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linux/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Copyright (C) 2012 Regents of the University of California
*/
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sched/debug.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <linux/kdebug.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
riscv: Add kprobes supported This patch enables "kprobe & kretprobe" to work with ftrace interface. It utilized software breakpoint as single-step mechanism. Some instructions which can't be single-step executed must be simulated in kernel execution slot, such as: branch, jal, auipc, la ... Some instructions should be rejected for probing and we use a blacklist to filter, such as: ecall, ebreak, ... We use ebreak & c.ebreak to replace origin instruction and the kprobe handler prepares an executable memory slot for out-of-line execution with a copy of the original instruction being probed. In execution slot we add ebreak behind original instruction to simulate a single-setp mechanism. The patch is based on packi's work [1] and csky's work [2]. - The kprobes_trampoline.S is all from packi's patch - The single-step mechanism is new designed for riscv without hw single-step trap - The simulation codes are from csky - Frankly, all codes refer to other archs' implementation [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20181113195804.22825-1-me@packi.ch/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-csky/20200403044150.20562-9-guoren@kernel.org/ Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@linux.alibaba.com> Co-developed-by: Patrick Stählin <me@packi.ch> Signed-off-by: Patrick Stählin <me@packi.ch> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Tested-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com> Reviewed-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Patrick Stählin <me@packi.ch> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Björn Töpel <bjorn.topel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
2020-12-17 09:01:42 -07:00
#include <linux/kprobes.h>
riscv: Only consider swbp/ss handlers for correct privileged mode RISC-V software breakpoint trap handlers are used for {k,u}probes. When trapping from kernelmode, only the kernelmode handlers should be considered. Vice versa, only usermode handlers for usermode traps. This is not the case on RISC-V, which can trigger a bug if a userspace process uses uprobes, and a WARN() is triggered from kernelmode (which is implemented via {c.,}ebreak). The kernel will trap on the kernelmode {c.,}ebreak, look for uprobes handlers, realize incorrectly that uprobes need to be handled, and exit the trap handler early. The trap returns to re-executing the {c.,}ebreak, and enter an infinite trap-loop. The issue was found running the BPF selftest [1]. Fix this issue by only considering the swbp/ss handlers for kernel/usermode respectively. Also, move CONFIG ifdeffery from traps.c to the asm/{k,u}probes.h headers. Note that linux/uprobes.h only include asm/uprobes.h if CONFIG_UPROBES is defined, which is why asm/uprobes.h needs to be unconditionally included in traps.c Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/87v8d19aun.fsf@all.your.base.are.belong.to.us/ # [1] Fixes: 74784081aac8 ("riscv: Add uprobes supported") Reviewed-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nam Cao <namcaov@gmail.com> Tested-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230912065619.62020-1-bjorn@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
2023-09-11 23:56:19 -07:00
#include <linux/uprobes.h>
#include <asm/uprobes.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/irq.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <linux/entry-common.h>
#include <asm/asm-prototypes.h>
#include <asm/bug.h>
riscv: Add CFI error handling With CONFIG_CFI_CLANG, the compiler injects a type preamble immediately before each function and a check to validate the target function type before indirect calls: ; type preamble .word <id> function: ... ; indirect call check lw t1, -4(a0) lui t2, <hi20> addiw t2, t2, <lo12> beq t1, t2, .Ltmp0 ebreak .Ltmp0: jarl a0 Implement error handling code for the ebreak traps emitted for the checks. This produces the following oops on a CFI failure (generated using lkdtm): [ 21.177245] CFI failure at lkdtm_indirect_call+0x22/0x32 [lkdtm] (target: lkdtm_increment_int+0x0/0x18 [lkdtm]; expected type: 0x3ad55aca) [ 21.178483] Kernel BUG [#1] [ 21.178671] Modules linked in: lkdtm [ 21.179037] CPU: 1 PID: 104 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.3.0-rc6-00037-g37d5ec6297ab #1 [ 21.179511] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 21.179818] epc : lkdtm_indirect_call+0x22/0x32 [lkdtm] [ 21.180106] ra : lkdtm_CFI_FORWARD_PROTO+0x48/0x7c [lkdtm] [ 21.180426] epc : ffffffff01387092 ra : ffffffff01386f14 sp : ff20000000453cf0 [ 21.180792] gp : ffffffff81308c38 tp : ff6000000243f080 t0 : ff20000000453b78 [ 21.181157] t1 : 000000003ad55aca t2 : 000000007e0c52a5 s0 : ff20000000453d00 [ 21.181506] s1 : 0000000000000001 a0 : ffffffff0138d170 a1 : ffffffff013870bc [ 21.181819] a2 : b5fea48dd89aa700 a3 : 0000000000000001 a4 : 0000000000000fff [ 21.182169] a5 : 0000000000000004 a6 : 00000000000000b7 a7 : 0000000000000000 [ 21.182591] s2 : ff20000000453e78 s3 : ffffffffffffffea s4 : 0000000000000012 [ 21.183001] s5 : ff600000023c7000 s6 : 0000000000000006 s7 : ffffffff013882a0 [ 21.183653] s8 : 0000000000000008 s9 : 0000000000000002 s10: ffffffff0138d878 [ 21.184245] s11: ffffffff0138d878 t3 : 0000000000000003 t4 : 0000000000000000 [ 21.184591] t5 : ffffffff8133df08 t6 : ffffffff8133df07 [ 21.184858] status: 0000000000000120 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000003 [ 21.185415] [<ffffffff01387092>] lkdtm_indirect_call+0x22/0x32 [lkdtm] [ 21.185772] [<ffffffff01386f14>] lkdtm_CFI_FORWARD_PROTO+0x48/0x7c [lkdtm] [ 21.186093] [<ffffffff01383552>] lkdtm_do_action+0x22/0x34 [lkdtm] [ 21.186445] [<ffffffff0138350c>] direct_entry+0x128/0x13a [lkdtm] [ 21.186817] [<ffffffff8033ed8c>] full_proxy_write+0x58/0xb2 [ 21.187352] [<ffffffff801d4fe8>] vfs_write+0x14c/0x33a [ 21.187644] [<ffffffff801d5328>] ksys_write+0x64/0xd4 [ 21.187832] [<ffffffff801d53a6>] sys_write+0xe/0x1a [ 21.188171] [<ffffffff80003996>] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x2 [ 21.188595] Code: 0513 0f65 a303 ffc5 53b7 7e0c 839b 2a53 0363 0073 (9002) 9582 [ 21.189178] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 21.189590] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com> # ISA bits Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230710183544.999540-12-samitolvanen@google.com Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
2023-07-10 11:35:49 -07:00
#include <asm/cfi.h>
#include <asm/csr.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
#include <asm/syscall.h>
#include <asm/thread_info.h>
#include <asm/vector.h>
#include <asm/irq_stack.h>
int show_unhandled_signals = 1;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(die_lock);
riscv: add userland instruction dump to RISC-V splats Add userland instruction dump and rename dump_kernel_instr() to dump_instr(). An example: [ 0.822439] Freeing unused kernel image (initmem) memory: 6916K [ 0.823817] Run /init as init process [ 0.839411] init[1]: unhandled signal 4 code 0x1 at 0x000000000005be18 in bb[10000+5fb000] [ 0.840751] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 5.14.0-rc4-00049-gbd644290aa72-dirty #187 [ 0.841373] Hardware name: , BIOS [ 0.841743] epc : 000000000005be18 ra : 0000000000079e74 sp : 0000003fffcafda0 [ 0.842271] gp : ffffffff816e9dc8 tp : 0000000000000000 t0 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.842947] t1 : 0000003fffc9fdf0 t2 : 0000000000000000 s0 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.843434] s1 : 0000000000000000 a0 : 0000003fffca0190 a1 : 0000003fffcafe18 [ 0.843891] a2 : 0000000000000000 a3 : 0000000000000000 a4 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.844357] a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 0000000000000000 a7 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.844803] s2 : 0000000000000000 s3 : 0000000000000000 s4 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.845253] s5 : 0000000000000000 s6 : 0000000000000000 s7 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.845722] s8 : 0000000000000000 s9 : 0000000000000000 s10: 0000000000000000 [ 0.846180] s11: 0000000000d144e0 t3 : 0000000000000000 t4 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.846616] t5 : 0000000000000000 t6 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.847204] status: 0000000200000020 badaddr: 00000000f0028053 cause: 0000000000000002 [ 0.848219] Code: f06f ff5f 3823 fa11 0113 fb01 2e23 0201 0293 0000 (8053) f002 [ 0.851016] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000004 Signed-off-by: Yunhui Cui <cuiyunhui@bytedance.com> Reviewed-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230912021349.28302-1-cuiyunhui@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
2023-09-11 19:13:49 -07:00
static int copy_code(struct pt_regs *regs, u16 *val, const u16 *insns)
{
const void __user *uaddr = (__force const void __user *)insns;
if (!user_mode(regs))
return get_kernel_nofault(*val, insns);
/* The user space code from other tasks cannot be accessed. */
if (regs != task_pt_regs(current))
return -EPERM;
return copy_from_user_nofault(val, uaddr, sizeof(*val));
}
static void dump_instr(const char *loglvl, struct pt_regs *regs)
riscv: Add instruction dump to RISC-V splats Add instruction dump (Code:) output to RISC-V splats. Dump 16b parcels. An example: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 Oops [#1] Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc3-00302-g840ff44c571d-dirty #27 Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) epc : kernel_init+0xc8/0x10e ra : kernel_init+0x70/0x10e epc : ffffffff80bd9a40 ra : ffffffff80bd99e8 sp : ff2000000060bec0 gp : ffffffff81730b28 tp : ff6000007ff00000 t0 : 7974697275636573 t1 : 0000000000000000 t2 : 3030303270393d6e s0 : ff2000000060bee0 s1 : ffffffff81732028 a0 : 0000000000000000 a1 : ff60000080dd1780 a2 : 0000000000000002 a3 : ffffffff8176a470 a4 : 0000000000000000 a5 : 000000000000000a a6 : 0000000000000081 a7 : ff60000080dd1780 s2 : 0000000000000000 s3 : 0000000000000000 s4 : 0000000000000000 s5 : 0000000000000000 s6 : 0000000000000000 s7 : 0000000000000000 s8 : 0000000000000000 s9 : 0000000000000000 s10: 0000000000000000 s11: 0000000000000000 t3 : ffffffff81186018 t4 : 0000000000000022 t5 : 000000000000003d t6 : 0000000000000000 status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 000000000000000f [<ffffffff80003528>] ret_from_exception+0x0/0x16 Code: 862a d179 608c a517 0069 0513 2be5 d0ef db2e 47a9 (c11c) a517 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b SMP: stopping secondary CPUs ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b ]--- Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230119074738.708301-2-bjorn@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
2023-01-19 00:47:37 -07:00
{
char str[sizeof("0000 ") * 12 + 2 + 1], *p = str;
const u16 *insns = (u16 *)instruction_pointer(regs);
long bad;
u16 val;
int i;
for (i = -10; i < 2; i++) {
riscv: add userland instruction dump to RISC-V splats Add userland instruction dump and rename dump_kernel_instr() to dump_instr(). An example: [ 0.822439] Freeing unused kernel image (initmem) memory: 6916K [ 0.823817] Run /init as init process [ 0.839411] init[1]: unhandled signal 4 code 0x1 at 0x000000000005be18 in bb[10000+5fb000] [ 0.840751] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 5.14.0-rc4-00049-gbd644290aa72-dirty #187 [ 0.841373] Hardware name: , BIOS [ 0.841743] epc : 000000000005be18 ra : 0000000000079e74 sp : 0000003fffcafda0 [ 0.842271] gp : ffffffff816e9dc8 tp : 0000000000000000 t0 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.842947] t1 : 0000003fffc9fdf0 t2 : 0000000000000000 s0 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.843434] s1 : 0000000000000000 a0 : 0000003fffca0190 a1 : 0000003fffcafe18 [ 0.843891] a2 : 0000000000000000 a3 : 0000000000000000 a4 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.844357] a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 0000000000000000 a7 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.844803] s2 : 0000000000000000 s3 : 0000000000000000 s4 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.845253] s5 : 0000000000000000 s6 : 0000000000000000 s7 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.845722] s8 : 0000000000000000 s9 : 0000000000000000 s10: 0000000000000000 [ 0.846180] s11: 0000000000d144e0 t3 : 0000000000000000 t4 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.846616] t5 : 0000000000000000 t6 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.847204] status: 0000000200000020 badaddr: 00000000f0028053 cause: 0000000000000002 [ 0.848219] Code: f06f ff5f 3823 fa11 0113 fb01 2e23 0201 0293 0000 (8053) f002 [ 0.851016] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000004 Signed-off-by: Yunhui Cui <cuiyunhui@bytedance.com> Reviewed-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230912021349.28302-1-cuiyunhui@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
2023-09-11 19:13:49 -07:00
bad = copy_code(regs, &val, &insns[i]);
riscv: Add instruction dump to RISC-V splats Add instruction dump (Code:) output to RISC-V splats. Dump 16b parcels. An example: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 Oops [#1] Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc3-00302-g840ff44c571d-dirty #27 Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) epc : kernel_init+0xc8/0x10e ra : kernel_init+0x70/0x10e epc : ffffffff80bd9a40 ra : ffffffff80bd99e8 sp : ff2000000060bec0 gp : ffffffff81730b28 tp : ff6000007ff00000 t0 : 7974697275636573 t1 : 0000000000000000 t2 : 3030303270393d6e s0 : ff2000000060bee0 s1 : ffffffff81732028 a0 : 0000000000000000 a1 : ff60000080dd1780 a2 : 0000000000000002 a3 : ffffffff8176a470 a4 : 0000000000000000 a5 : 000000000000000a a6 : 0000000000000081 a7 : ff60000080dd1780 s2 : 0000000000000000 s3 : 0000000000000000 s4 : 0000000000000000 s5 : 0000000000000000 s6 : 0000000000000000 s7 : 0000000000000000 s8 : 0000000000000000 s9 : 0000000000000000 s10: 0000000000000000 s11: 0000000000000000 t3 : ffffffff81186018 t4 : 0000000000000022 t5 : 000000000000003d t6 : 0000000000000000 status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 000000000000000f [<ffffffff80003528>] ret_from_exception+0x0/0x16 Code: 862a d179 608c a517 0069 0513 2be5 d0ef db2e 47a9 (c11c) a517 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b SMP: stopping secondary CPUs ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b ]--- Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230119074738.708301-2-bjorn@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
2023-01-19 00:47:37 -07:00
if (!bad) {
p += sprintf(p, i == 0 ? "(%04hx) " : "%04hx ", val);
} else {
printk("%sCode: Unable to access instruction at 0x%px.\n",
loglvl, &insns[i]);
return;
}
}
printk("%sCode: %s\n", loglvl, str);
}
void die(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *str)
{
static int die_counter;
int ret;
long cause;
unsigned long flags;
oops_enter();
spin_lock_irqsave(&die_lock, flags);
console_verbose();
bust_spinlocks(1);
pr_emerg("%s [#%d]\n", str, ++die_counter);
print_modules();
riscv: Add instruction dump to RISC-V splats Add instruction dump (Code:) output to RISC-V splats. Dump 16b parcels. An example: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 Oops [#1] Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc3-00302-g840ff44c571d-dirty #27 Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) epc : kernel_init+0xc8/0x10e ra : kernel_init+0x70/0x10e epc : ffffffff80bd9a40 ra : ffffffff80bd99e8 sp : ff2000000060bec0 gp : ffffffff81730b28 tp : ff6000007ff00000 t0 : 7974697275636573 t1 : 0000000000000000 t2 : 3030303270393d6e s0 : ff2000000060bee0 s1 : ffffffff81732028 a0 : 0000000000000000 a1 : ff60000080dd1780 a2 : 0000000000000002 a3 : ffffffff8176a470 a4 : 0000000000000000 a5 : 000000000000000a a6 : 0000000000000081 a7 : ff60000080dd1780 s2 : 0000000000000000 s3 : 0000000000000000 s4 : 0000000000000000 s5 : 0000000000000000 s6 : 0000000000000000 s7 : 0000000000000000 s8 : 0000000000000000 s9 : 0000000000000000 s10: 0000000000000000 s11: 0000000000000000 t3 : ffffffff81186018 t4 : 0000000000000022 t5 : 000000000000003d t6 : 0000000000000000 status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 000000000000000f [<ffffffff80003528>] ret_from_exception+0x0/0x16 Code: 862a d179 608c a517 0069 0513 2be5 d0ef db2e 47a9 (c11c) a517 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b SMP: stopping secondary CPUs ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b ]--- Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230119074738.708301-2-bjorn@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
2023-01-19 00:47:37 -07:00
if (regs) {
show_regs(regs);
riscv: add userland instruction dump to RISC-V splats Add userland instruction dump and rename dump_kernel_instr() to dump_instr(). An example: [ 0.822439] Freeing unused kernel image (initmem) memory: 6916K [ 0.823817] Run /init as init process [ 0.839411] init[1]: unhandled signal 4 code 0x1 at 0x000000000005be18 in bb[10000+5fb000] [ 0.840751] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 5.14.0-rc4-00049-gbd644290aa72-dirty #187 [ 0.841373] Hardware name: , BIOS [ 0.841743] epc : 000000000005be18 ra : 0000000000079e74 sp : 0000003fffcafda0 [ 0.842271] gp : ffffffff816e9dc8 tp : 0000000000000000 t0 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.842947] t1 : 0000003fffc9fdf0 t2 : 0000000000000000 s0 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.843434] s1 : 0000000000000000 a0 : 0000003fffca0190 a1 : 0000003fffcafe18 [ 0.843891] a2 : 0000000000000000 a3 : 0000000000000000 a4 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.844357] a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 0000000000000000 a7 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.844803] s2 : 0000000000000000 s3 : 0000000000000000 s4 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.845253] s5 : 0000000000000000 s6 : 0000000000000000 s7 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.845722] s8 : 0000000000000000 s9 : 0000000000000000 s10: 0000000000000000 [ 0.846180] s11: 0000000000d144e0 t3 : 0000000000000000 t4 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.846616] t5 : 0000000000000000 t6 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.847204] status: 0000000200000020 badaddr: 00000000f0028053 cause: 0000000000000002 [ 0.848219] Code: f06f ff5f 3823 fa11 0113 fb01 2e23 0201 0293 0000 (8053) f002 [ 0.851016] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000004 Signed-off-by: Yunhui Cui <cuiyunhui@bytedance.com> Reviewed-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230912021349.28302-1-cuiyunhui@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
2023-09-11 19:13:49 -07:00
dump_instr(KERN_EMERG, regs);
riscv: Add instruction dump to RISC-V splats Add instruction dump (Code:) output to RISC-V splats. Dump 16b parcels. An example: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 Oops [#1] Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc3-00302-g840ff44c571d-dirty #27 Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) epc : kernel_init+0xc8/0x10e ra : kernel_init+0x70/0x10e epc : ffffffff80bd9a40 ra : ffffffff80bd99e8 sp : ff2000000060bec0 gp : ffffffff81730b28 tp : ff6000007ff00000 t0 : 7974697275636573 t1 : 0000000000000000 t2 : 3030303270393d6e s0 : ff2000000060bee0 s1 : ffffffff81732028 a0 : 0000000000000000 a1 : ff60000080dd1780 a2 : 0000000000000002 a3 : ffffffff8176a470 a4 : 0000000000000000 a5 : 000000000000000a a6 : 0000000000000081 a7 : ff60000080dd1780 s2 : 0000000000000000 s3 : 0000000000000000 s4 : 0000000000000000 s5 : 0000000000000000 s6 : 0000000000000000 s7 : 0000000000000000 s8 : 0000000000000000 s9 : 0000000000000000 s10: 0000000000000000 s11: 0000000000000000 t3 : ffffffff81186018 t4 : 0000000000000022 t5 : 000000000000003d t6 : 0000000000000000 status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 000000000000000f [<ffffffff80003528>] ret_from_exception+0x0/0x16 Code: 862a d179 608c a517 0069 0513 2be5 d0ef db2e 47a9 (c11c) a517 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b SMP: stopping secondary CPUs ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b ]--- Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230119074738.708301-2-bjorn@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
2023-01-19 00:47:37 -07:00
}
cause = regs ? regs->cause : -1;
ret = notify_die(DIE_OOPS, str, regs, 0, cause, SIGSEGV);
if (kexec_should_crash(current))
crash_kexec(regs);
bust_spinlocks(0);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&die_lock, flags);
oops_exit();
if (in_interrupt())
panic("Fatal exception in interrupt");
if (panic_on_oops)
panic("Fatal exception");
if (ret != NOTIFY_STOP)
make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
}
void do_trap(struct pt_regs *regs, int signo, int code, unsigned long addr)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
if (show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(tsk, signo)
&& printk_ratelimit()) {
pr_info("%s[%d]: unhandled signal %d code 0x%x at 0x" REG_FMT,
tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk), signo, code, addr);
print_vma_addr(KERN_CONT " in ", instruction_pointer(regs));
pr_cont("\n");
__show_regs(regs);
dump_instr(KERN_INFO, regs);
}
force_sig_fault(signo, code, (void __user *)addr);
}
static void do_trap_error(struct pt_regs *regs, int signo, int code,
unsigned long addr, const char *str)
{
current->thread.bad_cause = regs->cause;
if (user_mode(regs)) {
do_trap(regs, signo, code, addr);
} else {
if (!fixup_exception(regs))
die(regs, str);
}
}
#if defined(CONFIG_XIP_KERNEL) && defined(CONFIG_RISCV_ALTERNATIVE)
#define __trap_section __noinstr_section(".xip.traps")
#else
#define __trap_section noinstr
#endif
#define DO_ERROR_INFO(name, signo, code, str) \
asmlinkage __visible __trap_section void name(struct pt_regs *regs) \
{ \
if (user_mode(regs)) { \
irqentry_enter_from_user_mode(regs); \
do_trap_error(regs, signo, code, regs->epc, "Oops - " str); \
irqentry_exit_to_user_mode(regs); \
} else { \
irqentry_state_t state = irqentry_nmi_enter(regs); \
do_trap_error(regs, signo, code, regs->epc, "Oops - " str); \
irqentry_nmi_exit(regs, state); \
} \
}
DO_ERROR_INFO(do_trap_unknown,
SIGILL, ILL_ILLTRP, "unknown exception");
DO_ERROR_INFO(do_trap_insn_misaligned,
SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, "instruction address misaligned");
DO_ERROR_INFO(do_trap_insn_fault,
SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "instruction access fault");
asmlinkage __visible __trap_section void do_trap_insn_illegal(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
bool handled;
if (user_mode(regs)) {
irqentry_enter_from_user_mode(regs);
local_irq_enable();
handled = riscv_v_first_use_handler(regs);
local_irq_disable();
if (!handled)
do_trap_error(regs, SIGILL, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->epc,
"Oops - illegal instruction");
irqentry_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
} else {
irqentry_state_t state = irqentry_nmi_enter(regs);
do_trap_error(regs, SIGILL, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->epc,
"Oops - illegal instruction");
irqentry_nmi_exit(regs, state);
}
}
DO_ERROR_INFO(do_trap_load_fault,
SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "load access fault");
asmlinkage __visible __trap_section void do_trap_load_misaligned(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (user_mode(regs)) {
irqentry_enter_from_user_mode(regs);
if (handle_misaligned_load(regs))
do_trap_error(regs, SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, regs->epc,
"Oops - load address misaligned");
irqentry_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
} else {
irqentry_state_t state = irqentry_nmi_enter(regs);
if (handle_misaligned_load(regs))
do_trap_error(regs, SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, regs->epc,
"Oops - load address misaligned");
irqentry_nmi_exit(regs, state);
}
}
asmlinkage __visible __trap_section void do_trap_store_misaligned(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (user_mode(regs)) {
irqentry_enter_from_user_mode(regs);
if (handle_misaligned_store(regs))
do_trap_error(regs, SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, regs->epc,
"Oops - store (or AMO) address misaligned");
irqentry_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
} else {
irqentry_state_t state = irqentry_nmi_enter(regs);
if (handle_misaligned_store(regs))
do_trap_error(regs, SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, regs->epc,
"Oops - store (or AMO) address misaligned");
irqentry_nmi_exit(regs, state);
}
}
DO_ERROR_INFO(do_trap_store_fault,
SIGSEGV, SEGV_ACCERR, "store (or AMO) access fault");
DO_ERROR_INFO(do_trap_ecall_s,
SIGILL, ILL_ILLTRP, "environment call from S-mode");
DO_ERROR_INFO(do_trap_ecall_m,
SIGILL, ILL_ILLTRP, "environment call from M-mode");
static inline unsigned long get_break_insn_length(unsigned long pc)
{
bug_insn_t insn;
if (get_kernel_nofault(insn, (bug_insn_t *)pc))
return 0;
return GET_INSN_LENGTH(insn);
}
riscv: Only consider swbp/ss handlers for correct privileged mode RISC-V software breakpoint trap handlers are used for {k,u}probes. When trapping from kernelmode, only the kernelmode handlers should be considered. Vice versa, only usermode handlers for usermode traps. This is not the case on RISC-V, which can trigger a bug if a userspace process uses uprobes, and a WARN() is triggered from kernelmode (which is implemented via {c.,}ebreak). The kernel will trap on the kernelmode {c.,}ebreak, look for uprobes handlers, realize incorrectly that uprobes need to be handled, and exit the trap handler early. The trap returns to re-executing the {c.,}ebreak, and enter an infinite trap-loop. The issue was found running the BPF selftest [1]. Fix this issue by only considering the swbp/ss handlers for kernel/usermode respectively. Also, move CONFIG ifdeffery from traps.c to the asm/{k,u}probes.h headers. Note that linux/uprobes.h only include asm/uprobes.h if CONFIG_UPROBES is defined, which is why asm/uprobes.h needs to be unconditionally included in traps.c Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/87v8d19aun.fsf@all.your.base.are.belong.to.us/ # [1] Fixes: 74784081aac8 ("riscv: Add uprobes supported") Reviewed-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nam Cao <namcaov@gmail.com> Tested-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230912065619.62020-1-bjorn@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
2023-09-11 23:56:19 -07:00
static bool probe_single_step_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
bool user = user_mode(regs);
return user ? uprobe_single_step_handler(regs) : kprobe_single_step_handler(regs);
}
static bool probe_breakpoint_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
bool user = user_mode(regs);
return user ? uprobe_breakpoint_handler(regs) : kprobe_breakpoint_handler(regs);
}
void handle_break(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
riscv: Only consider swbp/ss handlers for correct privileged mode RISC-V software breakpoint trap handlers are used for {k,u}probes. When trapping from kernelmode, only the kernelmode handlers should be considered. Vice versa, only usermode handlers for usermode traps. This is not the case on RISC-V, which can trigger a bug if a userspace process uses uprobes, and a WARN() is triggered from kernelmode (which is implemented via {c.,}ebreak). The kernel will trap on the kernelmode {c.,}ebreak, look for uprobes handlers, realize incorrectly that uprobes need to be handled, and exit the trap handler early. The trap returns to re-executing the {c.,}ebreak, and enter an infinite trap-loop. The issue was found running the BPF selftest [1]. Fix this issue by only considering the swbp/ss handlers for kernel/usermode respectively. Also, move CONFIG ifdeffery from traps.c to the asm/{k,u}probes.h headers. Note that linux/uprobes.h only include asm/uprobes.h if CONFIG_UPROBES is defined, which is why asm/uprobes.h needs to be unconditionally included in traps.c Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/87v8d19aun.fsf@all.your.base.are.belong.to.us/ # [1] Fixes: 74784081aac8 ("riscv: Add uprobes supported") Reviewed-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nam Cao <namcaov@gmail.com> Tested-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230912065619.62020-1-bjorn@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
2023-09-11 23:56:19 -07:00
if (probe_single_step_handler(regs))
riscv: Add kprobes supported This patch enables "kprobe & kretprobe" to work with ftrace interface. It utilized software breakpoint as single-step mechanism. Some instructions which can't be single-step executed must be simulated in kernel execution slot, such as: branch, jal, auipc, la ... Some instructions should be rejected for probing and we use a blacklist to filter, such as: ecall, ebreak, ... We use ebreak & c.ebreak to replace origin instruction and the kprobe handler prepares an executable memory slot for out-of-line execution with a copy of the original instruction being probed. In execution slot we add ebreak behind original instruction to simulate a single-setp mechanism. The patch is based on packi's work [1] and csky's work [2]. - The kprobes_trampoline.S is all from packi's patch - The single-step mechanism is new designed for riscv without hw single-step trap - The simulation codes are from csky - Frankly, all codes refer to other archs' implementation [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20181113195804.22825-1-me@packi.ch/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-csky/20200403044150.20562-9-guoren@kernel.org/ Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@linux.alibaba.com> Co-developed-by: Patrick Stählin <me@packi.ch> Signed-off-by: Patrick Stählin <me@packi.ch> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Tested-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com> Reviewed-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Patrick Stählin <me@packi.ch> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Björn Töpel <bjorn.topel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
2020-12-17 09:01:42 -07:00
return;
riscv: Only consider swbp/ss handlers for correct privileged mode RISC-V software breakpoint trap handlers are used for {k,u}probes. When trapping from kernelmode, only the kernelmode handlers should be considered. Vice versa, only usermode handlers for usermode traps. This is not the case on RISC-V, which can trigger a bug if a userspace process uses uprobes, and a WARN() is triggered from kernelmode (which is implemented via {c.,}ebreak). The kernel will trap on the kernelmode {c.,}ebreak, look for uprobes handlers, realize incorrectly that uprobes need to be handled, and exit the trap handler early. The trap returns to re-executing the {c.,}ebreak, and enter an infinite trap-loop. The issue was found running the BPF selftest [1]. Fix this issue by only considering the swbp/ss handlers for kernel/usermode respectively. Also, move CONFIG ifdeffery from traps.c to the asm/{k,u}probes.h headers. Note that linux/uprobes.h only include asm/uprobes.h if CONFIG_UPROBES is defined, which is why asm/uprobes.h needs to be unconditionally included in traps.c Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/87v8d19aun.fsf@all.your.base.are.belong.to.us/ # [1] Fixes: 74784081aac8 ("riscv: Add uprobes supported") Reviewed-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nam Cao <namcaov@gmail.com> Tested-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230912065619.62020-1-bjorn@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
2023-09-11 23:56:19 -07:00
if (probe_breakpoint_handler(regs))
return;
current->thread.bad_cause = regs->cause;
riscv: Add kprobes supported This patch enables "kprobe & kretprobe" to work with ftrace interface. It utilized software breakpoint as single-step mechanism. Some instructions which can't be single-step executed must be simulated in kernel execution slot, such as: branch, jal, auipc, la ... Some instructions should be rejected for probing and we use a blacklist to filter, such as: ecall, ebreak, ... We use ebreak & c.ebreak to replace origin instruction and the kprobe handler prepares an executable memory slot for out-of-line execution with a copy of the original instruction being probed. In execution slot we add ebreak behind original instruction to simulate a single-setp mechanism. The patch is based on packi's work [1] and csky's work [2]. - The kprobes_trampoline.S is all from packi's patch - The single-step mechanism is new designed for riscv without hw single-step trap - The simulation codes are from csky - Frankly, all codes refer to other archs' implementation [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20181113195804.22825-1-me@packi.ch/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-csky/20200403044150.20562-9-guoren@kernel.org/ Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@linux.alibaba.com> Co-developed-by: Patrick Stählin <me@packi.ch> Signed-off-by: Patrick Stählin <me@packi.ch> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Tested-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com> Reviewed-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Patrick Stählin <me@packi.ch> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Björn Töpel <bjorn.topel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
2020-12-17 09:01:42 -07:00
if (user_mode(regs))
force_sig_fault(SIGTRAP, TRAP_BRKPT, (void __user *)regs->epc);
#ifdef CONFIG_KGDB
else if (notify_die(DIE_TRAP, "EBREAK", regs, 0, regs->cause, SIGTRAP)
== NOTIFY_STOP)
return;
#endif
riscv: Add CFI error handling With CONFIG_CFI_CLANG, the compiler injects a type preamble immediately before each function and a check to validate the target function type before indirect calls: ; type preamble .word <id> function: ... ; indirect call check lw t1, -4(a0) lui t2, <hi20> addiw t2, t2, <lo12> beq t1, t2, .Ltmp0 ebreak .Ltmp0: jarl a0 Implement error handling code for the ebreak traps emitted for the checks. This produces the following oops on a CFI failure (generated using lkdtm): [ 21.177245] CFI failure at lkdtm_indirect_call+0x22/0x32 [lkdtm] (target: lkdtm_increment_int+0x0/0x18 [lkdtm]; expected type: 0x3ad55aca) [ 21.178483] Kernel BUG [#1] [ 21.178671] Modules linked in: lkdtm [ 21.179037] CPU: 1 PID: 104 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.3.0-rc6-00037-g37d5ec6297ab #1 [ 21.179511] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 21.179818] epc : lkdtm_indirect_call+0x22/0x32 [lkdtm] [ 21.180106] ra : lkdtm_CFI_FORWARD_PROTO+0x48/0x7c [lkdtm] [ 21.180426] epc : ffffffff01387092 ra : ffffffff01386f14 sp : ff20000000453cf0 [ 21.180792] gp : ffffffff81308c38 tp : ff6000000243f080 t0 : ff20000000453b78 [ 21.181157] t1 : 000000003ad55aca t2 : 000000007e0c52a5 s0 : ff20000000453d00 [ 21.181506] s1 : 0000000000000001 a0 : ffffffff0138d170 a1 : ffffffff013870bc [ 21.181819] a2 : b5fea48dd89aa700 a3 : 0000000000000001 a4 : 0000000000000fff [ 21.182169] a5 : 0000000000000004 a6 : 00000000000000b7 a7 : 0000000000000000 [ 21.182591] s2 : ff20000000453e78 s3 : ffffffffffffffea s4 : 0000000000000012 [ 21.183001] s5 : ff600000023c7000 s6 : 0000000000000006 s7 : ffffffff013882a0 [ 21.183653] s8 : 0000000000000008 s9 : 0000000000000002 s10: ffffffff0138d878 [ 21.184245] s11: ffffffff0138d878 t3 : 0000000000000003 t4 : 0000000000000000 [ 21.184591] t5 : ffffffff8133df08 t6 : ffffffff8133df07 [ 21.184858] status: 0000000000000120 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000003 [ 21.185415] [<ffffffff01387092>] lkdtm_indirect_call+0x22/0x32 [lkdtm] [ 21.185772] [<ffffffff01386f14>] lkdtm_CFI_FORWARD_PROTO+0x48/0x7c [lkdtm] [ 21.186093] [<ffffffff01383552>] lkdtm_do_action+0x22/0x34 [lkdtm] [ 21.186445] [<ffffffff0138350c>] direct_entry+0x128/0x13a [lkdtm] [ 21.186817] [<ffffffff8033ed8c>] full_proxy_write+0x58/0xb2 [ 21.187352] [<ffffffff801d4fe8>] vfs_write+0x14c/0x33a [ 21.187644] [<ffffffff801d5328>] ksys_write+0x64/0xd4 [ 21.187832] [<ffffffff801d53a6>] sys_write+0xe/0x1a [ 21.188171] [<ffffffff80003996>] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x2 [ 21.188595] Code: 0513 0f65 a303 ffc5 53b7 7e0c 839b 2a53 0363 0073 (9002) 9582 [ 21.189178] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 21.189590] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com> # ISA bits Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230710183544.999540-12-samitolvanen@google.com Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
2023-07-10 11:35:49 -07:00
else if (report_bug(regs->epc, regs) == BUG_TRAP_TYPE_WARN ||
handle_cfi_failure(regs) == BUG_TRAP_TYPE_WARN)
regs->epc += get_break_insn_length(regs->epc);
else
die(regs, "Kernel BUG");
}
asmlinkage __visible __trap_section void do_trap_break(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (user_mode(regs)) {
irqentry_enter_from_user_mode(regs);
handle_break(regs);
irqentry_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
} else {
irqentry_state_t state = irqentry_nmi_enter(regs);
handle_break(regs);
irqentry_nmi_exit(regs, state);
}
}
asmlinkage __visible __trap_section __no_stack_protector
void do_trap_ecall_u(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (user_mode(regs)) {
riscv: entry: set a0 = -ENOSYS only when syscall != -1 When we test seccomp with 6.4 kernel, we found errno has wrong value. If we deny NETLINK_AUDIT with EAFNOSUPPORT, after f0bddf50586d, we will get ENOSYS instead. We got same result with commit 9c2598d43510 ("riscv: entry: Save a0 prior syscall_enter_from_user_mode()"). After analysing code, we think that regs->a0 = -ENOSYS should only be executed when syscall != -1. In __seccomp_filter, when seccomp rejected this syscall with specified errno, they will set a0 to return number as syscall ABI, and then return -1. This return number is finally pass as return number of syscall_enter_from_user_mode, and then is compared with NR_syscalls after converted to ulong (so it will be ULONG_MAX). The condition syscall < NR_syscalls will always be false, so regs->a0 = -ENOSYS is always executed. It covered a0 set by seccomp, so we always get ENOSYS when match seccomp RET_ERRNO rule. Fixes: f0bddf50586d ("riscv: entry: Convert to generic entry") Reported-by: Felix Yan <felixonmars@archlinux.org> Co-developed-by: Ruizhe Pan <c141028@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ruizhe Pan <c141028@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Shiqi Zhang <shiqi@isrc.iscas.ac.cn> Signed-off-by: Shiqi Zhang <shiqi@isrc.iscas.ac.cn> Signed-off-by: Celeste Liu <CoelacanthusHex@gmail.com> Tested-by: Felix Yan <felixonmars@archlinux.org> Tested-by: Emil Renner Berthing <emil.renner.berthing@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com> Reviewed-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230801141607.435192-1-CoelacanthusHex@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
2023-08-01 07:15:16 -07:00
long syscall = regs->a7;
regs->epc += 4;
regs->orig_a0 = regs->a0;
regs->a0 = -ENOSYS;
riscv_v_vstate_discard(regs);
syscall = syscall_enter_from_user_mode(regs, syscall);
add_random_kstack_offset();
riscv: entry: set a0 = -ENOSYS only when syscall != -1 When we test seccomp with 6.4 kernel, we found errno has wrong value. If we deny NETLINK_AUDIT with EAFNOSUPPORT, after f0bddf50586d, we will get ENOSYS instead. We got same result with commit 9c2598d43510 ("riscv: entry: Save a0 prior syscall_enter_from_user_mode()"). After analysing code, we think that regs->a0 = -ENOSYS should only be executed when syscall != -1. In __seccomp_filter, when seccomp rejected this syscall with specified errno, they will set a0 to return number as syscall ABI, and then return -1. This return number is finally pass as return number of syscall_enter_from_user_mode, and then is compared with NR_syscalls after converted to ulong (so it will be ULONG_MAX). The condition syscall < NR_syscalls will always be false, so regs->a0 = -ENOSYS is always executed. It covered a0 set by seccomp, so we always get ENOSYS when match seccomp RET_ERRNO rule. Fixes: f0bddf50586d ("riscv: entry: Convert to generic entry") Reported-by: Felix Yan <felixonmars@archlinux.org> Co-developed-by: Ruizhe Pan <c141028@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ruizhe Pan <c141028@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Shiqi Zhang <shiqi@isrc.iscas.ac.cn> Signed-off-by: Shiqi Zhang <shiqi@isrc.iscas.ac.cn> Signed-off-by: Celeste Liu <CoelacanthusHex@gmail.com> Tested-by: Felix Yan <felixonmars@archlinux.org> Tested-by: Emil Renner Berthing <emil.renner.berthing@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com> Reviewed-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230801141607.435192-1-CoelacanthusHex@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
2023-08-01 07:15:16 -07:00
if (syscall >= 0 && syscall < NR_syscalls)
syscall_handler(regs, syscall);
/*
* Ultimately, this value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(),
* so the maximum stack offset is 1k bytes (10 bits).
*
* The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler when
* applying stack alignment constraints: 16-byte (i.e. 4-bit) aligned
* for RV32I or RV64I.
*
* The resulting 6 bits of entropy is seen in SP[9:4].
*/
choose_random_kstack_offset(get_random_u16());
syscall_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
} else {
irqentry_state_t state = irqentry_nmi_enter(regs);
do_trap_error(regs, SIGILL, ILL_ILLTRP, regs->epc,
"Oops - environment call from U-mode");
irqentry_nmi_exit(regs, state);
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
asmlinkage __visible noinstr void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
irqentry_state_t state = irqentry_enter(regs);
handle_page_fault(regs);
local_irq_disable();
irqentry_exit(regs, state);
}
#endif
static void noinstr handle_riscv_irq(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct pt_regs *old_regs;
irq_enter_rcu();
old_regs = set_irq_regs(regs);
handle_arch_irq(regs);
set_irq_regs(old_regs);
irq_exit_rcu();
}
asmlinkage void noinstr do_irq(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
irqentry_state_t state = irqentry_enter(regs);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IRQ_STACKS) && on_thread_stack())
call_on_irq_stack(regs, handle_riscv_irq);
else
handle_riscv_irq(regs);
irqentry_exit(regs, state);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG
int is_valid_bugaddr(unsigned long pc)
{
bug_insn_t insn;
if (pc < VMALLOC_START)
return 0;
if (get_kernel_nofault(insn, (bug_insn_t *)pc))
return 0;
if ((insn & __INSN_LENGTH_MASK) == __INSN_LENGTH_32)
return (insn == __BUG_INSN_32);
else
return ((insn & __COMPRESSED_INSN_MASK) == __BUG_INSN_16);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG */
riscv: add VMAP_STACK overflow detection This patch adds stack overflow detection to riscv, usable when CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y. Overflow is detected in kernel exception entry(kernel/entry.S), if the kernel stack is overflow and been detected, the overflow handler is invoked on a per-cpu overflow stack. This approach preserves GPRs and the original exception information. The overflow detect is performed before any attempt is made to access the stack and the principle of stack overflow detection: kernel stacks are aligned to double their size, enabling overflow to be detected with a single bit test. For example, a 16K stack is aligned to 32K, ensuring that bit 14 of the SP must be zero. On an overflow (or underflow), this bit is flipped. Thus, overflow (of less than the size of the stack) can be detected by testing whether this bit is set. This gives us a useful error message on stack overflow, as can be trigger with the LKDTM overflow test: [ 388.053267] lkdtm: Performing direct entry EXHAUST_STACK [ 388.053663] lkdtm: Calling function with 1024 frame size to depth 32 ... [ 388.054016] lkdtm: loop 32/32 ... [ 388.054186] lkdtm: loop 31/32 ... [ 388.054491] lkdtm: loop 30/32 ... [ 388.054672] lkdtm: loop 29/32 ... [ 388.054859] lkdtm: loop 28/32 ... [ 388.055010] lkdtm: loop 27/32 ... [ 388.055163] lkdtm: loop 26/32 ... [ 388.055309] lkdtm: loop 25/32 ... [ 388.055481] lkdtm: loop 24/32 ... [ 388.055653] lkdtm: loop 23/32 ... [ 388.055837] lkdtm: loop 22/32 ... [ 388.056015] lkdtm: loop 21/32 ... [ 388.056188] lkdtm: loop 20/32 ... [ 388.058145] Insufficient stack space to handle exception! [ 388.058153] Task stack: [0xffffffd014260000..0xffffffd014264000] [ 388.058160] Overflow stack: [0xffffffe1f8d2c220..0xffffffe1f8d2d220] [ 388.058168] CPU: 0 PID: 89 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.12.0-rc8-dirty #90 [ 388.058175] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 388.058187] epc : number+0x32/0x2c0 [ 388.058247] ra : vsnprintf+0x2ae/0x3f0 [ 388.058255] epc : ffffffe0002d38f6 ra : ffffffe0002d814e sp : ffffffd01425ffc0 [ 388.058263] gp : ffffffe0012e4010 tp : ffffffe08014da00 t0 : ffffffd0142606e8 [ 388.058271] t1 : 0000000000000000 t2 : 0000000000000000 s0 : ffffffd014260070 [ 388.058303] s1 : ffffffd014260158 a0 : ffffffd01426015e a1 : ffffffd014260158 [ 388.058311] a2 : 0000000000000013 a3 : ffff0a01ffffff10 a4 : ffffffe000c398e0 [ 388.058319] a5 : 511b02ec65f3e300 a6 : 0000000000a1749a a7 : 0000000000000000 [ 388.058327] s2 : ffffffff000000ff s3 : 00000000ffff0a01 s4 : ffffffe0012e50a8 [ 388.058335] s5 : 0000000000ffff0a s6 : ffffffe0012e50a8 s7 : ffffffe000da1cc0 [ 388.058343] s8 : ffffffffffffffff s9 : ffffffd0142602b0 s10: ffffffd0142602a8 [ 388.058351] s11: ffffffd01426015e t3 : 00000000000f0000 t4 : ffffffffffffffff [ 388.058359] t5 : 000000000000002f t6 : ffffffd014260158 [ 388.058366] status: 0000000000000100 badaddr: ffffffd01425fff8 cause: 000000000000000f [ 388.058374] Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel stack overflow [ 388.058381] CPU: 0 PID: 89 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.12.0-rc8-dirty #90 [ 388.058387] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 388.058393] Call Trace: [ 388.058400] [<ffffffe000004944>] walk_stackframe+0x0/0xce [ 388.058406] [<ffffffe0006f0b28>] dump_backtrace+0x38/0x46 [ 388.058412] [<ffffffe0006f0b46>] show_stack+0x10/0x18 [ 388.058418] [<ffffffe0006f3690>] dump_stack+0x74/0x8e [ 388.058424] [<ffffffe0006f0d52>] panic+0xfc/0x2b2 [ 388.058430] [<ffffffe0006f0acc>] print_trace_address+0x0/0x24 [ 388.058436] [<ffffffe0002d814e>] vsnprintf+0x2ae/0x3f0 [ 388.058956] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs Signed-off-by: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
2021-06-20 20:28:55 -07:00
#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
riscv: VMAP_STACK overflow detection thread-safe commit 31da94c25aea ("riscv: add VMAP_STACK overflow detection") added support for CONFIG_VMAP_STACK. If overflow is detected, CPU switches to `shadow_stack` temporarily before switching finally to per-cpu `overflow_stack`. If two CPUs/harts are racing and end up in over flowing kernel stack, one or both will end up corrupting each other state because `shadow_stack` is not per-cpu. This patch optimizes per-cpu overflow stack switch by directly picking per-cpu `overflow_stack` and gets rid of `shadow_stack`. Following are the changes in this patch - Defines an asm macro to obtain per-cpu symbols in destination register. - In entry.S, when overflow is detected, per-cpu overflow stack is located using per-cpu asm macro. Computing per-cpu symbol requires a temporary register. x31 is saved away into CSR_SCRATCH (CSR_SCRATCH is anyways zero since we're in kernel). Please see Links for additional relevant disccussion and alternative solution. Tested by `echo EXHAUST_STACK > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT` Kernel crash log below Insufficient stack space to handle exception!/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT Task stack: [0xff20000010a98000..0xff20000010a9c000] Overflow stack: [0xff600001f7d98370..0xff600001f7d99370] CPU: 1 PID: 205 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.1.0-rc2-00001-g328a1f96f7b9 #34 Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) epc : __memset+0x60/0xfc ra : recursive_loop+0x48/0xc6 [lkdtm] epc : ffffffff808de0e4 ra : ffffffff0163a752 sp : ff20000010a97e80 gp : ffffffff815c0330 tp : ff600000820ea280 t0 : ff20000010a97e88 t1 : 000000000000002e t2 : 3233206874706564 s0 : ff20000010a982b0 s1 : 0000000000000012 a0 : ff20000010a97e88 a1 : 0000000000000000 a2 : 0000000000000400 a3 : ff20000010a98288 a4 : 0000000000000000 a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : fffffffffffe43f0 a7 : 00007fffffffffff s2 : ff20000010a97e88 s3 : ffffffff01644680 s4 : ff20000010a9be90 s5 : ff600000842ba6c0 s6 : 00aaaaaac29e42b0 s7 : 00fffffff0aa3684 s8 : 00aaaaaac2978040 s9 : 0000000000000065 s10: 00ffffff8a7cad10 s11: 00ffffff8a76a4e0 t3 : ffffffff815dbaf4 t4 : ffffffff815dbaf4 t5 : ffffffff815dbab8 t6 : ff20000010a9bb48 status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: ff20000010a97e88 cause: 000000000000000f Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel stack overflow CPU: 1 PID: 205 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.1.0-rc2-00001-g328a1f96f7b9 #34 Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) Call Trace: [<ffffffff80006754>] dump_backtrace+0x30/0x38 [<ffffffff808de798>] show_stack+0x40/0x4c [<ffffffff808ea2a8>] dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x5c [<ffffffff808ea2d8>] dump_stack+0x18/0x20 [<ffffffff808dec06>] panic+0x126/0x2fe [<ffffffff800065ea>] walk_stackframe+0x0/0xf0 [<ffffffff0163a752>] recursive_loop+0x48/0xc6 [lkdtm] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel stack overflow ]--- Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Cc: Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/Y347B0x4VUNOd6V7@xhacker/T/#t Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221124094845.1907443-1-debug@rivosinc.com/ Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> Co-developed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Acked-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230927224757.1154247-9-samitolvanen@google.com Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
2023-09-27 15:47:59 -07:00
DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long [OVERFLOW_STACK_SIZE/sizeof(long)],
riscv: add VMAP_STACK overflow detection This patch adds stack overflow detection to riscv, usable when CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y. Overflow is detected in kernel exception entry(kernel/entry.S), if the kernel stack is overflow and been detected, the overflow handler is invoked on a per-cpu overflow stack. This approach preserves GPRs and the original exception information. The overflow detect is performed before any attempt is made to access the stack and the principle of stack overflow detection: kernel stacks are aligned to double their size, enabling overflow to be detected with a single bit test. For example, a 16K stack is aligned to 32K, ensuring that bit 14 of the SP must be zero. On an overflow (or underflow), this bit is flipped. Thus, overflow (of less than the size of the stack) can be detected by testing whether this bit is set. This gives us a useful error message on stack overflow, as can be trigger with the LKDTM overflow test: [ 388.053267] lkdtm: Performing direct entry EXHAUST_STACK [ 388.053663] lkdtm: Calling function with 1024 frame size to depth 32 ... [ 388.054016] lkdtm: loop 32/32 ... [ 388.054186] lkdtm: loop 31/32 ... [ 388.054491] lkdtm: loop 30/32 ... [ 388.054672] lkdtm: loop 29/32 ... [ 388.054859] lkdtm: loop 28/32 ... [ 388.055010] lkdtm: loop 27/32 ... [ 388.055163] lkdtm: loop 26/32 ... [ 388.055309] lkdtm: loop 25/32 ... [ 388.055481] lkdtm: loop 24/32 ... [ 388.055653] lkdtm: loop 23/32 ... [ 388.055837] lkdtm: loop 22/32 ... [ 388.056015] lkdtm: loop 21/32 ... [ 388.056188] lkdtm: loop 20/32 ... [ 388.058145] Insufficient stack space to handle exception! [ 388.058153] Task stack: [0xffffffd014260000..0xffffffd014264000] [ 388.058160] Overflow stack: [0xffffffe1f8d2c220..0xffffffe1f8d2d220] [ 388.058168] CPU: 0 PID: 89 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.12.0-rc8-dirty #90 [ 388.058175] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 388.058187] epc : number+0x32/0x2c0 [ 388.058247] ra : vsnprintf+0x2ae/0x3f0 [ 388.058255] epc : ffffffe0002d38f6 ra : ffffffe0002d814e sp : ffffffd01425ffc0 [ 388.058263] gp : ffffffe0012e4010 tp : ffffffe08014da00 t0 : ffffffd0142606e8 [ 388.058271] t1 : 0000000000000000 t2 : 0000000000000000 s0 : ffffffd014260070 [ 388.058303] s1 : ffffffd014260158 a0 : ffffffd01426015e a1 : ffffffd014260158 [ 388.058311] a2 : 0000000000000013 a3 : ffff0a01ffffff10 a4 : ffffffe000c398e0 [ 388.058319] a5 : 511b02ec65f3e300 a6 : 0000000000a1749a a7 : 0000000000000000 [ 388.058327] s2 : ffffffff000000ff s3 : 00000000ffff0a01 s4 : ffffffe0012e50a8 [ 388.058335] s5 : 0000000000ffff0a s6 : ffffffe0012e50a8 s7 : ffffffe000da1cc0 [ 388.058343] s8 : ffffffffffffffff s9 : ffffffd0142602b0 s10: ffffffd0142602a8 [ 388.058351] s11: ffffffd01426015e t3 : 00000000000f0000 t4 : ffffffffffffffff [ 388.058359] t5 : 000000000000002f t6 : ffffffd014260158 [ 388.058366] status: 0000000000000100 badaddr: ffffffd01425fff8 cause: 000000000000000f [ 388.058374] Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel stack overflow [ 388.058381] CPU: 0 PID: 89 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.12.0-rc8-dirty #90 [ 388.058387] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 388.058393] Call Trace: [ 388.058400] [<ffffffe000004944>] walk_stackframe+0x0/0xce [ 388.058406] [<ffffffe0006f0b28>] dump_backtrace+0x38/0x46 [ 388.058412] [<ffffffe0006f0b46>] show_stack+0x10/0x18 [ 388.058418] [<ffffffe0006f3690>] dump_stack+0x74/0x8e [ 388.058424] [<ffffffe0006f0d52>] panic+0xfc/0x2b2 [ 388.058430] [<ffffffe0006f0acc>] print_trace_address+0x0/0x24 [ 388.058436] [<ffffffe0002d814e>] vsnprintf+0x2ae/0x3f0 [ 388.058956] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs Signed-off-by: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
2021-06-20 20:28:55 -07:00
overflow_stack)__aligned(16);
asmlinkage void handle_bad_stack(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long tsk_stk = (unsigned long)current->stack;
unsigned long ovf_stk = (unsigned long)this_cpu_ptr(overflow_stack);
console_verbose();
pr_emerg("Insufficient stack space to handle exception!\n");
pr_emerg("Task stack: [0x%016lx..0x%016lx]\n",
tsk_stk, tsk_stk + THREAD_SIZE);
pr_emerg("Overflow stack: [0x%016lx..0x%016lx]\n",
ovf_stk, ovf_stk + OVERFLOW_STACK_SIZE);
__show_regs(regs);
panic("Kernel stack overflow");
for (;;)
wait_for_interrupt();
}
#endif