycle's pull request message this converts everything to rely on struct mnt_idmap. Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces that are relevant on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this was a potential source for bugs. This finishes the conversion. Instead of passing the plain namespace around this updates all places that currently take a pointer to a mnt_userns with a pointer to struct mnt_idmap. Now that the conversion is done all helpers down to the really low-level helpers only accept a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. Conflating mount and other idmappings will now cause the compiler to complain loudly thus eliminating the possibility of any bugs. This makes it impossible for filesystem developers to mix up mount and filesystem idmappings as they are two distinct types and require distinct helpers that cannot be used interchangeably. Everything associated with struct mnt_idmap is moved into a single separate file. With that change no code can poke around in struct mnt_idmap. It can only be interacted with through dedicated helpers. That means all filesystems are and all of the vfs is completely oblivious to the actual implementation of idmappings. We are now also able to extend struct mnt_idmap as we see fit. For example, we can decouple it completely from namespaces for users that don't require or don't want to use them at all. We can also extend the concept of idmappings so we can cover filesystem specific requirements. In combination with the vfs{g,u}id_t work we finished in v6.2 this makes this feature substantially more robust and thus difficult to implement wrong by a given filesystem and also protects the vfs. - Enable idmapped mounts for tmpfs and fulfill a longstanding request. A long-standing request from users had been to make it possible to create idmapped mounts for tmpfs. For example, to share the host's tmpfs mount between multiple sandboxes. This is a prerequisite for some advanced Kubernetes cases. Systemd also has a range of use-cases to increase service isolation. And there are more users of this. However, with all of the other work going on this was way down on the priority list but luckily someone other than ourselves picked this up. As usual the patch is tiny as all the infrastructure work had been done multiple kernel releases ago. In addition to all the tests that we already have I requested that Rodrigo add a dedicated tmpfs testsuite for idmapped mounts to xfstests. It is to be included into xfstests during the v6.3 development cycle. This should add a slew of additional tests. * tag 'fs.idmapped.v6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping: (26 commits) shmem: support idmapped mounts for tmpfs fs: move mnt_idmap fs: port vfs{g,u}id helpers to mnt_idmap fs: port fs{g,u}id helpers to mnt_idmap fs: port i_{g,u}id_into_vfs{g,u}id() to mnt_idmap fs: port i_{g,u}id_{needs_}update() to mnt_idmap quota: port to mnt_idmap fs: port privilege checking helpers to mnt_idmap fs: port inode_owner_or_capable() to mnt_idmap fs: port inode_init_owner() to mnt_idmap fs: port acl to mnt_idmap fs: port xattr to mnt_idmap fs: port ->permission() to pass mnt_idmap fs: port ->fileattr_set() to pass mnt_idmap fs: port ->set_acl() to pass mnt_idmap fs: port ->get_acl() to pass mnt_idmap fs: port ->tmpfile() to pass mnt_idmap fs: port ->rename() to pass mnt_idmap fs: port ->mknod() to pass mnt_idmap fs: port ->mkdir() to pass mnt_idmap ...
2023-02-20 12:53:11 -07:00
int fuse_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *, struct dentry *dentry,
struct posix_acl *acl, int type);
/* readdir.c */
int fuse_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx);
/**
* Return the number of bytes in an arguments list
*/
unsigned int fuse_len_args(unsigned int numargs, struct fuse_arg *args);
/**
* Get the next unique ID for a request
*/
u64 fuse_get_unique(struct fuse_iqueue *fiq);
void fuse_free_conn(struct fuse_conn *fc);
/* dax.c */
#define FUSE_IS_DAX(inode) (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FUSE_DAX) && IS_DAX(inode))
ssize_t fuse_dax_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to);
ssize_t fuse_dax_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from);
int fuse_dax_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
virtiofs: serialize truncate/punch_hole and dax fault path Currently in fuse we don't seem have any lock which can serialize fault path with truncate/punch_hole path. With dax support I need one for following reasons. 1. Dax requirement DAX fault code relies on inode size being stable for the duration of fault and want to serialize with truncate/punch_hole and they explicitly mention it. static vm_fault_t dax_iomap_pmd_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf, pfn_t *pfnp, const struct iomap_ops *ops) /* * Check whether offset isn't beyond end of file now. Caller is * supposed to hold locks serializing us with truncate / punch hole so * this is a reliable test. */ max_pgoff = DIV_ROUND_UP(i_size_read(inode), PAGE_SIZE); 2. Make sure there are no users of pages being truncated/punch_hole get_user_pages() might take references to page and then do some DMA to said pages. Filesystem might truncate those pages without knowing that a DMA is in progress or some I/O is in progress. So use dax_layout_busy_page() to make sure there are no such references and I/O is not in progress on said pages before moving ahead with truncation. 3. Limitation of kvm page fault error reporting If we are truncating file on host first and then removing mappings in guest lateter (truncate page cache etc), then this could lead to a problem with KVM. Say a mapping is in place in guest and truncation happens on host. Now if guest accesses that mapping, then host will take a fault and kvm will either exit to qemu or spin infinitely. IOW, before we do truncation on host, we need to make sure that guest inode does not have any mapping in that region or whole file. 4. virtiofs memory range reclaim Soon I will introduce the notion of being able to reclaim dax memory ranges from a fuse dax inode. There also I need to make sure that no I/O or fault is going on in the reclaimed range and nobody is using it so that range can be reclaimed without issues. Currently if we take inode lock, that serializes read/write. But it does not do anything for faults. So I add another semaphore fuse_inode->i_mmap_sem for this purpose. It can be used to serialize with faults. As of now, I am adding taking this semaphore only in dax fault path and not regular fault path because existing code does not have one. May be existing code can benefit from it as well to take care of some races, but that we can fix later if need be. For now, I am just focussing only on DAX path which is new path. Also added logic to take fuse_inode->i_mmap_sem in truncate/punch_hole/open(O_TRUNC) path to make sure file truncation and fuse dax fault are mutually exlusive and avoid all the above problems. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2020-08-19 15:19:54 -07:00
int fuse_dax_break_layouts(struct inode *inode, u64 dmap_start, u64 dmap_end);
int fuse_dax_conn_alloc(struct fuse_conn *fc, enum fuse_dax_mode mode,
struct dax_device *dax_dev);
void fuse_dax_conn_free(struct fuse_conn *fc);
bool fuse_dax_inode_alloc(struct super_block *sb, struct fuse_inode *fi);
void fuse_dax_inode_init(struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags);
void fuse_dax_inode_cleanup(struct inode *inode);
void fuse_dax_dontcache(struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags);
bool fuse_dax_check_alignment(struct fuse_conn *fc, unsigned int map_alignment);
void fuse_dax_cancel_work(struct fuse_conn *fc);
/* ioctl.c */
long fuse_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
long fuse_file_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg);
int fuse_fileattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa);
int fuse_fileattr_set(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa);
/* iomode.c */
int fuse_file_cached_io_open(struct inode *inode, struct fuse_file *ff);
int fuse_inode_uncached_io_start(struct fuse_inode *fi,
struct fuse_backing *fb);
void fuse_inode_uncached_io_end(struct fuse_inode *fi);
int fuse_file_io_open(struct file *file, struct inode *inode);
void fuse_file_io_release(struct fuse_file *ff, struct inode *inode);
/* file.c */
struct fuse_file *fuse_file_open(struct fuse_mount *fm, u64 nodeid,
unsigned int open_flags, bool isdir);
void fuse_file_release(struct inode *inode, struct fuse_file *ff,
unsigned int open_flags, fl_owner_t id, bool isdir);
/* passthrough.c */
static inline struct fuse_backing *fuse_inode_backing(struct fuse_inode *fi)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_FUSE_PASSTHROUGH
return READ_ONCE(fi->fb);
#else
return NULL;
#endif
}
static inline struct fuse_backing *fuse_inode_backing_set(struct fuse_inode *fi,
struct fuse_backing *fb)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_FUSE_PASSTHROUGH
return xchg(&fi->fb, fb);
#else
return NULL;
#endif
}
fuse: implement open in passthrough mode After getting a backing file id with FUSE_DEV_IOC_BACKING_OPEN ioctl, a FUSE server can reply to an OPEN request with flag FOPEN_PASSTHROUGH and the backing file id. The FUSE server should reuse the same backing file id for all the open replies of the same FUSE inode and open will fail (with -EIO) if a the server attempts to open the same inode with conflicting io modes or to setup passthrough to two different backing files for the same FUSE inode. Using the same backing file id for several different inodes is allowed. Opening a new file with FOPEN_DIRECT_IO for an inode that is already open for passthrough is allowed, but only if the FOPEN_PASSTHROUGH flag and correct backing file id are specified as well. The read/write IO of such files will not use passthrough operations to the backing file, but mmap, which does not support direct_io, will use the backing file insead of using the page cache as it always did. Even though all FUSE passthrough files of the same inode use the same backing file as a backing inode reference, each FUSE file opens a unique instance of a backing_file object to store the FUSE path that was used to open the inode and the open flags of the specific open file. The per-file, backing_file object is released along with the FUSE file. The inode associated fuse_backing object is released when the last FUSE passthrough file of that inode is released AND when the backing file id is closed by the server using the FUSE_DEV_IOC_BACKING_CLOSE ioctl. Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2024-02-09 08:14:50 -07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_FUSE_PASSTHROUGH
struct fuse_backing *fuse_backing_get(struct fuse_backing *fb);
void fuse_backing_put(struct fuse_backing *fb);
fuse: implement open in passthrough mode After getting a backing file id with FUSE_DEV_IOC_BACKING_OPEN ioctl, a FUSE server can reply to an OPEN request with flag FOPEN_PASSTHROUGH and the backing file id. The FUSE server should reuse the same backing file id for all the open replies of the same FUSE inode and open will fail (with -EIO) if a the server attempts to open the same inode with conflicting io modes or to setup passthrough to two different backing files for the same FUSE inode. Using the same backing file id for several different inodes is allowed. Opening a new file with FOPEN_DIRECT_IO for an inode that is already open for passthrough is allowed, but only if the FOPEN_PASSTHROUGH flag and correct backing file id are specified as well. The read/write IO of such files will not use passthrough operations to the backing file, but mmap, which does not support direct_io, will use the backing file insead of using the page cache as it always did. Even though all FUSE passthrough files of the same inode use the same backing file as a backing inode reference, each FUSE file opens a unique instance of a backing_file object to store the FUSE path that was used to open the inode and the open flags of the specific open file. The per-file, backing_file object is released along with the FUSE file. The inode associated fuse_backing object is released when the last FUSE passthrough file of that inode is released AND when the backing file id is closed by the server using the FUSE_DEV_IOC_BACKING_CLOSE ioctl. Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2024-02-09 08:14:50 -07:00
#else
static inline struct fuse_backing *fuse_backing_get(struct fuse_backing *fb)
{
return NULL;
}
static inline void fuse_backing_put(struct fuse_backing *fb)
{
}
#endif
void fuse_backing_files_init(struct fuse_conn *fc);
void fuse_backing_files_free(struct fuse_conn *fc);
int fuse_backing_open(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct fuse_backing_map *map);
int fuse_backing_close(struct fuse_conn *fc, int backing_id);
fuse: implement open in passthrough mode After getting a backing file id with FUSE_DEV_IOC_BACKING_OPEN ioctl, a FUSE server can reply to an OPEN request with flag FOPEN_PASSTHROUGH and the backing file id. The FUSE server should reuse the same backing file id for all the open replies of the same FUSE inode and open will fail (with -EIO) if a the server attempts to open the same inode with conflicting io modes or to setup passthrough to two different backing files for the same FUSE inode. Using the same backing file id for several different inodes is allowed. Opening a new file with FOPEN_DIRECT_IO for an inode that is already open for passthrough is allowed, but only if the FOPEN_PASSTHROUGH flag and correct backing file id are specified as well. The read/write IO of such files will not use passthrough operations to the backing file, but mmap, which does not support direct_io, will use the backing file insead of using the page cache as it always did. Even though all FUSE passthrough files of the same inode use the same backing file as a backing inode reference, each FUSE file opens a unique instance of a backing_file object to store the FUSE path that was used to open the inode and the open flags of the specific open file. The per-file, backing_file object is released along with the FUSE file. The inode associated fuse_backing object is released when the last FUSE passthrough file of that inode is released AND when the backing file id is closed by the server using the FUSE_DEV_IOC_BACKING_CLOSE ioctl. Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2024-02-09 08:14:50 -07:00
struct fuse_backing *fuse_passthrough_open(struct file *file,
struct inode *inode,
int backing_id);
void fuse_passthrough_release(struct fuse_file *ff, struct fuse_backing *fb);
static inline struct file *fuse_file_passthrough(struct fuse_file *ff)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_FUSE_PASSTHROUGH
return ff->passthrough;
#else
return NULL;
#endif
}
ssize_t fuse_passthrough_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter);
ssize_t fuse_passthrough_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter);
ssize_t fuse_passthrough_splice_read(struct file *in, loff_t *ppos,
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
size_t len, unsigned int flags);
ssize_t fuse_passthrough_splice_write(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
struct file *out, loff_t *ppos,
size_t len, unsigned int flags);
ssize_t fuse_passthrough_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
#endif /* _FS_FUSE_I_H */