AdGuardHome/internal/dnsforward/dns.go
Ainar Garipov fc9ddcf941 Pull request: all: client id support
Merge in DNS/adguard-home from 1383-client-id to master

Updates #1383.

Squashed commit of the following:

commit ebe2678bfa9bf651a2cb1e64499b38edcf19a7ad
Author: Ildar Kamalov <ik@adguard.com>
Date:   Wed Jan 27 17:51:59 2021 +0300

    - client: check if IP is valid

commit 0c330585a170ea149ee75e43dfa65211e057299c
Author: Ildar Kamalov <ik@adguard.com>
Date:   Wed Jan 27 17:07:50 2021 +0300

    - client: find clients by client_id

commit 71c9593ee35d996846f061e114b7867c3aa3c978
Merge: 9104f161 3e9edd9e
Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM>
Date:   Wed Jan 27 16:09:45 2021 +0300

    Merge branch 'master' into 1383-client-id

commit 9104f1615d2d462606c52017df25a422df872cea
Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM>
Date:   Wed Jan 27 13:28:50 2021 +0300

    dnsforward: imp tests

commit ed47f26e611ade625a2cc2c2f71a291b796bbf8f
Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM>
Date:   Wed Jan 27 12:39:52 2021 +0300

    dnsforward: fix address

commit 98b222ba69a5d265f620c180c960d01c84a1fb3b
Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM>
Date:   Tue Jan 26 19:50:31 2021 +0300

    home: imp code

commit 4f3966548a2d8437d0b68207dd108dd1a6cb7d20
Merge: 199fdc05 c215b820
Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM>
Date:   Tue Jan 26 19:45:13 2021 +0300

    Merge branch 'master' into 1383-client-id

commit 199fdc056f8a8be5500584f3aaee32865188aedc
Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM>
Date:   Tue Jan 26 19:20:37 2021 +0300

    all: imp tests, logging, etc

commit 35ff14f4d534251aecb2ea60baba225f3eed8a3e
Author: Ildar Kamalov <ik@adguard.com>
Date:   Tue Jan 26 18:55:19 2021 +0300

    + client: remove block button from clients with client_id

commit 32991a0b4c56583a02fb5e00bba95d96000bce20
Author: Ildar Kamalov <ik@adguard.com>
Date:   Tue Jan 26 18:54:25 2021 +0300

    + client: add requests count for client_id

commit 2d68df4d2eac4a296d7469923e601dad4575c1a1
Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM>
Date:   Tue Jan 26 15:49:50 2021 +0300

    stats: handle client ids

commit 4e14ab3590328f93a8cd6e9cbe1665baf74f220b
Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM>
Date:   Tue Jan 26 13:45:25 2021 +0300

    openapi: fix example

commit ca9cf3f744fe197cace2c28ddc5bc68f71dad1f3
Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM>
Date:   Tue Jan 26 13:37:10 2021 +0300

    openapi: improve clients find api docs

commit f79876e550c424558b704bc316a4cd04f25db011
Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM>
Date:   Tue Jan 26 13:18:52 2021 +0300

    home: accept ids in clients find

commit 5b72595122aa0bd64debadfd753ed8a0e0840629
Merge: 607e241f abf8f65f
Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM>
Date:   Mon Jan 25 18:34:56 2021 +0300

    Merge branch 'master' into 1383-client-id

commit 607e241f1c339dd6397218f70b8301e3de6a1ee0
Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM>
Date:   Mon Jan 25 18:30:39 2021 +0300

    dnsforward: fix quic

commit f046352fef93e46234c2bbe8ae316d21034260e5
Author: Ainar Garipov <A.Garipov@AdGuard.COM>
Date:   Mon Jan 25 16:53:09 2021 +0300

    all: remove wildcard requirement

commit 3b679489bae82c54177372be453fe184d8f0bab6
Author: Andrey Meshkov <am@adguard.com>
Date:   Mon Jan 25 16:02:28 2021 +0300

    workDir now supports symlinks

commit 0647ab4f113de2223f6949df001f42ecab05c995
Author: Ildar Kamalov <ik@adguard.com>
Date:   Mon Jan 25 14:59:46 2021 +0300

    - client: remove wildcard from domain validation

commit b1aec04a4ecadc9d65648ed6d284188fecce01c3
Author: Ildar Kamalov <ik@adguard.com>
Date:   Mon Jan 25 14:55:39 2021 +0300

    + client: add form to download mobileconfig

... and 12 more commits
2021-01-27 18:32:13 +03:00

595 lines
15 KiB
Go

package dnsforward
import (
"crypto/tls"
"fmt"
"net"
"path"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/internal/dhcpd"
"github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/internal/dnsfilter"
"github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/internal/util"
"github.com/AdguardTeam/dnsproxy/proxy"
"github.com/AdguardTeam/golibs/log"
"github.com/lucas-clemente/quic-go"
"github.com/miekg/dns"
)
// To transfer information between modules
type dnsContext struct {
srv *Server
proxyCtx *proxy.DNSContext
// setts are the filtering settings for the client.
setts *dnsfilter.RequestFilteringSettings
startTime time.Time
result *dnsfilter.Result
// origResp is the response received from upstream. It is set when the
// response is modified by filters.
origResp *dns.Msg
// err is the error returned from a processing function.
err error
// clientID is the clientID from DOH, DOQ, or DOT, if provided.
clientID string
// origQuestion is the question received from the client. It is set
// when the request is modified by rewrites.
origQuestion dns.Question
// protectionEnabled shows if the filtering is enabled, and if the
// server's DNS filter is ready.
protectionEnabled bool
// responseFromUpstream shows if the response is received from the
// upstream servers.
responseFromUpstream bool
// origReqDNSSEC shows if the DNSSEC flag in the original request from
// the client is set.
origReqDNSSEC bool
}
// resultCode is the result of a request processing function.
type resultCode int
const (
// resultCodeSuccess is returned when a handler performed successfully,
// and the next handler must be called.
resultCodeSuccess resultCode = iota
// resultCodeFinish is returned when a handler performed successfully,
// and the processing of the request must be stopped.
resultCodeFinish
// resultCodeError is returned when a handler failed, and the processing
// of the request must be stopped.
resultCodeError
)
// handleDNSRequest filters the incoming DNS requests and writes them to the query log
func (s *Server) handleDNSRequest(_ *proxy.Proxy, d *proxy.DNSContext) error {
ctx := &dnsContext{
srv: s,
proxyCtx: d,
result: &dnsfilter.Result{},
startTime: time.Now(),
}
type modProcessFunc func(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode)
// Since (*dnsforward.Server).handleDNSRequest(...) is used as
// proxy.(Config).RequestHandler, there is no need for additional index
// out of range checking in any of the following functions, because the
// (*proxy.Proxy).handleDNSRequest method performs it before calling the
// appropriate handler.
mods := []modProcessFunc{
processInitial,
processInternalHosts,
processInternalIPAddrs,
processClientID,
processFilteringBeforeRequest,
processUpstream,
processDNSSECAfterResponse,
processFilteringAfterResponse,
s.ipset.process,
processQueryLogsAndStats,
}
for _, process := range mods {
r := process(ctx)
switch r {
case resultCodeSuccess:
// continue: call the next filter
case resultCodeFinish:
return nil
case resultCodeError:
return ctx.err
}
}
if d.Res != nil {
d.Res.Compress = true // some devices require DNS message compression
}
return nil
}
// Perform initial checks; process WHOIS & rDNS
func processInitial(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
s := ctx.srv
d := ctx.proxyCtx
if s.conf.AAAADisabled && d.Req.Question[0].Qtype == dns.TypeAAAA {
_ = proxy.CheckDisabledAAAARequest(d, true)
return resultCodeFinish
}
if s.conf.OnDNSRequest != nil {
s.conf.OnDNSRequest(d)
}
// disable Mozilla DoH
// https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/canary-domain-use-application-dnsnet
if (d.Req.Question[0].Qtype == dns.TypeA || d.Req.Question[0].Qtype == dns.TypeAAAA) &&
d.Req.Question[0].Name == "use-application-dns.net." {
d.Res = s.genNXDomain(d.Req)
return resultCodeFinish
}
return resultCodeSuccess
}
// Return TRUE if host names doesn't contain disallowed characters
func isHostnameOK(hostname string) bool {
for _, c := range hostname {
if !((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') ||
(c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') ||
(c >= '0' && c <= '9') ||
c == '.' || c == '-') {
log.Debug("DNS: skipping invalid hostname %s from DHCP", hostname)
return false
}
}
return true
}
func (s *Server) onDHCPLeaseChanged(flags int) {
switch flags {
case dhcpd.LeaseChangedAdded,
dhcpd.LeaseChangedAddedStatic,
dhcpd.LeaseChangedRemovedStatic:
//
default:
return
}
hostToIP := make(map[string]net.IP)
m := make(map[string]string)
ll := s.dhcpServer.Leases(dhcpd.LeasesAll)
for _, l := range ll {
if len(l.Hostname) == 0 || !isHostnameOK(l.Hostname) {
continue
}
lowhost := strings.ToLower(l.Hostname)
m[l.IP.String()] = lowhost
ip := make(net.IP, 4)
copy(ip, l.IP.To4())
hostToIP[lowhost] = ip
}
log.Debug("DNS: added %d A/PTR entries from DHCP", len(m))
s.tableHostToIPLock.Lock()
s.tableHostToIP = hostToIP
s.tableHostToIPLock.Unlock()
s.tablePTRLock.Lock()
s.tablePTR = m
s.tablePTRLock.Unlock()
}
// Respond to A requests if the target host name is associated with a lease from our DHCP server
func processInternalHosts(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
s := ctx.srv
req := ctx.proxyCtx.Req
if !(req.Question[0].Qtype == dns.TypeA || req.Question[0].Qtype == dns.TypeAAAA) {
return resultCodeSuccess
}
host := req.Question[0].Name
host = strings.ToLower(host)
if !strings.HasSuffix(host, ".lan.") {
return resultCodeSuccess
}
host = strings.TrimSuffix(host, ".lan.")
s.tableHostToIPLock.Lock()
if s.tableHostToIP == nil {
s.tableHostToIPLock.Unlock()
return resultCodeSuccess
}
ip, ok := s.tableHostToIP[host]
s.tableHostToIPLock.Unlock()
if !ok {
return resultCodeSuccess
}
log.Debug("DNS: internal record: %s -> %s", req.Question[0].Name, ip)
resp := s.makeResponse(req)
if req.Question[0].Qtype == dns.TypeA {
a := &dns.A{}
a.Hdr = dns.RR_Header{
Name: req.Question[0].Name,
Rrtype: dns.TypeA,
Ttl: s.conf.BlockedResponseTTL,
Class: dns.ClassINET,
}
a.A = make([]byte, 4)
copy(a.A, ip)
resp.Answer = append(resp.Answer, a)
}
ctx.proxyCtx.Res = resp
return resultCodeSuccess
}
const maxDomainPartLen = 64
// ValidateClientID returns an error if clientID is not a valid client ID.
func ValidateClientID(clientID string) (err error) {
if len(clientID) > maxDomainPartLen {
return fmt.Errorf("client id %q is too long, max: %d", clientID, maxDomainPartLen)
}
for i, r := range clientID {
if (r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') || (r >= '0' && r <= '9') || r == '-' {
continue
}
return fmt.Errorf("invalid char %q at index %d in client id %q", r, i, clientID)
}
return nil
}
// clientIDFromClientServerName extracts and validates a client ID. hostSrvName
// is the server name of the host. cliSrvName is the server name as sent by the
// client.
func clientIDFromClientServerName(hostSrvName, cliSrvName string) (clientID string, err error) {
if hostSrvName == cliSrvName {
return "", nil
}
if !strings.HasSuffix(cliSrvName, hostSrvName) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("client server name %q doesn't match host server name %q", cliSrvName, hostSrvName)
}
clientID = cliSrvName[:len(cliSrvName)-len(hostSrvName)-1]
err = ValidateClientID(clientID)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid client id: %w", err)
}
return clientID, nil
}
// processClientIDHTTPS extracts the client's ID from the path of the
// client's DNS-over-HTTPS request.
func processClientIDHTTPS(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
pctx := ctx.proxyCtx
r := pctx.HTTPRequest
if r == nil {
ctx.err = fmt.Errorf("proxy ctx http request of proto %s is nil", pctx.Proto)
return resultCodeError
}
origPath := r.URL.Path
parts := strings.Split(path.Clean(origPath), "/")
if parts[0] == "" {
parts = parts[1:]
}
if len(parts) == 0 || parts[0] != "dns-query" {
ctx.err = fmt.Errorf("client id check: invalid path %q", origPath)
return resultCodeError
}
clientID := ""
switch len(parts) {
case 1:
// Just /dns-query, no client ID.
return resultCodeSuccess
case 2:
clientID = parts[1]
default:
ctx.err = fmt.Errorf("client id check: invalid path %q: extra parts", origPath)
return resultCodeError
}
err := ValidateClientID(clientID)
if err != nil {
ctx.err = fmt.Errorf("client id check: invalid client id: %w", err)
return resultCodeError
}
ctx.clientID = clientID
return resultCodeSuccess
}
// tlsConn is a narrow interface for *tls.Conn to simplify testing.
type tlsConn interface {
ConnectionState() (cs tls.ConnectionState)
}
// quicSession is a narrow interface for quic.Session to simplify testing.
type quicSession interface {
ConnectionState() (cs quic.ConnectionState)
}
// processClientID extracts the client's ID from the server name of the client's
// DOT or DOQ request or the path of the client's DOH.
func processClientID(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
pctx := ctx.proxyCtx
proto := pctx.Proto
if proto == proxy.ProtoHTTPS {
return processClientIDHTTPS(ctx)
} else if proto != proxy.ProtoTLS && proto != proxy.ProtoQUIC {
return resultCodeSuccess
}
hostSrvName := ctx.srv.conf.TLSConfig.ServerName
if hostSrvName == "" {
return resultCodeSuccess
}
cliSrvName := ""
if proto == proxy.ProtoTLS {
conn := pctx.Conn
tc, ok := conn.(tlsConn)
if !ok {
ctx.err = fmt.Errorf("proxy ctx conn of proto %s is %T, want *tls.Conn", proto, conn)
return resultCodeError
}
cliSrvName = tc.ConnectionState().ServerName
} else if proto == proxy.ProtoQUIC {
qs, ok := pctx.QUICSession.(quicSession)
if !ok {
ctx.err = fmt.Errorf("proxy ctx quic session of proto %s is %T, want quic.Session", proto, pctx.QUICSession)
return resultCodeError
}
cliSrvName = qs.ConnectionState().ServerName
}
clientID, err := clientIDFromClientServerName(hostSrvName, cliSrvName)
if err != nil {
ctx.err = fmt.Errorf("client id check: %w", err)
return resultCodeError
}
ctx.clientID = clientID
return resultCodeSuccess
}
// Respond to PTR requests if the target IP address is leased by our DHCP server
func processInternalIPAddrs(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
s := ctx.srv
req := ctx.proxyCtx.Req
if req.Question[0].Qtype != dns.TypePTR {
return resultCodeSuccess
}
arpa := req.Question[0].Name
arpa = strings.TrimSuffix(arpa, ".")
arpa = strings.ToLower(arpa)
ip := util.DNSUnreverseAddr(arpa)
if ip == nil {
return resultCodeSuccess
}
s.tablePTRLock.Lock()
if s.tablePTR == nil {
s.tablePTRLock.Unlock()
return resultCodeSuccess
}
host, ok := s.tablePTR[ip.String()]
s.tablePTRLock.Unlock()
if !ok {
return resultCodeSuccess
}
log.Debug("DNS: reverse-lookup: %s -> %s", arpa, host)
resp := s.makeResponse(req)
ptr := &dns.PTR{}
ptr.Hdr = dns.RR_Header{
Name: req.Question[0].Name,
Rrtype: dns.TypePTR,
Ttl: s.conf.BlockedResponseTTL,
Class: dns.ClassINET,
}
ptr.Ptr = host + "."
resp.Answer = append(resp.Answer, ptr)
ctx.proxyCtx.Res = resp
return resultCodeSuccess
}
// Apply filtering logic
func processFilteringBeforeRequest(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
s := ctx.srv
d := ctx.proxyCtx
if d.Res != nil {
return resultCodeSuccess // response is already set - nothing to do
}
s.RLock()
// Synchronize access to s.dnsFilter so it won't be suddenly uninitialized while in use.
// This could happen after proxy server has been stopped, but its workers are not yet exited.
//
// A better approach is for proxy.Stop() to wait until all its workers exit,
// but this would require the Upstream interface to have Close() function
// (to prevent from hanging while waiting for unresponsive DNS server to respond).
var err error
ctx.protectionEnabled = s.conf.ProtectionEnabled && s.dnsFilter != nil
if ctx.protectionEnabled {
ctx.setts = s.getClientRequestFilteringSettings(ctx)
ctx.result, err = s.filterDNSRequest(ctx)
}
s.RUnlock()
if err != nil {
ctx.err = err
return resultCodeError
}
return resultCodeSuccess
}
// processUpstream passes request to upstream servers and handles the response.
func processUpstream(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
s := ctx.srv
d := ctx.proxyCtx
if d.Res != nil {
return resultCodeSuccess // response is already set - nothing to do
}
if d.Addr != nil && s.conf.GetCustomUpstreamByClient != nil {
clientIP := IPStringFromAddr(d.Addr)
upstreamsConf := s.conf.GetCustomUpstreamByClient(clientIP)
if upstreamsConf != nil {
log.Debug("Using custom upstreams for %s", clientIP)
d.CustomUpstreamConfig = upstreamsConf
}
}
if s.conf.EnableDNSSEC {
opt := d.Req.IsEdns0()
if opt == nil {
log.Debug("DNS: Adding OPT record with DNSSEC flag")
d.Req.SetEdns0(4096, true)
} else if !opt.Do() {
opt.SetDo(true)
} else {
ctx.origReqDNSSEC = true
}
}
// request was not filtered so let it be processed further
err := s.dnsProxy.Resolve(d)
if err != nil {
ctx.err = err
return resultCodeError
}
ctx.responseFromUpstream = true
return resultCodeSuccess
}
// Process DNSSEC after response from upstream server
func processDNSSECAfterResponse(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
d := ctx.proxyCtx
if !ctx.responseFromUpstream || // don't process response if it's not from upstream servers
!ctx.srv.conf.EnableDNSSEC {
return resultCodeSuccess
}
if !ctx.origReqDNSSEC {
optResp := d.Res.IsEdns0()
if optResp != nil && !optResp.Do() {
return resultCodeSuccess
}
// Remove RRSIG records from response
// because there is no DO flag in the original request from client,
// but we have EnableDNSSEC set, so we have set DO flag ourselves,
// and now we have to clean up the DNS records our client didn't ask for.
answers := []dns.RR{}
for _, a := range d.Res.Answer {
switch a.(type) {
case *dns.RRSIG:
log.Debug("Removing RRSIG record from response: %v", a)
default:
answers = append(answers, a)
}
}
d.Res.Answer = answers
answers = []dns.RR{}
for _, a := range d.Res.Ns {
switch a.(type) {
case *dns.RRSIG:
log.Debug("Removing RRSIG record from response: %v", a)
default:
answers = append(answers, a)
}
}
d.Res.Ns = answers
}
return resultCodeSuccess
}
// Apply filtering logic after we have received response from upstream servers
func processFilteringAfterResponse(ctx *dnsContext) (rc resultCode) {
s := ctx.srv
d := ctx.proxyCtx
res := ctx.result
var err error
switch res.Reason {
case dnsfilter.Rewritten,
dnsfilter.RewrittenRule:
if len(ctx.origQuestion.Name) == 0 {
// origQuestion is set in case we get only CNAME without IP from rewrites table
break
}
d.Req.Question[0] = ctx.origQuestion
d.Res.Question[0] = ctx.origQuestion
if len(d.Res.Answer) != 0 {
answer := []dns.RR{}
answer = append(answer, s.genAnswerCNAME(d.Req, res.CanonName))
answer = append(answer, d.Res.Answer...)
d.Res.Answer = answer
}
case dnsfilter.NotFilteredAllowList:
// nothing
default:
if !ctx.protectionEnabled || // filters are disabled: there's nothing to check for
!ctx.responseFromUpstream { // only check response if it's from an upstream server
break
}
origResp2 := d.Res
ctx.result, err = s.filterDNSResponse(ctx)
if err != nil {
ctx.err = err
return resultCodeError
}
if ctx.result != nil {
ctx.origResp = origResp2 // matched by response
} else {
ctx.result = &dnsfilter.Result{}
}
}
return resultCodeSuccess
}