mirror of
https://github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome.git
synced 2024-11-17 10:58:29 -07:00
fc9ddcf941
Merge in DNS/adguard-home from 1383-client-id to master Updates #1383. Squashed commit of the following: commit ebe2678bfa9bf651a2cb1e64499b38edcf19a7ad Author: Ildar Kamalov <ik@adguard.com> Date: Wed Jan 27 17:51:59 2021 +0300 - client: check if IP is valid commit 0c330585a170ea149ee75e43dfa65211e057299c Author: Ildar Kamalov <ik@adguard.com> Date: Wed Jan 27 17:07:50 2021 +0300 - client: find clients by client_id commit 71c9593ee35d996846f061e114b7867c3aa3c978 Merge: 9104f1613e9edd9e
Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM> Date: Wed Jan 27 16:09:45 2021 +0300 Merge branch 'master' into 1383-client-id commit 9104f1615d2d462606c52017df25a422df872cea Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM> Date: Wed Jan 27 13:28:50 2021 +0300 dnsforward: imp tests commit ed47f26e611ade625a2cc2c2f71a291b796bbf8f Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM> Date: Wed Jan 27 12:39:52 2021 +0300 dnsforward: fix address commit 98b222ba69a5d265f620c180c960d01c84a1fb3b Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM> Date: Tue Jan 26 19:50:31 2021 +0300 home: imp code commit 4f3966548a2d8437d0b68207dd108dd1a6cb7d20 Merge: 199fdc05c215b820
Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM> Date: Tue Jan 26 19:45:13 2021 +0300 Merge branch 'master' into 1383-client-id commit 199fdc056f8a8be5500584f3aaee32865188aedc Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM> Date: Tue Jan 26 19:20:37 2021 +0300 all: imp tests, logging, etc commit 35ff14f4d534251aecb2ea60baba225f3eed8a3e Author: Ildar Kamalov <ik@adguard.com> Date: Tue Jan 26 18:55:19 2021 +0300 + client: remove block button from clients with client_id commit 32991a0b4c56583a02fb5e00bba95d96000bce20 Author: Ildar Kamalov <ik@adguard.com> Date: Tue Jan 26 18:54:25 2021 +0300 + client: add requests count for client_id commit 2d68df4d2eac4a296d7469923e601dad4575c1a1 Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM> Date: Tue Jan 26 15:49:50 2021 +0300 stats: handle client ids commit 4e14ab3590328f93a8cd6e9cbe1665baf74f220b Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM> Date: Tue Jan 26 13:45:25 2021 +0300 openapi: fix example commit ca9cf3f744fe197cace2c28ddc5bc68f71dad1f3 Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM> Date: Tue Jan 26 13:37:10 2021 +0300 openapi: improve clients find api docs commit f79876e550c424558b704bc316a4cd04f25db011 Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM> Date: Tue Jan 26 13:18:52 2021 +0300 home: accept ids in clients find commit 5b72595122aa0bd64debadfd753ed8a0e0840629 Merge: 607e241fabf8f65f
Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM> Date: Mon Jan 25 18:34:56 2021 +0300 Merge branch 'master' into 1383-client-id commit 607e241f1c339dd6397218f70b8301e3de6a1ee0 Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM> Date: Mon Jan 25 18:30:39 2021 +0300 dnsforward: fix quic commit f046352fef93e46234c2bbe8ae316d21034260e5 Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM> Date: Mon Jan 25 16:53:09 2021 +0300 all: remove wildcard requirement commit 3b679489bae82c54177372be453fe184d8f0bab6 Author: Andrey Meshkov <am@adguard.com> Date: Mon Jan 25 16:02:28 2021 +0300 workDir now supports symlinks commit 0647ab4f113de2223f6949df001f42ecab05c995 Author: Ildar Kamalov <ik@adguard.com> Date: Mon Jan 25 14:59:46 2021 +0300 - client: remove wildcard from domain validation commit b1aec04a4ecadc9d65648ed6d284188fecce01c3 Author: Ildar Kamalov <ik@adguard.com> Date: Mon Jan 25 14:55:39 2021 +0300 + client: add form to download mobileconfig ... and 12 more commits
595 lines
15 KiB
Go
595 lines
15 KiB
Go
package dnsforward
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import (
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"crypto/tls"
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"path"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/internal/dhcpd"
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"github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/internal/dnsfilter"
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"github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/internal/util"
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"github.com/AdguardTeam/dnsproxy/proxy"
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"github.com/AdguardTeam/golibs/log"
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"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go"
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"github.com/miekg/dns"
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)
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// To transfer information between modules
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type dnsContext struct {
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srv *Server
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proxyCtx *proxy.DNSContext
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// setts are the filtering settings for the client.
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setts *dnsfilter.RequestFilteringSettings
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startTime time.Time
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result *dnsfilter.Result
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// origResp is the response received from upstream. It is set when the
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// response is modified by filters.
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origResp *dns.Msg
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// err is the error returned from a processing function.
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err error
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// clientID is the clientID from DOH, DOQ, or DOT, if provided.
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clientID string
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// origQuestion is the question received from the client. It is set
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// when the request is modified by rewrites.
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origQuestion dns.Question
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// protectionEnabled shows if the filtering is enabled, and if the
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// server's DNS filter is ready.
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protectionEnabled bool
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// responseFromUpstream shows if the response is received from the
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// upstream servers.
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responseFromUpstream bool
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// origReqDNSSEC shows if the DNSSEC flag in the original request from
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// the client is set.
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origReqDNSSEC bool
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}
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// resultCode is the result of a request processing function.
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type resultCode int
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const (
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// resultCodeSuccess is returned when a handler performed successfully,
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// and the next handler must be called.
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resultCodeSuccess resultCode = iota
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// resultCodeFinish is returned when a handler performed successfully,
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// and the processing of the request must be stopped.
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resultCodeFinish
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// resultCodeError is returned when a handler failed, and the processing
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// of the request must be stopped.
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resultCodeError
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)
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// handleDNSRequest filters the incoming DNS requests and writes them to the query log
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func (s *Server) handleDNSRequest(_ *proxy.Proxy, d *proxy.DNSContext) error {
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ctx := &dnsContext{
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srv: s,
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proxyCtx: d,
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result: &dnsfilter.Result{},
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startTime: time.Now(),
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}
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type modProcessFunc func(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode)
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// Since (*dnsforward.Server).handleDNSRequest(...) is used as
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// proxy.(Config).RequestHandler, there is no need for additional index
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// out of range checking in any of the following functions, because the
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// (*proxy.Proxy).handleDNSRequest method performs it before calling the
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// appropriate handler.
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mods := []modProcessFunc{
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processInitial,
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processInternalHosts,
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processInternalIPAddrs,
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processClientID,
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processFilteringBeforeRequest,
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processUpstream,
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processDNSSECAfterResponse,
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processFilteringAfterResponse,
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s.ipset.process,
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processQueryLogsAndStats,
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}
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for _, process := range mods {
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r := process(ctx)
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switch r {
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case resultCodeSuccess:
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// continue: call the next filter
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case resultCodeFinish:
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return nil
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case resultCodeError:
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return ctx.err
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}
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}
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if d.Res != nil {
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d.Res.Compress = true // some devices require DNS message compression
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Perform initial checks; process WHOIS & rDNS
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func processInitial(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
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s := ctx.srv
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d := ctx.proxyCtx
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if s.conf.AAAADisabled && d.Req.Question[0].Qtype == dns.TypeAAAA {
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_ = proxy.CheckDisabledAAAARequest(d, true)
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return resultCodeFinish
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}
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if s.conf.OnDNSRequest != nil {
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s.conf.OnDNSRequest(d)
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}
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// disable Mozilla DoH
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// https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/canary-domain-use-application-dnsnet
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if (d.Req.Question[0].Qtype == dns.TypeA || d.Req.Question[0].Qtype == dns.TypeAAAA) &&
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d.Req.Question[0].Name == "use-application-dns.net." {
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d.Res = s.genNXDomain(d.Req)
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return resultCodeFinish
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}
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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// Return TRUE if host names doesn't contain disallowed characters
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func isHostnameOK(hostname string) bool {
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for _, c := range hostname {
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if !((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') ||
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(c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') ||
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(c >= '0' && c <= '9') ||
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c == '.' || c == '-') {
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log.Debug("DNS: skipping invalid hostname %s from DHCP", hostname)
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return false
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}
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}
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return true
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}
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func (s *Server) onDHCPLeaseChanged(flags int) {
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switch flags {
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case dhcpd.LeaseChangedAdded,
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dhcpd.LeaseChangedAddedStatic,
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dhcpd.LeaseChangedRemovedStatic:
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//
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default:
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return
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}
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hostToIP := make(map[string]net.IP)
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m := make(map[string]string)
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ll := s.dhcpServer.Leases(dhcpd.LeasesAll)
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for _, l := range ll {
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if len(l.Hostname) == 0 || !isHostnameOK(l.Hostname) {
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continue
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}
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lowhost := strings.ToLower(l.Hostname)
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m[l.IP.String()] = lowhost
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ip := make(net.IP, 4)
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copy(ip, l.IP.To4())
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hostToIP[lowhost] = ip
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}
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log.Debug("DNS: added %d A/PTR entries from DHCP", len(m))
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s.tableHostToIPLock.Lock()
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s.tableHostToIP = hostToIP
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s.tableHostToIPLock.Unlock()
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s.tablePTRLock.Lock()
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s.tablePTR = m
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s.tablePTRLock.Unlock()
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}
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// Respond to A requests if the target host name is associated with a lease from our DHCP server
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func processInternalHosts(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
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s := ctx.srv
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req := ctx.proxyCtx.Req
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if !(req.Question[0].Qtype == dns.TypeA || req.Question[0].Qtype == dns.TypeAAAA) {
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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host := req.Question[0].Name
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host = strings.ToLower(host)
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if !strings.HasSuffix(host, ".lan.") {
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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host = strings.TrimSuffix(host, ".lan.")
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s.tableHostToIPLock.Lock()
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if s.tableHostToIP == nil {
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s.tableHostToIPLock.Unlock()
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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ip, ok := s.tableHostToIP[host]
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s.tableHostToIPLock.Unlock()
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if !ok {
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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log.Debug("DNS: internal record: %s -> %s", req.Question[0].Name, ip)
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resp := s.makeResponse(req)
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if req.Question[0].Qtype == dns.TypeA {
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a := &dns.A{}
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a.Hdr = dns.RR_Header{
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Name: req.Question[0].Name,
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Rrtype: dns.TypeA,
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Ttl: s.conf.BlockedResponseTTL,
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Class: dns.ClassINET,
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}
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a.A = make([]byte, 4)
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copy(a.A, ip)
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resp.Answer = append(resp.Answer, a)
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}
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ctx.proxyCtx.Res = resp
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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const maxDomainPartLen = 64
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// ValidateClientID returns an error if clientID is not a valid client ID.
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func ValidateClientID(clientID string) (err error) {
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if len(clientID) > maxDomainPartLen {
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return fmt.Errorf("client id %q is too long, max: %d", clientID, maxDomainPartLen)
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}
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for i, r := range clientID {
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if (r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') || (r >= '0' && r <= '9') || r == '-' {
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continue
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}
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid char %q at index %d in client id %q", r, i, clientID)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// clientIDFromClientServerName extracts and validates a client ID. hostSrvName
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// is the server name of the host. cliSrvName is the server name as sent by the
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// client.
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func clientIDFromClientServerName(hostSrvName, cliSrvName string) (clientID string, err error) {
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if hostSrvName == cliSrvName {
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return "", nil
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}
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if !strings.HasSuffix(cliSrvName, hostSrvName) {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("client server name %q doesn't match host server name %q", cliSrvName, hostSrvName)
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}
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clientID = cliSrvName[:len(cliSrvName)-len(hostSrvName)-1]
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err = ValidateClientID(clientID)
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if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid client id: %w", err)
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}
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return clientID, nil
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}
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// processClientIDHTTPS extracts the client's ID from the path of the
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// client's DNS-over-HTTPS request.
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func processClientIDHTTPS(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
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pctx := ctx.proxyCtx
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r := pctx.HTTPRequest
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if r == nil {
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ctx.err = fmt.Errorf("proxy ctx http request of proto %s is nil", pctx.Proto)
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return resultCodeError
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}
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origPath := r.URL.Path
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parts := strings.Split(path.Clean(origPath), "/")
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if parts[0] == "" {
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parts = parts[1:]
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}
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if len(parts) == 0 || parts[0] != "dns-query" {
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ctx.err = fmt.Errorf("client id check: invalid path %q", origPath)
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return resultCodeError
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}
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clientID := ""
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switch len(parts) {
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case 1:
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// Just /dns-query, no client ID.
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return resultCodeSuccess
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case 2:
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clientID = parts[1]
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default:
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ctx.err = fmt.Errorf("client id check: invalid path %q: extra parts", origPath)
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return resultCodeError
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}
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err := ValidateClientID(clientID)
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if err != nil {
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ctx.err = fmt.Errorf("client id check: invalid client id: %w", err)
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return resultCodeError
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}
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ctx.clientID = clientID
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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// tlsConn is a narrow interface for *tls.Conn to simplify testing.
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type tlsConn interface {
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ConnectionState() (cs tls.ConnectionState)
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}
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// quicSession is a narrow interface for quic.Session to simplify testing.
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type quicSession interface {
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ConnectionState() (cs quic.ConnectionState)
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}
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// processClientID extracts the client's ID from the server name of the client's
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// DOT or DOQ request or the path of the client's DOH.
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func processClientID(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
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pctx := ctx.proxyCtx
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proto := pctx.Proto
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if proto == proxy.ProtoHTTPS {
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return processClientIDHTTPS(ctx)
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} else if proto != proxy.ProtoTLS && proto != proxy.ProtoQUIC {
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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hostSrvName := ctx.srv.conf.TLSConfig.ServerName
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if hostSrvName == "" {
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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cliSrvName := ""
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if proto == proxy.ProtoTLS {
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conn := pctx.Conn
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tc, ok := conn.(tlsConn)
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if !ok {
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ctx.err = fmt.Errorf("proxy ctx conn of proto %s is %T, want *tls.Conn", proto, conn)
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return resultCodeError
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}
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cliSrvName = tc.ConnectionState().ServerName
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} else if proto == proxy.ProtoQUIC {
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qs, ok := pctx.QUICSession.(quicSession)
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if !ok {
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ctx.err = fmt.Errorf("proxy ctx quic session of proto %s is %T, want quic.Session", proto, pctx.QUICSession)
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return resultCodeError
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}
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cliSrvName = qs.ConnectionState().ServerName
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}
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clientID, err := clientIDFromClientServerName(hostSrvName, cliSrvName)
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if err != nil {
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ctx.err = fmt.Errorf("client id check: %w", err)
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return resultCodeError
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}
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ctx.clientID = clientID
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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// Respond to PTR requests if the target IP address is leased by our DHCP server
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func processInternalIPAddrs(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
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s := ctx.srv
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req := ctx.proxyCtx.Req
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if req.Question[0].Qtype != dns.TypePTR {
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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arpa := req.Question[0].Name
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arpa = strings.TrimSuffix(arpa, ".")
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arpa = strings.ToLower(arpa)
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ip := util.DNSUnreverseAddr(arpa)
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if ip == nil {
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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s.tablePTRLock.Lock()
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if s.tablePTR == nil {
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s.tablePTRLock.Unlock()
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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host, ok := s.tablePTR[ip.String()]
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s.tablePTRLock.Unlock()
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if !ok {
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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log.Debug("DNS: reverse-lookup: %s -> %s", arpa, host)
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resp := s.makeResponse(req)
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ptr := &dns.PTR{}
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ptr.Hdr = dns.RR_Header{
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Name: req.Question[0].Name,
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Rrtype: dns.TypePTR,
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Ttl: s.conf.BlockedResponseTTL,
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Class: dns.ClassINET,
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}
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ptr.Ptr = host + "."
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resp.Answer = append(resp.Answer, ptr)
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ctx.proxyCtx.Res = resp
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return resultCodeSuccess
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}
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// Apply filtering logic
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func processFilteringBeforeRequest(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
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s := ctx.srv
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d := ctx.proxyCtx
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if d.Res != nil {
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return resultCodeSuccess // response is already set - nothing to do
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}
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s.RLock()
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// Synchronize access to s.dnsFilter so it won't be suddenly uninitialized while in use.
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// This could happen after proxy server has been stopped, but its workers are not yet exited.
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//
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// A better approach is for proxy.Stop() to wait until all its workers exit,
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// but this would require the Upstream interface to have Close() function
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// (to prevent from hanging while waiting for unresponsive DNS server to respond).
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var err error
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ctx.protectionEnabled = s.conf.ProtectionEnabled && s.dnsFilter != nil
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if ctx.protectionEnabled {
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ctx.setts = s.getClientRequestFilteringSettings(ctx)
|
|
ctx.result, err = s.filterDNSRequest(ctx)
|
|
}
|
|
s.RUnlock()
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
ctx.err = err
|
|
return resultCodeError
|
|
}
|
|
return resultCodeSuccess
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// processUpstream passes request to upstream servers and handles the response.
|
|
func processUpstream(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
|
|
s := ctx.srv
|
|
d := ctx.proxyCtx
|
|
if d.Res != nil {
|
|
return resultCodeSuccess // response is already set - nothing to do
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if d.Addr != nil && s.conf.GetCustomUpstreamByClient != nil {
|
|
clientIP := IPStringFromAddr(d.Addr)
|
|
upstreamsConf := s.conf.GetCustomUpstreamByClient(clientIP)
|
|
if upstreamsConf != nil {
|
|
log.Debug("Using custom upstreams for %s", clientIP)
|
|
d.CustomUpstreamConfig = upstreamsConf
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if s.conf.EnableDNSSEC {
|
|
opt := d.Req.IsEdns0()
|
|
if opt == nil {
|
|
log.Debug("DNS: Adding OPT record with DNSSEC flag")
|
|
d.Req.SetEdns0(4096, true)
|
|
} else if !opt.Do() {
|
|
opt.SetDo(true)
|
|
} else {
|
|
ctx.origReqDNSSEC = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// request was not filtered so let it be processed further
|
|
err := s.dnsProxy.Resolve(d)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
ctx.err = err
|
|
return resultCodeError
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx.responseFromUpstream = true
|
|
return resultCodeSuccess
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Process DNSSEC after response from upstream server
|
|
func processDNSSECAfterResponse(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
|
|
d := ctx.proxyCtx
|
|
|
|
if !ctx.responseFromUpstream || // don't process response if it's not from upstream servers
|
|
!ctx.srv.conf.EnableDNSSEC {
|
|
return resultCodeSuccess
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !ctx.origReqDNSSEC {
|
|
optResp := d.Res.IsEdns0()
|
|
if optResp != nil && !optResp.Do() {
|
|
return resultCodeSuccess
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Remove RRSIG records from response
|
|
// because there is no DO flag in the original request from client,
|
|
// but we have EnableDNSSEC set, so we have set DO flag ourselves,
|
|
// and now we have to clean up the DNS records our client didn't ask for.
|
|
|
|
answers := []dns.RR{}
|
|
for _, a := range d.Res.Answer {
|
|
switch a.(type) {
|
|
case *dns.RRSIG:
|
|
log.Debug("Removing RRSIG record from response: %v", a)
|
|
default:
|
|
answers = append(answers, a)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
d.Res.Answer = answers
|
|
|
|
answers = []dns.RR{}
|
|
for _, a := range d.Res.Ns {
|
|
switch a.(type) {
|
|
case *dns.RRSIG:
|
|
log.Debug("Removing RRSIG record from response: %v", a)
|
|
default:
|
|
answers = append(answers, a)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
d.Res.Ns = answers
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return resultCodeSuccess
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Apply filtering logic after we have received response from upstream servers
|
|
func processFilteringAfterResponse(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
|
|
s := ctx.srv
|
|
d := ctx.proxyCtx
|
|
res := ctx.result
|
|
var err error
|
|
|
|
switch res.Reason {
|
|
case dnsfilter.Rewritten,
|
|
dnsfilter.RewrittenRule:
|
|
|
|
if len(ctx.origQuestion.Name) == 0 {
|
|
// origQuestion is set in case we get only CNAME without IP from rewrites table
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
d.Req.Question[0] = ctx.origQuestion
|
|
d.Res.Question[0] = ctx.origQuestion
|
|
|
|
if len(d.Res.Answer) != 0 {
|
|
answer := []dns.RR{}
|
|
answer = append(answer, s.genAnswerCNAME(d.Req, res.CanonName))
|
|
answer = append(answer, d.Res.Answer...)
|
|
d.Res.Answer = answer
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case dnsfilter.NotFilteredAllowList:
|
|
// nothing
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
if !ctx.protectionEnabled || // filters are disabled: there's nothing to check for
|
|
!ctx.responseFromUpstream { // only check response if it's from an upstream server
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
origResp2 := d.Res
|
|
ctx.result, err = s.filterDNSResponse(ctx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
ctx.err = err
|
|
return resultCodeError
|
|
}
|
|
if ctx.result != nil {
|
|
ctx.origResp = origResp2 // matched by response
|
|
} else {
|
|
ctx.result = &dnsfilter.Result{}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return resultCodeSuccess
|
|
}
|