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Add tests for the host checking logic, clarify the behaviors (#20328)
Before, the combination of AllowedDomains/BlockedDomains/AllowLocalNetworks is confusing. This PR adds tests for the logic, clarify the behaviors.
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@ -2232,6 +2232,7 @@ ROUTER = console
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;BLOCKED_DOMAINS =
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;;
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;; Allow private addresses defined by RFC 1918, RFC 1122, RFC 4632 and RFC 4291 (false by default)
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;; If a domain is allowed by ALLOWED_DOMAINS, this option will be ignored.
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;ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = false
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;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
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@ -1083,7 +1083,7 @@ Task queue configuration has been moved to `queue.task`. However, the below conf
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- `RETRY_BACKOFF`: **3**: Backoff time per http/https request retry (seconds)
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- `ALLOWED_DOMAINS`: **\<empty\>**: Domains allowlist for migrating repositories, default is blank. It means everything will be allowed. Multiple domains could be separated by commas. Wildcard is supported: `github.com, *.github.com`.
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- `BLOCKED_DOMAINS`: **\<empty\>**: Domains blocklist for migrating repositories, default is blank. Multiple domains could be separated by commas. When `ALLOWED_DOMAINS` is not blank, this option has a higher priority to deny domains. Wildcard is supported.
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- `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`: **false**: Allow private addresses defined by RFC 1918, RFC 1122, RFC 4632 and RFC 4291
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- `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`: **false**: Allow private addresses defined by RFC 1918, RFC 1122, RFC 4632 and RFC 4291. If a domain is allowed by `ALLOWED_DOMAINS`, this option will be ignored.
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- `SKIP_TLS_VERIFY`: **false**: Allow skip tls verify
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## Federation (`federation`)
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@ -125,14 +125,14 @@ func (hl *HostMatchList) checkIP(ip net.IP) bool {
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// MatchHostName checks if the host matches an allow/deny(block) list
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func (hl *HostMatchList) MatchHostName(host string) bool {
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if hl == nil {
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return false
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}
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hostname, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(host)
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if err != nil {
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hostname = host
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}
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if hl == nil {
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return false
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}
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if hl.checkPattern(hostname) {
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return true
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}
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@ -84,7 +84,10 @@ func IsMigrateURLAllowed(remoteURL string, doer *user_model.User) error {
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// some users only use proxy, there is no DNS resolver. it's safe to ignore the LookupIP error
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addrList, _ := net.LookupIP(hostName)
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return checkByAllowBlockList(hostName, addrList)
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}
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func checkByAllowBlockList(hostName string, addrList []net.IP) error {
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var ipAllowed bool
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var ipBlocked bool
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for _, addr := range addrList {
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@ -93,12 +96,12 @@ func IsMigrateURLAllowed(remoteURL string, doer *user_model.User) error {
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}
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var blockedError error
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if blockList.MatchHostName(hostName) || ipBlocked {
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blockedError = &models.ErrInvalidCloneAddr{Host: u.Host, IsPermissionDenied: true}
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blockedError = &models.ErrInvalidCloneAddr{Host: hostName, IsPermissionDenied: true}
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}
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// if we have an allow-list, check the allow-list first
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// if we have an allow-list, check the allow-list before return to get the more accurate error
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if !allowList.IsEmpty() {
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if !allowList.MatchHostName(hostName) && !ipAllowed {
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return &models.ErrInvalidCloneAddr{Host: u.Host, IsPermissionDenied: true}
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return &models.ErrInvalidCloneAddr{Host: hostName, IsPermissionDenied: true}
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}
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}
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// otherwise, we always follow the blocked list
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@ -474,5 +477,7 @@ func Init() error {
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allowList.AppendBuiltin(hostmatcher.MatchBuiltinPrivate)
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allowList.AppendBuiltin(hostmatcher.MatchBuiltinLoopback)
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}
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// TODO: at the moment, if ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS=false, ALLOWED_DOMAINS=domain.com, and domain.com has IP 127.0.0.1, then it's still allowed.
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// if we want to block such case, the private&loopback should be added to the blockList when ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS=false
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return nil
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}
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@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
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package migrations
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import (
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"net"
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"path/filepath"
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"testing"
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@ -74,3 +75,42 @@ func TestMigrateWhiteBlocklist(t *testing.T) {
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setting.ImportLocalPaths = old
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}
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func TestAllowBlockList(t *testing.T) {
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init := func(allow, block string, local bool) {
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setting.Migrations.AllowedDomains = allow
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setting.Migrations.BlockedDomains = block
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setting.Migrations.AllowLocalNetworks = local
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assert.NoError(t, Init())
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}
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// default, allow all external, block none, no local networks
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init("", "", false)
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assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
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assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))
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// allow all including local networks (it could lead to SSRF in production)
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init("", "", true)
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assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
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assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))
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// allow wildcard, block some subdomains. if the domain name is allowed, then the local network check is skipped
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init("*.domain.com", "blocked.domain.com", false)
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assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("sub.domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
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assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("sub.domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))
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assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("blocked.domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
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assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("sub.other.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
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// allow wildcard (it could lead to SSRF in production)
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init("*", "", false)
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assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
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assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))
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// local network can still be blocked
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init("*", "127.0.0.*", false)
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assert.NoError(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4")}))
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assert.Error(t, checkByAllowBlockList("domain.com", []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}))
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// reset
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init("", "", false)
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}
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