mirror of
https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome.git
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86444eacc2
Merge in DNS/adguard-home from 2704-local-addresses-vol.2 to master Updates #2704. Updates #2829. Squashed commit of the following: commit 507d038c2709de59246fc0b65c3c4ab8e38d1990 Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Wed Mar 31 14:33:05 2021 +0300 aghtest: fix file name commit 8e19f99337bee1d88ad6595adb96f9bb23fa3c41 Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Wed Mar 31 14:06:43 2021 +0300 aghnet: rm redundant mutexes commit 361fa418b33ed160ca20862be1c455ab9378c03f Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Wed Mar 31 13:45:30 2021 +0300 all: fix names, docs commit 14034f4f0230d7aaa3645054946ae5c278089a99 Merge: 35e265cca72ce1cf
Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Wed Mar 31 13:38:15 2021 +0300 Merge branch 'master' into 2704-local-addresses-vol.2 commit 35e265cc8cd308ef1fda414b58c0217cb5f258e4 Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Wed Mar 31 13:33:35 2021 +0300 aghnet: imp naming commit 7a7edac7208a40697d7bc50682b923a144e28e2b Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Tue Mar 30 20:59:54 2021 +0300 changelog: oops, nope yet commit d26a5d2513daf662ac92053b5e235189a64cc022 Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Tue Mar 30 20:55:53 2021 +0300 all: some renaming for the glory of semantics commit 9937fa619452b0742616217b975e3ff048d58acb Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Mon Mar 29 15:34:42 2021 +0300 all: log changes commit d8d9e6dfeea8474466ee25f27021efdd3ddb1592 Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Fri Mar 26 18:32:23 2021 +0300 all: imp localresolver, imp cutting off own addresses commit 344140df449b85925f19b460fd7dc7c08e29c35a Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Fri Mar 26 14:53:33 2021 +0300 all: imp code quality commit 1c5c0babec73b125044e23dd3aa75d8eefc19b28 Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Thu Mar 25 20:44:08 2021 +0300 all: fix go.mod commit 0b9fb3c2369a752e893af8ddc45a86bb9fb27ce5 Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Thu Mar 25 20:38:51 2021 +0300 all: add error handling commit a7a2e51f57fc6f8f74b95a264ad345cd2a9e026e Merge: c13be63427f4f052
Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Thu Mar 25 19:48:36 2021 +0300 Merge branch 'master' into 2704-local-addresses-vol.2 commit c13be634f47bcaed9320a732a51c0e4752d0dad0 Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Thu Mar 25 18:52:28 2021 +0300 all: cover rdns with tests, imp aghnet functionality commit 48bed9025944530c613ee53e7961d6d5fbabf8be Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Wed Mar 24 20:18:07 2021 +0300 home: make rdns great again commit 1dbacfc8d5b6895807797998317fe3cc814617c1 Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Wed Mar 24 16:07:52 2021 +0300 all: imp external client restriction commit 1208a319a7f4ffe7b7fa8956f245d7a19437c0a4 Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Mon Mar 22 15:26:45 2021 +0300 all: finish local ptr processor commit c8827fc3db289e1a5d7a11d057743bab39957b02 Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Tue Mar 2 13:41:22 2021 +0300 all: imp ipdetector, add local ptr processor
555 lines
14 KiB
Go
555 lines
14 KiB
Go
package dnsforward
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import (
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"errors"
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"net"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/internal/aghnet"
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"github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/internal/dhcpd"
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"github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/internal/dnsfilter"
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"github.com/AdguardTeam/dnsproxy/proxy"
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"github.com/AdguardTeam/golibs/log"
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"github.com/miekg/dns"
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)
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// To transfer information between modules
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type dnsContext struct {
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// TODO(a.garipov): Remove this and rewrite processors to be methods of
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// *Server instead.
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srv *Server
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proxyCtx *proxy.DNSContext
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// setts are the filtering settings for the client.
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setts *dnsfilter.FilteringSettings
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startTime time.Time
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result *dnsfilter.Result
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// origResp is the response received from upstream. It is set when the
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// response is modified by filters.
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origResp *dns.Msg
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// unreversedReqIP stores an IP address obtained from PTR request if it
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// was successfully parsed.
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unreversedReqIP net.IP
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// err is the error returned from a processing function.
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err error
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// clientID is the clientID from DOH, DOQ, or DOT, if provided.
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clientID string
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// origQuestion is the question received from the client. It is set
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// when the request is modified by rewrites.
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origQuestion dns.Question
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// protectionEnabled shows if the filtering is enabled, and if the
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// server's DNS filter is ready.
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protectionEnabled bool
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// responseFromUpstream shows if the response is received from the
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// upstream servers.
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responseFromUpstream bool
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// origReqDNSSEC shows if the DNSSEC flag in the original request from
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// the client is set.
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origReqDNSSEC bool
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}
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// resultCode is the result of a request processing function.
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type resultCode int
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const (
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// resultCodeSuccess is returned when a handler performed successfully,
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// and the next handler must be called.
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resultCodeSuccess resultCode = iota
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// resultCodeFinish is returned when a handler performed successfully,
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// and the processing of the request must be stopped.
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resultCodeFinish
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// resultCodeError is returned when a handler failed, and the processing
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// of the request must be stopped.
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resultCodeError
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)
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// handleDNSRequest filters the incoming DNS requests and writes them to the query log
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func (s *Server) handleDNSRequest(_ *proxy.Proxy, d *proxy.DNSContext) error {
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ctx := &dnsContext{
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srv: s,
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proxyCtx: d,
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result: &dnsfilter.Result{},
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startTime: time.Now(),
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}
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type modProcessFunc func(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode)
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// Since (*dnsforward.Server).handleDNSRequest(...) is used as
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// proxy.(Config).RequestHandler, there is no need for additional index
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// out of range checking in any of the following functions, because the
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// (*proxy.Proxy).handleDNSRequest method performs it before calling the
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// appropriate handler.
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mods := []modProcessFunc{
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processInitial,
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s.processInternalHosts,
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s.processRestrictLocal,
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s.processInternalIPAddrs,
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processClientID,
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processFilteringBeforeRequest,
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s.processLocalPTR,
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processUpstream,
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processDNSSECAfterResponse,
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processFilteringAfterResponse,
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s.ipset.process,
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processQueryLogsAndStats,
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}
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for _, process := range mods {
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r := process(ctx)
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switch r {
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case resultCodeSuccess:
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// continue: call the next filter
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case resultCodeFinish:
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return nil
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case resultCodeError:
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return ctx.err
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}
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}
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if d.Res != nil {
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d.Res.Compress = true // some devices require DNS message compression
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Perform initial checks; process WHOIS & rDNS
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func processInitial(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
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s := ctx.srv
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d := ctx.proxyCtx
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if s.conf.AAAADisabled && d.Req.Question[0].Qtype == dns.TypeAAAA {
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_ = proxy.CheckDisabledAAAARequest(d, true)
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return resultCodeFinish
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}
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if s.conf.OnDNSRequest != nil {
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s.conf.OnDNSRequest(d)
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}
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// disable Mozilla DoH
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// https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/canary-domain-use-application-dnsnet
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if (d.Req.Question[0].Qtype == dns.TypeA || d.Req.Question[0].Qtype == dns.TypeAAAA) &&
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d.Req.Question[0].Name == "use-application-dns.net." {
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d.Res = s.genNXDomain(d.Req)
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return resultCodeFinish
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}
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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// Return TRUE if host names doesn't contain disallowed characters
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func isHostnameOK(hostname string) bool {
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for _, c := range hostname {
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if !((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') ||
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(c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') ||
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(c >= '0' && c <= '9') ||
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c == '.' || c == '-') {
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log.Debug("dns: skipping invalid hostname %s from DHCP", hostname)
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return false
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}
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}
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return true
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}
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func (s *Server) onDHCPLeaseChanged(flags int) {
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switch flags {
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case dhcpd.LeaseChangedAdded,
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dhcpd.LeaseChangedAddedStatic,
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dhcpd.LeaseChangedRemovedStatic:
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//
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default:
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return
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}
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hostToIP := make(map[string]net.IP)
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m := make(map[string]string)
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ll := s.dhcpServer.Leases(dhcpd.LeasesAll)
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for _, l := range ll {
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if len(l.Hostname) == 0 || !isHostnameOK(l.Hostname) {
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continue
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}
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lowhost := strings.ToLower(l.Hostname)
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m[l.IP.String()] = lowhost
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ip := make(net.IP, 4)
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copy(ip, l.IP.To4())
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hostToIP[lowhost] = ip
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}
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log.Debug("dns: added %d A/PTR entries from DHCP", len(m))
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s.tableHostToIPLock.Lock()
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s.tableHostToIP = hostToIP
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s.tableHostToIPLock.Unlock()
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s.tablePTRLock.Lock()
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s.tablePTR = m
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s.tablePTRLock.Unlock()
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}
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// hostToIP tries to get an IP leased by DHCP and returns the copy of address
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// since the data inside the internal table may be changed while request
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// processing. It's safe for concurrent use.
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func (s *Server) hostToIP(host string) (ip net.IP, ok bool) {
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s.tableHostToIPLock.Lock()
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defer s.tableHostToIPLock.Unlock()
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if s.tableHostToIP == nil {
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return nil, false
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}
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var ipFromTable net.IP
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ipFromTable, ok = s.tableHostToIP[host]
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if !ok {
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return nil, false
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}
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ip = make(net.IP, len(ipFromTable))
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copy(ip, ipFromTable)
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return ip, true
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}
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// processInternalHosts respond to A requests if the target hostname is known to
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// the server.
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//
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// TODO(a.garipov): Adapt to AAAA as well.
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func (s *Server) processInternalHosts(dctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
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req := dctx.proxyCtx.Req
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q := req.Question[0]
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// Go on processing the AAAA request despite the fact that we don't
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// support it yet. The expected behavior here is to respond with an
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// empty asnwer and not NXDOMAIN.
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if q.Qtype != dns.TypeA && q.Qtype != dns.TypeAAAA {
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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reqHost := strings.ToLower(q.Name)
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host := strings.TrimSuffix(reqHost, s.autohostSuffix)
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if host == reqHost {
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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// TODO(e.burkov): Restrict the access for external clients.
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ip, ok := s.hostToIP(host)
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if !ok {
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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log.Debug("dns: internal record: %s -> %s", q.Name, ip)
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resp := s.makeResponse(req)
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if q.Qtype == dns.TypeA {
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a := &dns.A{
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Hdr: s.hdr(req, dns.TypeA),
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A: ip,
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}
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resp.Answer = append(resp.Answer, a)
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}
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dctx.proxyCtx.Res = resp
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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// processRestrictLocal responds with empty answers to PTR requests for IP
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// addresses in locally-served network from external clients.
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func (s *Server) processRestrictLocal(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
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d := ctx.proxyCtx
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req := d.Req
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q := req.Question[0]
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if q.Qtype != dns.TypePTR {
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// No need for restriction.
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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ip := aghnet.UnreverseAddr(q.Name)
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if ip == nil {
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// That's weird.
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//
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// TODO(e.burkov): Research the cases when it could happen.
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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// Restrict an access to local addresses for external clients. We also
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// assume that all the DHCP leases we give are locally-served or at
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// least don't need to be unaccessable externally.
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if s.subnetDetector.IsLocallyServedNetwork(ip) {
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clientIP := IPFromAddr(d.Addr)
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if !s.subnetDetector.IsLocallyServedNetwork(clientIP) {
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log.Debug("dns: %q requests for internal ip", clientIP)
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d.Res = s.makeResponse(req)
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// Do not even put into query log.
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return resultCodeFinish
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}
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}
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// Do not perform unreversing ever again.
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ctx.unreversedReqIP = ip
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// Nothing to restrict.
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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// ipToHost tries to get a hostname leased by DHCP. It's safe for concurrent
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// use.
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func (s *Server) ipToHost(ip net.IP) (host string, ok bool) {
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s.tablePTRLock.Lock()
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defer s.tablePTRLock.Unlock()
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if s.tablePTR == nil {
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return "", false
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}
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host, ok = s.tablePTR[ip.String()]
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return host, ok
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}
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// Respond to PTR requests if the target IP is leased by our DHCP server and the
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// requestor is inside the local network.
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func (s *Server) processInternalIPAddrs(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
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d := ctx.proxyCtx
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if d.Res != nil {
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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ip := ctx.unreversedReqIP
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if ip == nil {
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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host, ok := s.ipToHost(ip)
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if !ok {
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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log.Debug("dns: reverse-lookup: %s -> %s", ip, host)
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req := d.Req
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resp := s.makeResponse(req)
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ptr := &dns.PTR{
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Hdr: dns.RR_Header{
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Name: req.Question[0].Name,
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Rrtype: dns.TypePTR,
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Ttl: s.conf.BlockedResponseTTL,
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Class: dns.ClassINET,
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},
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Ptr: dns.Fqdn(host),
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}
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resp.Answer = append(resp.Answer, ptr)
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d.Res = resp
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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// processLocalPTR responds to PTR requests if the target IP is detected to be
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// inside the local network and the query was not answered from DHCP.
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func (s *Server) processLocalPTR(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
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d := ctx.proxyCtx
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if d.Res != nil {
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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ip := ctx.unreversedReqIP
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if ip == nil {
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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if !s.subnetDetector.IsLocallyServedNetwork(ip) {
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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req := d.Req
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resp, err := s.localResolvers.Exchange(req)
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, aghnet.NoUpstreamsErr) {
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d.Res = s.genNXDomain(req)
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return resultCodeFinish
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}
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ctx.err = err
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return resultCodeError
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}
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d.Res = resp
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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// Apply filtering logic
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func processFilteringBeforeRequest(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
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s := ctx.srv
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d := ctx.proxyCtx
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if d.Res != nil {
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return resultCodeSuccess // response is already set - nothing to do
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}
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s.RLock()
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// Synchronize access to s.dnsFilter so it won't be suddenly uninitialized while in use.
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// This could happen after proxy server has been stopped, but its workers are not yet exited.
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//
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// A better approach is for proxy.Stop() to wait until all its workers exit,
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// but this would require the Upstream interface to have Close() function
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// (to prevent from hanging while waiting for unresponsive DNS server to respond).
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var err error
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ctx.protectionEnabled = s.conf.ProtectionEnabled && s.dnsFilter != nil
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if ctx.protectionEnabled {
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ctx.setts = s.getClientRequestFilteringSettings(ctx)
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ctx.result, err = s.filterDNSRequest(ctx)
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}
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s.RUnlock()
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if err != nil {
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ctx.err = err
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return resultCodeError
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}
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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// processUpstream passes request to upstream servers and handles the response.
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func processUpstream(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
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s := ctx.srv
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d := ctx.proxyCtx
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if d.Res != nil {
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return resultCodeSuccess // response is already set - nothing to do
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}
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if d.Addr != nil && s.conf.GetCustomUpstreamByClient != nil {
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clientIP := IPStringFromAddr(d.Addr)
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upstreamsConf := s.conf.GetCustomUpstreamByClient(clientIP)
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if upstreamsConf != nil {
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log.Debug("Using custom upstreams for %s", clientIP)
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d.CustomUpstreamConfig = upstreamsConf
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}
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}
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if s.conf.EnableDNSSEC {
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opt := d.Req.IsEdns0()
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if opt == nil {
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log.Debug("dns: Adding OPT record with DNSSEC flag")
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d.Req.SetEdns0(4096, true)
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} else if !opt.Do() {
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opt.SetDo(true)
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} else {
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ctx.origReqDNSSEC = true
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}
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}
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// request was not filtered so let it be processed further
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err := s.dnsProxy.Resolve(d)
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if err != nil {
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ctx.err = err
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return resultCodeError
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}
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ctx.responseFromUpstream = true
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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// Process DNSSEC after response from upstream server
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func processDNSSECAfterResponse(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
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d := ctx.proxyCtx
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if !ctx.responseFromUpstream || // don't process response if it's not from upstream servers
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!ctx.srv.conf.EnableDNSSEC {
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|
return resultCodeSuccess
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !ctx.origReqDNSSEC {
|
|
optResp := d.Res.IsEdns0()
|
|
if optResp != nil && !optResp.Do() {
|
|
return resultCodeSuccess
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Remove RRSIG records from response
|
|
// because there is no DO flag in the original request from client,
|
|
// but we have EnableDNSSEC set, so we have set DO flag ourselves,
|
|
// and now we have to clean up the DNS records our client didn't ask for.
|
|
|
|
answers := []dns.RR{}
|
|
for _, a := range d.Res.Answer {
|
|
switch a.(type) {
|
|
case *dns.RRSIG:
|
|
log.Debug("Removing RRSIG record from response: %v", a)
|
|
default:
|
|
answers = append(answers, a)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
d.Res.Answer = answers
|
|
|
|
answers = []dns.RR{}
|
|
for _, a := range d.Res.Ns {
|
|
switch a.(type) {
|
|
case *dns.RRSIG:
|
|
log.Debug("Removing RRSIG record from response: %v", a)
|
|
default:
|
|
answers = append(answers, a)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
d.Res.Ns = answers
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return resultCodeSuccess
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Apply filtering logic after we have received response from upstream servers
|
|
func processFilteringAfterResponse(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
|
|
s := ctx.srv
|
|
d := ctx.proxyCtx
|
|
res := ctx.result
|
|
var err error
|
|
|
|
switch res.Reason {
|
|
case dnsfilter.Rewritten,
|
|
dnsfilter.RewrittenRule:
|
|
|
|
if len(ctx.origQuestion.Name) == 0 {
|
|
// origQuestion is set in case we get only CNAME without IP from rewrites table
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
d.Req.Question[0] = ctx.origQuestion
|
|
d.Res.Question[0] = ctx.origQuestion
|
|
|
|
if len(d.Res.Answer) != 0 {
|
|
answer := []dns.RR{}
|
|
answer = append(answer, s.genAnswerCNAME(d.Req, res.CanonName))
|
|
answer = append(answer, d.Res.Answer...)
|
|
d.Res.Answer = answer
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case dnsfilter.NotFilteredAllowList:
|
|
// nothing
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
if !ctx.protectionEnabled || // filters are disabled: there's nothing to check for
|
|
!ctx.responseFromUpstream { // only check response if it's from an upstream server
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
origResp2 := d.Res
|
|
ctx.result, err = s.filterDNSResponse(ctx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
ctx.err = err
|
|
return resultCodeError
|
|
}
|
|
if ctx.result != nil {
|
|
ctx.origResp = origResp2 // matched by response
|
|
} else {
|
|
ctx.result = &dnsfilter.Result{}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return resultCodeSuccess
|
|
}
|